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PiACE. 
I 
South African history fs dominated by the encounters 
. I . 
and relationships between Eng4ish- and Afrikaans-speaking 
white people, and between whi t\e people and black people. 
I 
This study describes and anal~ses some aspects of the 
history and structure of these\ two relationships as they 
I 
developed in the wake of the cpuntryJ s industrial rev.olution. 
There are six chaptBrs, the fi~st four dealing primarily with 
. I 
the socio-economic basis of th~ White-White relationship, 
and the last two with the Whit~-Bla-ck relationshi'n~and the I -~ . 
problem of achieving compatibility between White security 
I 
and African advancement • 1 
This is not meant to b.e \a comprehensive account of 
I 
modern South African history. \Political events and changes 
I 
are included only in so far as \theyare essential for 
I 
clarification of the subject at: hand. Minority group·s, 
such as the Coloureds and India\ns, are referred to only 
incidentally and their relation~hips with Blacks and Whites 
are not explored. Relationshlp~ between and among African 
groups themselves.are not discu~sed. Attention is concent-
rated on the socio-economic foutdations of those relation-
ships that have most shap~d the\ course of South African 
history. 
The research for this study was undertaken under a 
fellowship granted by the Ford ~oundation. However, all 
i . 
statements of fact and opinion d:ontained herein are my own 
. I . . 
and not necessarily those of th~ Ford Foundation. The same 
applies to individuals who have ~elped me with information, 
crriticism and encouragement: Prpfessors Warren O. Ault and 
I 
William 0. Brown, my readers in ~oston University; Mr. 
Uharles Bloomberg; Mr. Hamish Ditkie-Clark, University of 
ii I 
Natal; Professor Arthur Keppel-Jones, presently of Queens 
University, Hamilton, Ontario; Professor Leo Kup-er, Uhiv-
ersity of Natal; Miss Esme Levin; Mr. Alpheus Ndlovu; 
Mr. David Pager; Professor J. L. Sadie, University of 
Stellenbosch. My thanks to Mr. Alf Every of Port Elizabeth 
.. . 
for permission to employ information contained in Africa 
X--Ray Renort; and Mr. G" • . A. Watermeyer of Johannesburg fo·r 
permission to quote excerpts in translation from his work 
of poetry, Die Renubli'e1\: vah Duisena ~· For the English 
rendering of these poems I am indebted to Mrs. Marcelle 
Varney. 
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I 
THE ADVENT OF INDUSTRnALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
i 
! 
I 
I, George Harrison do h~reby declare in the matter of 
my claims on above mentioned Farm, that I am the Original 
prospector of the quarter bf the Farm Langlaagte, belon-
ging to Gert Oosthuizen, a~d when I discovered reef on 
the said place, which was ~ayable, me and the owner of 
the said place went to Pre~oria, and exhibited the quartz 
to his Honour, the Freside~t, and there declared it was 
payable. ' 
I • 
G~orge Harrison, letter to the 
Gold Commissioner of the Witwa-
tersrand Goldfields, October 
112' 1886. j_ 
l 
' 
I 
Thus begins the history, of modern South Africa, not 
that George Harrison knew. I~ February 1886, on the slopes 
of the Witwatersrand hills, th~s obscure Australian digger 
i 
came upon an outcrop of the Ma!in Reef Group of Conglomera-
tes, the largest and richest gbldfield ever discovered. 2 
Harrison vanished into oblivio~ but his discovery, together 
' 
with the earlier finding of difmonds at Kimberley in 1870, 
launched South Africa into an /industrial revolution unique 
in character and results. 1 
I 
I 
I 
South Africa Before The MineraJl Discoveries 
I 
I 
The new economic activ~ties that followed Harrison's 
find came to a country almost ~holly unprepared for them. 
I 
South Africa lay on the fring~ of the West European indust-
1 
I 
I 
1 Quoted in Ethel L. and James Gray, A History of the 
Discovery of the Witwatersran9 Goldfields (Johannesburg: 
n. pl., Limited Edition, 1940)1, p. 103. 
2 Ibid.' P• 91. I 
rial revolution, on one of the outer frontiers of European 
expansion and contact with Non-European peoples. It was a 
country principally of herdsmen, both black and white, a 
territory of vast arid sheeplands and grasslands, thinly 
populated, poor, rural, and to a large extent feudally 
.organized. 
2 
In the fertile Western Ca~e, where permanent European 
colonization by the Dutch had commenced in 1657, an inten~ 
sive commercial agriculture was practised. This was a region 
which might have supported a large white population, but al-
most two centuries of slave labor had exerted a powerful 
restrictive influence here and elsewhere. Over the first 
138 years of white colonization (1657:-1795) a mere 2,164 
Dutch immigrants found it profitable to settle in the coun-
try. 3 Cape Tov-tn, centre of the country t s most populous re-
gion, and South Africa's only city aside from the then new-
ly burgeoning Kimberley, contained just over 30,000 inhabit-
ants in 1$77. 4 The white population of the entire country 
in 1865 was estimated to be 350,000 5--approximately 1 per 
cent that of the United States. 6 
Slave labor and, after the abolition of slavery in " 
1833, cheap non-white labor was used exclusively not only for 
8Andre Pieter du Plessis, Die Nederlandse Emigrasie 
Na Suid-AfriAA: Sekere Aspekte Rakende Voorbereiding 
Tot Aanpassing (Amsterdam: Teerhuis & Klinkenberg, 1956), 
p. 17. 
4 Anthony Trollope, South Africa 2 vols. (London: 
Chapman and Hall, Fourth Edition, 1878), vol. 1, pp. 64f. 
5 L. T. Badel1Jliorst, 11The future growth of the popula-
tion of South Africa and its probable age distribution." 
Population Studies, IV:3f, October 1951. 
6 The population of the United States in 1860 and 1870, 
respectively, was 31,443,000 and 38,558,000. Richard B. 
Morris, editor, Encyclopedia of American History (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, n.d.), p. 443. 
--- ~- --- -- - -- -- ------------ -- ----~ -~- -- ----
3 
all manual work but in skilled trades as well. 7 This fact 
largely determined the immigrant nature of South Africa's 
industrial revolution •. For with cheap labor competing at 
every level of employm~nt below that of its supervision the 
growth of an indigenous, white laboring c~a.ss was discoura-
ged, so that virtually the entire working complement of the 
Johannesburg and Kimberley mines had to be imported. 
Most of the small European population was thinly dis-
persed over huge stretches of country, eking out an easy but 
modest livelihood through cattle and sheep farming. The 
economy of the white pastoralists was not strictly self-
sufficient,8 btit their needs were so small and definite as 
. 
never to constitute a market sufficiently large to stimu-
late manufacturing development. Thus, when the mining econo-
my arrived in the Transvaal that area as regards industry 
was a wilderness, and the few rudimentary manufacturing en-
terprises in the country were almost entirely confined to 
the Cape Colony. Flour milling, baking, cart and wagon mak-
ing, wine and brandy .distilling, candle making, food-pres-
erving, blubber-boiling, boat-building and tanning, more or 
less sum up South Africa's industrial development after two 
centuries of white settlement.~ 
Small, poor and rura~, economically, the white popul-
ation was divided, moreover, into two ethnic groups, English-
and Afrikaans-speaking, and four political units--the Brit-
ish colonies of the Cape and Natal, and the two Boer repub-
lics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal. 
76. Pauw, Die Beroepsarbeid van die A:t'rikan~ in die 
Stad (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia-Drukkery (EDMS.) Bpk~, 
1946), p. 31. 
8See S. Daniel Neumark, Economic Influences on the 
South African Frontier,_l652-18J6 {Stanford, California=-
Stanford University Press·, 1957 , pp. 172-4. 
9M. H. de Kock, Economic Hisfory ...Q.1' South .Africa 
(Cape Town: Juta & Co., Ltd., 1924 , p. 283 .. 
4 
The British foothold in South Africa had been secured 
during the Napoleonic.Wars. It soon brought far reaching 
changes to the country. Sl~very was abolished and non-white 
people throughout the Colony were placed on a footing of le-
gal equality with Whites, though the social color bar re-
mained. Traditional Dutch administrative institutions were 
replaced by British counterparts, and English was proclaimed 
the sole official language in the country-...;at a time when 
little more than a tenth of the white inhabitants were Brit-
ish colonists. 
Not long after these measures were introduced the Boer 
republics were established. These were creations specifical-
ly of the Great Trek, one of. the central events of South 
African history. It took place between 1836 and 1846, when 
some 12,000 of the Cape Dutch population left the Colony and 
occupied the grasslands beyond the Orange and Vaal rivers.~0 
The Great Trek,_ unlike the westward movement of the 
American pioneers, was as much an ideological as an economic 
movement. It was a result of drought and war on the front.:.--, 
iers of previous settlement, but also of a desire of many of 
the descendants of the original Dutch colonists to escape 
from the controls of the new British colonial administrators 
who were suppressing their way of life.~~ 
The Transvaal, under which the gold reef lay buried, 
virtually became a series of Tfeudal' domains. Equipped 
with rifles, the Calvinist horsement rode across the Vaal, 
subjugated the' African tribes and yoked thousands of Afri-
~ 0Eric Anderson Walker, The Great Trek (London: A. & 
C. Black -Ltd., 1934), p. 6. 
~~The Voortrekkers issued a Manifesto shortly before 
their departure from the Cape wherein they lay bare their 
§rievances and aspirations, inclUding a determination to 
preserve proper relations between master and servant 11 in 
their new homelands. See G. w. Eybers, editor, Select 
Documents Illustrating South African ~istory, 1715-1910 
(London: George Routledge & Sons, Limited, 1918 , p. 144. 
5 
cans to the great estates they carved out for themselves. 
They consolidated their conquest into a system whereby ttthe 
Bantu was economically, if not legally, bound to the land'1 ; 
so restricted was the black man's freedom of movement that 
one of the principal duties of the State was to see to it 
that a satisfactory distribution of labor between individual 
farmers was attained. The black man's children were indent-
ured as domestic servants in· the Boer household. · The parents 
worked in the fields. Each African farm family was permit-
ted to till its own plot of ground on the master•s lands, 
and to keep a few cattle. Vassal tribes were obliged to 
contribute young men for compul~ory labor on public works.~ 2 
Thus on the eve of the mineral discoveries South . .' :.'::·· 
ifr±6i lay not only on the perimeter of the West European 
economy, but its white rulers stood far from, indeed with 
their backs against, European social and ideological develop-
ments. Everywhere, even in the Cape where the forma of' po-
litical equality did little to reshape ordinary life, Whites 
commanded, Non-Whites obeyed. That no class of white agric-
ultural or industrial workers existed in the country had a 
social as well as economic basis. For the white people had 
also learned to despise manual labor, to associate it with 
defeat, obedience and inferiority. The employer~employee 
relationship was almost completely co-related with color. As 
will be seen, the industrial revolution in South Africa 
broke this co~relation. It brought into being a class of 
white wage laborers, thereby causing great tensions among 
the white people themselves. 
At a time when rapid changes were taking place in 
Europe, the European minority in South Africa naturally were 
~ 2A. J. H. van der Walt, J. A. Wiid and A. L. Geyer, 
editors, Geskiedenis ~ Suid-Af'rika, 2 vola. (Cape Town: 
Nasionale Boekhandel; Beperk; Second, Rev~sed Edition, 1955,, 
vol. ii, p. 214. 
6 
hoping that things in general would stand still. Their attit-
ude to change is illustrated by a passage in Paul Kruger•s 
Memoirs in which the Transvaal President who was a Dapper, 
a member of the fundamentali~~branch of the Dutch Reformed 
Church, explains that the name was probably derived from dop, 
a damper for putting out candles; 1'the meaning would seem to 
be that, just as a dop extinguishes a candle, so the Doppers 
extinguished all new thoUghts and opposed all progress~ fl'l.S 
This frame of' mind now :raced its most serious chal~, 
lenge. In 1870, diamond bearing volcanic pipes were disco-
vered on a bare farm in the North East Cape. Sixteen years 
later, the Witwatersrand Goldfields were proclaimed. 
The Coming Of Industrialism To South Africa 
Over 400,000 European immigrants entered South Africa 
b~t~eeri 1875 and 1904, a number greater than the entire white 
population in l875e1.4 Probably half a million Africans 
crossed the country's land borders during these years and, 
although these were supposedly mig!ant workers, many failed 
to return to their homes.~~ Never before or since has South 
Africa experienced the like of this inf'lux. 
1.aPaul Kruger, The Memoirs of Paul Kruger, 2 vola. 
(Londont T. Fisher Unwin, 1902), val. i, pp. 83:r. 
1.4 C. G. w. Schumann, Die Ekonomieae Posisie van die 
Afrikaner (Bloemfontein: Nasionale Pers Bpk.; Die Tweede 
Trek Reeks No. VI, 1940), pp. 67:r. Schumann calculates that 
a net average of 13,pOO white immigrants entered the country 
annually between 1875 and 1904, and that together with their 
children born in South Africa these immigrants alone were 
respondible for a gain of 528,000 in the country's white 
population during this thirty year period. 
1. 5According to the (Tomlinson) Commission fo~ the 
Socio-Economic Development of ~e,Bantu Areas within the 
Union of ~gtB Africa the country s black population in 1951 
numberea , 00 more persons than would have been the case 
in the absence of permanent African immigration, U.G. 61-'55, 
p. 41. 
7 
The sleepr isolation of the land was smashed and its 
empty spaces began filling up. Between 1875 and 1911, the 
white population quadrupled (from 328;ooo·to 1,276,242). Its 
rate of average annual increase from 1875 to 1904 rose to 
4.3 per cent, six times that of Western Europe (0.7 per cent 
from 1850 to 1900), nearly six times that of Australia (2.3 
per cent from 1880 to 1910), and double that of·the United 
States (2.1 per cent from l880 to 1910).~6 Despite the 
presence of South Africa's large non-white population and the 
absence of immigration of unskilled white workers, the coun-
try's industrial revolution therefore produced a volume of 
white immigration so large that the.relative increase in the 
white population was greater even than that of the United 
States, when that country underwent its most rapid industrial 
growth·and absorbed the major waves of European migration. 
Eight years after the discovery of the Main Reef in 
1886, an economically stagnant country had been transformed 
into the world's largest gold producer. South Africa accoun-
ted for 23.6 per cent of the total world output of gold be-
tween 1884 and 1930, and 51 per cent between 1919 and 1930. 
She became centre of the world's diamond production with De 
Beers Consolidated controlling 90 per cent of world sales.~ 7 
Up to 1952, the value of South Africa's diamond production 
totalled M52,000,000 and of gold ~3,278,900,000. 18 
.· .. · ·. 
The new found.wealth enabled cities to be built on des-
ert and veld. It brought railroads out to meet them and a 
swarm of shipping to the harbors, carrying in their holds 
goods which for the first time the country was able to afford. 
A year after its founding, Kimberley had 50,000 
16van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, ££• cit., vol. ii, p. 
l. 7D .. A. Farnie, 11 The Mineral Revolution in South 
Africa.u South African Journal of Economics, 24:12pf, June 1956. 
18Loc. cit. 
8 
inhabitants, rivalling Cape Town as the most populous set-
tlement in the country.~~ Johannesburg's growth was as spec-
tacular and more persistent: ten years after Harrison's. dis-
covery of the gold reef the city's population passed 100,000; 20 
today it is over a million. Sixty-three miles of railroad 
along the entire sub-continent on the eve of the diamond era 
grew to 6,894 miles by 1909, 2~ as new lines spanned the semi-. 
arid karoos and sparsely-populated veld to carry the diamonds 
of Kimberley and the gold of the Witwatersrand over thousands 
of miles to five ports. The latter hummed with activity. 
The tonnage of ships berthing in South African harbors alone 
(i.e. excluding the Portuguese East African port of Lourenco 
Marques which had also been linked by rail to the Witwaters-
rand) increased from 368,000 in ~862 to 7,950,000 in 1898~ 22 
Never prior to the discovery of diamonds had imports enter-
ing South African ports exceeded ~.5 million in value, but 
·by 1905-09 they reached a yearly average value of *24.5 mil-
lion; concurrently, the value of total exports rose nineteen 
fold, from slightly over ~.~ million in the years 1865-69 
to almost ~5 million per annum between 1905 and 1909. 28 
190. w. de Kiewiet, A History of South AfrEc): Social 
and Economic (London: Oxford University Press, 19 1 , p. 89. 
20Du Plessis, Q2• cit., p. 30n. 
21van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, ~· cit., vol. ii, 
p. 240. 
22De Kook,~· cit., p. 340. 
28Ibid., p. 328. The importance of precious metals 
and minerals in this quickening of trade and the transformat-
ion that they effected in the SouthAfrican economy is seen 
in the fact that while agricultural products, chiefly wool, 
comprised 92 per cent of the value of the country's total ex-
ports in 1868-70, by 1907-09 diamonds and gold made up 80 
per cent of all exports--even though the absolute value of 
agricultural exports had more than trebled over this period. 
Schumann, .Q.l?.• ill·, p. 47; CC I-51 
9 
Such was the turn of events that by 1871, only one 
year after the diamond rush had begun, there were more white 
people on the diamond fields in and around Kimberley than 
had taken part in the Great Trek. From the alluvial dig-
gings alone, the value of diamonds taken was more than four 
times as much as the Transvaal national debt at the time. 24 
In 1882, the export of diamonds was worth more than South 
Africa's total exports in the.year of the diamond discoveries, 
. 
and exceeded in value the combined exports of the rest of 
sub-Saharan Africa. 25 By 1892, the private income of an im-
migrant named Cecil John Rhodes, who had come to South ~rica 
with a few pounds in his pocket, was thrip~ what the entire 
income of the Cape Colony had been twenty years earlier, and. 
it was still growing. 26 
These sudden and. multifgld changes were bound to dis-
rupt the habits and lives of the people among whom they 
occurred. They represent the beginning of an industrial 
revolution. An eleme~t of continuity has usually remained. 
throughout most other countries' industrial revolutions in 
that the new conditions generally have been prepared for and 
brought about through the changing attitudes and activities 
of the local population, which may be stimulated to varying 
degrees by foreign ideas and techniques and may be trained 
by foreign technicians. When immigrants have arrived they 
have been absorbed into an economic structure which they 
2~Leo Marquard, The St)ry of South Africa (London: 
Faber an4 Faber Limited, 1955 , p. 179. 
258. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa: 
Its Course and Effects (London: Oxford University Press, l938)t 
p. 54. Up to 1882, the Cape produced approximately ~: · ~ · · • 
~26,000,000 worth of diamonds 1 an amount greater than the aggregate value of the Colony s exports from 1826 to 1861. 
26Sir James Tennant Molten.o, The Dominion QJ_ Afrika-
nerdom: Recollections Pleasant and Otherwise (London: Methuen 
& Co. Ltd., 1923), P• 25. -
10 
help to deveiop further, but whose foundations have already 
been built. In South Africa the opposite occurred. The 
existing population was confronted with and eventually ab-
sorbed in an economy aimost completely organized and worked 
by immigrants. 
Nearly everything was foreign: the mineowners and 
managers were foreigners, the capital came from abroad, the 
workers were imported, even the food to feed them and the 
wood for coffins to bury them was brought in from outside. 
I 
from the ends of the earth and from all classes and condit-
ions the newcomers came, from the Mountains of· the Moon in 
Equatorial Africa and the slums of Wh1techapel 1 from the old 
world and the new, on foot and by sea, black men and white 
men. There were tribesmen from the Nyasa lakes, miners from 
Wales, California and the Australian goldfields. There were 
innovators like the Scotsman, J. S. MacArthur, to demon-
strate the new cyanide process of gold extraction, and Amer-
ican engineers like Gardner Williams, to introduce shaft 
sinking and techniques of subterranean mining in the diamond 
industry. There came men to build capitalism and others to 
destroy it, Lithuanian merchant Jews, ~ike the peddler Sammy 
Marks, and Lithuanian communist Jews, like the revolutionary 
Lazar Bach. Indeed, they often had little in commbn, but to 
the rural Afrikaner population they were all aliens. 
It was inevitable that the men to initiate the new 
economic activities were foreigners. As we have seen there 
·were no white workers and few non-white artisans in South 
Africa at the start of ita industrial revolution. All the 
skilled miners had to ~e recruited overseas, chiefly in 
~itain, Australia and the United States. Many of the mining 
villages of Devon and Cornwa+l became. depopulated as the men 
sailed to join the company converging on Kimberley and the 
Witvratersrand. 27 There they were joined by miners from 
27Farnie, QQ• cit., p. 129.' 
' I 11 
I Greece, Italy, Austria and Spa:t:n. 2 8 Many contracted 
i phthisis and died. Yet even i~ 1910, forty years after the 
I 
opening of the Kimberley field~, and eighteen years after 
I 
the beginning of deep level mi~ing on the Rand, 72.8 per 
cent of the then 7,285 w~ite m~ne employees were immigrants. 29 
Not until 1921, on the eve of ~he great General Strike, did 
. I 
South African exceed the numb~r of foreign-born miners. 
The unskilled African laborers!who did most of the manual 
. i 
work in the mining operations 1riginated also mainly from 
outside South Africa. In 1904~ 76.5 per cent of the 77,000 
I 
African gold- and coal miners working in the Transvaal came 
. I 
from foreign territories, chietlY Portuguese East Africa; 
I 
and of the army of 323,000 Afrtcan miners in the Transvaal 
at the outbreak of the Second torld War, 51.99 per cent were 
tribesmen from across the Limpppo and Caledona 30 
The bulk of th~ skilled/and semi-skilled ·labor force 
I 
for the railways, the building/ trades and other industries 
also had to be brought in from! overseas. 31 In the Cape and 
Natal the railway staff came cbiefly from the BritiSh Isles, 
. I 
and in the South African Repub~ic (TransvaalJ generally from 
the Continent, mainly the Net~erlands. 32 Over 56 per cent 
I 
I 28Report of the ~elac~ !Committee on,European Employ-
ment and-Labour _QQ..I!.dition~, ].11,2, (.§..Q. 9- 13), Minutes of 
Evidence, para. 83. . 
29 I 
.de Kock, ~· cit., p~ 442. 
I 
80Sheila van der Horst) Native Labour in South Africa 
(Cape Town: Oxford Universitj Press and Juta-ana Co., ·1942), 
pp. 216f. I 
I 
81Report of the Unempl6xment Investigation Committee, 
1932, (U.G. 30-~2~parae 1,. 
32 CC r-72. 
-- -- ---- - ---- --- - -- -- ---- ---- ------ - - - --- --
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of the 3,162 railway officials in the Transvaal in 1899 were 
Hollanders. 38 On the Cape railway system the skilled mechan-
ics in the workshops and steam sheds at Uitenhage were pred-
ominantly foreign-born. 34 
In the higher paid occupations the immigrant charac-
ter or the new economy was just as pronounced and even more 
enduring. Thirty-five years after the discovery of the 
Reef, and half a century after the opening of the Kimberley 
diamond craters, immigrants controlled most South African 
industry and provided the bulk of its professional requir~ 
ements, as the following table shows: 
3 3 du :Plessis, 2.12• ill• , P• 32_~ 
. ~· 
~~Cape of Good Hope, Report of the Select Committee 
on the~ White Question, 1906, (s.c:-Io-'o6), para. 7. 
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TABlE I 
I 
I PERCENTAGE OF MALES BORN OVERSEAS, IN A NUMBER 
OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 
BASED ON 1921 CENSUS DATA85 
i 
Occupational I Gr<?up 
I 
Percentage 
Born Overseas 
I 
I 
1. Company Directots •••••••••••••• 
2. Merchants and Business Managers. 
3· Doctors ·······i·····:····~···•• 4, Archi tecta •••.• 
1 
.................. . 
5· Chartered Acco~tants •••••••••• 
6. T~achers~ •. Cit ••• ~ •••••••••••••••• 
7• Fitters and Tu~ers •••••••••••• 
8. Electricians •• ·! ................ . 
9 •. TyPesetters .... ~ •••••••••••••••• 
10. Carpenters •••.•• ! ................ .. 
11. Bricklayers •••• \ ................ . 
12. Civil Servants .1 ••••••••••••• , •• 
13. Underground Goldminers .......... . 
I 14. Barbers •...... ·i .... "' .............. . 
15. Unskilled Labor~rs .............. . 
16. Farmers ••••••• ·j· ............... .. 
I 
I 
76.0 
68.8 
62.3 
80.4 
70.8 
29.9 
55.8 
40.0 
59.8 48.3. 
28.6 
37·3 
34.3 
52 .. 1 
10.0 
5.8 
I . 
It will be seen that !Only in the lowest paid pro:fess-
1 ional occupations, teaching and the civil service, were i . 
South African-born Whites inj the majority. The top-salaried 
. . I 
ciyil service positions werej occupied predominantly by immig-
rants. 56 In the trades, im~grants still comprised a signif-
. I icant proportion of the perspnnel. The last t~o items in 
the Table are noteworthy. T~ey indicate what the local white 
! 
35Relates to white pelsons only. 
taken from S. · Pauw, .QJ2• cit.~ Table VIi, 
I 56 See below, PJl• . 67f(• 
\ 
I 
I 
I I. 
The information is 
p. 122. 
-- - ~-- - ---- - ----~ ----- ~-
- - --r 
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inhabitants were doing when industrial capitalism set root 
in South Africa, and .the occupation through which many· of 
them first encountered the new economy. 
Not only the personnel of the industrial economy, but 
all the machinery and most of the manufactured goods and 
stores required initially had to_ be b~ought in from over-
seas. 57 The foreigners ate foreign food-~bread made o:f im-
ported flour and rrozen meatfrom the Argentine; :they drank 
condensijd milk from Europe and America and even the unpalat-
able dried vegetables upon which they fi!st had to ~ely were 
only slowly supplanted by the produce of market gardens run 
by Portuguese and Indians. 88 More than half the aggregate 
wages paid to the African miners was spent purchasing impor-
ted products. 89 . So steep was the economic barrier separating_ 
the old economy from the new, and so inadequate the response 
of the Transvaal Boers to the consumer demands of the Witwat-
ersrand, that in 1894, for example, t60,000 worth ofbutter, 
~19,000 of wheat and meal, ~37,000 of oats, ~107,000 of mea-
lies and kaffir corn, ~8,000 worth of vegetables and fruit, 
had to be brought in from across the Vaal to feed what was 
still a small industrial population (of probably less than 
150,000)l.iving along the gold reef. •o 
., ... , 
' . 
37Transvaal Government, Report of the Mining Industr.:r 
Commission, 1907-08, 1908, (,I_. G. 2-'08'):---i)ara;, 199; van der 
Horst, QQ.• cit., p. 139; Donald Wood Gilbert, The
11
Economic 
Effects of the Gold Discoveries upon South Africa, The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 47:591, August 1933; van der Walt, 
Wild and Geyer, ~· cit., vol. ii, p. 219. 
38R. K. Cope, Comrade Bill: The Life.~ Times of 
W. fl. jlndrews, Workers Leader-[ Cape Town: Stewart Printing 
Co., n.d.), p. 19. · 
39T.G. 2-'08, para. 204. 
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To keep the immigrant personnel fed ·and working 
nearly ~00,000,000 in foreign capital, mostly British, was 
invested in South Africa between 1886 and 1910. 4~ The bulk 
of this investment-went into the gold mining industry, where 
amounts up to ~3 million were required for the shafts and 
machinery of each mine before a single ounce of ore could be 
surfaced."' 2 Capital expenditure on a much smaller scale was 
necessary for the diamond mines. These were largely financed 
at first by capital raised in the Cape Colony; 48 but their 
own phenomenal profits supported their subsequent growth. 44 
Moreover, the advent of mining laid the groundwork for 
the development of secondary industries, to whose foundations 
immigrants made many contributions. Mining companies them-
selves, such as De Beers, launched manufacturing concerns 
producing dynamite, fertilizer, bricks, tiles, jam and wine. 46 
In addition to the many other local enterprises initiated by 
immigrants, overseas firms, attracted by the new market, est-
ablished manufacturing branches in the country. "' 6 ·:The train-
. 
4 J.Gilbert, loc. cit.; p. 562; H. M. Robertson, "150 
1 Years of Economic Contact between Black and White. Part II, ~ 
S.A.J.E., 3:14, March 1935; Farnie, loc. cit.,p. 127; 
Frankel, £Q• cit., p. 156. 
42Gilbert, loc. cit. 
43Schumann, .Q:2• cit., p. 49. · 
44Franke1, QR• £11., PP• 53f 
45Farnie, loc. cit.; H. Schaud.er~ 11 The Chemical Indus-
try in South AfriCi=~Before Union (1910;,~ S.A.J.E., 14:281, 
December 1946. 
466ee MarcU:s Arkin, 11 The Jewish Share in South African 
.Economic Development," S.A.J.E., 24:141, June 1956; F. Meyer, 
11 Tb.e development of the Iron and Steel Industry in South · 
Africa, 11 S.A.J.E., 20$10lff, June 1952; R. L. Threlfel1, 
"'Some Comments on Secondary Industry in South Africa, 11 S:~A. J. E., 
· 14t292f, December 1946; Board of Trade and Industries; Report 
No. 318; The Pneumatic Tire Manufacturing Industry, p_. d., · 
paras. 11~13; and Report No. 222.: The Paint Manufacturi:gg 
Industry, n.d., para. 20. · 
- -- -- - - ~~- -- -- - - - - ~ -- - ~- - - - -
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ing of South Africans for skilled work in manufacturing indus~ 
try as well as mining was also undertaken at first by the 
foreign born. 4 '' 
Immigrant industrialism carried in its baggage trade 
unionism and socialism, which for the first time now made · 
their appearance in South Africa. In a history of South 
African labor organizations brief biographies are given of 
thirty-six leading white trade union officials and socialists; 
of the 34 of these whose birth places are listed_, all but two 
were born outside South Africa. Even Clements Kadalie, lead-
er of the first mass African trade union, the Industrial and 
I 
Commercial Workers' Union, was a Nyasalander· and used inter-
preters to deliver his message to black South African wor-
4 7 S.C. 9-' 13, minutes of evidence regarding the South 
African School of Mines and Technology; :Report· of Special 
Committee Ap:pointed .£:y the Advisory Board. of. Industry ana. ~ :·_ ~ 
Science §1 the Request of the Right Honourable the l,~§ }!i_n:-
ister, to Enguire into the Position of the Unio'l:lTS Boot and 
Shoeindustry, 1921 (A. 1 .... '21), PP• If .. Although the expan~ 
. sion of secondary industry did not gain full impetus until 
After the First World War, it eventually overt.ook mining as 
chief contr~butor to the nat·ional income (Schumann, 212.• cit .. , 
p. 88). The number of white employees in this sector rose 
between 1910/11 and 1952/53 from 21,049 to 259,869, and the 
non-vthite employees from 44,867 to 559,789, an increasettin 
both cases of more than 1,000 per cent (C.S. Richf,rds, The 
Growth of Government in South Africa*since Union, S.A.J.E., 
25:240, December 1957). The general rate of industrial-exp-
ansion between the two World Wars (1916/17 to 1940/41) whet-
her measured by the annual rate of increase in gross or net 
output, or in numbers employed, was higher in South Africa 
than in many other industrial nations; thus the average ann-
ual rate of increase in gross:·output ·was -6.92 per cent in 
South Africa, a rate 1.37 times greater than that in New Zea-
land, ·1.40 times greater than in 4ustralia, 3.33 times great-
er than in Canada, and 4.91 times greater than in the United 
States; the av~rage annual rate of increase in persons emp-
loyed.'was nearly 20 times higher in South Africa than in the 
United States--which was harder hit by the Great Depression 
(Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 282: Investigat-
ion into Manufacturing Industries ig ~ Union Qf -~ 
Africa, 1945, para. 51) .. 
. 17 
kers. 48 
Finally, it must be noted that the cities to which the 
new economy gave rise became the province of immigrants and 
developed an English-speaking character. In 1904, roughly 
half the white population of the seven principal towns in the 
country consisted of persons born overseas. 49 The degree of 
isolation of the .Afrikaner people from industrial activities 
. . 
and urban life--an important factor in the subsequent rise of 
~frikaner Nationalism--is suggested by the fact that of the ten 
largest South African cities (1929), only in Bloemfontein, 
Germistori and Pretoria were more then 30 per cent of the white 
inhabitants of Afrikaner parentage. 60 Even the dwellings in 
which the newcomers lived sometimes had an outlandish quality 
about them. Every plank used. in the construction of Kimber-
ley, for instance, had to be dragged to the site five hundred 
miles by oxen. 61 Built in the wild, scrub country of the 
48Ernest Gitsham and James F. Trembath, A First Account 
of.Labour Organisation in South Africa (Durban:-n.pu., 1926) 
pp. 159-179. After the establishment of.the Comintern its 
first adherents in South Africa were immigrants, frequently 
young, Jewish workers from Poland and Lithuania; see Edward 
Roux, s. P. Bunting: A Political Biography (Cape Town: Pub~ 
lished by the author; 1944), p. 138. 
49See Pauw, QR· cit., Table VI, p. 120. Close to 26 
per cent of the total white population in the country in 1904 
was foreign-born, Walt, Wiid and Geyer, Q2· cit., vol. ii, p. 310. 
6000 I-72n; see also Pauw, QP• cit., Table IX, P• 127. 
61Trollope, QR• cit., vol. ii, p. 193. Wood was so 
scarce in the early days of the diamond fields that a bishop, 
brought in to officiate at the last ceremony of one of Kimber-
ley's leading .citizens, received his cue when, looking at the 
coffin at his feet, he espied the motto, ttPlease keep away 
from the boiler. 11 Molteno, .Q.ll· cit., p. 226. 
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North East Cape, it was, as a lecturer informed an American 
audience, na city in the desert--dropped, as it were, fl'bm the 
clouds •••• 1152 Indeed, it was as if the clouds had given 
South Africa her industrial revolution, so unexpected was its 
appearance and so stormy its result. 
The Clash With Boer Pastoralism 
Ten years after the discovery of the Main Reef, an 
attempt was made to secure political control of the gold-
fields by force. This failed, but three years later war 
broke out in South Africa and the Transvaal was taken. 
Trouble gathered over the area from the ·start. Only 
thirty-odd miles of· grassland lay between Pretoria and the 
City of Gold. Much greater distances of other kinds separat-
ed them. Pretoria was the village capital of a republic of 
herdsmen. As pioneers they had conquered the land and clear-
ed the fields under which the gold lay. They had subdued the 
African peoples and become their masters. They viewed their 
occupation of the Transvaal as a march ·into Canaan and they 
justified their mastery in the harsh cadenzes of the Old Tes-
tament. Within their own group all men were equal and shared 
the vote. They dealt justly with each other, recognizing no 
social distinction. The story they loved to relate concerned 
two sons in doubt as to the fairest division of a farm, their 
inheritance, who came to their old· President for advice, and 
received the Solomon-like comment:- 11The elder can make the 
division and fix the beacons, the younger can take the ·· 
choice.nsa., Possessing little education64 or ambition they 
52Quoted in van der Horst, QR· cit., p~ 86. 
68Molteno, QQ• cit., p. 227. 
64Ten years bef~re the discovery of go·ld there were 
only fifteen State schools in the Transvaal, with 442 white 
pupils, or about 8 per cent of the total number of white 
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wished to spend their livea·on farms named Weltevreden ('Well-
satisfied'), supervising their herds and servants, and discov-
ering their prototypes and vindication in the Bible. 
The appearance of a clamarous, growing mining town in 
the middle of the high-veld threw a shadow over these hopes. 
. l' . 
For it soon became evident that Johannesburg s inhabitants, 
influenced by worldly, energetic adventurer-businessmen, like 
Hh.ode·s, wette not prepared to accept the authority of a Pre--
toria· assembly of~·farmers .. 
Rhodes was a British Nationalist, or rather Imperial-
ist. His first will 1 composed a"l;t Oxford where he studied af-
ter having made his initial mark in diamonds, was later rep-
laced, but it expresses an attitude that he was to retain 
throughout his life. He leaves the bulk of his anticipated 
fortune not to his relatives and friends, but ih trust to the 
British Colonial Secretary and his successors to enable them 
to ·found a Secret Society for the extension of British rule _ 
throughout the world. The objects of this Society would be: 
·the colonization by British subjects of all lands 
where the means of livelihood are obtainable by 
labour, energy and enterprise, and especially the 
occupation by British settlers of the entire continent 
of Africa, the Holy Land, the Valley of the Euphrates, 
the islands of Cyprus and Candia, the whole of South 
America, the islands of the Pacific .... the whole of 
the Malay Archipelago, the sea board of Japan ••• (and) 
the ultimate recovery of the United States as an 
integral part of the British Empire (with) colonial 
representation in·the Imperial Parliament. 56 
childl"el;r,;Q_:[;')~>CJ;lool' Q~;ffi~~-- :tS~~Bj;la _ B~t:t.~r_sQ.~; ttb.B ·l;~s!£:;,£J.~c-~.2 ,. ·~: 
Trek: A Study of the ~ ~eople ~ the Afrikaner Nation 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1957); p. 220 
156Quoted in Reginald Ivan Lovell, The Struggle for 
South Africa 1875-1899: A Study in ~.Qonomic Imperialism 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p •. 119. 
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Rhodes was probably ~ne of the last personalities 
whose life fits comfortably in childrens' history books. 
"Whenever I took a country ;_11 he boasted, tri simply said to 
the Queen, 'I have taken that; you must put your flag over 
it. ' 11 n I would annex the planets if I could," he told a 
British.editor, "I often think of that." 6 q He genuinely 
thought that British rule would benefit.everyone, and he. 
lived at a time when this view could still be tested in prac-
tice. 
Rhodes and his Johannesburg mineowner 'colleagues were 
impatient at being subje~ted to the authority of a barely-
literate people whom they regarded as inferior in all res-
pects to themselves. Moreover, they calculated that the pol-
itical control which the.Boers exercised over their industry 
was costing them an increase in their annual dividends of 
*2,413,268. 'llhey worked out that with 11good government" 
t~ey could effect a saving of six shillings per ton of ore 
crushed. 5 7 
Certainly the Boer Government, suddenly required to 
administer a large, alien population and a complex, growing 
industry had bogged down in a mire of red tape, corruption 
and inefficiency. It took Pretoria two years to decide what 
the scale of cab fares in Johannesburg should be. 68 It took 
. . 
less time for the ill-paid and inexperienced officials and 
legislators to settle other matters. A concession for the 
building of a railroad in the Transvaal was lobbyed through 
\ 
the Volksraad by a member who secured the support of his fel-
low lawmakers by a judicious distribution of presents--Amer-
ican spiders, Cape Carts, gold watches, shares in the company 
66Quoted_in William Plomer, Cecil Rhodes (n.pl.: 
Peter Davis Limited, 1933), pp. 16lf. . 
57J. A. Hobson, The War in South A~rica: Its Causes 
and Effects (London: James Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1900), pp. 229f. 
58 . 8 Marquard, 2J2.• cit., p. 1 9. 
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to be floated, etc. Thus launched, the Selati Railway Comp-
any arranged with a contractor to build the line at a maximum 
I 
cost allowed in the concession of •9,000 per mile. Two days 
later the contractor sublet the contract for 'I::.7,002 per mile. 
As the distance was 200 miles, the-Republic signed away 
l..519,000 at a stroke of the pen--"one of the biggest 'steals' 
even in the Transvaal'J, accord.itig ·to one of Rhodes~ followers 
who publicized the story in order to discredit the Boer Gov~ 
ernment. 159 Even the President of the Republic -W£1S"'~-~?-d1ng 
himself money from the State Funds at 2J..j2 per ceD.t i;t-~rest._ 
when the current rate was about 6 per cent, and building 
dams and roads on his private farm with Treasury money. 60 
His officials, who were frequently his relatives, in several 
cases followed suit. During a debate to discuss the appoint-
ment of a State Financier, who among other duties would be 
responsible for tracing some twG hundred missing vouchers, 
the Auditor-General said that he did not want an official of 
this nature who would always be snivelling about his books. 6 ~ 
Of more direct concern to the mining enterprises was 
President Kruger's policy of granting monopolies to private 
individuals for the production or supply of commodities crit-
ical to mining operations. Dynamite; used in blasting, was 
supplied by a concession which manufactured only a third of 
the requirements locally-~ The balance was imported and res-
old to the mines at an enormous mark-up. 62 The concession 
system affected an extensive list of items, from cement to 
·jam. It became so notorious that Lord Randolph Churchill, 
visiting the Transvaal in 1895, reported a rumor that some-
69J. P. Fitzpatrick, The Transvaa~ From Within: A 
Private Record of fublic Affairs (London: William Heinemann, 
1900),. p:p~ 56f .-
60Ibid., Appendix c., p. 304. 
6l.~·, Appendix D., p. 306. 
62Schauder, loc. cit., P• 283 
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one had applied for a concession to grant all other conces-
·sions. 68 
Another problem was African labor. To secure a plent-
ifUl, cheap, regular and submissive supply of black workers 
was a prime necessity for the mineowners. The Government 
11 should 11 , as one of the newcomers put it, "try some cogent 
form of-inducement or practically compel the native through 
taxation or in some other way, to contribute his quota to 
the good of the community, and to a certain extent he would 
then have to work. 11 Not. only would he have to work, but he 
would have to work' cheap, for, as an American engineer said, 
"With good government there will be an abundance of labor, 
and with an abundance of labor there will be no d.if:ficulty 
in cutting down wages .. 1164 A 11 good governmentu would assist 
ag.ents Of the mining industry'to obtain black'labor; it 
would upay premiums to Kaffir chiefs, 't furnish extra pay to 
Native.Commissioners·for the same purpose, convey the labor 
u · u n 11 
under supervision to the mines, erecting compounds along 
the' road, reduce railway fares to one third'of the existing 
rate, and ·in a dozen other ways spend public money to reduce 
the cost of mining and raise the dividend. 65 But the Boer 
legislators and officials, utilizing their own African farm 
labor in an easy-going manner, ·were not keyed to provide ef-
ficient services for others. Their controls were so lax that 
68Marquard, _QQ. cit., p. 189. The uitlanders made 
considerable propaganda out of Boer corruption and the con-
cession system, i~ which of course they were themselves ful-
ly implicated; the concessions were generally granted to fo-
reigners, including mineowners; Eckstein, for instance, held 
the cement concession, and Barnato Brothers that of the Joh-
annesburg market (J. Ramsay. Macdonald, What I Saw In South 
Africa, September and October, 1902 (London: The Echo, 1902), 
p. lOlL. 
64Quoted in Hobson, £2· cit., p. 233. 
65 Ibid., P• 231. 
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about· one-third of the African mine labor force was constant-
ly incapacitated by bad liquor smuggled in from M0zambique. 66 
The situation was likely to give rise to the kind of irrit-
ation that would ensue~if;~say, French Canadian backwoods 
farmers controlled the price of .mat-erials and the supply of 
labor to the Detroit auto industry. It was estimated that 
- -bad administration made a difference of up to three per cent 
on the dividend on the best mines, threatened the chance of 
any dividend on the second best, and made useless the work-
ing of third class mines where 1/.he ore was of a still lower 
grade. 67 Bad government had to be removed. _The question was 
how .. 
For the Boers were not willing to be pushed aside. 
They had taken the country for themselves, wresting it-from 
the 11 swartzelsn (black creatures). 68 But they had weakened 
their claim. Years earlier, the laws of the Transvaal for-
bade the working of gold mines altogether, for the people 
held that it does least harm when undi,scovered. 69 But such 
Spartan rusticity collapsed. In 1883, the Transvaal hung on 
66 Lovell, .2.I2.!.. cit., p. 523. 
67James Bryce, Impressions of South Africa (London: 
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1897), p. 523. 
68The feeling was expressed during the first British· 
annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. A-party of 450 Boers rode 
into Pretoria to see.what the British-were ii> to. One man 
walked up to the British flag and shouted: 0 Father, 0 
Grandfather, 0 Great Grandfather, rise from·the dead and 
drive away these red-nanded wretches who have come to take 
our land from us, the land which we took from the Swart zels.' r• 
Sir H. Rider Haggard, The Days of .MY Life, An Autobiography, 
2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926), vol. 
i, PP• 951'. 
69Bryce, 2.12.• cit., p. 509. 
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the edge of bank.ruptcye By 1895, State Revenue had increased 
twenty-five fold. 70 The cattle farmers had decided to take 
the newcomers' gold; but they would not allow the immigrants 
a share in the administration of the State. 71 Indeed the 
Boers had no easy choice •. There were only 29,000 adult males 
among them. 72 Alread.y they were outnumbered by the ui tla:n,d-
. ·er.f!. 73 Rather than surrender power, the Boer Government 
wrote a series of measures into law putting an effective 
vote out of the immigrants' reach. Relations between the 
two groups became strained. The feeling was reflected when 
President Kru~er, adressing a meeting in Johannesburg, opened 
II . 
with the salutatioi:H Burghers, friends, murderers, thieves 
II h • i I 1 and robbers, w ereupon his. audience broke nto ·Ru e Brit ... r: ,. 
ania' • 74 
Excluded from an effective franchise, the immigrant 
leaders made ready to take the Trahsvaal by force. Utilizing 
their wealth in every direction, they·laid the groundwork for 
violence with bribery and propaganda. Rhodes, the pivot 
figure in this, was pr<;;~pared to bribe a.iLmost anyone. While 
on a visit to England, according to a recent biographer, he 
suggested to the Irish Homeruler, Parnell, wh~ had incurred 
the hostility of the Catholic clergy after being named co-
respondent in a divorce case, that the Irish leader's polit~ 
70de Kiewiet, QR. Cit., p. 119. 
7:1:-on May 17, 1902, the defeated Boer leaders, treating 
with the representatives of the victorious power, proposed 
the retention of semi-autonomous status for their Republics 
in. exchange for eessation of the Witwatersrand. (But by.:then 
it was too late.) Cecil Headlam, editor, The Milner Papers, 
South Africa 1899-1905, 2 vola. (London: Cassell & Company 
Ltd., 1933), vol. ii; P• 343e 
72Hobson, ~· cit.) P• 7~· 
78de Kiewiet, .Ql2• cit., p .• 132. By 1895, there were 
seven uitlanders for every three burghers. 
74Marquard, .Ql2• cit., p. 188. 
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leal career might yet be saved by 11 squaring the Popen. 76 
Now Rhodes bought time in which to'pursue his plans by buy-
ing men. In 18'89, 125,000 Chartered shares were brought out 
and offered to members of the Cape Parliament and other prom-
inent men at par, far below their market worthe The bulk of 
these shares were distributed to members or friends of.the 
Afrikaner Bond, the Afrikaner bloc in the Cape.Parliament; 76 
who in the following year helped elect him Prime Minister of 
the Colony. Rhodes thereupon became interlocking director 
par excellance--Prime Minister of the Cape, boss of a vast 
territory (Rhodesia), head of De Beers, the greatest diamond 
producers iri the world, director of Consolidated Goldfields, 
and commander of virtually a private army, the British Soutli 
Africa Company Police~ Finally, he secured the appointment 
of Sir Hercules Robinson as High Commissioner, chief agent 
.of the British Government in.South Africa, a man who had been 
. I 
a shareholder in one of Rhodes companies and a director of 
another. 77 
An armed rising of immigrants in Johannesburg was ar-
ranged to coincide with an invasion across the Transvaal bor-
~er by Rhodes' private task force. After the expected fait 
accompli, the High Commissioner would entrain for the Trans-
vaal and settle with the Boers. 
Rhodes made ample,use of his interlocking political 
and economic positions. In his capacity as Prime Minister 
of the ·cape he ceded to himself, as Managing Director of the 
British South .Africa Company, the Pitsan1 base from which his 
mobile force would strike into the Transvaal. At once, the 
75Felix Gross, Rhodes of Africa (London: Cassell & Co. 
Ltd., 1956), p. 161. 
76B. A. Tindall, editor, James Rose Innes Autobiogral-
gy (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 87; Lovel , 
gQ. cit., p; 162. 
77Rose Innes, QQ· cit., p. 110. 
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High Commissioner issued a proclamation confirming the ces~ 
sion. 78 Meanwhile, Imperialist newspapers began preparing 
the British public for what was to come with a strong prop-
aganda offensive against the Boers, on lines suggested by 
the Times of Natal: 
Franchise, paramountcy, and so forth, have been all 
very useful in the evolutionary process of education. 
But before we shall have finished we have to reach that 
point when home opinion shall have come ~nto line with 
opinion in Natal, as to the necessity for a clean sweep 
of the present order of things in the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State, and of the Bond in the Oape Colony. 
To do this there is but little cause now to harp upon 
old well-worn grievances. Those have already become 
fai:rlywell understood at home. The best object lesson 
we can now -employ are those _atrocities to<our women and 
children. If we are to disarm those who are now up 
against us at home, and who-will endeavour in the day 
of our triumph to restore as much of the Boer power as 
possible, out of a misplaced sentiment for a weak foe, 
and who could go frantic over atrocities in Bulgaria, 
then if they require atrocities to assist their comp-
rehension of facts, and to disarm their opposition, so 
be it. It should not now be difficult to supply the 
necessary chapter of horrors to strike the;imagination 
even of these good people. 79 _ _ ·-· 
The last item in the "necessary chapter 6t horrors" 
turned out to be an appeal dispatched to Jameson, the comman-
der of the Pitsani force, imploring him to fly to the aid of 
11 a the unarmed men, women and children of our race, subject to 
the mercy of well-armed Boers. This appeal, sent.two months 
before the rescue operation began, was left undated, allowing 
Jameson to write this in when his preparations were complete. 
But the Jameson Raid failed, ana with it the first at-
tempt of the immigrant population to take the Transvaal by 
force. The uprising in Johannesburg never came off. At 
7
-
8 Ib1d., pp. ·117f. 
79Quoted in Hobson, QQ· cit., p. 227. 
27 
Pitsani, Jameson's troopers celebrated the anticipated suc-
cess of their venture with quantities of alcohol,and next 
day rode out towards,~ a.: Boer: trap .. 80 Jameson was captured 
and handed over to the British Gove·rnment for trial.. He was 
sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment. No· action was 
pressed against Rhodes~himself.. As he explained to the 
"r . Kaiser, was~ naughty boy ..... an,d I never got whipped at 
all.nal. · 
Nevertheless, the immigrants 1 propaganda efforts had 
born fruit. When news of the Raid reached London, Austin, 
the English poet laureate, set to work and in short order was 
out with a poem lauding Jamesonrs prompt and splendid heroism 
in flying to the rescue of the women and children. Duped . 
like all but a few of his country-men, ignorant that Jameson 
did not fly until eight weeks aft~r the invitation, the poem 
bears witness to the facts as they were widely understood in 
England: 
When men of our own blood pray us 
~o ride to·their kinsfolks' aid 
Not heaven itself shall stay us 
From the rescue they call a raid. 
There are g1rls in the gold reef city 
There are mothers and children too 
And they cry, uHurry up for Pity" 
So what can a brave man do1~2 
After three more years of. these. and. similar sentiments 
in their newspapers, most of the British people were prepared 
for the necessity of eliminating bad government in the Trans~ 
vaal. 1heir leaders, fearing that an invigorated Boer Repub-
80Plomer, QTI• cit., p. 96 
sl.Quoted Ibid., p. 101. 
82 Pub1ished in the London Times, 11 January 1896, 
quoted in Mark Twain, More Tramps Abroad (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1897), pp~ 455f. 
28 
lie, enriched by mining taxation, might prove a future men-
ace to the Cape Colony and Natal, and the alternative route 
to India, had other reasons, but both agreed to expend life 
and capital to bring about the destruction of Boer power. 83 
A force of 240,000 British troops gradually took the field, 
an army greater than had ev:er.-taken··:part' iii 'any British war, 
and as large as the combined Boer population of the Repub-
lics--men, women and children. 84 For three years the Trans-
vaal and Free State burghers fought. On May 31, 1902, they 
laid down their arms. 
The war settled that the British flag should fly over 
the Government offices in Fretoria and Bloemfontein. It 
placed British officials-and immigrants at the head of aff-
airs, but it decided little else. It left misery and a 
trail of hatred that broadened with the years. It cost Great 
Britain ~50,000,000 and the lives of 21,942 of her sons; 86 
it inflicted a capital loss of 30 to 70 million pounds on the 
Boer people, 86 and deprived them of practically the whole of 
88See Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher and Alice Denny, 
Africa and the Victorians: The .Official Mind of !mperialism 
(London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,. l9bl), pp •. 410-441. 
84The total British force taking part in the campaign 
_numbered 448,725, exclusive of staff, although the actual num-
ber of regulars who from fi.rst to last took part in the oper-
ations was 256,340, more than three times the number who set 
foot in the Crimea~ L. S. Amery, editor, The :rimes History 
Qf the War 1g South Africa, 1899-]902 7 vola. (London: 
Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd., 1909), vol. vi, pp. 279, 257. 
815Ibid., vol. vii, p .. 25; S.F.N. Gie, Geskiedenis vir 
Suid-Afrika: Of Ons Verlede, 2 vola. (Stellenbosch: Die Univ~ 
ersiteitsuitgewers en Boekhandelaars (Edms•) Beperk, 1955)~ 
vol. :1.i, p~ 42:1:.. 
86The former amount represents Lord ¥J.ilner' s :rp,iniljl'O.m 
and provisional estimate right after surrender, Headlam, Qll• 
~' pp. 363f; the latter is General Botha's:estimate, Pauw, 
.Qn• cit., p. 63 
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their moveable estate. 67 It demolished their villages, 
burned th:ei.;r crops, destroyed their herds, and in so devast-
ating their countryside while leaving the cities of the 
immigrants untouched, it thrust South Africa into the.twent-
ieth century with its ruling population.sharply divided into 
two groups, the impoverished, defeated·Afrikaner and the 
prosperous, triumphant English urbanite. 89 Only 4,000 Boers 
fell on the battlefields, but 26,000 Boer women and children 
died, mainly of disease, in the British concentr~tion camps.eg 
A real .,chapter of horrorsu wa-s written and the Boers were 
left to'tread the poverty which marked their defeat nourish-
ing a memory that never deserted them: 
I was in the veld until they made peace, (wrote the 
Afrikaner writer, Herman Charles Bosman.) Then we laid 
down our rifles and went home. What I knew my farm by 
was ·the hole under the koppie where I quarried slate 
stones for the threshing floor. That was about all that 
remained as I had left it. Everything else was gone. 
My home was burnt down.. My lands were laid waste. My 
cattle and sheep were slaughtered. Even the·stones I 
had for the kraals·were pulled down. My wife came out 
of the concentration camp, and we went together to look 
?-t our old farm. My wife had gone into the conc·entration 
camp with our two children, and she came out alone. And 
when I saw her. again, and noticed the way she had changed, 
I knew that I who had been all the way through the fight-
ing, had not seen the Boer War. 90 
97Report of the Commission in Re Pretoria _Indigents, 
para. 19. 
66Pauw, Q2• Q11., pp. 64f. 
69van 1der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, QJ2. _ill., val. 1·, 
p. 600. 
9
°From Bosman's short story, 11 The Rooinek", in the 
anthology, Mafeking Road (JohannesbuFg: Ce~tral News Agency,· 
Dassie Books Edition, 1957), PP• 150f. 
greeted them as aristocrats.ana rlilers. 
attire they bore the mark of privilege. 
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For under their mean 
They were not just 
poor people, but Poor Whites, in a society where black poverty 
generally went unnoticed or unquestioned. In 19.;!,6, two years 
after the Tuberculosis Commission cast light on the ravages 
of hunger and disease among the black shack populations of 
South Africa • s urban areas, 4 ·~ Poor White investigatory com-
u 
mission was reporting that · indigency prevails in South Africa 
almost wholly among the white races, and is practically un-
known among the black races.u 5 Ironically, though, indigency 
might have :remained practically unknown among the white people 
were it not for the existence of black poverty and the circum-
stances which worsened it. 
The Impoverishment of Afrikanerdom 
The seeds of the Poor White problem were sown in the 
frontier wars. For a hundred years fighting raged where the 
African tribes moving southvJard met tl?-e spearheads of European 
settlement advancing north. The inevitable triumph of rifle 
over assegai was often followed by the expropriation of 
African-occupied land and the extrusion of its inhabitants 
Africa, were based on a survey limited to white families with 
children at school; according to Professor J. L. Gray, head 
of the Department of Social Studies at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, the Report of the Carnegie Commission under-
estimated the extent of white poverty in that the survey 
excluded families without school children, as well as the 
aged. Die Transvaler, 31 May 1941. 
4 See below, pp. 214-217. 
15Province of the Transvaal, Repor} of the Relief and 
Grants-in-Aid Commission, 1916, (T.P. 5- lb), ]ff_ajot;ity Report, 
para. 60; ibid., First Minority Rep~rt, para. 5: There is. 
no indigency among the black races. 
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or their indenture into the labor serv~ce of the Europeans. 
The latter upon winning the wars retired from the·field of 
manual labor and left it stigmatized as a servile vocation, 
Thus, although their military penetration of South Africa was 
halted, the Africans continued their colonization of the 
country as agricultural and industrial workers, so that reg-
ions which formerly had never seen black men eventually 
became entirely dependent on their labor. It was accordingly 
determined that when warfare came to an .end, approximately 
at the same time that gold was discovered, there were few 
jobs available for·the victors' sons and grandsons to perform. 
Unskilled labor on the farms.and in tne towns had become the 
province of the Non-White, and skilled labor on the mines 
that of trained immigrants who had learned no aversion for 
industrial work. The distress suffered by Africans as a res-
ult of the alienation of their lands was inflicted in time 
on the descendants of the men who had dispossessed them and 
turned them out into the labor market.with poverty their only 
weapon. Against this weapon the children of the Voortrekkers 
recoiled, and in their pride thousands of them became Poor 
Whites--men who were socially unemployable. 
Within less than three generations the Bantu people 
of South Africa lost roughly four-fifths of the land they 
had previously held. 6 They crowded back on what remained, but 
a surplus continued to .spill over to carry O:t;l the struggle for 
existence as laborers on European farms. In the Orange Free 
State, the Basuto lost over half t};leir arable l~nd. 7 Like 
other tribespeople in similar straits, many became laborers 
on white farms, working for a renumeration which no vihite. man 
6William Miller Macmillan, Complex South Af~ica: An 
Economic Footnote· to History :(..London: Faber & Faber Limited, 
1930), p. 120. --
7 de Kiewiet, History of South Africa, p. 78. 
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1-vould accept. Between 1921 a:rid 1936, the black population 
of the Free State increased at a rate over five times faster 
than that of the white populati.on, 6 partly as<.aL'result of· 
African immigration from Basutola.nd and partly because the 
sons and tenants of the White farming class, unwilling to 
compete as agricultural laborers, were emigrating to the towns 
of other provinces. In the Transvaal, where Native Adminis-
tration in the 1858 Voortrekker Constitution fell under the 
heading, 'over.de Krijgsmagt en den Krijgsraad' (concerning 
the Army and Military Council); the wars of dispossession--
as they are termed by Africans--had resulted by 1915 in the 
residence of nearly one quarter of the rural African popu-
lation on land owned but unoccupied by Europeans; nearly 
400,000 other Africans worked as laborers and labor tenants 
·on White-owned farms under white owners or managers. So that 
by the time of the First World War, a good half of the rural 
African population of the Transvaal was effectively landless, 
and existed as a rural proletariat. 9 
The land frontier came to an end about 18703..0 By then 
close to.90 per cent of the country's.land area had 'come 
under white ownership.~~ Farmer's sons could no longer be 
provided with new farms, and there was no place for them as 
farm laborers. One expedient then adopted by their parents 
8 Ibid., p. 201. 
9 See William Miller Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton. 
The Making of the South .African Native ProbleiillLondon: Faber 
& Gwyer Limitea:-1929), pp. 30b-3ll. . 
3.. 0 van qer Walt, Wiid and Geyer, Geskiedenis Y§g Suid-
Afrika, val. ii, p. 250. 
:J.l.The:.tNatives (Land) Act of 1936 provided for a land 
purchase scheme to add land to the African Reserves. When 
the program is completed, Africans 11ill have title to about 
12 per cent of the country's laud. See below, p. 293. 
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was to divide up the. family estate. For generation upon gen-
eration fragmentation of farms proceeded. . In 1908, the Trans..:. 
vaal Indigency Commission reported a c.9:se where a single heir 
. 29,1387,007 ~ 
was entitled to 4 , 705 , 511, 234, 760 o~ a farm of 2,527 morgen--
less than half an acre.l. 2 Two decades· later. the Carnegie 
Commission came upon an old farmer in the Marico Bushveld who 
owned.55 acres, portions of which were still arable in good 
seasons. This man, who had ten children and more than fifty 
grandchildren, informed the Commissioners.that he intended 
. . . 
deviding his property equally among his children so that each 
f . f ~3 
would at least have his own sitplekkie • The onset of any 
natural disaster, drought; locusts, rinderpest, etc., would· 
be sufficient to dislodge these folk from their tiny plots. 
They would then be compelled to sell out to more fortU11ate 
farmers, and became bywoners (tenants) of whomever would have 
the~.l.4 Field workers they could not become, because here 
they faced competition from landless Africans even poorer 
than themselves. 
Among the methods adopted by the Government of the 
South .African Republic (Transvaal) to relieve the distress 
of its poorer citizens were those which had helped lead to 
it in the first place; more land was taken from Africans. 
in 1882, for instance, a Boer commando was sent against the 
~poch chief, Niabel, allegedly because of Niabel's refusal 
~ 2Transvaal Gover~~ent, Report of the .Transvaal Indigency 
Commission, 1906~08, (T. G. 13- 1 08), para. 117. A morgen 
is· the equivalent to 2.12 English acres. 
l.scc r-121. 
1 
~4The Transvaal +ndigency Commission defined bywoner 
as 1any man or family who live on land belonging to another--
usually a relative--without any clearly defined rights or 
duties.n T. G. 13-'08, para 17. 
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to deliver up to the Republican Government an African who had 
murdered his step-brother, the Sekukini chief. Whether or 
not this was the only motive of the expeditioh,~5 its res-
ult was a Volksraad resolution confiscating the lands of the 
defeated tribe; and ordering the dispersal or the Mapoch 
people oyer the length and breath of the Republic and their 
indenture as servants and laborers in burgher households and 
on farms. This done, the well-watered lands of the Mapoch 
were surveyed into small holdings and commonage, and made 
available to indigent burghers who had fought with the 
expedition. On the morning of October 18, 1883, 350 to 400 
of the latter gathered before the former tribal lands. It was 
decided that 
everyone who wished for a bit of land, would have to 
start on foot and mark out each place for himself. This 
was done to place everyone, as much as possible, on an 
equality, as some burghers had horses and others none, ·as 
otherwise the mounted men would have an-advantage over 
the footmen ..... .......................................... . 
Yesterday morning at 11 a.m. the ground was declared 
open. The moment the word was given that the burghers 
were at liberty to occupy, there was a general rush over 
the boundry, and a most amusing scene ensued, everyone 
running as for dear life and in a few moments not a soul 
was to be seen in a camp of about 150 vehicles. Towards 
evening the tired and weary burghers returned, same hav-
ing run 12 miles; but the maJority were satisfied and I 
am happy to say very few disappointed• Some very strange 
names given to the patches of ground were the result of-
this hurry scurry race14 such as t~A$per Verloren.., ~lmost Lost], rrwelverdiend11• ~ell-DeserveS!.Jr~ , "'Flaauwgekomenilf 
{j.rrived Dead Beaf]; ••• and 1rKaalkop r~ Bare Head , the· 
last name on account of the-owner having lost his hat in 
the race and not waiting to pick it up he reached his 
ground bare-headed.~6 
~5 11 •••• the announcement that the fMapo chl Gronden [and~ were to be thrown open for occupation did not come 
as a surprise to the burghers who had fought in the wa:r.lt 
Francois :::rti:a:p~~~~~ Gillie, ~ Mapoch' s Gronden: An Aspect of 
the Poor White ~uestion (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation in His-
tory, University of Pretoria, 1934), p. 9. 
~ 6Die Volkstem, 16 November 1883, quoted in Gillie, ~· 
cit • , pp • 12f • 
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A recent claim that 11 the economic life of the Repub-
lican Boers was soundn and ihat their impoverishment was due 
to f~ctors beyond their control,~ 7 appears to be contradicted 
by the probable motive and resul.ts of the Mapoch expedition. 
The plotholders, unaccustomed to any but spasmodic labor, 
improvidently allowed their small farms to deteriorate. Fruit 
trees which the Mapoch people had carefully tended and which 
might have usefully supplemented the_burgher economy were 
left to strangle in a wilderness of cactus and thorn. 18 The 
poop burghers remained poor burghers, and the black farmers 
whom they had displaced became black laborers on European 
farms, blocking the opportunity of landless Whites taking up 
such work, thus making for more poor burghers in the future. 
Years later, Nationalist leaders like D. F. Malan spoke at 
political rallies o:f 11 70,000 white men who in ten years' time 
8-911-2j] left the coUn.tryside, driven off by the rapidly-
growing assegai-less hordes from Nigger-land, 11 ~ 9 but not of 
the process which brought the 11 assegai-less hordes" into the 
'white' countryside. 
The advent of mining only temporarily relieved the 
growing pressure of population in the rural areas. As there 
were no railways in the Transvaal in 1886, the whole of the 
mechanical equipment of the mines as well as food and supplies 
for the mining population had to be brought in by animal 
~ 7Adriaan Nicolaas Petrus Pelzer, Die 1 Arm-Blankel 
Verskynsel ig ~ Suid-Afrikaanse Republi~k Tussen die Jare 
1882 ~ 1899: n Sosiaal-Historiese Studie \Unpublished l"r.A. 
Dissertation in History, University of Pretoria, 1937), p. 17. 
It is;strange that Pelzer should make this statement, as 
Cillie'.s Manoch's Gronden was one of his sources. 
i 8 Cillie, Qn· cit., pp. 79-98. 
~ 9Dr. D~ F. Malan, Die Groot Vlug.: · 'n Nabetragting ~ 
die Arm-Blanke-Kongres, 1,2g2, .§!!: ~ die O'ffisiele Sensu.sopgawe 
(n.pl.: pamphlet containing articles appearing between 10 and 
24 July, 1923, in Die Burger, n.a..), p. 8 · 
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transport from the coast or from neighboring areas. Trans~ 
port riding for a time furnished the Poor White countryman 
with a socially acceptable occupation. Moreover, the arrival 
of a mining population created a market for agricultural prod-
uce which had never previously existed. Meat, forage and 
mealies were required, and these commodities the Transvaal 
·farmer could most easily produce. 
But the period of prosperity brought on by these devel~ 
opments was short~lived. The decline set in with the con-
struction of the railways to Johannesburg. The Cape line 
reached the Rand in 1882, and by December 1895 both the 
through lines from-Durban and Lourenco Marques had been com-
pleted. The transport riders lost their jobs.· Unfitted ·by 
previous education and training to seek skilled or semi-skil- . 
led employment on the railroads or in the mines, 20 they and 
others deprived of their living by the railways were forced 
back into the rural areas. Simultaneously, the farmers were· 
hit. The forage and supplies for the thousands of animals · 
engaged in transporting goods to the Rand were no longer req-
uired. Furthermore, the railways were bringing more cheaply 
from the coas·tal colonies and their ports supplies to the 
Witwatersrand population which had previously been purchased 
at high prices from local producers. Goods trains were un-
loading American maize at Park Station, Johannesburg, at a 
20Although industrial and vocational schools had been 
established for Coloured and Af"rican pupils in the Cape as far 
back as 1854, itwas not until forty years later that attempts 
were made to institute industrial education for Whites_;-and 
then these efforts were aimed specifically as a remedy for 
the emergent Poor White problem. Even so, vocational educat-
ion was associated for many years thereafter with mental def-
iciency and criminal tendencies, as well as with poverty. CO, 
Joint Findings and Recoramendations, para. 18. 
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price almost equal to the cost of transport alone to the 
Afrikaner farmer riding his oxfwagon load into town from the 
Magatos Mountains, a few hundred miles away. 21 The immediate 
effect of railway construction, therefore, was to throw back 
onto the land large numbers of people previously engaged in 
transportation services, just at a time when the Transvaal 
farmer found his chief market threatened from the outside. 22 
No sooner had the transport riders returned to their 
precarious bywoner positions on the farms than they were swept 
away again, this time in many cases for good. In May 1896, 
rinderpest spread t~~ough the Transvaal. 23 Of 1,435,292 cat-
tle J.n the Republic at the beginning of 1896, 984,239...;-more 
than two-thirds' of the total--died as a result of the pest. 24 
The bywoners could no longer plough ahd the impoverished far-
mers were unable to support them. Back to the towns trekked 
a large number of the former transport riders. From about 
this time dates the birth of Vrededorp, Fordsburg, and other 
white shanty slums along t~e Rand, in Pretoria, and on the 
outskirts of other Transvaal Towns. 25 
The rinderpest epidemi.c revealed the cumulative effects 
on the ruling minority of two. centurie? 1 reliance on .Non--wni te 
labor. Fitte& by tradition for the supervision of black, 
rural labor, the upro6te4 burghers lacked both the training 
21~.G. 13- 1 08, Minutes of Evidence, Q. 5266. 
22T.G. 13- 1 08, paras. 19-2.J:. 
23Already in 1893 a serious natural disaster had struck 
the rural areas in the form of a locust descent. Despite many 
memorials requesting the Government to make extermination of 
locusts obligatory, the Volksraad decided that no regulation 
. It . 
along this line could be laid down, because this is a plague 
of the Higher Hand laid upon us.rr Qu0ted-in :Pelzer, 2J2.• cit., 
P• 69. . . . -
24 . 6 : Ibid.,. p. 2. I • 
26T.G. 13-'08, para. 22. 
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to compete with skilled immigrants and the willingness to 
work underground together with black miners. Unemployed and 
hopeless they vmndered through the streets of Johannesburg, 
often ignored or repulsed if they approached immigrants for 
a ·job: 11De Jingos Willen niet een enkele Boer werk gefentt 26 
(.The Jingos won't give work to a single Boer). Inevitably, 
they turned to the G;overnment. 
Almost the entire session of the 1897 Volksraad was 
devote.d to debating the plight of the indigent burghers. Hun-
dreds of memorials· for financial assistance were received. 
The (Dutch) language of these memorials was usually ·crude 
and ungrammatical but their sense was plain: 
We the undersigned Burghers are all needy and poor 
that·we can get no earnings and we have wife and chil-
dren who have to eat and there i.s nothing to live on 
we must all perish of hunger we .~on't expect office 
work but any sort of work outside offices·either .with 
pick ana. shovel·on the railroad and.in the streets or 
country roads and where you hire niggers.we can be 
taken instead. Honored and Respected Gentlemen we 
don~ t mind .1}-hii/ or otherwise we shall perish of 
hunger. 27 
The above_came from.the Pretoria slums; the following 
from those around Johannesburg~ 
B:Scause·here.in·Fordsburg, Burgersdorp and Vrededorp 
there are many sick and dead among the poor and needy that 
we have difficulty in co~lecting money to bury them decent.-
ly, and. ~4r. Jl G. Frieslich puts them into the earth as 
cheaply as possible and would ·if he could ·g:et ·some other 
·assistance even bury the poorestfor nothing, your 
memorialists pray that Honored and Respected .Gentlemen 
may be pleased to help them in this as Honored and 
Respected Gentlemen think f1t. 28 
The Government resolved iio give them ahearse. 
26 Letter to Die Volkstem, 10 April 1898, quoted in 
Pelzer, QI?.• cit. , p. 23.: . 
27Q,uoted ibid., p. 41·. 
2 6 Q,uoted ibid., p. 56. 
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Usually it responded to appeals by providing relief' 
work. Occasionally it dispatched a wagon load of food to 
the most··,needy cases. But the attitude generally expressed 
byVolksraad members during the debates was that a firm line 
shou:}_d be drawn against Government aid, else 'towns·~li:ke 
Pretoria would be flooded with such poor persons." ·The hope 
was that they would return to the countryside. 2 g • 
Thus even before the outbreak of' the Anglo-Boer War 
in 1899, a portion.of the rural white population had sunk 
into pauperism. A suggestion.of' the extent of this is gained 
from the fact that through the departure of' the head of' the 
household on military duty at least 1,415 families were 
immediately left destitute, and had to be provided with food 
by the Government. 30 
The War was a disaster of first clas.s magnitude in 
its effect on the growth of Poor Whitism. Thousands of' Boers 
joined their commandos wondering how their families would · 
make ends meet. When they came back, three years later, t~.._ 
there were no longer any ends to meet, for . .,the mills of the 
. . ., 
British army had ground slowly, but they had ground exceed-
ing small'. '" 31 ·The countryside had been burned almost into 
a desert. ~erything that could be turned into food had been 
destroyed, cattle had beenbutchered, farming implements 
smashed, dams and irrigation works broken and damaged. 32 
The Boer villages of Bothaville, Ventersburg, Frankfort, 
Lindley, Fouriesburg, had been completely razed; others were 
29Ibid., P• 4 3. 
30Ibid., pp. llOf' • 
. 
3 ~W. B. Worsfo~d, Reconstruction of the Colonies 
under Lord Milner, pp. 23f, quoted in Pauw, Die Beroepsar-
beid Y§n die Afrikaner in die Stad, p. 63. · 
32Macdonald, What ~ Saw In South Africa, p. 52. 
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left partly habitable. 33 Sixteen years after the immigrants 
established themselves on the Witwatersrand, Lord Milner, 
their champion and Robinson's successor .as British High Com-
missioner in South Africa, was writing to an English lady 
of rank.that: 
The state of the country is horrible, death and devas-
tation everywhere; as the continuance of this w·retched 
and senseless guerrila war has forced the military to 
sweep the country from end to end. The Orange River . 
Colony is virtually a desert, ~lmost the whole population 
living in~.··refugee camps along the railway line. At a 
liberal computation there are not more than 6,000 Boers 
still in arms against us. They are ill mounted, ill clad, 
ill armed, the most wretched objects conceivable, and 
consta~tly on the run. 34 . 
There was little motive for surrender. When peace at 
last came, General Botha, the· Boer leader, reckon~d that 
30,000 farm dwellings were burned and that the material loss 
suffered by his people amounted to ~70 million, representing · 
an average loss of at least ~00 per person or, at five people 
to a family, ~1,000 per family. 35 
With the solid assets of the pastoral states liquidated, 
the ranlts of the.bywoner Poor Whites were swollen in the win-
ter months after the Peace of Vereeniging by the destitute 
Boer landowner. He returned from war.to find his stock gone, 
his buildings dem~lished 1 the whole sleepy process of rural 
life.disorganized, requiring time, capital and the return o:f 
morale before it cou~d be set going again. But thou~ the 
Brit·i~:?h Government paid !.3 million to help repair war damages 
and guaranteed a !.35 million loan to promote rehabilitation 
and .economic development, many farmers stood little chance 
33G. B. Beak, The Aftermath of War. An Account of 
the ReJ2atriation.o:f Bc;ers and.Natives 'i!l""theOrange River 
COlony 1902-1904 -r-London: Edward . .Arnold, 1906), :p .. J.3. 
34Headlam, ed., The Milner Papers, vol. ii, p. 273. 
35 Pauw, op. cit., p. 64. 
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of recovery. From the beginning of January to the end of 
September, 1903, only ~.09 inches of rain were registered in 
.South Africa--a record drought. 3 ·6 That same year there began 
a six-years trade depression. 37 The indigent population of 
Pretoria tripled. 38 Ten thousand Afrikaners with nowhere to 
go simply stayed on in the British ·concentration camps for 
months after the War. 39 
Mining, the industryaffording the greatest scope for 
the employment of unskilled labor, was effectively closed to 
them. Geological, economic and social forces had combined 
to bring this about. When the immigrant diggers, managers, 
geologists and technicians arrived on the Witwatersrand they 
found its ore formations different from those 6f any·other 
great mining region. They saw· no "glittering Australian nug-
. gets, or laden Comstock lode, 'L!2,o c6ncentra.ted near the sur- . 
face by alluvial action; and workable with pick, shovel and 
pan. ·on the contrary, the gold finely distributed in its 
bed of conglomerate rock-was usually invisible to the naked 
eye. What had been found were low grade ores. Moreover-, the 
reefs dipped thousands of feet below the surface, extending 
under a vast territory in an arc over a h~ndred miles long. 4~ 
Merely to reach the gold-bearing conglomerates required a 
hug·e investment in shafts,. machinery. and 'development', and 
then before an ounce of gold. cou.ld be extracted the rock had 
to be blasted out with explosives, crushed and treated chem-
36Beak, Ql?.~ Cit., P•. 119. 
37Schumann, Die Ekonomiese Posisie van die Afrikaner, 
p.'78. 
38Report of the Commission in re Pretoria Indigents, 
para. 15. 
39T.G. 13-t08, para. 24. 
4< 0 de Xiewiet, .2:!2• cit., p. 116. 
4 ~·Today, the arc o:f the gold reef extends over 300 miles. 
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ically in a long and difficult process necessitating further 
great expenditures. 
An indication of what this meant is seen in the fact 
that prior to the Anglo-Boer War average y~eld per ton of ore, 
exclusive of working costs, was about 43s. (and from 1902-45 
about 3ls.), whereas in the United States it ranged from 
l00-200s., in Australia from 60-l40s .. , in India 90s. and in 
Mexico and Canada 50s. 42 
The great cost of extraction and the low yield of the 
ores could not be balanced by_setting a proportionately higher 
price. For despite the metal's legendry reputation, gold was 
not in such vital demand as to enable the industry to pass on 
·extra costs to the consumer. In fact; the chief buyer, the 
United States Government, rather than the major producer, 
South Africa, held the deciding vote in the international 
arrangement that pegs the price of gold. 
The immigrants were thus faced with a geologic and 
economic fait accompli. The price they received for their 
product was fixed by their buyers, naturally at a much lower 
level than they would have preferred. Ana. the amount of' gold 
in each hard won ton of rock was arranged by nature to be 
microscopic. 
With working revenue pre-determined by circumstances 
outside the industry 1 s control, attention was focused on the 
possibility of lowering working costs, of which the chief 
co1I1Ponent was the cost of labor. Here history had stacked 
the cards. The types of labor required by the mineowners 
were non-existent in the pastoral and feudal area where they 
established their industry. They were compelled, as we have 
seen, to import their skilled labor force from Europe. To 
lure. men from settled communities to the bleak, isolated 
42Transvaal and Orange Free Sta.ta Chamber of Mines, 
Sixty-eighth Annual Report, 1957, p. 72; de Kock, Economic 
History of South.Africa, p. 246. 
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Witwatersrand, where they lacked any opportunity of digging 
independently and where the cost of living was high, a suit-
able inducement had to.be offered. That inducement was a 
rate of pay for .skilled labor higher almost than anywhere 
else in the world. Shiftgangers (labor overseers) on the 
Witwatersrand, for example, received double the wage paid 
for the same duties on the Australian fields. 43 The stan-
dard established was a real wage for skilled South African 
workers 50 per cent above that earned by the corresponding 
class of workers 'in England, 44 while the mon.ey wage was 
(1908) from 50 to 100 per cent higher than in Australia, 
New Zealand and the Weste~n States of America. 46 
Had these rates obtained for the entire labor force, 
mining on the Witwatersrand would· have been impossible. 46 . 
Even mariy of the Western .Australian mines with higher grade 
ores·--would have been compelled to shut down had their skilled 
labor. been paid on the same scale as on the Rand. On the. 
other hand, if unskilled miners on the Witwatersrand had 
been paid the same wages received by their counterparts in 
Western Australia, 35 out of the 52 Witwatersrand mines 
(in 1913) could not have worked at a profit. 4. 7 . 
Consequently, employment on the Rand was organized in 
such a way that the number of highly-paid skilled workers 
43Dr. J. H' .. Botha, Die Arbeidsvraagstuk van Suia-
Afrika (Amsterdam: .H. J. Paris, 1928), p. 119.--rstatement · 
applies to the year 1913.) 
44Report
1
of the Economic and Wage Commission (1925), 
1926, (U .• G. 14- 26), Mills-Clay-Martin Report, para. 149. 
(Statement applies to the year 1925). 
:,:o ~-.... ,~" 4:6 ~~G';,, 13-,!·0S, ',·p~ra. ~ 75., : .(Figu:res·:,I3.P:PlY-' t9 1908~ 
. 
46Dona1d Wood Gilbert, uThe Economic Effects· of the 
Gold Discoveries u:2on South .Africa, 11 The g,uarterly Journal 
of Economics, 47:579, August 1953. · 
47S.C. 9-'13, Minutes of Evidence, paras. 1424f. 
44 
was limited, and complemented by a large unskilled force 
renumerated at a rate low enough to enable the poorer mines 
to realize a profit. ·unable: to avoid paying artisan miners 
wages among the highest in the world, unskilled miners had . 
to be found who wo~ld accept a rate not just proportionately 
lower, but among the lowest in the world. 48 
The Poor 'Whlites who were beginning to make their 
appearance when mining began were then too few in number to 
make up the full unskilled complement :required by the indus-
try'· These 11 old burghers of the land11 , traditionally averse 
to manual work, would object to toil:Eilg alongside tlkaffers 11 , 
·and in any case could usually claim Government relief work' 
at 5s. a day, double.what the mines offered for manu?l labor. 
The usefulness of their traditions to the mining industry can 
be measured from the following incident ol:1served by members 
of the Carnegie Commission: 
A couple of poor whites were e~rning 6s. each a day 
on relief work on a remote road. They hired a couple 
of natives to.do the work at 3s. each· per day while 
they (the whi.te men) lazed about sleeping in the shade 
behind a bush. The natives were content vdth the wages. 
The work v-1as done. The white men 'earned' 3s. each .per . 
day.49 
Only people unable to engage in this kind of enterprise 
. . 
would do, cheap non-European labor. But here difficulties 
14fere also encountered. Thousands of .Africans' made landless 
by .war, were tied down as serfs on white farms and so were 
46Although the total number of unskilled miners (Non- -
Whites) annually in this century has exceeded the total -force 
of skilled.miners (Whites) about eight ... fold, the formers' 
annual wage bill has totalled less than half the amount paid 
to the latter. In 1957, for instance, the 335,098 non-white 
employees of the gold mines and contracting companies affiliated 
with the Chamber of Mines received an aggregate of ~2,532,361 
in wages, whereas the 47,903 white employees between -them rec-
eived ~50,619,384. Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber 
of Mines, Sixty-Eighth Annual Report, 1957, p~ 80 
49Quoted in RomLd Table, 23:614, June 1933. 
:· 
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not available to the industry. And though the tribal lands 
. ·had been considerably reduc~d they still provided a subs is-
. . I 
tence livelihood for many Africans; too few black peasants 
i 
were voluntarily seeking suwplementary work in the mines. 
I 
To increase the supptY of' labor pressure was brought 
. i 
to bear on.~. the tribal econortles. The method selected for 
. . I . , 
this was to lay taxes on th~ tribespeople, thus raising their 
I . 
cost of' living and making tb\em less self-supporting on their 
lands. Regarding the Ci'skeil Reserve Africans, Prime Minister 
. I • 
Rhodes reminded the Cape Hou~e of' Assembly in 1894 of their. 
1t · · I duty to remove these poor children ou.t of' their state of' 
sloth. and laziness, and giv·~\ them some gentle stimul-ant to 
I . u· 
go forth and find out some of the dignity of labour. 50 The 
. I 
. I ' 
stimulant took the form of a'\ t_en shilling tax on those who 
did not go forth; "labour~ meant.labor :for other people. 5 ~ 
. . I The taxation provisions of th~ Glen Grey Act of 1894 
failed to produce a sufficierlt supply of labor to satisfy the 
industry's requirements, and !resort wa~ had also to the ree-l . 
rui tment of bl?-ck 1•1orkers fro~ neigh"?oring territories. 5. 2 
Just as the sugar and tea plartations of Natal had been dev-
eloped, after 1860 with indentp.red WO:r;'kers from India, so South 
i 
' i I .. 
60Quoted in Tindall, ea., James Rose Innes Autobiog-
raphy, p •. 105. \ 
6 ~Ibid., p. 105 •. The iaxation provisions of the Glen 
Grey Act, affecting the Ciskei Reserve Africans, broke down 
and were repealed tn 1905, (vdn der Horst, Native. Labour in 
South ~rica, p. 14S) but leg~slation for the same purpose 
was subsequently enacted for the entire African population· 
(Report .of the Industrial Legilslation Commission, 1935, (U .G ~ 37::-r-3"5)'; para. 6. i · · 
I 
52 u.And if yqu ask me fo~ a big foreign policy, it is 
the question whether we can br~ng these natives to under-
stand the di~nity of labou~, a~d whether we ca~ make arrang-
ements with
1
neighbouring States to co-operate J.n bringing 
that about,' Rhodes, reported by the Cape Times, 29 October 
1894, q:uoteG. in Hobson, The War in South Africa, p • . 286~ 
46 
Africa 1 s gold mining. industry i-ras organized 1r.rith a prepon-
derance of foreign-born labor in both skilled and unskilled 
grades. 
The gap in wages between skilled white and Unskilled 
non-white miners became a permanent f~ature of the industry. 
Notwithstanding that with the passage of years an inland sup-
ply of skilled labor became available, trade union action 
and public opinion combined to insure that the skilled :pay 
rates initially established remained unaltered, except up-
wards. 58 Meanwhile 'in 1889, the mineoWl;lers joined forces to 
form the Chamber of Mines, a .combination .which immediately 
attended to reducing the wages of unskilled laborers. 64 Due 
to shortages encountered in African recruiting these efforts 
at first were only partly successful, but with the institut-
ion of a system of centralizedrecruiting and rationing of 
labor among the various mines, the Chamber had managed by 
1913 to bring the average pay of itsAfrican workers down to 
a level below that of 1896, and from then until the outbreak 
of the Second World War the daily wage of African miners 
rose by only 4d. 66 
Thus the uprooted and unskilled Afrikaners seeking a 
livelihood after the Anglo-Boer War found no entrance into 
the gold mines. Unwilling to take orders alongside African 
miners or accept their rate of wages,' some returned ,to the 
countryside to be taken on as bywoners or to squat on Govern-
ment land. Others swelled the number of charity cases in the 
towns, whose victorious and prosperous immigrant population 
I 
68S.Q. 9-rl3, Mlnutes of Evidence, para. 188; U.G. 
14- 26, Mills-Clay-Martin Report, para. 137; U.G. 37-T35, 
para. lO ·-
64van der Horst, on. cit., pp. 129, 205-207. 
55 Report of the Witwatersrand Mine Nativest Wages 
Commission, 1944--, (U.G. 21-'44), para. 68. 
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thereupon doubly despised them. 66 
Even the Poor Whites' children, who main chance of 
· getting work lay in obtaining training in the skilled trades, 
were rebuffed by the immigrant economy. For the British 
artisans, who naturally viewed the ~rikaner urban influx as 
a threat to their monopoly of the skilled trades and high 
wages, utilized the machinery of the apprenticeship boards, 
and their influence with the labor bureaux, to hinder their 
training. 67 In 1912,. for example, British workmen of the 
South·African Typographical Union sent a .deputation to Mr. 
W. J. Horne, the Organizer of Techni'cal Education in the 
' ff ' Transvaal, to tell this .gentleman that there were enough 
employees available .in the country for years to come, 11 and 
objecting to boys being trained as printers at the'Pretoria 
Trades School and Polytechnic. ""'They also published a notice 
in the daily Press asking parents not to send their boys to 
be taught the printing trade, and warning them that there 
would be no openings in that trade. 11 That this threat was 
effective is shovm. by the fact that ·the printing branch of 
the Pretoria·Trades School was closed. 58 
Nor could the impoverished Afrikaners expect much 
assistance for the post-War British.Colonial Administration. 
66See below, pp. 5lf. 
6 7Pauw, 2:!2.• cit •. , pp •. 110-114, 263. Between 1926 and 
1939 the relative position of Afrikaners in;·the skilled trad-
es remained more or less constant despite the relative in-
crease in the Afrikaner urban population. One of the few 
craft occupations.in which Afrikaners advanced relatively was 
that of repairmen. in the railway service, 'which testifies to 
their dependence on employment by the State, ibid., p. 234. 
58Report of the Commission Apnointed. to Inauire into 
the Condit~on o~ Xrade ~Industries, 1912 TIT. G. 10-'12), 
Majority Repor'E", p. 19. HostiTI'ty to .the training of unskil-
led Whites· was long lasting; see Dr. ·a. J. van Eck, Some As-
pects of the South African Industrial Revolution (Johannes-
burg: S.A.I.R.R., Second and Revised Edition, 1953), p. 18. 
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The latter in fact pursued~ policy that in the.short:run 
helped to spread pauperism among the defeated Boers. The 
Administration hoped to consolidate the IDllitary victory 
by securing permanent political supremacy for the British 
section of the white population. To achieve this a substan-
tial numerical strengthening of the latter was .necessary. 
Accordingly, it was planned to assimilate a large part of 
the army among the residential population by inoU.d:tng: dem-
obilized soldiers to stay on in South Africa as settlers. 59 
The number of posts in some branches of the public ·service 
may have been increased beyond essential requirements to 
give employment to these peopl.e. 60 In any event, the Rail-
ways, Police and each of the Civil Service departments were 
almost entirely staffed with new personnel. Only for those 
Afrikaners who had thrown in their lot with the British and 
become out castes from the Boer community we.re positions 
found in t4e Police and· other public departments. 6 :t The 
civil servants of the former Boer Republics, .some of::·whomo::were 
Af~ikaners, were not taken back. Many became destitute and 
sank to the condition of Poor Whites. In 1905, the Commis-
sion In Re Pretoria Indigents reported that more than one out 
of five persons applying for poor relief .in Pretoria were for-
mer Republican civil servants, chiefly ex-military and police 
officials. 
Though the dust of war eventually settled, and a Union 
of South Africa was established, in which from 1910 to 1948 
three Boer generals succeeded each other as Prime Minister, 
69Telegram, Lord.Milner to Mr. Chamberlain, Headlam, 
ed., ~· cit., val. ii, pp. 369f. 
60When the Transvaal received Respo~sible Government 
:in 1907, ·the Botha Administration reduced the size of the 
police force by more than half; see Pauw, QQ• cit., pp. 67f. 
6 :tibid., pp. 67f. 
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the A:frikiner pauper c1.uvve continued to rise: 106,000 in 1916; 
120,000 in 1921; 300,000 in 1929-30. 62 ~~ny of these people 
still lived in the rural areas, often as squatters on Govern-
ment land, eking out a precarious income by raising a few 
maize plants, hunting, ploughing for Africans, or doing odd 
jobs for neighboring farmers, such as fencing, killing white 
ants, etc. 93 They occupied shelters of raw brick, dried clay--
even ditrellings of wattle and daub with no ceilings were com-
mon. MUd floors smeared with liquid cow d~ng or blood in 
order to 'bind' the surface inevitably bred flies in prof-
·usion, and these swarmed through every home.in summer. San-
itary conveniences were almost totally lacking. Only'on 
farms uwhere the farmer and his family were above the average 
in·prosperity and culture, 11 was a pit closet to be found, and 
even so it was usually reserved for the white women of the 
·family. Faeca·l pollution of water and food, and· swarming 
flies and body lice, accounted for a heavy death rate am~ng· 
the children. 64 
If the squatters' position was bad, most of those who 
still owned land were not much better off. 66 One farmer inf-
62Verslag m Het Kerkelik Kongres Gehouden te Cradock. 
Q.:Q 22 §11 g2_ November, 1916, Het Arme Blanken Vraagstuk . ( Kaap-
stad: De Nationale Pers, Beperkt, 1917), P• 9; Second ~nterim 
Reuort of the Unemployment Commission, 1921, (U.G. 34- 21), 
para. 2; CO III-217,220. Similar estimates are given in 
w. M. Macmillan, The South .African Agrarian Problem and its 
Historical Develoument (Johannesburg: Published by the Cen-
tral News Agency, Ltd., for the Council of Education, Witwat-
ersrand, 1919), PP• 13-15, 86; Botha, QJ2• cit., p. 208.. · 
63T.G. 13-'08, para. 127 
64CC IV-8; CO, Joint Findings and. Recommendations, 
para. 38.-
66It was calculated that· in 1941, despite vast Govern-
ment expenditures in direct arid indirect as·sistance to .the 
white farming community, nearly half the white farming famil-
ies earned cash incomes of less than ~100 a year, and more 
than a fifth less than ~50 a year. Social and Economic Plan-
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armed the Carnegie Commission that he settled all'his shop 
debts in kind. He possessed no stock. Now and then he 
obtained a little meat for a bucket of maize. Gash he never 
had. 66 
While some Afrikaner fa:rmers prospered through the 
misfortunes of their fellows, 67 the position of the mass of 
rural .Afrikaners became progressively more desperate. Des-
pite emotional attachments to their tiny plots68 a succession 
of droughts ( 1919, 1924-27), and depressions ( 1920-.23; 1929-33), 
shrivelled up what remaining assets they possessed69 and com-
bined.with the constant competition of African labor~0 to 
force them off the land.. The Second Great Trek of the Afrik-
aner people.was on, the trek to the cities. 
What had been a trickle before the Anglo-Boer War 
became a flood in.the twentieth century. Over half a million 
ning Council, Report No. 4: The Future of Farming in South 
Africa, 1945, (u .9:_. 10-' 45), P.7. 
66 CC I-119. 
67Large estates developed hand in hand with dwarf hold-
ings as the owners of the latter one after another were forced 
to sell out; for details of the South African .enclosure move-
ment see de Kiewiet, Qn• cit., p. 72; Macmillan, Complex 
South Africa, PP• 89,98; CC I-6 
68Unskilled railwaymen, for instance, would club toget-
her to make small monthly contributions. towards the purchase 
of a cow, with the aim ·of providing one of their band, ·chosen 
by lot, with a nucleus for hi~ return to the land. Macmillan, 
Complex South .Africa, p. 95. 
69 Interim Report of the Drought Investigation Commis-
sion, April 1922, 1922, Tu.G. 2~-'22), paras. 6,
1
156; U.G. 
30- 1 32, para. 43~ A.J. Bosman, Die Sakewereld-- n Halfeeu 
opkoms.en Groei, 1 in D.P. Goosen, editor, Die Triomf Y§ill. 
Nasionalisme in .Suid-Afrika 1910-1953 (Johannesburg: Impala 
Opvoedkundige Diens (Edms.) Bpk., 1953), ·p. '715. 
70 uEven now minimum wages and reserved employment for 
whites in occupations not rural have resulted in sharper nat-
. rJ ive competition on farms, thereby aggravating the rural exodus, . 
CC I-ll; see also U.G. 37-'35, para 242. 
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Whites, mostly Afrikaners, left the .countryside betwe.en 1911 
and 1951; 7 :1.. whereas before 1899 there were less than 10,000 
Afrikaners in all South African towns, 72 there were over a 
million by 1951, representing 69 per cent of the total 
Afrikaner population. 73 
In certain·respects this rural exodus was unlike urban 
migrations in many other industrializing countries. In West-
ern Europe the migrant came among people of his own national 
group, speaking his own tongue. The Afrikaner entering the 
cities met his conquerers, prosperous people whose language 
he often did not understand and whose contempt for his own 
language and customs was often made evident. Perhaps the 
closest parallel is the experience of the African in South 
Africa. 
"Undesirable influx," was the verdict of the Commie-
. sion In Re Pretoria Indigents: 
The poor white class is chiefly drawn from the orig-
inal European settlers of South Africa whose function 
should essentially be that of cultivators of the soil. 74 
The Commission pointed out that Poor White children 
in towns were ~exposed to many temptations"; that the pres-
ence of their parents there was 'Pnot desirable from an 
economic and moral standpoint, and that endeavours should be 
made to settle them on the land 11 ; it noted that a commission 
of $\.frikaners in the days when the Boers were masters in'_ the 
Transvaal had reached the same conclusion. 76 
?:!..Schumann, Qn• cit., p. 101; Walt, Wiid and Geyer, 
~· cit., vol. ii, p. 279; Pretoria News, 23 March 1955, 
quoted in P.~, 13/1955/134f. 
· 
72According to Dr. J. R. Albertyh of the D.R.C., 
Vereeniging News, 18 February 1950, inP.D. 8/1950/82. 
73Pretoria News, 23 March 1955, in P.D. 13/1955/l34f. 
74Paras. 23, ·18. (My italics.) 
• 
76 Para. 54. 
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For years this attitude persisted. In 1916 a member 
of the Relief And Grants-In-Aid Commission decided that the 
n ~ . 
only remedy lay in keeping as many Poor Whites on the land 
as possible.~6 On the occasion of the 1923 Poor White Cong-
ress, the Bloemfontein English-language newspaper, The Friend, 
called for a stepping-up of immigration from overseas as a 
protective measure for city dwellers against the lowering 
effect of the Afrikaner influx. 77 Two years later, a $'wit-
ness of standing'r advised the Economic and Wage Commission 
that the Poor Whites should all be exported f:~to other count-
ries~". 76 The mood of the.migrants, in the words of an 
Afrikaner poet, was that of 
om stief op stasies uit te klim, . 
klein stippels teen 1 n blinde kim •••• 79 
(step-children getting off at stations, 
·small specks against a blind horizon .••• ) 
Until the new Nationalist Government began opening 
permanent avenues of employment for Poor Whites in 1924, 
those in the towns existed partly on charity, partly by doing 
casual work such as trolley or cab-driving, and frequently 
by living on the money earned by their children as messen-
gers and newspaper sellers. The men were often driven to 
contravene the law, for instance by selling liquor to Africans. 
The women sometimes drifted into prostitution. 60 The chil-
dren, compelled to drop out of school at an early age to 
help their families financially, usually remained illiterate 
and had little opportunity of improving on their parents' 
economic position. Malnutrition and underf·eeding were rife. a:1.. . 
76T.P. 5- 1 16, First Minority Report, para. 27. 
7 7 Malan, 212.. ill· , p. 6. 
78U.~. 14~'26, Andrews-Lucas-Rood Report, para~ 171. 
79G .A. Watermeyer, liDie Tweede Trek1r, in Die Repub-
liek ~ Duisend Jaar. 
80T.~. 13-'08, para. 220; ibid., Mlnutes of Evidence, 
P• 9. 
a:L."Touleier••, The Poor White Problem in South Africa 
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In 1913, the Johannesburg Medical Officer of Health 
reported after visiting a Poor White shanty town: 
This slum-like property swarms with low-class white 
and coloured people and their children; their habits are 
swinish in their filthiness, and yards and conveniences 
cleaned up under the personal direction of the sanitary 
inspector may be found strewn with filth in the after-
noon. 82 · 
Similar conditions were observed by the Carnegie 
Commission nearly twenty yea-rs later, when the problem had. 
become more widespread: 
~n a large railway centre a hovel was seen in the 
corner by two corrugated iron fences. The room was 6 
by 4 feet in area, and 5 feet high. The two fences 
served as two sides of the room; the other two sides 
were of iron sheets. The roof was a framework of a 
bed covered with bags. Here a mother and five small 
children lived. 
Just over the municipal boundry of a large city a 
father, mother and baby (the other children had been 
removed to a Home), were'found seated round a fire in 
front of the place where they had slept. The walls 
were made of iron sheets, but the height of the wall 
was the breadth of a sheet, about two feet. The roof 
was of reeds and pieces of wood covered with bags. 
To enter, they had to push aside a curtain and creep in 
on all fours. When they were lying down, the roof was 
about one foot above them. 83 
Political Asnects Of The Poor White Problem 
At least 24 commissions and conferences were devoted 
wholly or in part to a study of the _Poor White problem bet~ 
ween 1886 and 1939, beginning with a synod of the Nederduits 
Gereformeerde Kerk and ending with the Eerste Ekonomiese 
Volkskongres (People's First Economic Congress) on the eve 
of the Second World War. 
(Johannesburg: The S.A. Liberty Press, n.d.), PP• 20f. 
82Quoted in X.P. 5- 1 !6, Second Minority Report, P• 113. 
63 CC V-27~. 
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It is not surprising that so much interest was shown 
in the problem, for it entered deeply into three main polit-
ical relationships: White and Black; Bri t·on and Afrikaner; 
prosperous and poor Afrikaner. 
Its effect on the first of these drew the most atten-
tion. Various dangers were noted. Some said that the fact 
that many white people were living in poverty comparable to 
that o~ Africans imperilled God 1 s Plan for the country: 
The call to civilise of the white man in South A~rica, 
and especially of the Boerevolk, requires that he main-
tain a standard of living that shall be much higher than 
that of the non-white, because he cannot otherwise ful-
fill his calling ••.• 64 
More generally stressed was the ~ear that spreading 
poverty among the white people could undermine their common 
front against the black people. In the circumstances emp-
loying some questionable analogies to express this, the Car-
negie Commission wrote in 1932: 
In a country like South Africa a conviction of their 
essential solidarity is of supreme: .interest to all Europ-
eans. The history of all countries teaches us that the 
neglect or oppression of a part of the population leads 
to the great detriment, if not the ruin of the whole 
nation •••• History shows how the Hellenes abominated the 
Helots, and the Roman Patricians the Plebians, and that 
out of such action grew the seeds of national disruption. 
At the Poor White Congress at Cradock in 1916 the late 
~~. George Hofmeyr said, rA nation is like a ship; it is 
impossible for one end of it to begin sinking without 
threatening the safety of the whole.' In our country with 
its great predominance of natives, this truth·is of 
special significance. 65 
.. _ .... 
64J. H. Coetzee, Verarming en Oorheersing (Bloem-
fontein: Nasionale Pers Beperk, 1942), p. 39. · 
66 CC V-103. The Select (Parliamentary) Committee on 
European Employment and Labour Conditions had more or less 
the same to say in 1913; "The importance of the Poor White 
~ueBtlonin South Africa arises from the fact that the Europ-
ean mi~ortty occupying, as it does, in relation to the non-
European majority the position of a dominant race, cannot 
allow a considerable number of its members to sink into 
·apathetic indigency, and to fall below the level of the non-
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It was specially noted in this connection that poverty 
was bringing marty Poor Whites into continuous contact with 
Non-vThites. Thus in Port Elizabeth in 1929, more than 3,000 
white people were found living in the Karsten slum area which 
also contained 10,000 non-white ·people. BQ 'rUnmistakable 
. . . . B 
signs of social mingling between white and coloured· were 
observed. 8 ·7 This mingling was regarded as undesirable for 
two reasons. On the on·e. hand, the Poor Whites thereby were 
thought .to be losing their sense of ttracial pride" and feel-
ing of 11 solidarity't with other white ·people; on the other, 
that 
•.• the non-white loo13es through this contact and this 
social.intimacy the necessary awe for the white in general, 
and in his heart· is born a rebellious spirit towards, and 
a dangerous feeling of equality with· the white. 88 
To meet the problem, the Carnegie Commission recom-
mended that Poor Whites be trained in "solidarity and racial 
selfrespectr1 ; 11 a· national· crusade on the part of the State, 
the Church and.the School in the interests of the whole people 
is urgently indicat.ed. 11890 
The Poor White problem also affected the white popul-
ation's internal relationships. The fact ·that the Poor Whites 
·belonged predominantl~ to one section of the ruling minority--
perhaps more than 90 per cent were Afrikaners90--created tens-
European worker. If they do ••• our race is bound to perish in 
11 t South Africa, S.Q. 9- 13, para. 2. 
86 CC I-222. 
, 
87 CC V-:-106--reported under the heading 'Loss of Racial 
.Pride • 
88Coetzee, .212.· cit., pp. 4if. 
8 ~CC,. Joint Findings and Recommendations, para. 103; 
CO V-106. 
9
°Coetzee, op. cit., p. 36. Dr. N. Diederichs, Ekonom-
iese Bewuswording, Kongresrede B.§hou }2y geleentheid Y.§U1 die 
Derde RDB.-Kongres in Bloemfontein QQ }, 4 en 2 Julie ~ 
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ions not only b.etween the two sections, but introduced prob-
lems for the Afrikaners themselves. It meant that class dis-
tinctions were emerging among the latter which threatened to 
obstruct the attainment of grqup unity. Afrikaners had quar-
relled frequently in the past, but their political align-
ments had not been based on economic and social differences. 
Before the era of gold, one Afrikaner remarked with only 
II 
slight exaggeration, we were all poor but we were all 
· eq~al and we were happy. 9-~ Now some Afrikaners were rich, 
while the majority were so poor that in one of the most im-
poverished districts of the Cape the Carnegie Commission for 
the first time heard a white man addressing his employer as 
nbaasr11--an appellation traditionally reserved for use by Non-
Whites.92 Economic contrasts and social cleavages were not-
iced in nearly every region visited ·by the Commission, the 
wealthier Afrikaners coming to resent the handshaking fam-
iliarity and claims of kinship of their poor relatives. 93 In 
towns, the indigent Whites were regarded almost as degenerates 
by their prosperous compatriots. 94 
(R.D.E. Voorligtingreeks No. 10), p. 9, claims that 98 per 
cent of Poor Whites were Afrikaners. For further comments on 
this point see Dr. E. F. Verwoe~d, n·Die t?estryding van A.rmeede 
en die Herorganisasie van Welvaartswerk, in Verslag ~ die 
Volkskongres oor die Armblanke-vraagstuk·Gehou te Kimberley, 
2 tot 5 Okt. 1934, PP• 28-30. 
9 ~CC ·I-53n. 
92 CC I-129. 
93 CC I-17f; Macmillan, Complex South Africa, p. 100. 
94This emerges quite melodramatically in a 1935 Dep-
ression novel, Die Ondergang Y§g rn Medemens (The Fall of a 
Fellow Man) by Maarten E. Conradie (Pretoria: J~ L. Schaik, 
Bpk.). Van Ravenstein, head bookkeeper of an importing con-
cern, looses his job. However, he refuses to seek relief 
wo.rk at the Office of White labour, where he fears having to 
stand in line with Poor White 11blikkiesdorpers 11 (shanty town 
dwellers); •rwe have sunk low e:aough, u he explains to his wife. 
He relents when his family begins starving, but the trip to 
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The ·impatience and con~empt encountered by the Poor 
i ' 
Whites impressed them rrith a ~ense of inferiority and bitter-
ness.96 T4ey began breaking ~ith their traditional instit-
1 
utions, particularly the DutcH Reformed Churches, in whose 
puritanical Calvinism which coln·sidered poverty a mark of 
I 
, I 
inferiority and prosperity a s:ign of God 1 s blessing, 9·~ they 
I 
found no comfort. Thousands jloined various evangelical 
I . 
sects where they were welcome~ as ·equals and often invited 
to. t-ake prominent parts in relligious services. S? 7 By 1951, 
170,000 Afrikaners, one-eighth[ o~ the total language group, 
. I , 
no longer belonged to the Dutcp. Reformed Churches. 99 
However, the drift from! traditional Afrikaner instit-
utions d.id not culminate in m~~s desertions, and the socia~ 
cleavage within Afrikanerdom d~d not assume a clear-cut pol-
' itical expression.~ 00 Recallihg the spirit of co-operation 
I 
. , I 
that had obtained in the pione~r past, Afrikaner intellec-
i 
tuals and politicians urged th~ir people to renew this spirit 
I 
and to stick together. They f~attered the Poor Whites as 
l 
I 
n 1 u the White Labour Office was f9r him a journey to Canossa. 
Finally, after further such hu~iliations, he looses his 
sanity, in a medical sense. ' 
96 CC V-l03f. 
96A..J. Bruwer, Kanitali~me, Party-Politiek en Armoede 
(Bloemfontein: Gedruk vir dieiSkrywer deur Nasionale Pers 
Beperk, 1935), p. 165. · \ 
I 
97CC II-73. The Apostqlic Faith Mission in recent 
years had approximately 70,000iwhite adherents, nearly all of 
them Afrikaners, Patterson, The Last Trek, p. 214. 
. i 
96Ibid., p. 70. 
I 
I • 
99 In 1934, the National]st Movement split, one sec-
tion following Hertzog into Fusion with the political party 
of.thy English spealq.ng electo~ate, the other following Dr. 
Malan s Purified Natlonal Party
1
• The latter received strong 
support from Poor Whites in the; Cape, but in other provinces 
where peverty was also rampant ~t was less successful; 
see below, pp. 59f •. i 
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11 aristocrats and rulers" and It children of martyrs, "J.oo and 
they identified themseives with their strugglee Although 
large Afrikaner estates continued to grow,· and the rural 
exodus of poor men whose heart was still on the land went 
on, no cry for land reform was ever issued • .1.o.1. Instead, dis-
content was channelled outside the group. Afrikaners were 
taught that their-poor economic circumstances were entirely 
due to foreigners and that the solution lay in bridling the 
'imperialists' and the 1 kaffirs~ • .1.os Probaply typical of 
thousands of speeches comprising this educational campaign 
was an address delivered on a farm in ~934 by a Professor 
S. P. · Barnard. He delineated .for his· rural audience their . 
various enemies. First, ther~ was the Englishman. He con-
trolled the banks, such as National and Standard Bank, which 
encouraged Boers to borrow money, usually at excessive rates 
of interest, and even to over-capitalize their farms. The 
moment the farmer·got into difficulties, these alien instit-
utions pressed for repayment. Na.turally they cared not a 
whit for the effect on the Boers, as their interests lay 
overseas. Then there were ~J:cursed insti tutio'nsn, like the 
11Gemengde Raad vir kaffers €m witmense 11 ( ttMixed ·Council for 
riiggers and white men 11 , i.e.," Joint Council for Bantu and 
Europeans), and woolly-minded parsons who were so enamored 
100Dr. D. F. Malan, rrDe Toestand van achteruitgang en It . de oorzaken daarvan, in Verslag van get Kerkelik Kongre~ 
Gehouden te Cradock, 1916, p. 11. 
. .1.o.1.See G. D. Scholtz, Het Die Afrikaanse Volk ~-
Toekoms? (Johannesburg: Voortrekkerpers Beperk, 1954), p. 112; 
Macmillan, Complex South Africa, pp. 85f. 
:l. 02 In a chapter enti tl.ed, rrDirect Economic- Losses as A 
Consequence of Domination), a tally is given of various Brit-
ish actions and omissions claimed responsible for the Afrikan-• .. . . . 
er s economic backwardness; this ranges from the humanand 
material losses of the Anglo-Boer War, back to the number of 
hous.es burned, horses, cattle and sheep stolen in an 1~34 
frontier war with Africans. 
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with 1rdie liewe kaffertjies" ( 11 dear little niggersn) as to 
have iost all concern for the bread and butter of their own, 
white :flesh and blood. Meanwhile, ~tkaffers 11 were allowed to 
insult white women and Indian factory owners were raping 
Afrikaner girl workers •. The 11 Black PerilN: was more dangerous 
than ever.'l.os 
The Nationalists did more than talk. In the following 
chapter we shall deal in detail with concrete measures under-
taken by the Nationalist Government after 1924 to help Poor 
Whites. As we have indicated, the latter responded to the 
various efforts to keep them within the ranks of the ruling 
group, and more particularly within the Afrikaner fold. Their 
plight provided Afrikaner Nationalism with a strong platform, 
and their votes made it a viable force.~04 Seventeen of the 
twenty Cape seats won by Dr. Malan's Purified National Party 
in the 1938 General Election were captured in areas where the 
1932 percentage of ·white families in the Carnegie Commission•s. 
classi,fication o-r the 11very poorFJ! was above the national 
average.~ 05 Ten years later the Nationalist General Election 
victory was decided in the urban constituenciest'l.06 where as 
~ 03Prof. S. P. Barnard, Die Armblanke Kwessie en die 
Naturelle Probleem, rede gehou Qn Dingaans Dag, 122i, OD die 
Plaa.s Erfenis, distrik Ventersburg. 
~ 04Macmillan, Complex South Africa; p. 41; Patterson, 
op. cit., p. ~3; 11 Touleier", 2.P.• cit., :pp. 3f; Leo Marquard, 
The Black Man s Bl.:lrden, by· John Burger {psrud.) (London~ Vic~ 
tor Gollancz Ltd., 1943), p. 120; U.G. 14- 26, Mills-Clay-Martin 
Report, p. 81. 
'l.06 This statement is based on a comparison of the res~ 
ults of the Carnegie Commission survey on the incidence of 
poverty in the.administrative districts of South Africa, pres-
ented in tabular form in CO III-218f, with constituency elec-
tion returns contained in Goosen et al, editors, Die Triomf 
~ Nasionalisme in Suid-Afrika 1910-1953, passim. · 
~06According to Mr. B. J. Schoeman, then Minister of 
Transport·, Die Vaderland; 12 June 1957, in P.D. 23/1957/223. 
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a result mainly of the influx of poor people the Afrikaner 
population increased by 84per cent between 1938 and 1948, 
as against a 21 per cent increase in the non-Afrikaner white 
urba~ group.~07 
The Economic.Division Within The 3Uling Caste 
Not all Afrikaners became Poor Whites, but Afrikaners 
in general have remained much less prosperous than other 
Whites. Indeed, the Poor Whites disappeared as a social en-
tity in the wake of the industrial expansion during and after 
the Second World War. But the economic inferiority of Afrik-
aners as a whole in relation to English-speaking Whites has 
persisted. Just how closely economic contrasts have co-incided 
over a long period with ethnic differences will be seen from 
the statistics gathered in the next few pages. 
Table II (p. 61) reflects these contrasts in the 
sphere of work; it shows how differently Afrikaners and non-
Afrikanerc:Mhi tes have been represented over the range of 
occupations in nine of the main urban areas of South Africa: 
the Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, 
East Londo~, Bloemfontein, Pietermaritzburg and Kimberley: 
~8 7Lukas Johannes Potgieter, Die Ekonomie ~ die 
Afrikaner.en :ex .Aandeel in die Sakelewe (Unpublished Master 
of Commerce Dissertation in Economics, Potchefstroom 
University for Christian Higher Education, 1954), p. 23. 
TABLE II . 
PERCENTAGE OF AFRIKANERS AMONG WHITE MEN IN VARIOUS 
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN THE CITIES OF SOUTH .AFRICA, 
BASED ON CENSUS DATA AND VOTERS' LISTS108 
Occupational Group 
1. Unskilled Laborers•······ 
2. · Mineworkers ••••• ~. ·• •· .•••• 
3. Railway Workers •••••••••• 
4, Factory Workers •••••••••• 
5. Carpenters .................. 
6. Bricklayers •••••••.••••••• 
7· F~tters •••••••••••.•••••• 8. Clerks ••••••••••••••••••• 
9. Civil Servants ••••••••••• 
10. -Teachers ••••••••••••••••• 
11. Business Managers 
( 0§:mllllf?:J;l~ ~). 
12. Merchants •••••••••.••••••• 
13. :Professional People •••••• 
14 •.. Oompap.y' Di:rector~, . Manuf- . 
acturer13 (Industry), etc. 
~ercentage Afrikaners Among 
All Wb.i tea Surveyed ••••••••.• 
Percentage 
1926 1939 1948 
60 82 86 
53 69: 79 
42 57 74 
5,0" 63 
18 31 46 
32 53 65 
10 8 21 
13 19 32 
32 43 54 
28 49 61 
6 8 15 
4 10" 
11 9 15 
3 5 
30 
61 
108 . . The figures for 1926 are taken.fro.m Pauw, QJ2• cit., 
Table XXIII, pp. 222 ... 225, and those for 1939 .and 1948 from· 
It S. Pauw!J Die Afrikaanse Ondernemer, die Verbruiker en die 
Werker, t in Verslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres 
(12.5.Q), ·4, 5 en.§. Oktober ~' Bloemfontein (Johannesburg: 
Gedruk deur Voortrekkerpers Beperk, n.d.), Table II, p. 113. 
· Omissions in ·the l-926 col1;llil!l :ar-e. dut3 tp·· pOJllparable figures 
being unavailable. A discussion of· the methods employed in 
the collection of the data appears in the sources cited. 
109
-Approximate estimate based on the 1951 Census. At 
that time the Afrikaans-speaking (home language) white popul-
ation of the said, nine urban areas was 40.2 per cent of their 
total white population (excluding 26,826 persons with both 
English and Afrikaans listed as home language). Dnion Statis-
62' 
As the ratio of occupied Afrikaners to all occupied 
Whites represented in the Table is 23, 30 and 40 per cent, 
respectively, for 1926, 1939,and 1948, the percentage of 
Afrikaners in each vocational category in these years should 
correspond approximately to these proportions were Afrikaners 
on an economic par with other white people •. But evidently 
this has.not been the case; it will be seen, for example, 
that non-Afrikaner Whites, who constituted 77 per cent of the 
urban occupi~d male gr.oup in 1926, accounted for 94 per cent 
of the commercial business managers and only 40 per cent of 
the unskilled white workers~ 
Indeed; on'ly in fields like or close to unskilled labor 
have Afrikaners predominated. Out of 60 urban.occupations 
ranked according to importance as a source of employment to 
various white ethnic groups, unskilled labor ranked first in 
importance among Afrikaners in 1926, eighteenth among white 
people of British ancestry, 27th among Jews and eleventh 
among other Whites.~~o Mineworking, associated with spec~al · 
hazards and occupational maladies, in 1939 ranke.Q. second 
.among Afrikaners, and thirteenth among non-ltfrikaner Wb.ites.:J..~l. 
The further down the occupational ladder one· travelled 
the more Afrikaners were found, and the high~r one went the 
'• . J 
language usually heard was English. In the.class of Railway 
officials, station masters, etc.,r Afrikaners comprised in 
1926 only 8 per cent of the employees, in the class of 
'Conductors' 38 per cent, in the. cJ.,ass.of 'Railway laborers', 
71 per cent.~~ 2 This was the position throughout the civil 
•. 
tics for Fifty Years 1910-1960 (Compiled ·by the Bureau of 
Census and Statistics, Pretoria, 1960), p. A-18. 
1 ~ 0Pauw, Beroensarbeid van die Afrikaner in die Stad. 
Table XXIV, P• 127. . 
3..11Ibid., ·p. : 243. 
J.l. 2 cc I-224. 
63 
service~ a sphere which became particularly identified as an 
employment field for the Afrikaner. · In the top- salaried 
grades (those over ~500 a year) of 22 Departments of State 
in 1931, Afrikaners occupied a majority of the posts in only 
one--the Department of Education; 77.9 per cent of the top-
salaried officials in 28 State and Provi~cial Departments 
were English-speaking South Africans. Even in Departments 
whose jurisdiction affected Afrikaners primarily--Lands, 
Agriculture, Forestry, Irrigation--the same situation prev-
ailed. In the Departments of Native .Affairs and Police, 
Afrikaners held only 2.6 per cent_and·5.1 per cent, l"~spec­
tively, of the senior positions. 1 ia As.recently. as 1952, 
when 80 per cent of the white staff employed by the South 
African Railways and Harbours Admin~stration was .A.frikaans-
speaking, 67 per cent of those in the ~1,000-a-year-and-over 
group were English-speaking;.the Post Office reflected a 
similar position. 1~ 4 
Income disparities between the two sections of the 
ruling minority paralleled their occupational difference.s. 
They still do, as is shown in the following table (p. 60), 
which represents the per capita income of the two groups in 
the major urban centers: 
113Pauw, Beroepsarbeid ~ die Afrikaner in die Stad 
Table XXI, p. 188. 
1~ 4Patterson, op. cit., p. 85. 
TABLE III 
PER CAPITA INCOME OF ENGLISH- AND AFRIKAANS-SPEAKING 
WHITE3 IN THE :MAJOR URBAN CENTERS OF SOUTH AFRICA, 
BASED ON THE 1951 CENSUS~~ 6 
Urban .Area 
East Rand1 
West Rand 2 
.Johannesburg 
Percentage. of 
.Afrikaners 
Among White 
Population 
56.8 
62 •. 1 
29.1 
Witwatersrand 
Pretoria 
43 
67.2 
21.9 
12.8' 
39.8 
73.3 
Cape Town 
D-urban 
Port Elizabeth 
Bloemfontein 
Per Capita 
Afrikaans-
speaking 
Whites 
180 
196 
184 
182 
179 
203 
212 
151 
180 
Income (I:.) 
English-
speaking 
Whites 
283 
267 
384 
349 
303 
312· 
301 
296 
318 
1 Benoni, Boksburg, Brakpan, Germiston, Nigel, Springs 
2 Krugersdorp, Randfontein, Roodepoort· 
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In Johannesburg, the country's business c.apital, 81 
Afrikaners were listed in 1951 in the super income bracket 
(over I:.3,000 a year) in contrast t~ 3,201 white people with 
English and other home languages.~16 Only one per cent of 
the return on capital investeQ in mining accrued to Afrikaner 
min~owners and shareholders. 117 
Only in agriculture did Afrikaners occupy leading pos-
itions. Their low or weak standing in industrial and profes-
sional occupations is largely accountable to the fact that 
. 
115Potg1eter, ~· cit., pp. 40f; G. T. Visser, 
11Stedelike Koopkrag van Afrikaans- en Engelssprekerides," 
Volkshandel XV:56, Table III, March 1954. 
116:Potgieter, ,Q,:Q. cit., p. 43. 
117Ibid., Table v, p. 19. 
-- . . 
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training::aild experience f'or these activities_ must be acquired 
in the city, and from the. city1 as we know, Afrikaners were 
long separated by both distance and language. . They arrived 
in towns usually as poor men or students, and in both ins-
tances f'aced disadvantages. Af'rikaner medical students, f'or 
example, were impeded not only b.Y ·having to study through the 
medium of a foreign language (English), but coming as the· 
majority did from rural are·~s they were handicapped financial-
. ly by the additional expenses on room and board which urban 
English-speaking students did not have to meet, and which, 
. ' . . 
since the majority of' the latters parents were well estab-
lished in commerce, f'inance and the professions, was usually 
no problem for them. .It is not surprising therefore that in 
1938, when the total white population was composed approx-
imately of 57 per cent Afrikaners, 37.5 per cent Britons, 
and 4.5 per cent Jews,. the respective percentages of medical 
students were 27.6, 35.4 and 35.4.J.J.e 
EVen the few non-agricultural areas in which Afrikan-
ers had made advances were lost to them aft:er the arrival of 
the immi~rant economy. Banking provides a case in point. 
Between 1836 and 1861, 31 district banks were established in 
various villages of the more advanced Cape Colony. For the 
most part these undertakings were initiated by Afrikaner 
entrepreneurship and capital. By the end of.the century, how-
ever, all but one had come to grief, struck down by succes-
sive business crises and absorbed and replaced by the great 
imperial banks that spread themselves all over the country.J.l.Sl' 
~18Pauw, Beroepsarbeid ~die Afrikaner in die Stad, 
pp. 27lff; only 22.6 per cent of the .Afrikaner students lived 
in the towns where they studied, compared with 41.8 per c~nt 
of the British students and 59.4 per cent of the .Jews. Over 
60 per cent of :the students~ fathers, in 1938, were engaged 
in commer·ce, finance and the pro.fessions, but few of these 
were .Afrikaners. 
1 J. 9Schumann, £2• cit., pp. 24, 34f. 
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The Afrikaners 1 relatively low economic status was, 
however, not determined by the play of impersonal forces 
alone. Po~itics also played a part. The Anglo-Boer War can 
be considered one element in this. But there were more. 
Despite the death ro21:l in the-concentration camps, the 
Afrikaans-speaking section still emerged from the struggle 
with a numerical majority among the white population. Pros-
pects for permanent British supremacy in South Africa accor-
dingly were limited. Lord Milner, Britainrs chief represen-
tative in the country in the· post-war period hoped to impPove 
them. 1ti am determined to break the dominion of Afrikanerdom, 11 . 
he was alleged to have remarked.~20 Whether or not he was 
quoted correctly, h;l..s actions certa'inly reflected the spirit 
of these.words. 
Milner set about the task in several ways: he launched 
an educational program designed to eliminate the Afrikaans 
language and Afrikaner group consciousness, coupled this with 
an immigration drive to achieve electoral predominance for 
the British section, and instituted administrative measures 
to insure the existence of a Government bureaucracy, British 
in membership and loyalty. 
The first of these schemes do not concern us here, 
though the result was a strong reaction highlighting issues 
that led to the formation of the National Party in 1912.~2 k 
His other policies are directly relevant. Milner estimated 
the white population at the end of the War to be composed as 
follows: 
British 
368,000 
Afrikaners (Dutch) 
496,000 
Other Whites 
76,000 
Total 
940,000 
By means of encouraging British immigration, the 
~20Molteno, "The Dominion of Afrikanerdom$ pp. l84f. 
~ 2~For the Afrikaner view of Milner's language policy, 
see Macdonald, ~- cit., pp. 95f; Oswald Pirow, James Barry 
Munnik Hertzog \Cape Town: Howard Timmins, n.d.), pp. 43f'. 
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numerical position after five years would appear thu.s: 
British .Afrikaners (Dutch) Other Whites Total 
615,000 544,000 111,000 1,270,000122 
A Semi-official British immigration agency, the 
~Emigration Information Office~, established in London, is-
sued brochures painting the attractions of the Transvaal and 
Orange River Colony to prospective immigrants. In order to 
hold in the country British soldiers who had fought in the 
War~ preference was given to them in the allocation of Crown 
Lands in the ex-Republics. Assisted passages were offered 
to British women willing to settle in the former Republics.~ 28 
As previously indicated, the size of the public establishment 
was increased to provide jobs for the new settlers, and 
Afrikaners were ejecte.d from the only important· place they 
had yet occupied in the vocational life of the Republics. 
The post-War drought and depression spiked Milner's 
plan to attain permanent voting supremacy through numerical 
predominance. But though he failed in this, and Afrikaners 
with·their higher birth rate continued to hold the key to 
SouthAfrican elections,. the extent to which British immig-
ration was increased left a lasting imprint on the country's 
social structure. For the immigrants who settled in South 
Africa during the Milner Period (18$}7-1905) acquired domin.:. 
ating positions in every branch of the economy, in the pub-
1ic.service, in commerce, and in industry. They remained in 
these positions for the remainder of their lifetimes, twen-
ty, thirty and forty years. 
Professor S. Pauw examined the Civil Service lists 
for 1920 and 1938 and found that a high proportion of the top-
salaried officials in both cases received their first appoint-
.:l. 22van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, .212• cit., vo1. i, p. 
77· 
~ 23 clu Plessis, Die Nederlandse Emigrasie ~ Suid-Afrika, 
p. 45. 
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menta during Mllnerts time. In 1938, on the eve or the Second 
World War, 37.3 per cent or the officials in the administrat-
ive departments or the civil service earning between ~00 and 
~999 a year, and 52.1 per cent or those with annual salaries 
or ~1,000 and over, were first appointed between 1900 and 
1904. ~.2 4. ~'Over a period or thirty years and longer," Prof-
essor J?auw.observes, "governments have come and gone; but the 
Milner Men always continued to exert their influence."~26 
That influence also extended into the private sector 
of the economy. Of the urban dwellers liste·d in the 1939 
edition or The South African Who's Who, which gives a fairly 
represe~tative sample or individuals prominent in business 
and industrial circles, 58.8 per cent were born overseas.~26 
It will be seen from Figure 1 (p.69) that twice as many or 
thes.e people entered South Africa during the Milner era than 
in any other period or equal duration~ 
Furtaermore, the controlling positions acquired by 
these immigrants in the economy and the public service added 
a self-perpetuating factor to British econoffilc and social sup-
remacy; rtTo a large degree, the selection or new personnel 
in the occupations, and of successors to themselves, rested 
in their hands.~2 ? 
Probably many or the immigrants who came to South 
Africa during the Milner Period would ~ave been attracted to 
the country anyway, and would have found their way to the top 
unaided, even in the public service, for which insufficient 
Afrikaners were trained and from which no great number were 
ejected. But the fact that their dOminance was associated 
J. 24Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner.in die Stad, Table 
III, P• 7.7 • . 
~26 Ibid., P• 77. 
~26 Ioia., P• 78. 
~ 2 ?Ibid., p. 78. 
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FIGqRE :1: 
RELAT~TE CONTRIBUTIONS OF DIFFERENT IM¥IGRATION PERIODS 
TO THE GROUP OF URBAN· DWELLERS IN THE UNION WHO ARE 
LISTED IN. THE l939 EDITION OF THE SOUTH .AFRICAN WHO'S WHO:t. 2 e 
~ 28 Ibid., Graph III, P• 79. 
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with a calculated i-mperialist policy helped fill the economic 
and social gulf separating .English- and Afrikaans-speaking 
Whites with emoti~nal overtones. Moreover, Afrikaners were 
angered that language equality, enshrined in the 1910 Act of 
Union, was not--t9 their economic detriment--strictly enfor-
ced; ~29 in this, too, they saw the hand. of imperialism. 
Thus immigrant industrialism left South Africa with 
its ruling minority divided not only into liguistic and eth-
nic groupings but on economic and social lines largely co-
inciding with these--a split that was psychological and pol-
itical. "'once again in our hearts and lives, 11 said an Afrik~ 
. II , 
aner leader in 1903," the lines must be drawn, which indicate 
tbe boundry between ourselves and all foreigners. 11 ~ 80 
Indeed the ~foreigners1' were cut off from Afrikaners 
not only at the start, but thereafter. They lived in towns; 
the older population lived on farms. They won the war; 
Afrikaners lost it. They became rich; Afrikaners did not. 
The separation remained. Even when Afrikaners began to be 
~?, 9 In 1912, about 85 per cent of the Civil Service was 
English-speaking. The Public Service Act of 1912 provided 
that entrants to the Civil Service after the passage of the 
Act, who spoke only one of the two o·fficial languages, would 
be required to attain bi-lingualism within five years of 
their appointment or promotion· would be withheld. In prac-
tice this measure seems never to have been stringently enf-
orced by pre-1924 non-Nationalist Governments. In March 1925, 
nearly 30 per cent of the Civil Service was still uni-lingual, 
and 99·7. of the uni-linguals were British, to 0.3 per cent 
Afrikaans-uni-lingual·. In 22 Departments of State in 1931 
there was not a single Afrikaans-speaking official in the hig-
hest' paid categories (over ~500 per annum) who could not 
speak the other language. However in fifteen of these Dep-
artments, the percentage of English-speaking officials unable 
to speak Afrikaans exceeded the bi-lingual English-speaking 
officials. In the Public Works Department, for example, 82.7 
per cent of the top-salaried officials spoke only English; 
in the Native Affairs Department this percentage was 73·. 3 
Ibid., Table XXI, p. 188, pp. 186f. 
130Quoted in L. J'. E. Retief, l 11The Afrikaner cultural 
reaction to 'Milnerism' , 11 (Unpublished paper read in a His-
tory Honours Seminar, University of Cape Town, 1959), p. 2·. 
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urbanized, they lived apart in the poorer quarters of the 
cities, nursing their defeat and memories of past status on 
a medicine of social inferiority. 13 L 
There were, of course, repercussions. Some of these 
will be traced in the two chapters that follow. 
L 3 j_
11frhere exists a~ inferiorit~ complex among us which 
·has arisen·~ue to forei~ predominance --Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, 
rrverbruikersverenigings, '~ Referate, Beslui te ~ Presensielys, .. 
Ekonomiese Volkskongres, ·}, 4 en 2 Oktober, 12}2, Bloemfontei~ 
p. 165 {henceforth to be ci te.d as Verslag ·van die ·Eerste ·•· 
Ekonomiese Volkskonp;res); this· matter is also brought up in 
J. D. Kestell, .MY Nasie in Nood (Bloemfontein: Nasionale Pers 
Bpk.,), pp.l5, 25. 
III 
' 
I 
THE PATH OF THE W,ITE WORKER 
I 
I 
I Wherever •.•• he enters the "~preach for his Volk, the 
Afrikaner of the new Great Trek encounters the non-white 
. I by his Blood River half or eyen completely unarmed, with-
out ramparts and without riv$r protection; defenceless 
on the open plains of econom+c equality. 
I 
Dr~ D. F* Malan, speech on the 
ce,tenary of the Battle of · 
Blqod River, 16 December, 1938.~ 
! 
I 
t 
In 1893, a young Englishmdn newly arrived in Cape Town 
! joined a trainload of immigrants ito the Transvaal. He was a 
qualified fitter and within a fo~tnight had found himself a 
! job on a goldmine, the Geldenhuis Estate. A foreman immediat-
ely initiated him in his duties. i u·Here' s your hammer," th~ 
I 
man said, handing him his tools, l11 ana. here's your chisel, 
I • t II 
shifting spanner, pliers ••• and h~re s a nigger. The young 
II . i I 11 • 
man was somewhat taken aback. W;hat s he for? he asked. The 
• I If • foreman looked at him,.and repliedj tersely: To carry your 
112 I tools. I 
I 
'The young fitter, Bill Ana.jrews, was to become a trade 
union leader and head of the Co~unist Party in South Africa. 
Meanwhile he learned more about t~e local labor scene. One 
I 
day his helper, a young Zulu, inquired how much he drew in 
wages. nA pound a shift, tt Andrew~ replied. nAnd how much do 
I get?Jf. asked the Zulu. I1:What 1 s ~t--two bob a day?'t 11Yes, II 
I 
said tlie Zulu. "And is that righ~? Who does al·l tne liard 
work, who lifts the iron into thelmachine, who carries your 
I 
2-·L· 
s.tad: 
I 
~Die Nuwe Groot·Trek. Suia-Afrika §.§. NoodroeT. 12£. 
Malan se Reds 21:?. Bloedrivier 16 Desember .12..2§ Kaap-
Nasionale Pers Beperk, n. a.. i), P• J:O. 
I 2 Quoted in Cope, Comrade Bitll, p. 27. 
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things for you, and hands you your tools? I do. us 
Underground, where the ore was extracted, ·black mine 
employees did more of the actual work than even Andrews•·zulu 
helper, a Parliamentary Committee discovered from a mining 
e~gineer in 1913: 4 · 
17. What class of work are the Africans allowed to 
do?--They drill holes and do tramming and shoveling 
work, but they are not allowed to run rock dril]_s; 
that is they do run rock drills, but a white man 
supervises. 
18. What do you mean by supervising?--Well, he's always 
there. 
19. And does nothing?--I do not say he does nothing. 
20. Well, he watches?--Yes, he watches. 
21. What does he do while he is watching?--If the rock 
drill went out of order he would help the boy to put 
it right. 
22. And if it does not go out of order1--He would still 
watch. 
23. Is he allowed to smoke?--Yes. 
24. I suppose he sits down and smokes and w~tches the 
other fellows working?--He might have a smoke. 
25. And what ~oes he get paid for that?--The white, if 
he is on day's pay, would be paid 20s. to 25s. for 
his day. 
26. And the native?--The native would vary from ls. 9d. 
to 2s. or 2s. 3d. on day's pay. 6 
27. And that is what they call the division of labour?~­
That is the division. 6 
5Quoted ibid., pp. 27f. 
4 Testimony of Mr. H. Ross, Consulting Engineer to the 
··Durban Roodepoort Company and Vogelstruis Estates, S.C. 
9-'13, Minutes of Evidence. · 
6 Exclusive of food, housing and medical attention, 
then valued at 6d. to 7d. per day. 
6 Cf. the Tomlinson Report. (U .£. 61-' 55, P• 156): ''The 
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That the skilled white worker earned more in a day 
than the black worker earned in a week remain~d a distinc-
tive characteristic of the South African economy. In 1938, 
for instance, unskilled wages in South ~rica averaged_l6.7 
per cent of skilled wages_, a figure that stands in sharp con-.. 
trast to the corresponding percentage 
Great 
Canada Britain Italy Australia France 
52.9 66.0 68.4 75e4 75.6 
in many other countries: 7 
New 
Germany Zealand Sweden 
79.0 81.3 82_ .• 0 
Not only did the white artisans find themselves espec• 
ially well off in comparison with ·all other workers in their 
. 
n~w country, but their incomes were as high or higher than 
that of their counterparts throughout the world, including 
America. 6 Their position was distinguished fu~ther in that 
they were· frequently employers of labor themselves; they hired 
domestic workers for their homes, paid them and fired them. 9 
desire for seif-help must be stimulated in the Bantu. Nothing 
has· ever been gaip.ed without sweating and.labouring for it.H 
7 Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission of En-
~ (Q.i
1
G. o2-?.i}-;-p~ra. 260. ThW wage spread between whi:te 
(mainly skilled and semi-skilled ) workers has narrowed in 
some sectors of the·So~th African eeonomy, and widened in ot-
hers. The average wage of Africans, Indians and Coloureds 
as a percentage of white wages in manufacturing industry rose 
from 19, 21.2 and 31.3, respectively, in 1924/25 to 25, 42, 
42.8, respectively, in 1947/48 ;. but the -average wage of non-
white wages as a percentage of white wages in mining fell from 
10.5 to 7.2 ovet' the same period, ibid., Table 37, para. 244; 
see further Dr. Guy Routh, Industrial Relations and Race Rel-
ations (Johannesburg: S.A.I.R.R. New Africa Pamphlet No. 22, 
n.a..), p. 12 • 
. 
8For instance in 1914,--though the cost of living (food 
and rent) was 40 per cent greater on the Witwatersrand than 
in the United States, and nearly 80 per cent higher than in 
any European country,--the white artisans on the Reef were 
earning wages 40 per cent higher than in America and almost 
225 per cent higher than in any European country; allowing 
for the cost of living as a whole, they were considered to 
be better off than most .American workers, Report of the Econ-
omic Commission, 1914, (U.G .. 12- 1 14), para. 130. - - --
9de Kiewiet, Hist.ory of South Africa, p. 209; 'I' .G. 
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But their fortune was marred by a greater anxiety for 
the security of their jobs tha~ their overseas .counterparts 
eXJ:)erienced. · For the black me~ who toiled: :.under their super-
vision rapidly acquiredtheir ~kiiis and were.often perfor-
ming their jobs in fact though\not in name. 10 Employers 
came to view many of their white artisan employees as expen-
. . I 
sive feather-bedders, paid more than their work was worth, 
. ! . . 
·and strove to replace them by those who might be paid less.~1 
I -It is not therefore surprisinglthat the path of the skilled 
I 
white workers in South Africa is marked not so much by strug-
i gles for higher wages and imprd,ved working conditions, but 
by/a series of battles to hold \onto their jobs~ 
The problem confronting 1tthe unskille.d Whi tea, the Poor 
. l 
Whites, was of a different orde:r. Coming off the land, they 
. I . 
had no jobs at first. Theirs w~s a search for employment. 
This was more difficult. As th~ proportion of White to Non-
, . 
Wb.i:te in the total population was much higher than the ratio 
i 
of skilled to unskilled jobs available, wage differentials 
I 
being what they weX'e, relatively tew of these Afrikaner mig-
\ 
\ 
I . I . 13- OB, parae 73. Even many Po9r Whites kept servants, CC 
; I-176. At the Kakamas D.R.C. s~ttlement for Poor Whites, 
~,ooo of the latter maintained 400 GolRured servants, or 
no coloured ~eople worth. speak~ng of, according to a wit-
:aesa, !2,.Q. 9- 13, Minutes of Ev~dence, ·para. 592. 
i 
10The ability of African.\mine~a to perform all unde:r-. 
ground mining operations.was de~onstrated during the 1907 
Witwatersrand strike. Mr. Bay, )Manager of the ·Witwatersrand 
Deep gold mine, informed the Tr~svaal Indigency Commission-
at the time that 11the white meh who have been put in are 
' H really overseers, ·and the blacki boys are doing the work. 
II II The boys were running the mach~nery and taching the over-
' 8 ' seers their trade, T.G. 13- 0 , ~nutes of Evidence, paras~ 
8419f. : 
· 
11 In 1907 the Resident Ma6istrate of Kimberley test-
ified to the Transvaal Indigency:Oonimission that 11 85 per cent 
of the mechanics eniployed in theibuilding trade i:a Kimberley 
are coloured, and that their wages vary from 5s. to lOs. per 
diem. It is common opinion thatlunless some change soon 
tak.es place in Kimberley not a single white mechanic will be 
. II I I 8 
-employed in the building trade, . \T·~· 13- 0 , para. 55. 
\ 
I 
i 
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rants could aspire to reach t~e artisan·level.~ 2 On the other 
'hand; the lower level positiqns were occupied by Non-Whites, 
renumerated at a rate too lowlto enable a person to live in 
. . I . 
.. I 
the style or a white man.~ 8 I 
I 
Ir the immigrant white \workers discovered special mat-
erial adv~ntages as well as s~ecial problems in South Africa, 
so did the employers$ The la~ter maintained relations with 
the majority. or their workers !quite unlike those prevailing 
in their countries of' origin. \ Thus in the mining industry, 
they found themselves dealing [With migrant laborers, eight 
out or_ten of their employees ~eing African peasants who ret-
urned to their tribal homes af~e·r working for a spell. (Not 
all of them returned. In 1910\, the mortality rate among 
African miners coming from arejas north of. Latitude 22, reg-
ions from which about '80,000 wjere recruited annually, was 82 
per 1,000.~4 ) They were permi~ted to house them in what has 
been de.scribed as 1~a cross bet~een a stable and a prison, 
.known as·a compound .. 11 l. 5 These\ workers-were not allowed to 
form trade unions or· to strikel, . and were. not paid a wage suf-
ficient to support :family lifE+ ~6 . Their lack of political · 
rights guaranteed that their labor stayed cheap. 
. - I 
I . . . 
, 
12Report of the Unemployment Commission, 1922, (U.G. 
17- 22), para. 69. ! i 
~ 8As already stated, th~ great disparity between skil-
led and unskilled wage rates has remained. In 1945, the aver-
age minimum wage of' skilled wotkers 6n the Witwatersrand was 
45 per cent higher than in Lon~on, but the average minimum 
wage o:f English laborers was lf3 per cent higher than the 
laborerts wage 0:0: the Rand, Sopial and Economic Planning Coun-
cil, Report No. 1.}; The Econoinic and Social Conditions of 
the Racial Grouns in South A:frica, 1948, (U.Q:. 53- 1 2i8), para. 
62. I I 
I ~4Assembly Debates, volr i, 1911, c. 1179. 
l. 6 G. E. Williamson, n_Mu~ti-Racial Problems and the 
Development of Manufacturing I:ip.dustry in South .A:frica, "Race 
Relations, ·15: 25; 1948.. ·l · 
~ 6See Chapter V, PP• 24~ 24.5' 1- ,. 
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On the other hand, the employers were not free to or-
ganize their. employment structure in whatever way t~ey wished 
and could not ·derive maximum advantage :from the cheapness o:f 
·African labor. They were. expec:ted to reserve certain jobs 
:for white :people, and also to insure that no white man was 
:placed at a :post where he· would receive orders :from a Non-
White. Thus they cou.ld not promote·a :man solely in terms o:f 
his instrinsic value to the :firm .. 17 Furthermore, where a 
demand:for jobs existed, they were expected to accord :prefer-
ence to their :fellowWhites .. 
These social expectations or conventions applied through-
out the ~conomy. In the goldmining Industry certain skilled 
occupations were legally reserved .:for Whites, but :for the most 
part in that industry and elsewhere the racial distribution 
o:f jobs was governed by convention alone .. 
Although the conventional color bar, as it was known, 
held down their profits, employers were willing to abide by 
1 ts terms while business prospered. :1. 8 However when busines·s 
:1.?ltColoured workers. cannot, like the European employees, 
claim the·right to promotion on the mere grounds o:f competence 
and loyal service• 'r Advancement on these grounds might en~ 
tail :placing them in positions o:f authority over Whites, and 
rrrsuch a situation would run contrary to ordinary European 
sentiment and usage in South Africa in the relationship bet-
ween the two . groups, ft Report of the Commission o:f Inquiry 
Regarding the Cane C0loured Population 2f 1h& Union, 1937, 
(U.G. 54-• 37), :para. 223 .. Similar reasons were advanced to 
explain why Africans were prevented :from doing work for which 
some.had qualified, such as locomotive driving, but which em-
br'aced authoritative :functions, such ~s ordering white tres-
passers o:f:f the track, Report o:f the Mining Legislation Com-
mission, 1925,(U.G. 36- 1 25), :paras. 69,. 118n. The Dutch Ref-
ormed Church-sponsored Kimberley Conference on the Poor White 
:problem urged in 1934 that 11 strict supervision be exercised 
so t%at Europeans do .not work with or under natives or Asiat~ 
ics, Verslag van die Volkskongres oor die Armblanke-vraagstuk 
Gehoa te Kimberley, g tot 5 Okt. 1934, J! .. -.£2.2.. 
:1.eThe conventi-onal color bar long operated in trades 
and industries--engineering, building, :printing, etcr-where 
no legal restrictions obtained, Report of the Low Grade Mines· 
78 
was bad, the conventions tended to break'down. Moreover no 
conventi.on required employers to hire unskilled Whites at 
higher wage rates than those prevailing :for unskilled Blacks. 
Thus the conventional color bar offered little help to the 
growing number of Poor Whites. And it did not afford com-
plete security to the immigrant artisans •. 
The white workers' struggle for employment and.job 
security .occupied part of the foreground of public dispute 
in the first quarter of this century, and led to· a seri.es of 
violent clashes between the white people themselves J> ·culmin-
ating in the bloody General Strike of 1922. 
White V. Black Labor? 
Unsettled .conditions int,the wake of the Anglo-Boer War 
disrupted.the supply of African labor to the mines. Sixty 
thousand Chinese were imported from overseas to fill the gap, 
·but a public outcry from the white population resulted in 
1907 in their complete repatriation,. The question of the or-
ganization of em~loyment in the industry was thereupon reop-
. . t 
ened at a crucial stage in the country s history. An op-
portunity seemed to.have arisen either to extend the use of 
Africa~ ~abor to .skilled work, or to open the field of un-
skilled labor in the mines to the Poor Whites, and.thereby 
establish a precedent . for ba.sing all urban ·industry on white 
labor,. A judicial body, the Mining Industry Commission, was 
appointed by th.e Transvaal Government to examine these alter~ 
natives. The hearings were held at the same time that the 
Commission, 1920, (U.G. 34 .... '20), p. 38. However, recent ,, .. , 
. amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act, in 1956 and 
1959, have furnished a legal ba.sis.for the extension of racial 
job reservation throughout the economy. These amendments 
. " empower the Minister of Labour to ·safeguard the economic wel-
fa::t'e of any race 11 · by determining that employment in any .. un-. 
dertaking~· trade. or occupation, in any area, shall be res-
erved· for.persons of a specified race~ ·rn line with these 
provisions, over 20 oc.qupations in various industries had 
been reserved for Whites bY 1959, Ray Alexander and H. J• 
.S:imons·~ .. ,Jo"EY Reservation. ... an:r<ill the Trade Unions (Cape Town: 
Eht'erpri·se-; 1959 )' l p: 2o·· · 
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Transvaal Indigency Commission was conducting its investigat-. 
ions into the Poor White problem. 
Advocates of.an all-white labor force argued that the 
African worker menaced the future of white. civilization in 
South Africa •. Living on 1rhis. rice. and water standardu, ~ 9 
fettered with immobilizing and cheapening restrictions, he 
threatened to undercut the more highly-paid wbite man right 
out of the labor field. What chance did white workers stand 
when the Workman's Compensation laws made emp:Tioyers liable 
to only one fifth the expense in death or inju~y_payments if 
the victim was black, and when pass and labor regulations 
afforded immunity from strikes in the case of A:fri.-can work-
ers'?20 
· Some white people, including workers, saw the answer 
in abolishing the discriminatory laws and restrictions which 
were giving .African workers a competitive advantage in ob-
taining employment. A majority of the members on the Mining 
Industry Commission recommended that the Government give ef-
fect to this view. 2 ~ But that it was far from unanimous came 
out in the cross examination of several witnesses. The :fol-
lowing exchange, for instance, took place with J. J. Ware, 
representing the South African Trades and Labour Council--
the principal trade union federation: 
2-'08, Minutes of Evidence, q. 20,465. 
20Ibid., Majority Report, paras. 898f. 
2~Ibia., Conclusions and Recommendations, para. 67. 
The Majority Report was signed by the white labor policy 
advocates' In 1922, a Labour Party ::M.P., M. Kentridge, 
recommended the abolition of discriminatory labor laws and 
' u the establishment of-the principle of equal pay for equal· 
work" as a means to forestall the preference given to black 
' . t 
workers in employment, g.G. 17~ 22, Minority Report, para. 
100. For arguments questioning the belief that the pass 
laws increased the compe_ti tive advantage of black workers 
over white, see T.P. 5-rl6, Majority Report, p. 27, and 
ibid., Second Minority Report, p. 129. 
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· Q. 20,465.--If a white man refuses to work he can go some-
where else, but if a Ka~ir refuses to work he goes tp 
gaol. Is that a state of things you would like to see 
altered? 
Answer. --No, I do not say I would like to see tha t-.... free 
labour. If you give a Kaffir liberty 11s·regards not sen-
ding him to gaol I do not know how·you could. control 
them. 22 · 
Though disagreeing on the met~ods ·Of applying a white 
' ' ' labor policy, .its. ~dvocates ~11 urged that· the introduction-. 
of such a policy should .not be delayed. .If it were instit-
uted, employment in th~ mining industry alon.e could be found 
for 35,000 Poor 'Whites whose position was desparate. 23 Unless 
jobs were found for the~, unless attention was paid to the 
It t' II II . i t If principle of self~preserva ion , white civil sa ion would 
go down the di>ain, for uthe people'who do the work of·a coun-
try will in the end inherit it. 1124 Black labor should ·be dis-
pensed with before it became too late. Declared James Riley, 
President of the Trades and Labour Council: 
Were I in possession of the Government I should nation-
alise the whole of the land in South Africa in the first 
instance in ord·er to have control over it and do what we 
like with it, and then allocate the various portions nec-
essary for native territories and.then send the natives 
to those territories •••• As for the•:;Indian coolie and 
the.Ohi:q..e.se I would absolutely exelude them altogether. 2 l;i . 
.! ~' :·.; .t • ..,.., :. . • 
It will be seen that more than forty ye~rs before Dr •. 
Malan's Natio,nal Party.came to power, immigrant workers fr-om 
Britain had placed apartheid on the South African agenda. 
But the employers were not impressed. Their interests 
were not as ·directly imperilled by the existence of a force 
of cheap African labor, but on the contrary by the threat of 
22T.G. 2- 1 08, Minutes of Evidence. 
23~., Majority Report, para. 819. 
24Ibid., Conclusions and Recommendations, p. 132. 
26 Ibid., Minutes of Evidence, qs. 20,477 and 20,519. 
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its reduction or loss. Advocates of a white labor policy 
claimed that to extend use of white labor woUld involve no 
increase in- overall worlr:ing costs, and cited experiments pur-
porting to prove that the higher wage paid to white workers 
was compensated through their greater efficiency. 26 The mine 
·owners quote.d experiments that indicated· the very opposite, 27 
and argued it stood to reason that they would not willingly 
incur higher costs if they could avoid ~hem. In 1913~ the 
Chamber of Mines furnished the Select (Parliamentary) Com-
mittee of European Employment and Labour Conditions with Stat-
istics illustrating the effect on mining operations of sub-
stituting unskilled white labor for.their black miners who 
were paid an average of about 2s. per shift (day). The fol-
lowing table summarizes the Chamber's submission: 
26See T.G. 13- 1 08, Minutes of Evidence., q·s. 2 .. 425::;6,·~:·:: 
I -- •• T·¥· 2- 08, Conclusions and Recommendations, para; 47; T.P. 
5- 16, Second Minority Report, pp. ?7-99; £.Q. 9- 13, Minutes 
of Evidence, qs. ·1,960-65; U.G. 14- 26, Mills":"'Clay-Martin 
Report, paras. 239,241. 
27See Transvaal Colony, Report of the Transvaal Labour 
Commissi~n, 1904, (Cd. 1894), par~. 96; T.G. 2- 1 08, para. 932; 
T.G. 13- 08, para. 6,898; S.Q. 9- 13, Mlnutes,of Evidence, 
q. ·l,424j ibid., Appendices I and M; U.~. 12- 14, para. 74; 
U.G. 14- 26,.Mills-C~ay-Martin Report, paras. 136, 242; 248; 
. see·also Cope,~ cit., p. 72; van der Horst, Native Labour 
in. South Africa, p. 170. 
TABLE IV 
THE NUMBER OF WITWATERSRAND MINES WHOSE WORKING 
PROFIT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO· COVER THE ADDITIONAL 
COST OF SUBSTITUTING ALL AFRICAN EMPLOYEES· BY.:' 
WHITES, ASSUMING THE OUTPUT OF TWO WHITES WOULD 
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BE EQUAL TO THAT OF THREE AFRICANS. BASED ON·' 
JANUARY 1913 RETURNS FROM' 52 WITWATERSRAND MINES. 28 . 
"White labor At 
(per shift) 
Number of mines 
that would: cease 
to malre a profit 
Number of mines 
that would cont-
inue working, . 
but at a greatly 
reduced profit 
. 7/6 10/- 12/6 15/-
16 26 35 41 
36 26 17 11 
It will be seen that at 7s~6ci;: per shift the Chamber 
believed that approximately one= third. bf. :the "'liiines would 
close down, and that at l2s.6d. per shift (the wage received 
by unskilled Australian miners) about two-thirds of the mines 
would stop running. 
Even had it been possible to obtain unskilled white 
2 6S. c. 9- I 13' .Appendix _B. . The Consulting Engineer to 
the Johannesburg Investment Company and Principal of the 
South African .School of Mines and Technology testified that, 
contrary to the view current among white workers, two uns-
killed Wnites were not as efficient as three unskilled Blacks, 
ibid., Minutes of Evidence, para. 1,4249 Worsfold (W. B. 
Worsfold, The Union of South Africa, 1912, ~· 324) contented 
in 1912 that had the African mine laborers (then more than 
lBo1ooo) been replaced entirely by white workers, the indus-try s annual bill for unskilled labor would have been twice 
the value of production and six times the net profit, Donald 
Wood Gilbert, 11 The·Economic Effects of the Gold Discoveries 
tl . 
upon South Africa, The Quarterly Journal Q! Economics, 
47:579, August 1953. 
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labor at the wage rates prevailing for Africans, it is still 
doubtful whether the mineowners would have been satisfied. 
For the Africans 1 lack of personal and polit-ical rights also 
represe'hted a :financial advantage to the employers. Accor-
ding to the Manager of the Premier Diamond Mine, , the trouble 
with white labor.ers, whatever they might be paid was that 
You could not search .them and. could not put them in 
a compound. You ·could not put them in detention houses 
at the end of the period of servic~, to see that they 
do not take any diamonds·out. To be ·perfectly candid, 
you-would have them. on strike. ·You cannot have a big 
industry like that dependent upo'n labour that can any 
day go out. :H' . .. 
So there were quite a :few objections to the unskilled 
white worker, ranging from such· considerations as 11 ~10 a · 
• II 
month as against ~5, wh~ch is a very substantial objection, 
to the fact that the_white worker,· in service, had to be prov-
ided with "a bedstead •• ~and. bedding it, food of a ftvery d,if-
ferent kind to what the black gets,t:teo and could-not be sub..;. 
j.ecte?- to the same nhumiliatihg contro1.n 31 
The material·value to emvloyers of the political right-
lessness of African workers 32 beca.me manifest in 1907 when 
. . . 
white miners. staged a three months strike against a pay cut 
and an increase in duties. 33 .Although the strilte.was crushed 
29T.G!' 13-'08, Minutes of Evidence, qs. 6,943-4. 
30Ibid •. , Minutes of Evidence, q. 6, 939~ Evidence on. 
the objection to the. employment of white coachmen.· 
3 ~Ibid., Minutes of Evidence, qs. 6,907-8. 
32 In 1902, Percy Tarbuth, Director of the Consolidated 
Goldfields, wrote to the Manager of the Village Reef Mine stat-· 
int that the feeling of the owners 11 seems to be one of fear 
that if a large number of 'White men·are employed on the Rand· 
in the position of labourers,~ • • .the combination of the wor-
king classes will become so strong as to be able to dictate 
not onlF the question of wages, but also political questions 
as well by. the·power of the vote,~ quoted in ~ope, £2•. cit., 
P• 81. 
.• 
33E. S. Sachs-, The Choice Before South Africa (London 
T·urnstile Press, 1952), p. -142; van der Horst,. 2J2.• cit., P• 242. 
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it helped confirm the owners in their op-inions. Henceforth 
they would give work to unskilled whites only under compul-
1 . . ** 
sion. White supremacy could take care of itself. As long 
Jf : • 
as I could get Kaffirs, declared Mr. -Hallimond, Manager of 
I . 
the Crown Deep, rri would not ~ntertain111 the idea of white 
unski·lled labor as a permanen~ arrangement. 34 
I 
. Therea.~ter Poor Whites \were pe~manently excluded from 
unskilled jobs.in mining, the !country s largest industry. 
Moreover, ·the employers repea~edly indicat.ed a desire to rep-. 
lace as many as possible of t~eir highly-paid white artisans 
with Africans ·who could do thdir work just as well and of 
. I 
course much more cheaply. 35 ~e white workers responded in 
! 
a way the mineowners _feared they might--they organized them-
, j • 
. selves into a political party ·i 
The South African Labou~ Party came into being after 
the failure of the 1907 strikel. ·It was no ordinary Labor 
Party and its leader after 19llp, F. H. P. Creswell, bore few 
• 
11 I 
of the conventional badges of ! labor ~ Aris40cratic branches 
connected his family tree. Hib brother, Sir William Creswell, 
. i ' 
K.C.M.~., founded the Australian Navy. Creswell, himself, 
had served as an Imperial offiber in the Anglo-Boer War, and. 
. ' . 
I later rose to the rank of colonel. He used to say that he 
I i T 
only knew two tunes, one was vod Save The King and the other 
wasn't. 36 I 
. I . ·. I 
Creswell s qualificatio"fls as a labor leader seem 
peculiar even for· South Africa~ He had been several times a 
mine manager, and was a member!, of the Rand Club. It was he, 
! 
i 
I . . 
34T.Q:.. 2- 1 08, Minutes of Evidence, q. 7,454. 
35 Ibid., Minutes of Evilence, qs. ·13,372-5; S.Q. 
9-'13, Minutes of Evidence, qs~ 37-44. 
I 
36Sachs, £1?.· cit., P• 4'7; Margaret· Creswell, An Epoch 
of the Political History of So~th Africa in the Life of 
Frederic fl:!:!gh Page Creswell (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, n.d.), 
pp 122, 29, 168, 22. · ! 
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to.gether with a colleague, who formulated the plan for the 
Witwatersrand Native·Labour Association, 37 ·by means of which 
the mine. managements eliminated competition amongst themsel-
ves for African labor--a circumstance enabling them to red-
. . 
uce African wages and thus fortifyi~g their o9jections to 
. . 
hiring fellow Whites. (.As to the right of African working 
men to organize on their part, Creswell subscribed to the 
opinion of his Labour Party colleague, Walter Madeley, that 
"~it was criminal to teach labour solidarity to Native wor-
k:ers."38) Together with most white people he believed in 
the principle 11 die kaffer in sy plek en die··koeli~ uit die 
wegu ( 'rthe nigger in his place ana: the coolie out of th~ .,, .. '':. 
waytt). 59 What appears to have ende~red him to white workers 
especia;lly·· was the fact that he became the foremost exper-
imenter and advocate for the white labor policy. 
Though Creswell honored· British .traditions, he made 
some exceptions. The 1 socialist objective' clause of the 
South .African ~bour Party, which had modelled its constit-
ution on that of the British Labour Party, he found partic-
ularly objection~ble and made every effort to get it dropped. 
In this he was supported, his wife writes, by the Labour Par-
tY: women~ who 11 were more realistic in their· .views than the 
men and ••• were· solidly against ';Socialism in our time' whic"l?-
they well knew would entail equality.with natives in every 
sphere of life. 'L~o 
·a 7 Ibid., P• 33. 
3 ~uqted in dope, Q:Q• cit., p. 217. 
39See Hans van Rensburg, Their Paths Crossed Mine. 
Memoirs of the Commandant-General of the Ossewa~Brandwag. 
(South Africa: Central News Agency-,-1956), p. 41. . 
~°Creswell, Q:Q.• cit., pp. 73f. Even avowed Socialist 
organizat·ions, like the Cape Fabian society, tended to split 
over the color question; see Wilfrid H. Harrison, Memoirs of 
.§. Socialist in South Africa 1.903-1947 (Cape Town: Self-ptto=-
lished, n.d.J: p. 156. 
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It is clear that the South African Labour Party would 
have little positive to offer the maj-ority of workers in the 
country.. I.t was essentially. the p·oli -t;.ical organ of a minor-· 
ity of workers enjoying comfortable:living standards wh6 
sought tp shield them against the competition of people liv-. 
ing at a sparser level. In 1911, the Labour Party, having 
seated five of its members in the first Union Parliament, 
helped carry the.Mines and Works Act--the so-called 'Colour 
.Bar Act 1 • This debarred non-white workers from 32. out of 51 
skilled and semi-skilled occupations in the Tra,nsvaal and Free 
State. mines. Some 7,057 white miners :were thereby protected 
from competition by 1. CO]Dpetent 1 workers who were not white. 4 :t 
In the following year the Labour Party announced its 
official policy: segregation of White. and Black; encouragement 
of white immigration as a means to dispense with African labor; 
prohibition of mixed marriages and of sexual intercourse bet-
ween Whites ana Non-Whites; separate political representation 
for Africans in the form of special Councils limited to an 
~·dvisory function; no further extension of the Parliamentary 
. ' 
franchise to Africans. 42 
Although the Colour Bar Act resulted in most of the 
' highly-~aid mining occupations being'reserved for Whites, not 
a~l semi-skilled jobs were reserved. On certain work, such 
as drill-sharpening, waste-packing, pipe and track laying, 
etc!, Africans were employed in. some mines and 'Whites in ot-
hers. As the Africans received about 3s. a day for such work, 
and Whites 208. 43 the temptation of mine managers to substit-
4 :tu.G. 34-'20, paras. 162f. Trade Union pressure and 
-- . . 1 . ' 
. white public opinion extended the conventional colour bar to 
19 other occupations in which 4,020 Whites were employed, van 
der Horst, .Q..l2• gll:., p .. 179. The legal color bar was introduced 
in the mines under the Labour Importation Ordinance (Transvaal), 
No. 17 of 1904, which defined those occupations in which Chin= 
ese laborers might not be employed, and served as a model for 
the regulations imposed upder the Mines and Works Act (~o. 12 
of 1911). . 
42 Round Table., 3:377, 1912/13. 
43van der Horst, 212· cit., PP• 18lf. 
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ute black for white workers equalled in strength the latters' 
fears that this might happen. In 1916 the South African Mlne 
Workers• Union (white) opened negotiations on the question 
with the Chamber of Mines. The· latter, averse to a repetit-
ion·of the costly strikes experienced by the industry in 1913 
and 1914, 44 came to terms with the Union. A 'Status Quo 
. ' Agreement was signed in 1918, in accordance with which the 
existing employment arrangements were to be maintained--no 
jobs held by Whi t.es were to be 9ffered to .Africans, and vica 
versa. 46 
However the Agreement was short-lived. After 1920 
. South Africa ent~red. into a severe.pos~-War depression, the 
country undergoing the gravest condition of unemployme~t it 
. ' 
had yet experienced. The price of gold, 130s. per ounce in 
February 1920, fell to 95s. in December 1921. Meanwhile mi~­
ing expenses rose; working costs, averaging 17s.ld._ per ton 
of· ore milled in 191~, had since increased to 25s.8d.· .As· a 
. . 
result many mines were working at a loss while others showed 
thin margins of pro.fi t ~ In December. 1921, the Chamber of 
Mines propos.ed ·to terminate the Status Quo Agreement. 46 . Some 
2,qoo semi-skilled white·miners were affected. They would 
loose their jobs and Africans would be taken o·n in their 
. place. 
What followed b.as been described as the "greatest 
s-t;.ruggle in magnitude and importance in the history of the 
labour Mov.ement in South Africa .. " 47 The white miners struck 
work on January 10, 1922. Within a few days 20,000 white wor-
4~ee Sachs, 212.• cit., pp .• 143-148. 
45de Kook, Economic History of South Africa, p. 445. 
4~Re)ort of the Low Grade Ore Commission, 1932, 
U.G. 16- 32 , para. 8. 
4. 7Sachs, 212.· cit., p. 149. 
,• 
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kers .. and, since their jobs were interdependent, 180,000 black 
I . 
workers were idled. The Gov~rnment offered mediation but w~s 
turned down by the mine managements. A proposal from the 
• ! I 
dnamber of Mlnes to change t~e employment ratio from the 
existing scale of one White Jine employee to. 8·. 3 Africans to 
. .• . I 
a proportion of one White to 11 0~5 Blacks was rejected by the White miners, who.demanded a :scale of 1:3.5 in conformity 
with the general population rjatio. · Nor would the white min ... 
ers ~ccept a decr~ase in the-P,umber of paid holidays and in 
cost of living allowances. Nje€?otiations broke down.~ 8 On 
the 7th of March; 192·2, the ihdustrial dispute on ·the Wit-
. I 
• I 
watererand became a General Strike, and by t~e morning of the 
lOth of March it 11had d~velop~d into a Revolution.tt49 
. I 
On February 3, 1922, a\Dutch Reformed Church minister 
I 
told a miners' meeting in thei.Johannesburg Town ·Hall that 11if 
. • • I 
the colour bar was abolished, i the souls a:s well as the bodies·: 
of the workers would be ·murde~ed and the authority. of the 
· I tt5o · 
white ra.ce in South Africa co.me to an end. · Many speeches 
I 
. I • 
in a similar vein were made in the following weeks. On March 
. I . 
7th,· the day on which the Gen$ral Strike was declared, -a body 
I 
of 40 T.o 50 armed strikers attacked unarmed African workers 
. I . . 
in the Vrededorp MUnicipal Co~pound •. The Prime Minister, 
General Smuts; who also held ihe portfolio or' Mlnister of I ..._ 
Native Affairs, issued a notice ·to idled African workers that 
. I 
the: strike was a dispute betv-{een wnite workers and their 
empioyers and would be settled 
I 
i i. • 48D. w. Kruger, The Age of the Generals. A Short 
Political History· of the Union of South .,A.fric.a, 1910,;..1248 
(n.pl.: Dagbreek Book Store1 ~958), p.
1
121; Report of the 
Mining Industry Board, 1922, (~.~· 39~ 22), paras. l-5. 
. I . 
49Report of the Martial; Law I~uir~ JUdicial Com-
mission, 1922, (U.G. 35- 1 22), para. 6 • 
i 
•
60Quoted 1bid9, para. 97 • I 
I 
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without any necessity for anxiety on your part .. Remain; 
quietly in your compounds and obey the orders of the 
Government given you through the Director of Native 
Labour and Compound Managers. 61 
On the 8th of March, Africans were fired upon.at the 
Crown Mlnes. Bophiatown on the same day was attacked by an 
armed strikers r commando;· attacks were also made on· Africap.s 
in Ferreiratown, Glen Deep, Rose Deep, Primrose, MUnicipal 
Compound, Jubilee Compound and Salisbury Compound. One hun-
dred. and fifty-two Africans were wounded.; of whom 24 were 
killed or died of wounds. 52 
·The South African Industria·l Federation, which ·had 
distributed a circular stating that the aims of the strike 
·were to· protect white worker~ ~nd Hto fundamentally estab-
Iish this country as a white man Is. country, II~·~ appealed. for 
an end to assaults on Africans. But .the strikers, who dem~· 
onstrated under the slogan of na White South Africa".and sang 
the 'Red Flag 1 , would not be put off. Before the ·strike en-
ded 56 Non-Whites had been killed. 64 
Martial law was declared on the lOth of March. All· 
regu~ar traffic on the Witwatersrand came to a stop. Troops 
were moved up to help the police. Fierc,e battles raged all 
along the East Rand and in the Johannesburg white working 
class districts of Brixton and Langlaagte. The strikers~ 
61 Ibid., para. 278. 
62Ibid., par~. 281; Wild rumors sent the white inhab-
itants of Florida, Turffontein and Germiston into laager in 
their town halls and churches "against a Kaffir attack", 
Bernard Hessian, An Investigation into the Causes .Qf. the Lab~ 
·our Agitation ~ the Witwatersrand, January to March, 192·2,.. 
(Unpublished M.A. Dissertation in History, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1957), p. 16. 
63Quoted in U.G. 35-'22, para. 27. 
54S. P. Bunting, 'Red Revolt'; the B~g~.g:s.trike, Januarv-
March 1922; the Workers' Story ('Johannesburg: Communist Partr, 
(S • .A.), n.d.),p. 30--citing figures described as nofficials 1 • 
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stronghold, Fordsburg, was:shelled by artillery and bombed 
from the 'air, bringing resistance to an end. By March 16th, 
the men were back at work. I, · · 
Interpretations of '{he strike, both contemporary and 
. II i II 
recent, differ widely. B~ 1921, according to the present 
• II • Professor of History at the Potchefstroom University for 
. . . I II . . Christian Higher Education,! Black Laqour was sniffing round 
the perimeter of the stock~de .like a wild animal from the 
primeval forest, waiting fqr an opportunity to enter. The 
opportunity· came when e~onqmic circumstances drove employers 
to open the gates .. '"56 Fac~ng a more difficult problem of 
what public position to adqpt were the Communists of that 
'I • . . • 
period, who were confrontea, by the sight of civil war with-
i . in the working class, white1 workers shooting doWn blaq~ wor-
1 kers. However here too the: specta·cle was given a certain 
I, 
focus.· On March 10, 1922, S. P. Bunting, addre·ssing all wor-
. . . . \ 
ke.rs. through the editorial 1columns of The. I~ternational, ex-
plained that the repeal of fhe color bar regulations. ~tWILL 
NOT BENEFIT THE NATIVE WOREER, RATHER THE REVERSE ..... H The 
. I . . 
white worker "is. hurt by a crlos.ing of avenues. of employment 
to him far more that the na~ive can benefit by an opening of 
those avenues. to him. 66 .A 1ore recent Marxist expos.ition has i -
it' this way: ! 
Although the cry fori a nWhite South Africalt, which 
became the chief sloganjin·the dispute, appears. react-
ionary on the s.urface, t t was never"Hheless founded on ;. 
sound working-class ins'tinct. The White South Africa 
slogan embodied a defen$e against capitalis.t aggressioR, 
and was a challenge aga+nst the exploiting class. That 
the White workers saw n~ identity of _interest with the 
Black workers. and were ~ot prepared to co-operate with 
them, was a concrete reality of the time, and had to ·· :.-: 
find its expression. It is also important to note the 
remarkable fact that up:to the very last stage of the 
I 
II 
66Kruger, QQ• cit., RP• l20f. 
I 
66~ting QQ• cit., ~. 7, and Appendix .A. 
! 
! 
fight there 'V'1aS no talk wl:).atever a:riiong the White 
. strikers of host iii ty towards the Africans·. It can 
therefore be maintained against any insinuations 
that the call for a 11Wb.ite South Africau was not 
anti-Native,. and thr0ughout had mOre of·a class 
content than any historian has allowed. 67 . 
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How Africans view these .events and tb:ese :tnterpret~ 
ations has not yet ·been recorded. 
:Actually th~ Commu.nist leaders, S. P •. Bunting and 
W. H • .imdrev1S, both realized that the strike would fail and 
disapproved of its anti-Black overtol:l;es. In his pamphlett, 
Red Revolt, Bunting, one of the mqst courageous e~onents of 
racial equality, admitted that -the. Str1;tggle was essentially 
futile: 
The Chamber of Mines ••• repudiated the 'status-quo' 
agreement. The policy was justified as the only al-
ternative to closingdown the low-grade mines. The 
reply was that if low-grade mining involved low-grade 
wage standards, it should be treat'ed as an unprofitable 
proposition; but of course the closing ~ of these 
mines accordin&lY would have the same effect ~ the 
termination of the status-quo--both would throw a few 
thousand workers out of a job. Such was the form tak-
en in this strike by the eternal dilemma between cap-
italism and Labour, ~nsoluable ••• so long as the capit-
alist system continues. 68 . 
Andrews, corresponding in January 1922 with another 
· 
57Cope, .QJ2 cit., pp. 23lf. If the actions of white 
workers to maintain the color bar can be attributed to 
"sound working-class instinct~r, it is difficult to see to 
what impulse the attempts of African workers to penetrate . 
the color bar can be ascribed, if not to capitalist ag-
gression. For black workers were not always passive on the 
issue, their conflict with their comrades-in-theory was 
sometimes direct. On1 February 17, 1920,. tv10 years before 
the 1Grea t .Strike' , more than 71,000 ·African miners went on 
s.trike for higher pay and the right to be employed on more 
skilled work. The white trade unions and mineworkers treat-
e.d the strikers with great hostility and 11 carried on scab-
. II bing operat~ons with diligence and enthusia~m • With their 
help the strike was crushed after one week by the usual 
methods of f?olice terror and persecutions, several workers 
being shot, 1 .Sachs, ::'P• cit., P• 156 • 
68Bunting, .QJ2• Q!i., ~· 8. My italics. 
i 
i 
I 92 
. I . 
member of' the South African \Communist pa·rty, wrote in refer-
ence to th·e · strike: 'i\ . · 
. My private opinion is that it willinevitably be lqst, 
it is just as impossiblej for the white workers in South 
. .Africa permanently to '1tef3p the natives out of any form 
of industry·~hey are capl3.ble of undertaking 0s it was for 
the handicraftsmen in .th1e early days of the capitalist syst~m to stop the intro~uction of' labou~-saving machin-
ery ••• it will only be whpn by bitter experience white men 
find out the hopelessnesj of their colour bar thatit. 
will·be possible to talk reason t_o.them. 69 
These were the views.~f men ~ho did their utmost to 
I 
encourage the strike. .: . 
. . ~he General "Strike of'\ 1922 ·was the last violent ~lash 
of magnltude between white p~ople in South African history. 
Hundreds of soldiers, .policej and strikers lost their lives 
or suffered injuries. j 
It appeared that the employers had made their point • 
. I 
About 3,000 white miners were sacked and the cost of living 
I· 
I 
59~uoted in U.G. 35- 1 ~2, para. 152. In 1931, Bunting, 
. I Andrews and most of the leading members of the South African 
Communist Party were expelled for t1right-wing activities"? 
Believing in a non~racial society,.they had opposed the ~Nat­
ive Republic 1 slogan laid dov}n for the South African Commune.. 
ist Party by the Sixth Wor,ld 1 Congres~ of' the Communist Party~ 
held in Moscow in 1928. BUn.tingism became a major heresy. 
BUnting's biographer comment~ that taough the 'Native Repub~ 
lic 1 motto of 1931 was supposed to be based on a scientific 
ana=!,.ysi~ of' the ~elationshiplbetween the .African masses and 
Anglo-Boer imperlalism, and ~hese relations had not signif-
icantly altered .between ·1931 [and 1Q35, the· slogan was dropped 
in 1935 as' 'inexpedient 1 , .i. ~·, the foreign policy needs of 
the Soviet Union had changed,i see Roux, S. P .. Bunting, pp. 
125f'f. Incidentally, the sa~e 1928 Comintern Congress for-
mulated a solution, resembling apartheid, for the 'Negro 
Question' in the United Stat~s:-...:.:''Th~ right of' gover-nmental 
separation will be .unconditio\nally realized by the Communist 
J?arty ..... The Communist Party tmust stand up with all st:t'ength 
and courage for the struggle [to win independence and for the 
establishment of' a Negro repu{blic in the Black Belt, Resolut-
ions of' the Communist Inter:riartional .QB ,ihg Negro g.uestion in 
the Unite.9: States, 1930, quotled in Herbert Hill and Jack Green:... 
berg, Citizen's Guide to Desegrap;atioJ::t. A Study of Social. 
and 1egal Change in American fLife (Bfuston: The Beacon Press, 
1955 , PP• 3lf • . \ 
I 
I 
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allowances for tb.e rest were withdrawn altogether. Black min-
ers were taken on. 60 Output rose and working costs fell. 
Mines like the Gelde.nhuis Estate and Village Deep, which had 
shown no profits in December 1921, were prospering again by 
· July 1922~ 6 l. · 
Th.e r~tio of white to black mine employees, 1:8.4 on· 
the eve of the strike fe~l to 1:10.2 after its failure. The 
racial composition of the semi-skilled labor force, in.par-
ticular, ·.then continued to change, as will be seen below: 6 2 
Drill-Sharpeners 
December 1921 
September 1924 
Winch-Drivers 
· December, 1921 
September, 1924 
IDeo-Drivers 
December, 1921 
September, 1924 
. . . ••• 
. . . : ... 
••• . . . 
••• •• 9 
" .. ••• 
• e • . . . 
White. Black 
397 39 
297 313 
99 ·.237 
32 367 
90 2 
67 121. 
In addition to these developments a Supreme Court dec-
ision in 1923 voided the regulations framed under the Nines 
and Works Act of 1911, under which the whole ra~ge of skil-
led occupations had been reserved for.white workers. Mines 
. . 
began employing Africans as engine drivers and on other ski~ed 
tas~s formerly reserved by law or social convention for Whites. 68 
60de ~ock, 2£• cit., P• 253. 
6 l.Output of gold rose ·by over 3,000,000 tons milled 
.between 1921 and 1923,.working·costs fell from 25s.8d~ per 
tqn in 1921 to 20s;Od. in 2923, working profits per ton rose 
from hil·or a few shillings at the start of the strike to 
10s.9d. per.ton in November 1923, U.G. 16-'32, para. 9; de 
Kock, 2J2• cit., p. 253; Botha, Die Arbeidsvraagstuk ~ Sui·d-
Afrika, P• 133· 
62U. G~ 36-'25, para. 108. · 
~ 8 Ibid •. , ·para. 123~ 
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Thus, while the number of Poor Whites was daily scaling new 
peaks, and u~employment among white youths had become more 
widespread than ever in the country's. history, 64 indications 
were abroad that the future for·white labor would be even 
worse; in 1924 the gold mining-industry was affording no more 
direct employment opportunities to the white population than . 
in 1906~08. (wnen the campaign for a white labor policy' began), 
and . considerably le.ss than in the period 1909 to 1921; 6 6 ·and 
the color bar appeared to have been.permanently breached in 
. 
industry • 
. With the continued deterioration of eeonomic condit-
ions the ranks of the Labour Party swel.led. 66 Smuts 1 South 
African Party, associ~t~d with the mine managements' interests, 
lost. successive by-elections; the Government majority of 24 
in 1921 was reduced in: three years to eight. 67 Creswell, 
chief apostle of the white labor policy, and Hertzog, the 
Afrikaner Nationalist leader, decided to join forces against 
Government candidates in the next General Election to avoid 
three-cornered fights. Their chance to collaborate arrived 
suddenly. A rural constituency , Wakkerstroom, became vacant. 
Again?t a strong government candidate the Nationalists nomin-
ated an unknown farmer whose main distinction was that he had 
been shot. to pieces in the Anglo-Boer War and lost the use 
of both legs.68 The crippled veteran topped the poll, Smuts 
disolved Parliament, appealed to the electorate, and suffered 
an overwhelming defeat. .As a result, in June 1924:, the State 
fell into the hands of the two white groups most fearful of 
P• 90. 
64Pauw, Beroepsarbeid ~ die Afrikaner 1n ~ 8taa~. 
66de Kock, ~· cit., P• 440. 
66 Kruger, ob. cit., p. 125. 
67Pirow, Hertzog, P• 97. 
6 8 Ibid .. , p. 97. 
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.African economic advancement--the
1
farmers and the workers. 
i 
I 
The 'Civilised Labour Policy' 1 
1, 
i 
The National Party captured 63 seats in the 1924 Elec-
. i 
tion, white Smuts command~d .53 supporters-in the new House 
of .Assembly. The Labour Pa:r'ty, w~th 18 seats, held the bal-
ance of pqwer. Under the Pact ag~eement, the latter was al-
. I 
loted three Ministries, Defence, Ijabour, Posts and Telegraphs 
and Public Works, which we~e take~ by the Party leaders, Ores-
well, Boydell, Madeley and Sampsoti--representatives primarily 
of the skilled, white, immigrant wbrkers. The bulk of the 
: I . 
Pact Government's legislative and hdministrativ~ program 
dealing with the protection of .the\ white artisans and the 
employment of the Poor Whites was the work of these men. 69 
• I . . ' 
The new Government wasted n? time in tackling the 
I 
Poor 'White problem. On October 31~ 1924, one of the first 
documents drafted by the new leadebship was circularized 
. I 
. t I • from the Prime Minister s Office t0 certain Departments of 
I 
·state. It set out that as a matte~ of definite policy 
I 
1 ci~ilised labour 1 should be substituted wherever feasible 
.. ~ 'i • ... I 
in all branches of the public serv:Ifce :for labor which ·could 
be classified as 'unci vi.li'sed'. 1 Qivilised labour 1 was def-
ined as 
.the labour rendered by persons rt.Ihose standard of li virrg 
conforms to the standard of li~ing generally recognized 
as tolerable from the usual European standpoint. Unciv• 
ilised labour is to be regarde9 as the. labour rendered 
.by persons whose aim is restric~ed to the bare require;_ 
menta of the necessities of lifje as understood among 
barbarous and undeveloped peopl;es. 70 
I 
The care expended in formulalting "these defii:titions~. 
' 
enabled to policy to be defended asl devoid of color discrim-
ination. However, although there w~re undoubtedly black 
people whose·aim was to achieve a s~andard of living on a par 
I 
I 
69Creswell, Q2• cit., p. l08t Pirow, ~· cit., p •. 129. 
i 
70Quoted in U.Q. 54-'37, par~. l33n; van der Horst, 
Native Labour in South Africa, p. 2~0~ 
- I 
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with that of the draftees of this document, Inspectors of 
Labour soon made it clear that under .no circumstances would 
Africans be regarded as 'civilised labourers'.'7l. 
Formerly, the substitution of white for blB:-ck workers 
in the Government service had been viewed as ·a temporary 
measure to relieve white unemployment.'7 2 From 1924 onwards 
the 11building up of a widened sphere of employment of perman-
ent.character for civilised personsu became a cardinal feat-
of State economic policy. 73 ure 
It was envisaged that about 25,000 to 30,000 unskil~ 
led Whites would be-found jobs under the 1 Qivilised.labour 
policy•, which was ·also to be pursued l..n the private se_ctor 
of the economy.'74 The policy was given effect on the largest-
scale by· .the Railways and Ha;rbours Administration~ Between 
1924 and 1933 the proportion of' white labourers employed by 
the Railways rose from 9.5·to 39.3 per cent, while that of 
Africans fell from 75 to 48~9 per cent. These percentages 
7 l.Ibid., P• 250. 
..... 
72g.G.- 34-'21, paras. 27f'~ The South African Repu1:5lic. 
dealt with the Poor White problem by replacing· unskilled 
Africans by poor burghers on road construction and repair 
work, tree planting on Government property, etc. The-pay for 
this kind of work was 5s. per day, about four to five times . 
more than the rate paid to Africans, Pelzer, Die 11Arm-Blanke 11 
· Verskyn-sel in die Suid-Af'rikaanse Republiek, p .. 89. For fur-
ther information on antecedents to the 'civilised labour pol~ 
icy'. see
1
S.Q .. l0-'06, para. 7; S.C. 9-.1 13, Appendices C and 1 ~; U.G._ 14- 26, Mills-Clay-Martin Report, Appendix C; U.G• 30- j2, 
paras. 39-42. The Police Force was always an avenue of' emp- · 
loyment to Poor Whites, see Department of' Justice, Annual 
Report for the Calendar Year 1912, (U.G. 44-tl3), P• 74 · 
{Magistrates Annual Reports); CC I-198. · 
· 
73u.G. 14-'26, Mills-Olay~Martin Report, Append~x F; 
Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 282 , para. 336~ 
· r;~Ivan L. Walker· (Secretary. of' Labour and Social Wel-
fare),. 11 0ivilised Labour Po'licy 11 (Official Letter to the S.A.. 
Institute of Race Relat~ons), Race 'Relations, 2:60-61, Novem-
ber 1935. . 
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represented an increase of 13,022. in the number of Whites 
employed, and a decrease of 15,556 in the number of .Af'rican 
·employees. 76 ·By 1953-54 over 100,000 Whites were working 
for the Railways, then the single greatest employer of white 
labor in the country. 76 · 
Other Government Departments followed s~i t • 7 7 To ex- · 
tend the policy into the zone of Local Government, the Dep-
artment' of Labour launched a scheme whereby Lo'cal Authorities, 
·over one-third of whose employees were White, would be reim-
bursed by the Central Gov~rnment up to 75 per cent of the .ad-
ditional wage bill of the number of Whites above a third of 
the total work force. Similar arrangements ~ere made with 
MUnicipalities in respect to white, semi-skilled workers. 78 
In July 1930, Johannesburg employed about 700 white laborers 
at 12s •. 6d. per day, plus another hundred white men towards 
whose pay the City was receiving a subsidy. 79 The percent-
age of Whites among employees in Central ana Local Government 
industrial concerns in the Western Cape rose from 44 per cent 
in 1924/25 to.68 per cent in 1932/33. 60 
76U.~. 54-'37, para. 217. 
76 C. S. Richards, 11The Growth of Government in South 
Africa since Union,rr e_.A.J.E., 25:248f, December 1957. 
177See U .G~ 16- 1 26, Mills-Clay-Martin Report,' Appen-
dix F; South African Railways, Report of the Committee Ap-
pointed to Investigate the Employment 9f U~skilted European 
Workers in~ Rai-lway Service, 1947, [U.G• 29!: 47), paras. 
237-248. ' . . 
78J. H. Bbtha, 11Maatreels tot Werkverruiming in 
Stedelike Werkkringe, 11 ·in Verslag Y@ die yolkskongres QQ.!: 
die .Armblanke Vraagst-ak Cl-ehou ~ K~mberley, 1.23..4.· 
179CC I-197. Close to 90 per cent of the tramway emp-
loyees were Afrikaners, the majority from rural areas. White 
labor cost the City *'90,000 more a year than African labor 
would have done. 
8 0 U. G. 54- ' 371 para. 349'!' 
' 
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·The 'civilised labour.policy' was reaffirmed in 1948, 
when the present National'ist Government came to power. :In 
accordance w·ith a directive issued from the Prime Minister 1 s 
. . 
Office fifty African cleaners in· four Government Departments 
t . . . . . in Durban were handed a week~ notice.at the end of February 
1950, and were then replaced by white· and Coloured cleaners. 
Many of the dismissed men had been in the Government employ--
"f:rom;,ten to thir.ty-five years. The:tr pay averaged *"10 a 
month, whereas their replacements received ~16 a month~ .sJ. 
In March 1951, the . Minister of Labour ·announced that over th.e 
. . t 
two-year since the issuance of Dr. Malan s order 1,696 Afric-
ans in Government or Provincial Government service had been 
replaced by 1,290 white and406 Cape Coloured men. This had 
resulted in an additional expenditure of approximately 
~26 '000. 8 .2 
Indeed,'as the Acting Postmaster General informed the 
Economic and Wage Commission in 1925, 11little question of 
economic success is involved in this policy except that the 
wages are deflected into European pockets. 11 .83 According to 
the General Manager o.f the South African Ridlways, 11 on the· 
average the European iabourer is about 15 per cent more ef-
ficient than the native." BUt 
Unfortunately this 15 per cent .of ?.dditional efficiency 
is a rather,theoretical figure and in actual practic~ 
does not represent much value to the Administration.· 
, Hitherto as a general rule we have fauna i.t necessary 
on open lines to replace the natives by an equal number 
o:f Europeans~ •• :.;The real position ••• is that the .Adminis~ 
s:LN. N. Frankl·\ 1, Eco'nomics in South Africa (Cape 
Town: Oxford,University Press, Geoffrey CUmberlege; Second, 
Re:vised Edition, 1954), P• 188~ · . 
82Yruriel Horrell, Non-European Policies in: the Union• 
and the-Measure of their Success. A Survey·of the-conflict 
Between Economic Trends and Ideological Planning (Johannes-
burg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1954), pp.; 
22f; 
83U.G .. lit-'26, Mills-Clay-Martin Report, .Appendix F.; 
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trat.ion has .to face a co:n;siderable amount of extra eJq)en-
se on accoun:t'of the empl;oyment of European labourers. 84 
.Specifically, implemeJbation of the policy on the 
open lines _resulted in a 50 p,er: cent increase in labor 
I . 
costs. 85 The I'Thite laborers rere· paid more, were pr<;>Vided 
, with free:quarters or, in the
1
·case of single men,. with spec-
ial allowance for room and baird; medical treatment for the 
white worker and his fami~y wFs free. and their children 
could ride t~e trains to schopl for nothing. 86 In short, 
the higher pay for the. 1 civil~sed labourer', not being com-
1 . pensated for by increased prop.uctivity,·represented a sub-
sidy to him from the rest of ~he communi t~, . including the 
. I . • 
_'uncivilised labourert whom h~ had rep~aced~ 87 
'The importance of the fublic service as an employment 
field for the white populatiof-is seen in that· by 1~50 the 
Railways were employing nearlty as many white men as all manuf-
• • I • 
acturin-g industries taken tog!e.ther. 88 By 1954, 25.6 per cent 
of the occupied white inhabit~nts of.the country were receiv-
' . 
ing their wages or salaries fb::oom public funds. 89 Excluding 
1;1 ' 
84Ibid., Appendix c. 
I 85 Ibid.' para. 231. l 
86 Ibid., para •. 148n. I 
' ' i 87Ibid., :raras. 243-4~1 For furth~r analysis of' issues. 
relating to the civilis~d laibour policy see .S. Herbert Fran.-. 
kel, The Railway J>olicy of Soiuth Africa. An .Analysi's of· the 
Effects of Railway Rates·, Finp.nce and Mapa.gement QB the Econ-
omic Development of the Unio;nj ( J'ohannef3\1Urg: Horton Limited, 
1928). p;. 17; SE.Leila T. van d'er Horst, Equal Pay for Equal 
Work, n §..A.J .E., 22:200, J'-un:e 1954. 
8~ranklin, op. cit., b. 188. 
- I 
890. S. Richards, ttThE}! Growth of Government in South 
. II . ' Afri·ca since Union, .S.A.J .E.!, 25.:254, December 1957. 
J:oo 
Municipal employm.ent_and .. t~mporary and part time labor, one 
out of every· six employable Whites bet11reen the ageE) of 18 
, I • 
and 60 was working for the ~tat~,· against one in :fifty Non ... 
White~ (in 1950). 90 Nb .. spp.\ere ·outside farming provided Af~ 
rikaners, in particular, w~th as many jobs as did the pub-
lic service -(l9.52/53).~l. \' 
. I ' I ' The added expenditur~s incurred through the civilised 
' ' ' . ; . . . . labour policy · did not complete the total costs of assisting · 
I 
the Poor White; In 1929/30,\ for instance, the Oentral.Govern-
ment alone f?pent nearly 13 :der cent of its total'budget in 
aid of the Poor Wb.ii;.es, incl~ding allocations for relief 
. I . 
works, labor colonies, materftY grants, drought relief, etc. 
During that same year the Ca~e Province spent over a quarter 
of a mil~ion pounds on progtams assisting Poor.Whites, while 
. I the Orange Free State was spending over a half a million 
• I 
pounds. 92 Pauper rations and grants to charitable instit-
• I 
utions cost the four Provinc~al Administrations *'374,664 in-
192993 I 
':. 
'Civilised labour' was\ also introduced into the priv-
! 
ate sector of the economy. U:P,like the Railways and the Pub-
lic Services, whose special p9sition enabled them to pass on 
I the increased costs to the cottsumer or taxpayer, private 
., I . 
businessmen were at 
isedt rates of pay. 
I I first rel~tctant to take on men at civil·-
Various ~nducement·s, tariff adjustments, 
. I 
the withholding of Government :
1
tenders, direct subsidies, e.tc~, 
were adopted to bring them int~ line with State policy. 
. .·. .· ' \ 
The ide.a of manipulating the customs tariff to incr~ase 
\ 
90Leo Marquard, 
. Africa (London: Oxford 
1952), p. 105. 
I 
The Peo~les and Policies of.South 
Univers~ty Press-Geoffrey Cumberlege, 
. . I . 
I 
l· 
9 l.Potgieter, ·Die E.kono!!Ue van ~ .Afrikanere •••• p. 20~ 
92 CC I-26-29. 
93cc V-76. I 
I 
I 
I 
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emp:I_oym.ent of white workers in private industries was fi:rst 
broached by the Commission of Trade and Industries iri ·l9l2. $t4. 
The advent of the Pact Government to power in 1924 resulted 
in the reconstitution of the Board of Trade and·Industries 
and the drafting of a completely revised customs t?riff. 96 
In framing the new .tariff the Board ai.med at creating ua 
wider field of employment for civilisedlabour, tariff'assis-
tance to industries being part~y conditioned on good labour 
conditions and on the understanding that, wherever possible, 
a larger proP,ortion of civflised labour ·will be employed.tt96 
11Extremely unsatisfactory ta.bour conditions (l~ Europeans·. 
being employed as compared with l30.Indians and Natives) 11 
were observed, 'for instance, at the Globe Ohair and Wheel 
Factory in Durban. Tariff protection was refused, the manuf-
ac.turers being offered a suspended duty, the application of 
. If . 
which was to be recommended only in the event of improved 
· rt labour conditions. Complete withdrawl of tariff assistance 
from the· British Imperial Oil Company was urged,· because. its 
packing plant failed, in the Board's opinion, to employ 
enough white workers. 97 The Board's recommendations were 
incorporated in the Customs Tariff and Excise Duties Amend-
ment .Act (No. 36) of 1925, and thereafter became a perman~nt 
influence on the employment structure. 98 Functioning both as 
a stick and a carrot, the tariff compelled employers to hire 
94U.G. 10- 1 12, Majority Report, pp. 13,17,91 • 
. 
95Karl Gundelfinger, 1'Memorandum ·on the Poor White 
Problem11 Verslag_ van die· Volkskongr'es .QQJ: die .Armblankevraag-
stuk, Gehou .1§. Kimberle;y:, 123.!!, p. 164~ . 
96B'oard of .Trade and Industries, Report No. 51: Report 
on the Revision Qi the Customs Tariff witg the Proposed Tariff 
Bill and the Revised. Customs Tariff, l925, para. 4. 
97Ibid., para. 12~ 
9 Bsec. 4 (l) (c); Sec. 4 (2) •. · 
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more white workers, and mollified them in allowing the added 
expense to pass on to the consumer. 
Other techniques were alas> used~ Thus, for example, 
the regulations of the Union Tender and Supplies Board prov-
ided 11 for an approved list of South African firma which do 
not maintain 'satisfactory labour conditions, including the 
. . . . t 1199 
employment of a reasonable proportion of civilised workers • 
Again, special subsidies were given to private firms on cond~ 
ition that only white persons were employed, ~nd these at 
fixed wages. 100 
These measures were effective. In six categories of 
protected secondary industries total white employment grew 
from 7, 368 in 1924/25 to 15,612 in 1933, a perc·entage in- · 
crease. of 111 .• 9, while non-white employment rose from roughly 
the same base figure in 1924/25 (7,342), to 10,077 in 1933, 
.a percen~age rise of only 37.25. In 1933, the ratio of white 
to total employees in all ·industries covered by the Industrial 
Census was 41.9 per cent, whereas in fully protected indus-
tri~s the ratio was 57 per cent. 101 
H~re too the policy was expensiv.e. In 1933, the Tariff 
Commission estimated that the minimum cost in excess of free 
imports to the oommunity of goods produced by protected sec-
ondary industri~s amounted in that year to •3,214,000. 102 By 
1941, the corresponding cost was avera.ging *"10,000,000 annual-
ly.:l.os 
99g .• 3=. 53-~48, para. 54. 
10
°CC II-130. 
10~Report o.f the Customs.Tariff ,Commission 1934-35, 1936, 
(U.G. 5-· 36), paras. 37, 39. The proportion of white employ-
ees to all employees in the secondary industries of South 
Africa's major industrial areas rose from 34.99 per cent in 
1924/25 to 41.86 per. cent in 1933, U.G. 37-'35, para. 230. 
102~.G. 5-'36, para. 59. 
103Pauw, Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner in die Stad, p. 
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The major burden in higher costs of all these measures 
was born by the unprotected primary export ind.ustries, in 
particular the mining industry.l. 04 rn· effect, this means ·;, · 
that the migrant African worker in that industry (whose wages 
remained virtually unaltered up to the outbreak of the Second 
World War), and his dependents., made the heaviest contribution; 
The fact that between 1925 and 1930 the percentage of African 
employees in Government enterprises fell from 42 to 28, and 
that in private undertakings it dropped from 44 to 40 bet-
ween 1924/~5 and 1932/33,1.06 provides a further indication of 
who paid for'the 'civilised labour policy'. 
The effect of administrative measures to apply the 
'civilised labour policy' was reinforced by legislation, prin-
cipa-lly the Wage Act of 1925. Under this law a·· Wage Board 
was created, whose task was to recommend minimum wage stan-
dards. Ydnimum wage rates were established, varying from ind-
ustry to industry. Apparently, these were intended to oper-
ate as a color bar; employers, formerly willing to discount 
the social prejudice against, and relative inefficiency of, 
untrained Africans, against the price for which their labor 
.. 
could be obtained, tended to give preference in employment 
to white workers once a certain level of minimum wage had 
been established for their industry.l. 06 In several industries 
l. 04U.G. 5- 1 36, para. 373. See also Third Interim 
Report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements 
CommissiOn:-I941, (U.G. 4o-'41), paras. 110, 113; g.G• 14-'26, 
Mills-Clay-Martin Report, paras. 304f. The white agricult-
ural sector received its own forms of compensation, se.e 
Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, pp. lllf~ 
· l.06Arend de Waal Horak, Georganiseerde Arbeid ~ Ver-
arming Veral M!! die Witwatersrand ~ in -Pretoria (Unpublish-
ed :M.A. Dissertation in Sociology; University of Pretoria, 
1938), p. 97· . . 
l. 06See Summary of Evidence Given before the Commerce 
.and
1
Indus-tries Co~ssion, }913, (U.G. 9- 113), P• .39; U.G~ 
. 36- 25, para. 
1 
129:·; U .G. 14- 26, Mills-Clay-Martin Re:port, para. 
22_; U.G. 54- 37, Reservation to para. 378; U.G. 53- 48, para.· 
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suhject to minimum wage determinations Africans were rep-
laced by white workers.~ 0 ? 
Meanwhile legal protection from Non-White compet= 
i tion was secured by th·e white artisans. The Color Bar Act 
of 19ll,,struck down by a Supreme Court ruling in 1923, was 
restored to legal standing through amending legislation pas-
sed in i926. Successive Apprenticeship Acts from 1922 on-
wards effectively barred Africans from craft training.~oe 
The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 excluded them from 
participation in collective bargaining.k 09 On the other 
hand, collective bargaining between white· workers and emp-
loyers was promoted under a system of joint Industrial Coun-
cils. These Councils regularized relations between the two 
interests and facilitated agreements• One such agreement, 
by the Transvaal Council for the Motor Industry, created a 
special grade of,employee, ca~led 'service attendant', at a 
wage of 40s. per week; several hundred white people there-
upon became 1 service attendants' , .. the~r pay packets being 
financed through a 25 per cent reduct_ion in the wages of the 
...__ ':· :: .~-. 
II . 51; w. H. Hutt, Economic Aspects of tne Report of the Poor 
Whi~e Commissionj 11 £·!·I•E., 1:287, September 1933;. 
~ 07van der Hor~t, £2• cit., pp. 255f. The D.R.C.-spon-
sored Kimberley Conference on the Poor White Problem consid= 
ered the provisions of the Wage Act to be inadequate; the Con-
ference recommended that the Wage Board should not only be 
charged with making minimum wage determinations, but should 
also be 11 empowered to determine a minimum proportion between 
the numher of civilised and uncivilised laborers in industries 
where wage determination takes place, 11 Resolution 42, Verslag 
m die Volkskongres ••• , p. 299· . 
11 
k08van der Horst, £2• cit., P• 243; G. E. Williamson, 
Multi-Ra·cial Problems and the Development of Manufacturing 
Industry in South Africa, It Race Relations, 15:22, 1948; E. A. 
Dean, 1The Inter-Relationships of Races in the Trade Union 
Movement, 11 Race Relations, l5:43f, 1948; U.G. 53-'48, para. 
5; Alexander and Simons, on. cit., p. 10. 
~ 09U.G. 53-'48, para. 51; U.G. 14-'26, Mills-Clay-
Martin Report, para. 82. 
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African laborers in the industry. 110 The harmonious effect 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act on inter-white industrial 
relations can be judged from the fact that whereas more than 
2,890,000 working days and approximately b2,383,456 in wages 
were lost as a result of strikes between 1916 and 1925, from 
1925 to 1936 only 196,000 work;tng days were lost, represen-
ting a loss in wages of ~98,000. 111 
Did the 'civilised labour policy' solve the problem 
of white poverty? Because of numerous other factors involved 
no conclusive answer can be given to this question, but it 
may be pointed. out that fifteen years after the policy came 
into force, 58,000 white families, comprising 289,000 per-
sons,. were found still living in uterriblen poverty, all,with 
monthly incomes below bl2.~12 . This was.in'March 1939, on the 
eve of the Second World War. 
Daring the War, however, a phenomenal expansion oc-
curred in secondary·industry. The value of net output in 
this sector of the South African economy almost doubled bet-
ween 1939/40 arid 1944/45. 1 ~ 3 Employment opportunities mul-
tiplied and wages rose. The number of white workers employ-
ed in the fruit and vegetable canning industry, for instance, 
increased during the six war years by 139 per cent, repres-
enting an annual rate of growth approximately double that 
over the previous elev.en pre-war years. .And whereas the cash 
wages of the white workers here fell from an annual average 
of ~234 in 1928/29 to ~194 in 1938/39 (after the effects of 
the short-lived depression in South Africa had long been 
110van der Horst, QQ• cit., P• 248. 
l..l.l.de .Kiewi·et;<~· cit., P• 272. 
1 l. 2 According to an estimate by Professor J. L. Gray 
based on the State-subsidized butter scheme, Die Transvaler, 
31 May, 1941; see also Coetzee, Verarming en Oorheersing, p, 28. 
1 i 3 Union Statistics for Fifty Years, P• L-4. 
106 
overcome), they rose to ~335 in 1944/45. 
The Board o~ Trade and Industries in publishing these 
~igures account~d ~or the improvement in the following state-
u ment: As in other spheres o~ secondary industry the expan-
sion o~·output during the war years in the fruit and vegeta-
ble canning industry~~ 4 was .brought about predominantly by 
the employment of non-Europeans. 11 ~~ 6 In fact, non-white em-
ployment in the industry grew by.521 per cent during the war 
years, against a mere 47 per cent rise over the pre-war per-
iod; while non-white cash wages, which increased slightly 
from .. an average of ;b52 in 1928/29 to ~55 in 1938/39, then 
climbed to ~97 per annum in 1944/45. 
In a subsequent report the Board indicated that the 
growth o~ other industries affording more employment ~or 
Whites depended on the expansion of the non-white consum:e.r ~­
market. ~~.6 Without·::the growth or improvement of non-white 
employment opportunities such expansion would obviously be 
retarded. 
When the War ended the Poor White problem no longer 
. I 
existed. It would therefore appear that the civilised 
labour policy', while relieving white unemployment and open-.. 
ing a pro~ected route to landless Afrikaners into the indus-
trial economy, d.id not itself eliminate white poverty. After 
all, that policy, involving as it did a greater input for no 
increase in output,, reduced the national income. Although 
t'h;e immediate burdens fell chiefly on those without power to 
refuse them, the economic advanc~ment of the whole society 
was retarded •. Only when the influence of external events 
~~4Net output 1928/29 to 1938/39: ~154,992 to ~09,546; 
1939/40 to 1944/45: M-56,733 to ~,944,438. 
~~ 5Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 296: The 
Fruit and Vegetable Canning Industry, 1947, paras. 14f. 
~~ 6 Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. j]g: The 
Electrical Goods Manufacturing Industry, n. d., para. 42. 
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rendered more and better livelihoods available for non-white 
people did white poverty cease to exist as a major problem 
in South Africa. 
In the meantime, however, the problem of the Poor 
Whites was affecting Afrikaners in general, not merely the 
very poor. The Poor White was held as the stereotype of all 
Afrikaners among the socially-dominant white, English-speak-
ing stratum. In jokes and social discourse among the latter, 
the Afrikaner usually appeared (to judge from the fact that 
he still does) as the poor, uneducated railway worker, the 
ignorant policeman and station master: vacant, low class 
. . 
beings. A stigma of poverty and ignorance was attached to 
the whole group. Legislation and administrative measures 
designed to find menial work for the landless poor could only 
harden the stereotype. To weaken or replace it, Afrikaners 
had to build a new image of themselves, and this required a 
broader course of action than that of finding jobs for their 
poorer compa-triots. 
I IVI 
I 
THE AFRIKANER EC0NOMIC MOVEMENT 
I 
I 
I 
Om hierdie stad ~et dit begin, 
in hierdie stad ~al ons oorwin 
I 
sy binneplein enjpoorte vat ••• 
G! A. Watermeyer 
I 
I 
These are the opening lines from the second of a 
! l 
series of six poems entitled, Volkshandel (Volk s Commerce), 
I 
which form part of Watermeyer's collection of national poetry, 
Die Republiek :Y.§11. Duisend Jaar I (The Thousand. Year Republic.·) 
MUch of what is communicated bi this poetry is weakened or i . 
extinguished through translation and through selection of 
I 
only some of the poems of a se~ies. A rendering in English 
of the above and subsequent li~es and. poems is given with 
the.poet's kind. permission: 
(For this city d.~d. it begin; 
in this same ci~y we shall win 
! 
we'll take its dourtyard and. its gates ••• ) 
I . 
The city is Johannesburg. Despite its Afrikaans name, 
it i~ predo~inantly not an .Afr~kaner .·city. It is a metropol-
·.. . I 
is where most of the very pros~erous and i'Tell-to~do- people 
that·Afrikaners encounter are ~nglish-speaking; where the 
I . 
occupants of the garden-suburblmansions which the Afrikaner 
plumber and his black assistan~s come to visit are Britons 
i 
or Jews; where the poor man that An Afrikaner sees is an 
Afrikaner.~ 
i 
~In this connection, th~ black man here too seems to 
, be, as the Negro writer, RalphJEllison, observes in his book 
·by that name, the Invisible Ma • 
ids 
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Here, as in all South African cities, most of the <.::'·: 
shops, cinemas, banks, restaurants are owned by those long 
regarded by the Afrikaner as 11 f'oreigners 11 --people not born 
in hie country or their children. And here, many a poor 
Afrikaner coming in from the countryside has entered a shop 
where Afrikaans is not spoken, and trying in a stumbling fas-
hion to make himself understood in English has experienced 
the peculiar embarra·ssment of feeling a foreigner in his 
own land: 
Ons het die poorte wyd gebloei 
waardeur die handel vrugbaar vloei, 
ons het die vlaktes oopgeslaan 
waar mynstellasies rif'diep staan; 
met Trekkerswee en Driejaar-leed 
het ons die erwe uitgemeet 
waar winkelsentrums wolkhoog reik; 
maar weinig van ons name pryk 
op uithangborde, staan gegrif' 
in swaarvergulde bodeurskrif'; 
en word daar dividend verklaar 
oor voorbladruimte in die HST.A.R11 
blaai ons verby--soek volgens loon 
na huurvertrekke om te woon. 2 
(We opened up the gates with blood 
to let trade flow prosperously, 
we hewed open the wide plains 
where mine headgears grow from reef's; 
with doleful Trek and Three-year woe 
we measured out the plots of land 
where shopping centers reach the clouds; 
but few names of our people stand 
211Volkshandel III 11 
on nameboards, or are etched 
in heavy gilt upon the doors 
and when the dividends are declared 
11 Ji for front-page space in THE STAR 
llO 
we page on--and seek furnished apartments 
according to wages.) 
Johannesburg was the focus of a war for which 20,000 
Afrikaner women and children lost their lives in 1900-02, a 
city,where Afrikaner miners were shot down in the streets in 
1922, a city where the mayor is usually an Englishman or a 
Jew, and the bus conductor is almost always an Afrikaner: 
•••• Nog is ons wentelas en rat, 
klein onderdeel in die masjien 
wat vrug vir andervolk verdien, 
nog is ons klerk en ambagsman 
met enkeles wat breed beplan 
en blinkbres in die linies slaan 
wat kapitaalsterk teen ons staan •.•• 
Om hierdie stad het dit begin, 
in hierdie stad sal ons oorwin 
sy binneplein en poorte vat ••• s 
( ••• .'We are still pivot points and cogs, 
small parts .in the great machine 
that pick the fruit for other nations, 
we are still clerks and artisans 
lonely ones that build big schemes 
and shiny armored hit the lines 
of capitalism opposing us ••• 
For this .city did it begin, 
in this same city we shall win 
we'll take its courtyard and its gates ••• ) 
811Volkshandel II 11 
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In Johannesburg, the poet Watermeyer lives, an employee 
of a British advertizing agency. 
The Revival of Afrikaner Nationalism, 19~ 
Before 1938, some observers thought that Afrikaner 
nationalism was dying. The South African historian w. M. 
Macmillan, in a work published-in 1930, Complex South Africa, 
considered that 11 there need be little mention of the dead or 
• . 114 dying feuds of the two white peoples. The Boer General, 
He.rtzog, and the British Colonel, Creswell, had then been 
co-operating harmoniously in a coalition government for six 
years. An American historian, o. Janowsky, devoted a section 
of a 1945 study of nationalism to 11 The Evolution of Success-
ful Multi-National States, 11 grouping South Africa along with 
Switzerland and the Soviet'Union as examples of such count-
ries. 'rAlready, Boers read English books avidly, and their 
own literature is remarkably free of anti-British bias," he 
believed on the strength of South African source material 
from the 1930's. 6 
Indeed, many of the issues separating the British and 
Afrikaner groups had been bridged. With the unanimous con-
sent of the English-apeaking Parliamentary Opposition, Hert-
zog and Malan had secured recognition for Afrikaans as an of-
ficial language in 1925. They had given South Africa her own 
national flag along with the Union Jack in 1928, and won com-
plete, legal independence from Britain in 1931. Hertzog's 
National Party and Creswell 1s Labourites together had worked 
out a 'civilised labour policy', providing unemployed Afrik-
aners with jobs on the railways, and they had reconstructed 
the legal barriers against. the entrance of black workers into 
~Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Min-
orities (With Special Reference to East-central Europer-
(New York: The Macmillan Company, .1945), p. 68. 
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the skilled tradese 
' 
Even the prospect of a single white nationalism seem-
ed to have acquired a political foundation when Hertzog's 
National Party and Smuts' South African Party joined forces 
in 1933 in response to widespread p~blic demands that they 
work together to meet the economic crisis precipitated by the 
Great Depression. This step was not difficult for Hertzog 
who, after the passage of the Statu~e of Westminster in 1931, 
believed that he had achieved .most of the points dear to 
Afrikaner sentiment that he had set out to secure in 1912; 
nor for ~muts, who no longer saw his erstwhile opponent as 
a militant Nationalist and took the initiative in proposing 
co-operation. A Coalition Government was formed with Hert-
zog remaining on as Prime Minister and Smuts re-entering 
office as Deputy Prime Minister. The popularity of the 
Coalition with the electorate won it all but six House of 
Assembly seats in the 1933 General Election, and encouraged 
a fu;ther development the following year when the two par-
ties gave up their individual identities and fused to form 
a new entity, the United Party. 0~ minor significance at 
. J . 
the time was the fact that 19 of Hertzog s former Parliamen-
tary follo'wers, led by ·Dr. Malan, and a handful of Smuts' old 
supporters, led by Colonel Stallard, stayed out of Fusion to 
form independent parties on the wings--the 'Purified National 
Party' and the 1Dominion Party'. 
It h~s never been agreed why Dr. Malan and his fol-
lowers rejected Fusion; Dr. Malan, at the time, could point 
to no principle in the constitution of the new United Party 
which compromise4 the overt objectives of ~rikaner national-
ism.6 The rules of the United Party allowed members to make 
6 Pirow, Hertzog, pp. 180-189 .. Pirow, who was Hertzog's 
Minister of Justice, remaining with him after Fusion, suggests 
among reasons why the Malanites opposed the merger of the two 
great parties (first in the Coalition Government of 1933 which 
preceeded Fusion) that some of Malan's followers n saw even 
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propag~nda for the aim of turning South Africa into a rep-
ublic; the Party undertook to apply bilingualism in prac-
tice; the Union was free to secede from the Commonwealth, and 
to remain neutral in time of ~ar if Parliament so decided. 
This latter issue was to split the United Party in 1939, but 
few people in South Africa,even those who read Mein Kampf, 
could have anticipated in 1934 that the Nationalist principle 
of staying out of 11 Britain's warsu was not the academic issue 
that Hertzog thought it was. 
To outsiders it might readily appear that the Purified 
National Party lacked proper soil on which to grow, and that 
it ·was too small an entity to present a serious challenge to 
an organization enjoying the support of the great majority 
of both Afrikaans- and English-speaking Whites, and headed by 
their traditional leaders, Hertzog ·and Smuts. In staying 
clear of Fusion, however, Dr. Malan obviously had had a more 
hopeful look into his Party's prospects. Though his suppor-
ters numerically constituted a minority group, they included 
many of the most influential Afrikaners. HFrom the begin-
ning,11 writes the Afrikaner historian, D. w. Kruger, from ob-
. " servation at close range, Malan enjoyed the support of that 
influential Afrikaans cultural and intellectual circle who 
less of attaining Cabinet rank if the seats had to be shared 
between Hertzog and Smuts than if the former remained the sole 
dispenser of the loaves and fishes." Others of lower stan-
11 ding were horrified at the extra c0mpetition for appointments 
which Coalition would necessarily .introduce .. •t Others were 
II II 11 die-hard Republicans whose ideal was a Kr~ger Republic 
which would place the·Afrikaner on top for all time.n There 
were those to whom General Smuts was personally anataema, 
and tho:ae who saw the only hope for survival of the Afrikaner 
as a distinct national entity in a go-it-alone policy. What-
ever the nature of their opposition to C.oalition may Aa.ve 
been, the Malanites aware of its popularity~ith the elec-
torate, claimed the right to stand in the 1933 General Elec-
tion as Coalitionists and have their nominations guaranteed 
by Hertzog and Smuts. This was conceded. The Coalition took 
144 seats in a House of Assembly of 150, ibid., p. 154; 
Kruger, The Age of the Generals, p. 161. 
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had formerly stood behind Hertzog. 11 That is, though weak in 
Parliament, N~lan was strong in the Afrikaans universities, 
in the Afrikaans schools, in the Dutch Reformed Churches, and 
in the Afrikaans cultural organizations, of which we shall 
soon have more to say. He commanded a Press. Leaving aside 
the Dutch Reformed Church organs, he controlled Die Burger 
in the Cape; and with his Party boasting but one M.P. from 
the Transvaal (Strijdom), he nevertheless soon acquired news= 
paper support in that Province when Dr. Verwoerd was called 
from the chair of Applied Psychology at Stellenbosch Univer-
sity to start Die Transvaler in 1937. 
More particularly, 
Malan enjoyed the wholehearted support of the hard 
inner core of Afrikaans Calvinism which had for years 
been exerting a quiet but strong in£luence on the 
growth of political and national consciousness in 
South Africa. 7 
. What 11hard inner core If? We shall in due course at-
tempt to identify it. Close to its center at Potchefstroom 
University, Professor Kruger gives a frank account of its 
political attitudes: 
In Afrikaans Calvinism, British imperialism and lib~ 
eralism, in fact, everything that was British, had always 
found its toughest opponent. Calvinism, although in 
South .Africa it limited liberty and equality to men of 
European descent, had for many years espoused the cause 
of national independence and White supremacye .Acknowled8-
ing the sovereign power of God alone, Calvinists rejec-
ted the sovereignty of earthly princes,. especially of 
foreign origin. They ·detested every manifestation of 
pro-British sentiment as emanating from a spirit false 
and utterly alien to South Africa. They believed that 
Afrikanerdom had a divine calling which could be exer-
cised only by a people free and untrammeled. This belief 
had in the past brought to the front menwith iron in 
their souls, men harsh like the country they lived in, 
where existence was one continuous struggle against the 
elements of nature and against barbarian foes~ They bel~ 
ieved in freedom and equality and from the beginning of 
his movement Eertzog had had their support. For these 
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men politics was not a game to be played according to 
nicely regulated rules, a game of gentlemen and spots-
men pitting their wits against each other, the winner 
being congratulated and given the chance to rule the 
country. For them politics was dealy earnest, with 
the survival of Afrikanerdom at stake. 8 
It was this ui:nner coretl! which from· the moment of 
their break threw its weight behind Malan and against Hertzog 
in a contest wherein the growth of national consciousness 
could no longer be fostered through the exertion of a "1quiet 11 
influence. 9 
The new Party also did not lack a cause. The changes 
in.the country's constitutional status had not altered the 
status of the Afrikaner very much. The Statute of Westmin-
ster had merely recognized the independence of the State. 
The new national flag had not affected the fact that the ur-
ban Afrikaner was still usually the man working in the street, 
not the man in the office, that he belonged to that stratum 
of people, occasionally feared, but seldom respected. 
In what may be described as a work of national sociol-
ogy, Die Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner in~ Stad, the 
author reports that in the nine biggest cities of South Africa 
in 1939, one out of every 8 Afrikaner males was an unskilled 
laborer, in contrast to one out of every 85 non-Afrikaner 
Whites; one out of every 9 Afrikaners was a mineworker, in 
contrast to one out of every 47.non-Afrikaner Whites; one out 
of every 23 Afrikaners was a bricklayer, against one out o:f 
every 53 non-Afrikaner Whites; one out of every 35 Afrikan-
ers was a policeman, to.one out of every 60 non-Afrikaner 
Whites. And up the socio-economic ladder, one out of every 
8 Ibid., p. 181. 
~Hertzog was now violently attacked by the Malanites 
for instituting policies which the latter, while members of 
the old NatioP..al Party, had helped to formulate; :see Pirow, 
rYn. cit., pp. l99f. As a result, the 'Purified Nationalists' 
=--u 11 
appeared purified of all conscience and sepse o:f honour, 
to Hertzog; The Star) 24 October 1937. 
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2"I3 Afrikaners was a merchant, in contrast to one out of 
every 19 non-Afrikaner Whites; one out of every 179 
Afrikaners was a business executive, to one out of every 33 
non-Afrikaner Whites; one out of every 263 Afrikaners was 
engaged in the medical profession, against one out of every 
106 non-Afrikaner Whites; one out of every 385 Afrikaners 
was practising law, to one out of every 106 non-Afrikaner 
Whites.~ 0 
The socio-economic inferiority of Afrikaners became 
most perceptible at a time when the Afrikaans- and English-
speaking, white, urban populations were. approaching nunierical 
parity. Those unable to subsist in the countryside, the 
people for whom there was no 'stukkie grond 1 --bit of land--
were arriving daily in the cities. In-1936, the number of 
white people in towns whose home language wa$ English ex-
ceeded those Whites with Afrikaans their mother tongue by 
l52,?87; ih 1946, the corresponding figure was 12,093. Over 
this decade, the Afrikaner rural popu~ation fell by 47,070--
indicating that it lost more than the whole of its natural 
population increase; the Afrikaans white urban population 
rose by 286,024.~~ 
The trek to the cities was for those Afrikaners whose 
parents could not help them enter a profession generally a 
trek to mines, railway yards, sweatshops and factories, where 
they saw themselves working like black people, taking orders 
like black people, living in shabby, residential streets 
adjacent to black shanty towns, and having to speak a foreign 
language--English--like a conquered race. Urbanization for 
most Afrikaners involved a greater social transi~ion and more 
difficult problems of psychological adjustment than is the 
case in lands without a subject population--though these 
~ 0Pauw, op. cit., P• · 235. 
~~Union Statistics for Fifty Years, p. A-18. 
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problems, it will be admitted, were not nearly so difficult 
as for this subject population. 
It was an unhappy migration. Probably many who took 
part in it planted their sole hopes for the future in the 
possibility of returning to the past: 
•••• landloses wat oor landbou lees, 
vroegmorens inspan in die gees, 
nog laataand in die stad, voor bed 
eers op die weer se wolkstand let, 
diep dankbaar word wanneer die reen 
die sinkdak met oesdrome seen •••• ~ 2 
( •••• the landless reading agriculture, 
inspanning in their minds at crack of dawn, 
still after twilight in the city, at bedtime 
note the clouds for rain, 
deeply grateful when the rain 
blesses iron rooves with harvest dreams •••• ) 
Dreams alone were possible. For the majority there 
was no other way backe 
The political direction taken by the ever-increasing 
number of poor, landless Afrikaners could be decisive. Which-
ever party re-inspired these people, assisted them to develop 
a sense of pride and a forward-looking purpose, could be the 
party of the future. As we now see, looking back, no party 
was better suited for this role than the Purified National 
Party. 
The United Party, the agency of Fusion, suffered a 
double handicap~ It drew support not only from Afrikaner 
farmers, but from groups among the English-apeaking elector-
ate with whom poor, urban Afrikaners were in economic and soc-
ial conflict. It expected the Poor White to vote the same 
ticket as his employer, a man alien to him not only in lang-
~ 2G. A. Watermeyer, 11Die Onterfdes 11 (The.Disinherited), 
in Die Republiek van Duisen& Jaar, p. 23. · 
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uag,e and social attitude, but who by virtue of his business 
interests was predisposed in favor of low wages and a lowering 
of the industrial color bar. In the composition of its lead-
ership and Parliamentary membership, and in its policies, the 
Party was adjusted to the combination of ethnic and economic 
interests whom it served. With Smuts, who had smashed the 
1922 mineworkers 1 strike as Deputy Prime Minister, and a man 
like R. Stuttaford, whose family owned one of the leading 
department store chains in the country and who "supplied all 
the business knowledge any Cabinet could require, 11 :1. 3 on its 
front bench, the Party espoused conservatism in economic mat-
ters. On the national question the Party took a moderate 
position, not wishing to offend its English-speaking follo~­
ers by establishing a republican form of government against 
their Imperial sentiments. Thus the Party could manage no 
specific appeal either to the stomach or heart of the Poor 
Whites. Their sole attraction waa: to its leader, Hertzog. 
After the defeat of his neutrality motion and the entrance 
of South Africa into the War in September 1939, he left the 
Party, talcing 36 of his followers with him. :1.4< Thereafter 
~ 3Pirow, QJ2• cit., p. 158. 
:1.4 They constituted themselves as the Volksparty, mer-
ging in January 1940 with the Purified Nationalists under the 
name, Die Hereni~de Nasionale of Volksparty (The Re-United 
National or Volk:s Party), known simply as the H.N.P. Hert-
zog became H.N.P. leader and Malan his deputy. While popular 
among the ~rikaner public, this re~ion was unstable, part-
ly because it was seen that Hertzog s followers, who included 
five former Ministers, would have to be accommodated in the 
disposition of future Cabinet posts which Malanites had coun-
ted on for themselves; and partly because the.two groups dif-
fered in their attitude to. the English~speaking section. 
Despite the shock of the war vote, which he regarded as a blow 
to South Africa's national interests, Hertzog continued to 
favor equality of treatment for both white langUag§ groups. 
He insisted that a republic should not be established without 
broad support from both groups, thereby presupposing a grad-
ual weaning away of British South Africans from their attach-
ment to foreign traditions and loyalties. Dr. Malan believed 
the United Earty became increasingly identified with the 
English-speaking section. 
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The South African Labour Party was led by immigrant, 
British trade unionists and dre"Vl its following chiefly from-
English-speaking white artisans. Though it solicited the 
support of Afrikaner workers it naturally had no sympathy 
for their belief that their ills were due to "foreigners 11 • 
The P~rty's disinterest in the national question was coupled 
. .. I 
with some equivocation over the color bar, the organiz;ation s 
left wing pressing to change its character from that of a 
'White Labour Party' by encouraging adoption of a non-racial 
policy and the formation of an all-w·orkers 1 front. ~6 Poor 
Whites were unlikely to find comraderie with such people. 
In contrast, all the leaders and virtually all members 
of the Purified National Party were Afrikaners. They included 
·that not until an Afrikaner Republic had been established in 
which the Afrikaans language, and Afrikaans traditions held 
a dominant status, could the British begin to be educated in-
to a South African national consciousness. The personal riv-
alries between Hertzog's and Malan's followers probably ex-
acerbated their political differences. Intrigues were laun-
ched against Hertzog, with the result that before Reunion had 
lasted a year he lost control of H.N.P. policy and left pol-
itics permanently. With leadership passing now to Dr. Malan, 
the Re-United National Party retained its name and kept all 
but ten of ~he former Hertzogites. The latter came forward 
as the Afrikaner Party, an ineffectual splinter group that 
the H.N.P. absorbed in 1948, at which time it assumed its 
.present name, the National Party. For more detailed account 
of these and other episodes in Dr. Malan's struggle for as-
cendency in the Nationalist Movement, see Michael Roberts and 
A. E. G. Trollip, The South African Opposition 1939-1945. An 
Essa} in Contemporary History (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1947 • 
~ 6The Party as a whole began moving towards a non-rac-
ial policy in 1946, when it adopted a programme opposing the 
color bar in industry, but advocating equal political rights 
for Afpicans only in their 'own' territories, with elected 
white representatives in a federal central government, Sachs, 
lli:B' Chdi:c:e before South Africa, pp. 50f. In 1958 the Labour 
Party disappeared as a Parliamentary force. 
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men who had been among the first to draw attention to the 
plight of the Poor Whites and who never lost interest in 
them. At the 1934 Kimberley Conference on the Poor White 
problem, for instance, Dr. Malan was main speaker and Dr. Ver-
woerd chief organizer. Uprooted Afrikaners were not held in 
contempt by these men. On the contrary, the Purified Nat-
ionalists encouraged in them a sense of pride, an idea that 
they were all marching together on a definite historical 
mission, the ~'~~second Great Trekn. Like their Voortrekker 
ancestors their lot was hardship and humiliation, but their 
destiny was conquest. They would conquer the cities as 
their great grandfathers had conquered the land. They would 
restore· the Afrikaner Republic and make Afrikaners supreme 
·in every walk of life. English would become a nsecond and 
II . 
supplementary language , permitted equality with Afrikaans 
only where deemed to be in the State's interests.:L.6 Foreign-
~~KonseD Grondwet (Draft Constitution of the Repu~lic), 
Article 2, Clause 5. Art. 3, cl. 2 of this document provides 
that citizenship rights in the proposed Republic,would be be-
stowed only upon white subjects who behave in a 'volks~con­
structive11 manner; Art. 11, · cl. 1 states: 1rThe: propagation 
of any political policy and the existence 0f ~ny political 
organization that conflicts with the fulfillment of the 
Christian-National life-calling of the volk is forbidden.n 
The Konsep Grondwet was prepared in 1940 by a Policy Commis-
sion on which-the following organizations were represented: 
the Dutch Reformed Churches; the F.A.K. (Federation of Afrik-
aner Cultural Organizations), a co-ordinating body affiliat-
ing over 300 Afrikaner organizations of various types (see 
below, p. 128 ); the Reddingsdaadbond, the agency spear-
heading the Afrikaner Economic Movement (see below,pp. 15lf ); 
and the Ossewa Brandwag ("Ox Waggon Guard), a National-Social-
ist 'shirt 1 movement founded during the Great Trek Centenary 
celebrations in 1938, whose strength was given by Dr. Malan 
in 1941 as between 300,000 and 400,000 men (Assembly Debates, 
4 February 1941, col. 2196); as the total Afrikaner populat-
ion numbered approximately 1.2 million in 1941, the O.B. ap-
pears to have contained most adult Afrikaners. An outline 
of the Konsep Grondwet under the· title, Verklaring namens 
Volksorganisasies (Declaration on Behalf of Volk1 s Organiz-
ations) was approved by the following Nationalist leaders 
attending an augmented meeting of the Po~icy Commission in 
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owned businesses, like the gold mines, banks and credit 
institutions, would be taken over by the Republic or brought 
under strict State controls.~ 7 
1941: Dr. Malan, C. R. Swart, J. G. Strijdom, Dr. Donges, Dr. 
Verwoerd. The following signed the Verklaring: I. M. Lombard 
General Secretary of the Broederbond (see below, pp. 129-148 ) 
and of the F • .A.K~ (for the F .A..K.); H. J. van Rensburg, "Com-
mandant-General of the O.B. (for the O.B.); Professor L • .r. 
du Plessis (for the Economic Institute of the F.A.K.); .Dr. 
Diederichs, Chief Leader of the Reddingsdaadbond (for the 
RDB); and three D. R. C ministers in their personal capacity; 
Roberts and Trollip, Q2· cit., p. 82. Although the Konsep 
Grondwet was never adopted as official National Party policy 
and was disavowed in post-War years by the Nationalist lead-
ers, it undoubtedly reflected their political ideals at the 
time, and was publicized as
11
such, being published in Die Trans-
valer on January 23, 1942 · with the leave and upon the aut-
hority of Dr. D. F. Malan~--with the further explanation that 
11the Party and. its Chief Leader has acce:wted the scheme in 
its basic principles and broad outlines. 
~ 7Nationalization of private property was also never 
formerly adopted as National Party policy but was propagated 
dur~ the war years by Farty leaders and intellectuals. In 
1942, Dr. Malan, declaring that the ttdays of the capitalist 
system are gone, 11 stated that he could see no reason for not 
natronalizing the gold mining industry, and demanded the nat-
ionalization of banks and credit institutions: Dr. D. F. Mal-
an, On the March to the Republic: Dr. Malan gg the Future 
Policy of
1
the Re-United National Partv for~ New South Africa; 
Dr. Malan s statement of policy onl6 §_eptember 1942, at 
Pretoria, Qn the occasion of the Union Congress of the Re-
United National'Party (Cape Town: Re-United National Party, 
n.d.), pp. 8r. Acquisition of the gold mines by the State 
was advocated by such Nationalist intellectuals as A. J. 
Bruwer; see Kapitalisme, Party-Politiek en Armoede, p. 226. 
Nationalization of financial institutions was announced as 
a B:roederbond objective in 1944 by the society's General 
Secretary; Die Transvaler, 3 January 1944. In his Ons Repub~ 
liek (OUr Republic), published in 1941, Dr. Die~erichs, pres-
ently Minister of Economic Affairs, wrote that all key ind-
ustry, including the mining industry, must be placed under 
State control 11 , and that a ttstate Bank11 could be founded "in 
order to ensuFe that banking has a purely domestic character 
and that the money and credit matters of the State are cont-
fl t rolled in the,interests of the volk; extrac s from Ons Ren-
ubliek quoted in the Sunday E?CQress, · 26 ~October 1958-.-
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This was of course a message that could become accep-
table only among Afrikaners, and one which the Afrikaners in 
the United Party or the British artisan-politicians of the 
Labour Party were unlikely to voice~ To the landless Poor 
Wb.i tes working und.er non-Afrikaner bosses, it would seem to 
be one more.responsive to their social experiences and wants. 
On the one hand, they were not offered promises of material 
benefits along with silence on the social status quo. Neit-
her were they presented with improbable pictures of future 
white working class rule~ from which thei~ rural relatives 
were excluded; .or, for people with no· property but their col-
or to sustain them, encouraged to subscribe to the idea1L.of 
losing their racial privileges. 
The Nationalist leaders were nearly all middle-class 
professional people, actual or former newspaper editors like 
Dr. Malan and Dr. van Rhijn, ex-small town lawyers like Dr. 
Donges and J. G. Btrijdom, ex-academicians like Dr. Verwoerd 
ana Dr. Diederichs; of the members of the post-1948 Cabinets 
only one, B. J. Schoeman, came from a working class background. 
Several owned land or, like Dr. Verwoerd, acquired farms in 
the course of their careers. Few, initially, were businessmen. 
They were men whose upward strivings need not conflict with 
the interests of Afrikaner workers and farmers but could be 
complementary to them. Hence for economic as well as ethnic 
rea·sons the Purified Nationalists were less impelled to assume 
a moderate position than their rivals. They never advocated 
nationalization of land. But in their public utterances 
regarding other forms of property, like gold mines and banks, 
in which Afrikaners possessed little or no share, they were 
freer to adopt the radical stance that secured them the init-
iative among Afrikaner voters. And as the latter comprised 
almost 60 per cent of the·electorate, militant nationalism 
could be a -viable ideology'; 
EncoUraged by ltl;re knowledge that they would be assis-
ted by a cadre of well-placed intellectuals; heartened no 
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doubt by reflection on the political implications of the 
Afrikaner urban migration, the Purified Nationalists were 
also probably conscious--when the decision to break with 
Hertzog was made in 1934--that they might be favored by the 
calendar. The centenary of the Great Trek would soon be 
falling. Like the Voortrekkers of old, the Purified Nation~ 
alists had chosen isolation and independence to co-operat-
ion and subordinancy, and it is clear from events that they 
considered establishing this resemblance ~n the minds of 
those made responsive to it by poverty or boredom. 
According to Professor Kruger, mi~itant Afrikaner 
nationalism began reviving in 1936.. The Great Trek had star-
ted a hundred years before, reaching its critical point on 
December 16, 1838, at the battle of Blood River, when 3,000 
Zulus fell to the Voortrekkers' rifles. Blood River weakened 
the spine of African military resistance to white supremacy 
in South Africa, and its anniversary became an ~nnual, nation-
al-religious holiday. It was apt therefore, that lfthe rev-
ival of militant nationalism ••• gained full impetus'only in 
1938. ft:La In the General Election fought early that year the 
Purified Nationalist seemingly made only slight gains, inc-
reasing their Parliamentary representation ~o 27 against lll 
seats captured by the United Party. They received a mere 
29.56 per cent of the popularvote, but this represented half 
the total Afrikaner vote and was only 10.4 per cent short of 
the figure which secured them control of the country ten years 
and two elections later.:L 9 Had the election been delayed 
for several months, the Nationalists might have done even 
better; time would have permitted the impact of the centenary 
celebrations to be registered at the. polls. As it was, these 
celebratione were not forgotten: 
:L 8 Kruger, ~· £!!., p. 181. 
:L 9Gwendolen M. darter, The Politics of Inequality. 
South Africa since 1948 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1958), 
Chart 1, P• 449. 
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Throughout the length and breadth of the country, 
, from the great cities to the tiniest hamlet, Afrikaners 
were preparing to commemorate the Greak Trek •••• 
Afrikaans newspapers and periodicals published a 
steady stream of articles devoted to the Great Trek and 
on festival occasions speakers referred in glowing 
terms to the mighty deeds of the Voortrekkers. It was 
decided that a noble monument would be erected on a 
hilltop near Pretoria and that the foundation stone 
would be laid on the 16th December, 1938, exactly one 
hundred years after the battle of Blood River. To mark 
the solemn occasion a symbolic Trek by a number of ten-
ted ox-waggo.ns to the capital was organised. From dif-
ferent parts .of the compass they were to converge on 
Pretoria, visiting by the ~~y all the places sacred in 
the history of Afrikanerdom. They were thus to li!L~ 
the past '\'lith the present and that past included not 
only the desperate struggle against Native barbarians 
but against British imperialism also. 
The waggons began their long journey in August 1938 
and as they preceeded on their way, local festivities 
were organised throughout the country. People in their 
thousands put on Voortrekker dress for the occasion, 
men grew bears and nightly round countless camp fires 
the the Psalms of the Voortrekkers and patriotic songs 
resounded. Patriotic speeches were the order of the day 
and historical tableaux vividly pictured the past. The 
sight of the plodding oxen and creaking waggons rolling 
along the highway or lUmbering ponderously through the 
streets of sleepy villages and bustrl]ing towns sent 
enthusiastic crowds to the meeting ~aces. Every sin-
gle event was fully reported in the press and all other 
news took second place. The story of the Great Trek 
was retold many times and in their imagination the people 
suffered with the Voortrekkers and rejoiced in their 
victories. Deeds of valour acquired a new significance 
as part of the Afrikaner struggle against Bantu and 
Briton alike. The trials and tribulations of the past 
were ascribed to British action and British influence. 
As the waggons converged on their goal an extraordin~ 
ary s.piri t of fervid patriotism, bordering on adoration, 
swept over the country. Enthusiasm became nearly rel-
igious and sometimes hysterical~ women bringing their 
babies to be baptised in the shadow of the waggons. 
Speakers ur§ed the people to return to the ways of their 
fathers •• ~. 0 
2
°Kruger, op. cit., pp. 184f. 
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South Africa had never ~een the like. And everywhere 
the Nationalists, closer to thJ spirit of the·occasion, held I . 
the initiative. It was in fac11 the Federasie van Afrikaanse I -
Kultuurverenigings (F.A.~, a qultural organization establis-
hed and staffed by Nationalist[supporters, which from its 
central secretariat in Johannesburg performed the key role 
of organizing and co-ordinatincl the festivities. 2 ~ 
i . 
The climax was reached 9n December 16, 1938• 
On-a hilltop south of P1etoria the foundation stone 
of the Voortrekker Monument was laid. Tens of thousands came 
I to watch the ceremony. For da~s they camped round the Mon-
ument site, living in tents. ~ollowers of Hertzog and Malan 
i 
mingled fre·ely, exchanging retn4niscences. But party politics 
could not wholly be set aside. I The old Boer leader, General 
Kemp, a member of the Fusion Cabinet, attended the celebrat-
ions. t•rn his enthusiasm, and Ito the consternation of the 
English~speaktng wing of the uJited Party 11 he unexpectedly 
announced that the South Afric~~ military'headquarters of 
.i I • Roberts He ghts, named after t~e Brltish general who cap-
, u 
tured Pretoria in 1900, would tfereafter be known as Voor-
tt A I . . trekkerhoogte • . frikaners we~comed the announcement but it 
nearly caused·a Cabinet crisis.! Hertzog was forced to molify 
I 
his English-speaking supporters! by allowing the local post 
. i 
office to retain the old name. 2 i2 
I Dr. Malan did not have t
1
o compromise. He spoke at 
Blood River itself before a crord of 40,000, over three times 
the number of· all the original Voortrekkers. Renowned as an 
I 
orator, he told his audience th~t they were on a nNew Great 
Trekrr. Their e~emies were the lsame, the Bantu and the Briton~ 
Only'the form of the battle hadi altered: 
21 Carter, ~· cit., P• 
22Kruger, ~· cit., p. 
i 
I 
I 
! 
258. 
I 
I 1~6. 
I 
I 
i 
\ 
i 
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The strug~le with weapons is over. That was the 
Voortrekkers task. But a still more violent and dead-
lier struggle than theirs is now to be decided. The 
battlefield has moved. Your Blood River is not here. 
Your Blood River .lies in the city. 23 
The object of the struggle was the conquest of edon= 
omic independence for the Afrikaner. 24 We~shall subsequent-
ly examine the means which were employed. 
Another speaker who rrurged the people to return to 
u . K the ways of their fathers was the Rev. J .. D. estell of the 
Free State. He, too, was-concerned about the material plight 
of Afrikaners .. During the Anglo-Boer War he had served.as 
a chaplain with the Boer forces. Because of his exceptional 
bravery in rescuing wounded burghers under gunfire a town was 
named after him in, 1905. He had established a reputation as 
a man of letters, had written a number of books, including 
historical works, and had never actively engaged in party 
politics. He was known ana respected among &11 Afrikaners9 26 
Throughout 1938, Father Kestell, as he was known, 
toured the country exhorting his fellow Afrikaners to pay 
proper respect to the memory of Voortrekkers. Their mem-
ory, he insisted, deserved a more meaningful tribute than 
beards, games and ox~waggon journeys. It could be best per~ 
petuated by the uplifting of their thousands of descendants 
from the poverty in which they were sunk. The occasion dem= 
anded a reddingsdaad--an act of rescue. 
23Malan, Die Nuwe Groot Trek, p. 5· 
24Ibid., P• 6 .. 
215This description is based on a more glowing portrait 
given in Press Digest Memorandum ~' a critical review of 
the early history of the Afrikaner Economic Movement, in 
which Kestell's ideals are contrasted with the character which 
the Movement developed9 The Press Digests including the spec-
ial memorandum on the Economic Movement were prepared under 
the auspices of the Jewish Board of Deputies which, as we ~· 
shall see, had many reasons to be suspicious of the Movement; 
its Press Digest compiler may have exag~erated Kestell's qual-
ities in order to point up the Movement s failings. 
127 
t 1 i H U H U Kes el avoided bla~ ng exploiters or foreigners 
! • • • • for the condition of the ~opr Whites. He reserved his chief 
criticisms for Afrikane~s t~emselves' • 26 He deplored the 
spirit of self-seeking thatf had come to the fore since 1903, 
a spirit that had led to cl~ss distinctions and class hatred 
between rich and poor Afri~ners: : 
Our forefathers had ~ime fo.r bywoners !tenants] • The 
children learned to res~ect the bywoner. Re ate at the 
.same t~ble as the land-ewner and he could feel that 
blood crawls where it cr.nnot run. 
After the Second War of Independence !}.. e., 1899-19.0~ 
a new spirit was abroad, a spirit of each for himself. 
Then we had no more ti~e for the bywoners. · 
If we really want to1 develop the reddingsdaad, it 
must be a reddingsdaad porn out of the spirit. It must 
be a deed in which the volk helps itself. A volk can 
never exist '\'Thile a lar1ge number of its component parts 
are helpless. 2 " [ 
I 
Kestell directed.hislappeal to Afrikaners of all pol~ 
itical parties. He emphasi
1 
ed the need for a welding of 
Afrikaner forces to achieve! the reddingsdaad. However he 
wanted more than political rnity on this issue, more than 
the economic rehabilitation! of the poorer Afrikaners: 
I 
The idea which has t~ken possession of me with incre~s­
ing tenacity and which ~oes not want to release me from 
its clutches is that wei should save ourselves. It can 
never be considered ~ h~althy sign if our needy have to 
depend on State aid. I~ is we ·ourselves who must save 
each other and help our~elves. The spirit which must 
motivate u.s is that whiph inspired the Voortrekker to 
inspan his oxen in fron;t of that of another Trekker whose 
waggon fell fast •••• Thi~ spirit has practically ceased 
to exist since 1899-1902. It is this spirit which must 
28 I . be reborn.... i 
I 
26LJc. ill· 
. 
2 ~Speech by Rev. J. p. Kestell, delivered on the occas~ 
ion of the visit of the wag~ons to Bloemfontein on October 7, 
1938, quoted in P.~. Memora~dum ~' Appendix A. 
288peech by Rev. J. b. Kestell calling Free Staters 
to attend a celebration, qupted P.D. Memorandum 12}, Ap-· 
pendix A, My italics. 1 
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As a result of Kestell's speeches throughout 1938 red-
dingsdaad committees were formed in all parts of the country 
to collect half a million pounds for the rehabilitation of 
the Poor Whites. In October 1939 the Eerste Ekonomiese Volks-
kongres (People's First Economic Congress) was convened in 
Bloemfontein to consider how the money should be spent. 
The Volkskongres, the reddingsdaad groups, and the 
Great Trek celebrations from which the latter sprang were all 
organized by the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Associat-
ions (F~A.K.), the co-ordinating agency for Afrikaner cultur-
al, religious, educational and economic societies. In 1937 
the F .A .. K. contained o:'fer three hundred affiliated organiz-
ations, one third of them cultural and language associations, 
the r-est ~Church-·councils·-and.:bodies·,-'· gharitable societies, 
studentand youth groups, scientific study circles, and educat-
ional organizations. 29 The F.A.K. itself was set up in 1929, 
and supervised thereafter, by the Afrikaner Broederbond 
(Brotherhood). 30 The uhard inner core of Afrikaans Calvinism'', 
29Carter, QR• cit., p. 256. 
30Report py I. M. Lombard to the General Council of 
the Afrikaner Broederbond, at the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary 
Meeting of the Afrikaner Broederbond, held at Blo'emfontein, 
13 December 1943. (It is impossible at present to refer the 
reader to the sources for this and certain other information 
relating to the Broederbond; the term ·'confidential sources' 
will henceforth be used in the footnotes where the specific 
sources cannot be given., Lombard's remarks on this private 
occasion contradict his public statement in Die Transvaler, 
30 December 1944, that after its establishment the F.A.K. 
became self-operating. In any event·, the issue is largely 
academic, for Lombard himself served in .a duel capacity as 
Secretary of the Broederbond ana General Secretary of the 
F.A.K.; Professor J. 0. van Rooy, sometime Chairman of the 
Broederbond (Confidential Sources), headed the F.A.K. (at 
least) in 1948; Dr. Donges, Vice-Chairman of the Broederbond 
in 1944 (Confidential Sources), was also Vice-Chairman of 
the F.A.K. It will be evident from the discussion that fol-
lows that many other controlling positions in surface Nat-
ionalist organizations were held by members of the Broader-
bond Executive Council. 
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' i 
mentioned by Professor Kruge~, would seem to apply to the 
I 
Broederbond. To understand ~ore fully what transpired at 
and flowed from the People's rirst Economic Congress let us 
first look into the membersh~, aims and activities of this 
small, secret society~ For tb.e available evidence, though 
fragment~ry, suggests that th\e Broederbond played a leading 
if not the directing role in ~he Afrikaner Economic Movement. 
I 
The Broederbond 1 
II 
The Broederbond was founded in 1918 with an initial I . 
membership of 14, pledged to foster brother love among 
Afrikaners and provide mutual\ support in economic and cul-
tural spheres. 3~ The organization grew and subsequently 
I . 
went underground. According to a self-styled former char-
r 
ter member this occurred in 1~22 when the Society discarded 
its original intention to rem~in non-political and decided 
to work actively for the crea~ion of an Afrikaner-dominated 
. i 
republic; at this stage sever~l of the original members 
resigned. 5 2 
! Whatever the truth may lbe as to when and why it hap-
pened, a curtain fell between\the Broederbond and the public. 
I 
Membership was generally conc1aled. Meetings, never public-
ally advertized, were held beb\ind closed doors. At the 1943 
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Meeting elaborate and no doubt typ-
1 
ical security precautions were taken. Broers (Brothers) were 
warned not to leave scraps of ~aper lying around. Membership 
credentials were demanded at the start, and after the lunch 
recess each Broer was asked to\ check the membership card of 
\ 3 ~Report by I. M. Lomba+d to the General Council of 
the Afrikaner Broederbond, 1943. 
32 Carter, op. cit., p. ksl. Professor Carter 1 s source 
is Louis J. du Plessis, Letters of~ Farmer (Krugersdorp: 
privately printed, 195l), Reprinted letters to The Star, 20 
March 1944 and 12 October 19481 Du Plessis claims the Broed-
erbond was founded in his house, and that he resigned in 1922. 
I 
! 
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... · I'. 
the man next to him. The Cha~rman, Professor J. C. van Rooy 
of Potchefstroom University, levealing a- finec~apprecia tion 
I 
of human qualities, enjoined Broers that although all matters 
I 
were to be kept secret, some ~atters were toqbe kept even 
more secret than usual. Dr. Verwoerd, on the steering com~ 
mittee of the organization, s~ressed that documents relating 
to certain speeches must not pe sent through the post, but 
if necessary should be transmitted by hand through the sec-
retaries of the various branches. 33 . 
I Only a handful of publ~c statements have been issued 
by the Broederbond. On~Decem~er 14, 20, 30, 1944 and January 
3, -1945, ,D~e Transvaler carrifd articles on the character and 
work of the organization by i~s General Secretary, I. M. Lom~ 
. I bard. These were written as ~ reaction to Government charges 
I . 
that the Bond was attempting fo subvert the war effort. Gen-
eral Smuts had denounced it a~ ·''a dangerous, cunning, po1it-
u I • ical Fascist organization an~ had forbidden civil servants 
and teachers to be members .. 34 [ Lombard's articles were aimed 
at winning public sympathy and so relieving this pressure. 
Herein he accounts for the se~ret nature of the organization 
by reason_ that publicity might lead Bond members. to be gov-
erned by personal ambition ra~her than selfless service and 
more particularly that prematfre disclosure might result in 
11half-baked plans'", or give 1tpompetitors or enemies the chance 
! . 
• • • i II to undermine plans laid in the interest of the people. The 
rr · tf I .b 
confidential character of the Broederbond was no dif~erent 
i 
to that found in a meeting of!the Cabinet,· board of directors 
, I 
of a business, or church 6omm~ttee. 36 (Some of the Bond's 
I 
achievements were reported ini other articles in this series; 
these will be discussed below~. 
i 
33See below, p. 140, i 
i 
34Quoted in Kruger, 2J2.!• cit., p. 214; Qp.rter, QJ2.• cit., 
P• 252. I 
85Die Transvaler, 20 Drcember l944. 
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Further adverse criticism of the Bond after the Nation-
al Party 1 s advent to power in 1948 resulted in the appoint~ 
ment of a special investigatory committee by the Dutch Refor-
med Church. On the basis of information supplied by the 
Broederbond1 s Executive Council, this committee reported in 
1951 that the Bond was a "wholesome and sound" patriotic 
society. 86 
In short, very little of a factual nature has been 
said publically by or about the Broederbonde Reliable infor~ 
mation about the organization from published and private sour-
ces is limited and fragmentary. A detailed and comprehensive 
account of the methods and activities of the Broederbond is 
therefore not offered. 
One 'tf'act beyond doubt, however, is that the Bond is an 
exclusive organization, with interests which it will be seen 
are not exclusive to its members. Protestant, na~ionalminded 
Afrikaners alone are admitted. Membership is solely by invit-
ation. Few Afrikaners are invited. T~tal Membership in 1944 
was 2,672--less than l per cent of the then, adult, male Af-
rikaner population. The Secretary has explained that mass 
membership is not desired in the interests of efficiency: 
diversity, a representative cross-section of the Volk is 
sought, together with service potential to the organization1 s 
objectives. 37 
Representativeness was not attained by 1944, except 
with respect to religion. One-third of the then members were 
teachers; less than one out of every hundred Afrikaners was 
36Report of the Committee on 11 Current Problems about 
the Existence, Aim, and Object of the .Afrikaner Broederbond, 11 
Addendum B to The Transactions of the 22nd Council of Churches 
May 16, 1951, quoted in Carter, ~· cit., p. 255. --
87Die Transvaler, 14 December 1944, cited in Carter, QQ• 
cit., p. 253. The Bond is organized into branches throughout 
the country (afdelings) which send one delegate each to an an-
nual General Council (Algemene Raad); the latter elects the 
supreme authority, the EKecutive Council (Uitvoerende Raad). 
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a teacher. The majority of Broers were farmers; the balance 
of the Afrikaner population was already urban. Close to a· 
tenth of the membership (8.3 per cent) consisted of civil se~­
vants.38 How many clergy were members of the organization 
in 1944 is not here known. A report in the (Johannesburg) 
Sunday Times, 22 May 1960, alleged that the synods of the 
three main branches of the Dutch Reformed Church were cur-
rently under Bond control, over half the D.R.C. ministers 
and elders being members: t~Those who are known to belong to 
the Bqnd include the Rev. D~ F. B. de Beer, morals secretary 
of the Ned. Geref. Kerk, the Rev. C .. .B. Brink, Moderator of 
the Ned. Geref. Kerk in the Southern Transvaal, the Rev. F. E. 
o. Geldenhuys, Moderator of the Northern Transvaal Synod of 
the Ned. Ge!'ef. Kerk, the Rev. T. F. G. Dreyer, Secretary of 
the Hervormde Kerk, and the Rev. A. J. G. Oosthuizen, Moder-
ator of the Gereformeerde Kerk~~ 89 
There seems little room.for doubt, moreover, that vir-
tually all members of the Broederbond adhered--at least un-
til 1939--to the Purified National Party; and it seems like-
ly that during the wartime struggle for ascendency between 
38Die Transvaler, 14 December 1944. 
390n March 21, 1961, the Nederduits Hervormde Kerk, 
one of the three main Dutch Reformed Churches, withdrew from 
the World Council of Churches which at a recent conference 
held in South Africa had condemned apartheid and denied that 
the ideology possessed any scriptural sanction. The N. H. 
Kerk withdrawl was voted by all but 13 of the 500 delegates 
attending the Synod which decided the issue; The (London) 
Times, 22 March 1961. Of the 10 N. H. Kerk delegates to the 
World Council of Churches conference, seven were Bond mem-
bers, according to the Sunday Times, 19 March 1961, which 
listed them by name and position in the Synod leadership. A 
few days after the N. H. Kerk withdrawl, the Federal Coun-
cil of the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk, the largest of all 
the Dutch Reformed Churches, decided to recommend to its 
provincial synods in the Cape and the Transvaal that they 
terminate their membership of the World Council of Churches; 
Die Burger, 24 March 1961. 
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that party and the Ossewa Brandwag, 40 the bulk of the member-
ship. remained loyal to Dr. Malan. Thus with regard to polit-
ics~ too, the Bond cannot be viewed, during much of the per-
iod we are considering, as greatly represen~~tive of the Af-
rikaner community; . (by 1943, Dr. Malan had won less than :'. 
60:-::per ~cent· o:Lthe ·Afr.ikaner vote4~). Hertzog, ex-officio 
an expert witness on Afrikaner nationalism, and generally 
regarded among Afrikaners, including his political enemies, 
as an honest man, claimed in his 1935 Smithfield Speech at-
tacking the Purified National.Party that the Broederbond was 
its underground core. He listed several men as Broers, in-
cluding the following members of the post~l948 Cabinets: 42 
Dr. Malan (Prime Minister); J. G. Strijdom (Minister 
of Lands and Irrigation, Prime Minister); Stephanus le 
Roux (Minister of Agriculture); C. R. Swart~(Minister of 
Justice, Governor-General of South Africa, First Presid-
ent of the Republic); A. J. van Rhijn (Minister of Econ-
omic Affairs~ and of Mines, High Commissioner to the Un-
ited Kingdom;. 
It is noteworthy that the nucleus of the Purified 
National Party was strongly represented within the supreme 
authority of the Broederbond, its Executive Council, known 
also as t:he "Twelve .Apostles 11 • A confidential source·lists 
them at a stage before 1948 as follows: 
Dr. Diederichs (succeeded Dr. van Rhijn as Minister 
of Economic Affairs); Dr. Donf3es (.later Minister of the 
Interior, Minister of Finance); Dr. A. Hertzog (later 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and of Health); Dr. A. 
J. van Rhijn (see above); Dr. Verwoerd (later Minister 
of Native Affairs, Prime Minister); Dr. E. G. Jansen 
(later Minister of Native Affairs, Governor-General of 
South Africa); Dr. Malan (see above); Professor A. I. 
::·Malan (later Member of Parliament); H. J. Klopper (later 
Speaker of the Union House of Assembly); w. C. du Ples-
sis (later Member of Parliament, Ambassador to the U.s .A.); 
'- Professor. J. C. van Rooy of the Potchefstroom University 
.
40See below, PP• 141-144. 
41He secured a third of the total vote in 1943. 
42The Star, 7 November 1935· 
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for Christian Higher Education, Chairman of the Breeder~ 
bond; .I. M. Lombard, Secretary of the Broederbond. 
Others, reputed to be Broers, who undertook leading 
roles in the Afrikaner Economic Movement, included L. J. ·au 
Plessis, Professor of Commercial Law at Potchefstroom Univ-
ersity; Professor G. C~ Schumann, head of the Economic Res-
earch Institute at Stellenbosch University; and Dr. P. J. 
Meyer, the Afrikaner philosopher, Chief of Public Relations 
for the Rembrandt Tobacco Corporation, appointed in 1960 
Chairman of the Board of Control of the South African Broad-
casting Corporation. 43 
The above lists, totalling eighteen names, contain 
those of ten men who became Cabinet Ministers, including the 
three post-1948 Prime Ministers and the two Governors-Gener-
al, one of whom was to become the first President of the 
Republic. Several of these men also became successful busi-
ness executives. The South African Financial Year Book for 
125§, for example, lists 23 companies in which Dr. Diederichs 
was a director, including finance companies, wholesale chain 
stores, tobacco enterprises, gold mines, etc.; 18 companies 
in which Professor L. J. du Plessis was a director, including 
coal mines, newspapers, finance corporations, insurance com-
panies, wholesale firms; 11 companies in which Dr. A. Hertzog 
was a director, including banks, building societies, furnit-
ure companies, publishing houses, finance corporations; and 
so on. 44 
It is clear that neither in terms of political behav-
ior or socio-economic position did the membership reflect a 
representative cross-section of the Afrikaner community. 
Recruitment took place from the more educated and prosperous 
sections, professional people and farmers; whereas Afrikaner 
48Confidential Sources. 
44~. Cit., pp. xxiiif; xxv; xxxix 
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workers and Poor Whites, the latter a social category which 
as has been seen disappeared only during the Second World War, 
were represented weakly if at all in the Bond. Indigent and 
less educated people might not have been as articulate as the 
others, but this does not mean that their relative absence 
from the organization had no effect in shaping its goals. 
Had they be.en included, rivals for leadership might have 
contended for their support and presented them with a poJ,.icy 
choice. That this is not purely of hypothetical interest 
will be seen when we come to consider how the 1939 Economic 
Congress discarded Kestell's conception of the reddingsdaad 
as a movement aiming at direct help to the Poor Whites, and 
decided to charL~el most of the money collected for the red-
dingsdaad into building up private Afrikaner businesses. 
While representativeness was not a characteristic of 
the membership, service capacity was. An indication of the 
financial resourcefulness of the Society comes in December, 
1944, when the Bond was under Government attack. At "t!hat 
time a member informed the Executive Council that he could 
supply a list of 20 Br-oers who were prepared to give ~1,000 
each to fight the cause of the Bond. He mentioned Jannie 
Marais and Wynand Louw, directors of the Afrikaner insurance 
company, SANLAM, as among those willing to make donations. 46 
How·the money was to be employed is not here known. 
No doubt the relatively large contingent of farmers 
were useful on the financial side. It is likely, too, that 
members operating businesses established by the Bond direct-
ly, or through off-shoots like the F.A.K., provided money 
for its activities. These businesses included the major 
Afrikaner financial and commercial institutions, such as 
Volkskas, the bank established by the Bond in 1934, Uniewin-
kels, a chain of retail stores operated by the Bond through 
45 Confidential sources• 
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D. C. Malan, a member of the Steering Committee (Dag-bestuur) 
of its Executive Council in 1944, 46 and others to which we 
shall refer in our discussion of the Bond's activities. 
The select type of membership afforded tactical as 
well as financial advantages. Since it was intended to keep 
the Bond a small organization--though, as will be seen, one 
working to change society _at large~-it was economic to res-
erve membership to those most capable of influencing non-
members, people occupying authoritative positions or with 
smoother access to such position than merely the national-
minded. One out of every three Broers in 1944 was a teacher. 
General Hertzog alleged in his 1935 Smithfield Speech that 
the Free State educational system was almost entirely cont-
rolled by Broers. Schools in the Cape and Transvaal were 
also thought to be strongly under Bond influen~es. 47 In the 
Afrikaans universities, too, the Bond established itself. At 
the Society's Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Meeting in 1943, Broed-
er van Zyl, a member of the Pretoria University Senate, rep-
orted that the Bond was adequately represented on that body, 
that the 11 right ·Afrikaner spiri tr.' was being fostered in the 
University and that ideological.discipline was being ach1ev-
ed.4e 
The daily influence exerted on the public by Broers 
in their individual professional capacities as teachers, 
clergymen and newspaper editors49 could of course be extended 
46Confidential sources. The other members of the Steer-
ing Committee at that time were.Dr. Verwoerd, Dr. Diederichs, 
Professor J. C. van Rooy, I. M. Lombard, and Rennie Herbst, 
Treasurer of the Broederbond. 
47Carter, ~· cit., p. 255. 
48Confidential sources. 
49Dr. Malan·and C. R. Swart were directors of Die Nas-
ionale Pers, publishers of Die Burger (Cape Town), Die Volks-
blaa (Bloemfontein)-~of wh~ch Dr. van Rhijn was editor, Die 
Oosterlig (Port ·Elizabeth).; leading Broers, .r. G. Strijdom, 
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through co-ordinated efforts to place colleagues at the con-
trols of local governmental mechanisms. Reminding delegates 
at the General Council in 1943 that it was the Bond's calcul-
ated pol~cy to gain control of as many key points as possible, 
Dr. Verwoerd urged Broers to help each other become members 
of school committees, village committees, town and city coun= 
cils, in short, the Afrikaner Broederbond must gain control 
of everything it could lay its hands on, in every walk of 
life in South Africa, and must hot refrain from pushing its 
members into any position whatsoever~ 6 ° Control of a scho.ol 
committee by Bond clergymen, teachers ·and farmers would en-
able the Broederbond to withhold teaching appointments in the 
district from Afrikaners and others, identified as supporters 
of the United Party, the Labour Party, or the Communist Party, 
and thus--through an investment in Bond membership of only a 
few of the teachers i~ the district--gradually bring the 
whole of the area's white school population under direct 
Nationalist influences. 
From our discussion thus far, the Broederbond will be · 
seen as a covert AfriF~ner Nationalist organization contain- · 
. . 
ing a limited number of select personnel whose activities wer~ 
being co-ordinated to increase their composite power. To 
what purpose did they intend using this power? 
In his newspaper articles on the Bond, I. M. Lombard 
expressed its aims as follows: 6 ~ 
(a) To bring about a healthy and progressive unanimity 
amongst all Afrikaners who strive for the welfare of the 
Afrikaner nation. 
Dr. Verwoerd, Dr. Donges, and C. R. Swart, directed the Voor-
trekkerper s, which published Die Transvaler, edited by Dr. 
Verwoerd. The Hertzog-Havenga newspaper, Die Vaderland 
(Johannesburg), also came under Bond influence after the death 
in 1957 of Mr. Havenga; Dr. A. Hertzog then became chairman 
of its Board of Directors. 
5
°Con£idential sources. 
6 ~Die Transvaler, 3 January 1945, quoted Carter, Qn• 
cit~~ PP• 252f. 
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(b) To arouse the Afrikaner's national self-conscious-
ness, and to implant a love for his language, religion, 
tradition, country and people. 
(c) The furtherance of all the interests qf the Afrik-
aner nation. 
·Members were expected to strive for the realization 
of seven objectives: 
(1) The removal of everything in conflict with South 
Africa 1 s full international independence. 
(2) The ending of the inferiority of the Afrikaans-
speaking and of their language in the organization of 
the State. (3) Separation of all non-white races in South .Africa, 
leaving them free to independent development under the 
guardianship of the Whitese (4) Putting a stop to the exploitation of the resour-
ces and population of South Africa by strangers, includ-
ing the more intensive industrial development. (5) The rehabilitation of the farming community and 
the assurance of civilized self-support through work for 
all white citizens. (6) The nationalization of the money market and the 
systematic coordination of economic policies. (7) The .Afrikanerization of our public life and our 
teaching and education in a Christian National spirit 
while leaving free the internal development of all sec-
tions of the nation insofar as it is not dangerous to the 
State. 
These aims were ·acceptable to all Afrikaner National-
ists. Yet less than 2,000 Afrikaner Nationalists were accep-
ted to membership in the Bond. Why? I. M. Lombard's explan-
ation that membership was limited in the interest of effic-
iency is not entirely satisfying. The possibility must be 
considered that the organization's exclusiveness in respect 
to membership masked an exclusive political purpose.. Some 
evidence points to this. For example, on 14 January 1934, 
the year that the old National Party split, with the majority 
following Hertzog into Fusion with Smuts, and a minority ent-
ering Dr. Malan's newly-established Purified National Party, 
the Executive Council of the Broederbond .circularized to all 
,Ill~mb.e.~.s a letter signed by the Chairman, Professor J. C. van 
Rooy, and the Secretary, I. M .. Lombard, which read: 
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Let us focus our attention on the fact that the prim-
ary consideration is: whether Afrikanerdom will reach 
its ultimate destiny of domination (baasskap) in South 
Afrika. Brothers, our solution of South Africa's ail-
ments is not that this party or that party shall obtain 
the whip hand, but that the Afrikaner Broederbond shall 
rule South Africa. 52 
This may simply have been a way of encouraging members 
· not to introduce external political disputes into the Society. 
If it can be considered simultaneously a statement of the 
Bond's real aim and nature, then the disinclination to rec-
ruit for membership all the ab·le and willing falls open to 
interpretation on motives other than, or explanatory of . 
nefficiency·11 • Influencing what obviously was a· clear dec~ 
ision about'the si~e of membership may have been the con-
scious or unconscious consideration that the fewer who are 
able to co-ordinate their way to power, the fewer who wi:ll 
have to share power, and the more power per share. Or as 
Mosca puts it, casting a slightly different emphasis: 
In reality the dominion of an organized minority, 
obeying a single impulse, over the unorganized major-
ity is inevitable. The power of any minority is irres-
istable as against each single individual in the major-
ity, who stands alone before the totality of the organ-
ized minority. At the same time, the minority is or-
ganized for the very reason that it is a minority. A. 
hundred men acting uniformly in concert, with a common 
understanding, will triumph over a thousand men who are 
not in accord and can therefore be dealt with one by 
one. Meanwhile it will be easier for the former to 
act and have a mutual understandin~ simply because they 
are a hundred and not a thousand. 5 ~ 
Many Afrikaners could belong to the same church and 
have a mutual understanding about religion. Many, though 
never all, could agree that it was best that the National 
52Quoted by General Hertzog in his Smithfield Speech, 
7 November 1935, re-quoted in the Sunday Times, 5 October 
1944. 
63Gaetano ·Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza 
Politica), -translated by Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc.; Italian Edition 1923, 1939), p. 53. 
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Party should rule South Africa. But fewer could have a mut-
ual understanding about who should be chairman of the village 
committee, or manager of the bank, or candidate for Parliam-
. ent. 54 
There exists further evidence for which Lombard 1 s 
claim that the Broederbond was uonly a deliberative body in 
which consultation.s take place on what its members.regard as 
best fo.r the Afrikaner people, 1155 can hardly account. Thus 
it emerges that in 1943, the Bond was working to destroy a 
rival, secret society, Trekmaats (Trek-mates), evidently 
of a similar ideological character. At that time, Dr. Donges 
suggested at the General Council meeting tha,.t Broers should 
persuade suitable members of Trekmaats to join·the Broader-
bond, and to do all in their power to dissuade more men from 
joining Trekmaats. In this way, he continued, while negotiat-
ions were taking place regarding amalgamation of the two org~ 
anizations, Trekmaats would be weakened and the Broederbond 
strengthened, so that ultimately Trekmaats would be faced 
with a situation where they were only a few, and the Broader-
bond a great body. Dr. Donges formulated his proposal as a 
resolution, which was passed unanimously. 56 His speech on 
Trekm~ats was among those which Dr. Verwoerd advised the 
General Council delegates not to send through the post. 57 
These fragments, along with Dr. Verwoerd 1 s enjoinder 
that Broers should work in concert to capture commanding 
64In 1958, three Broederbond leaders, Dr. Ve~roerd, 
Dr. Donges and C. R. Swart, competed for the Premiership• 
The decision £dr Dr. Verwoerd was reached by the Nationalist 
Parliamentary Caucus by secret balloting.. Ballot pauers 
II tl ( were issued specially stamped with the letters N.P.. Nas-
ionale Party) to avoid forgeries, according to a leading 
South African political correspondent; Stanley Uys, 11 Dr. 
Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa,u 
A~rika South, 3!£f, January-March 1959. 
66Die Transvaler, 20 December 1944. 
56 Confidential sources. 
57See above, p. 130. 
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positions, stand in closer accord with the objective priv-
ately communicated to all members by v·an Rooy and Lombard in 
1934 than with Lombard 1 s public description of the Breeder-
bond ten years later as a discussion so·ciety, disinterested-
ly formulating plans and initiating projects for the advanc-
ement of Afrikanerdom. 
However, certain facta do not substantiate the view 
thus far implied~ and widely held in Opposition circles in 
South Africa, that the Broederbond has been the mastermind 
~nd steering hand.of the Nationalist Movement, that it has 
sought to dominate all other Afrikaner Nationalist organiz-
ations, in particular the National Party, and has been in 
fact their governing agency. .were this so., one would expect 
complete uniformity among members in their political loyal~­
tiea--the 11 single impulse 11 of which Mosca speaks. The strug-
gle for control over the country would obviously have to be 
managed through a surface political organization, presumably 
the National Party, which all members of the Bond would sup-
port. If some, while remaining members, worked for rival pol-
itical organizations, or playedthe role of positive neutral-
ity, the implication would be that either the Bond was not 
pursuing a private political objective, or at least for some 
time was unable to do so; the image of the Bond pulling the 
strings is irreconcilable with that of its members opposing 
each other in the public, political arena. Although from 
Hertzog's outcries again~t it, it is reasonable to assume 
that the Bond was actively behind Malan's National Barty in 
the latter's struggle with him (1934-39), a disciplined mem-
bership and a common political line was not maintained during 
the war years when the Ossewa Brandwag (O.B.) and other Nat-
ional-Socialist groups challenged the Party 1 s leadership of 
the Nationalist Movement. 
It will be recalled that the O.B. was founded in 1938. 
An outgrowth of the Great Trek celebrations, it was conceived 
as a mass movement dedicated to preserving Afrikaner tradit-
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ions and advancing Afrikaner cultural and material interests. 68 
Its growth was rapid. According to Dr. Malan, the O.B. in 
1941 contained between 300,000 and 400,000 Afrikaners, 69 the 
latter a figure representing virtually the entire male adult 
group. The membership was organized on a commando basis with 
an elite corps of Storm.iaers (Storm Troopers) whose task,:· it 
is said, was to protect O.B. meetings from molestation. 60 
Until 1941, relations between the Party and the O.B. 
were cordial. Broers who were Party leaders, such as J. G. 
Strijdom and C. R. Swart, were also O .. B .. members. In October 
1940, an agreement between the Party and the O.B. laid down 
that the tasks of the two organizations were to be complim-
entary, the Party to do the work of Nationalist Afrikanerdom 
on the party-political terrein, the O.B. to confine itself 
to activities not directly political. 6 :1. After the accession 
of Dr. J. F. J. van Rensburg as Kommandant-Generaal·of<the 
O.B. shortly after this division of labor was agreed, relat-
ions between the two organizations deteriorated. Van Rena-
burg was an avowed National-Socialist and under his influence 
the O.B. began to develop 11not as a non-political party, but 
as a 'no-party~ 1 party, a national anti-Parliamentary move-
·. II . 
ment favoring the establishment of an Afrikaner National-
Socialist Republic by direct action. 62 
The Party leaders were not initially hostile to Nation-
58Roberts and Trpllip, ~· cit., P• 73. 
59Assembly Debates, 4 February 1941, co·l. 2196, 
cited ibid., p. 78n. 
60Ibid., P• 79. 
61 Ibid., pp. 76f. 
62 Ibid., p. 79. 
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al-Socialist principles. 68 But they held Party offices and 
occupied Parliamentary seats. They felt their claims to 
being the legitimate leaders of Nationalist Afrikanerdom 
were under challenge. An observer saw the issue as follows: 
The H.N.P. wanted the O.B. as its action front; the 
O.B •••• wanted the H.N.P. as its action front. The 
H.N.P. panzer-divisions were to punch a hole in the so-
called British-Jewish-Democratic-Parliamentary front, 
while the O.B. infantry divisions thereafter in great 
and irresistable numbers would surge forward and roll 
up the Parliamentary front to left and right. But by 
this time the H.N.P.· leaders had begun at last to real-
ise what the other side was up to. They were afraid 
that they too would be rolled up with Parliamentary 
front •••• 64 · 
The fight which then broke out was conducted on both 
sides with all the bitterness of an internecine struggle. 
It was marked by personal abuse, physical assaults and at-
.tempted kidnappingse The O.B. issued an ultimatum threat-
ening to boycott all publications of Die Nasionale Pers un-
less the latter abandoned it.s hostile attitude; the boycot 
was instituted when the deadline passed and was immediately 
condemned as a blow "against the language and·culture of our· 
peoplen by the Party; which countered with a Nationalist 
68Thus an editorial on 18 February 1941 in Dr. van 
Rhijn1 s paper, Die Volksblad, expressed warm sympathy for 
National-Socialism; ibid., p. l2ln. For a time the Party 
itself included a Nuwe Orde faction led by Hertzog's former 
lieutenant, Oswald Pirow, that rejected the form and spirit 
. " of democracy and sought the establishment of a South African 
Christian European National-Socialist Republic, ·-under the 
guidance of God, severed from the British Empire and based 
on State authority and National Discipline"; Die Vaderland, 
18 November 1940, cited in P.D. 214/1940. ·In March 1941, 
.Dr. Malan stated that seven-eighths of Pirow's Ne~ Order 
, was incorporated in the National Party's programme· of action, 
but added that he did not believe the Party should break 
with democracy immediately; Die Burger, 13 March 1941, in 
~.D. 231/1941. 
64A. C. Cilliers, Nasionale Volksorg, pp. 69f., quot-
ed in Roberts and Trollip, Q2• cit., p. 8ln. 
144 
Press boycott of the O.B. 65 Party men in the O.B. resigned 
their O.B. posts and men for whom the O.B. held the greater 
attraction left the Party. In 1941, the O.B. removed C. R. 
Swart from its Free State Control Council; Strijdom, not 
waiting for dismissal in the Transvaal, resigned. 66 In Jan-
uary 1942, the Head Council of the Party in the Oape forbade 
any Party official to remain a member of the O.B. 67 Dr. Ver-
woerd began publishing lists of resignations from the O.B. 
in the columns of Die Transvaler. 68 
In this ·contest for the leadership of Nationalist 
.Afrikanerdom, members of the Broederbond took opposing sides~ 
Professor L. J. du Plessis, for instance, became head of the 
Policy· Division of the O.B. 1 s Grand Council ih May 1942; in 
Septem~er 1944 he resigned from the Party. 69 Dr. P. J. Meyer 
was appointed dhief Information Officer-of the O.B. in Feb-
ruary 1943. 70 Professor J. C. van Rooy, Chairman of the 
Broederbond, became an active neutral, delivering public 
speeches in 1942 favoring a Volkseenheid (National Unity) 
movement--a movement condemned by the Party Laadership. 7~ 
The story of the Party•s victory has been told else-
where.72 What we are concerned with is the.fact that this 
66 Ibid., 
66 Ibid., 
6 7Ibid., 
p. 
p. 
p. 
132. 
79· 
131. 
6 8 Ibid., p. 109. 
69Ibid., pp. 151, 168. 
70Ibid., p. 152. It is not here. known whether by this 
time Dr. -Meyer had become a member of the • Bond .. 
7~Ibid., pp. 133, 136. 
72 Ibid~, pp. 159f. The O.B. chief, van Rensburg, has 
written a cagey and rather uninformative autobiography, Their 
Paths Crossed Mine, (1954). In accounting for Dr. Malan s 
criticism of him, he says that once El .Alamain and Stalingrad 
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struggle found the Broederbond divided, with members in both 
camps or straddling them. In the light of this it cannot be 
maintained that the Broederbond was embarked towards a goal 
of political domination, although the evidence previously 
cited, which points to this, still stands. 
In areas not di~ectly political, the evidence relat-
ing to the Broederbond's role is unambiguous. The shaping 
of the Nationalist revival on both the cultural and economic 
fronts seems to have been largely its work. The co-ordinat-
ing agency for the cultural and economic movements, the 
F' .A.K., was founded by. the Bond in 1929. Thereafter Bond 
leaders, Professor J. C. van Rooy, I. M. Lombard and Dr. Don-
gee, served on the F.~.K .. Executive. 73 In turn the F.A .. K. 
I 
organized Nationalist institutions and movements: the Great 
Trek centenary celebrations of 1938; the Christian National 
Education Conference of 1939 and its offshoot, the Institute 
for Christian National Education; 74. the, Peopie' a:.First.·Ecen-
omic Congress of 1939, which gave rise to the Reddingsdaad-
bond and set the Economic Movement in motion. 
Examples illustrative of the Bond's direct participat-
ion in this Movement were furnished to members at the Soc.;;;:·-
iety's Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Meeting in 1943, when past 
and recent accomplishments were reviewed. 76 I. M. Lombard 
reminded the delegates that the Economic Institute of the 
had dest~oyed National Party hopes of a German victo~y the 
O.B. came to be regarded as a political embarrassment from 
which the Party, 11 aware of their responsibilities towards 
the future of the ·Afrikaner people_,'' felt compelled to 
disassociate itself; ibid., p. 204. I·t will be noted how-
ever that the struggle between the two Nationalist organizat-
ions began in the latter part of 1940--before the tid.e of 
war had turned. 
73See above, p. 129n. 
74See below,. PP• 168f. 
75 Confidential sources. 
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F.A.X. (which as will be seen was given responsibility for 
investing the donations collected in response to Rev. Xes-
tell's appeals in 1938 and became the Economic Movement's 
chief policy body) was formed by the Bond. The principal 
Afrikaner banking institution, Volkskas, was established in 
1934 purely under Broederbond auspices and was still (1943) 
under Bond control; the Bond also controlled.a chain of ret-
ail stores, Uniewinkels, and had 11 achieved 11 --whatever that 
means--another large bank, SASBANK, ·a major building society, 
Saambou Bougenootskap, and the great finance corporation, 
Federale Volksbeleggings (F.V.B.), which was set up with the 
approval of the ·1939 Economic Congress. 76 A financial state-
ment was read by the Bond's Treasurer, Hennie Herbst, who rep-
orted that the Society had invested ~,000 in F.V.B. which 
now supported seven ·subsidiary Afrikaner businesses that, 
together with F.V.B., enjoyed a gross turnover of ~750,000. 
Reporting on a recent acquisition, Dr. Diederichs of the 
Broederbond's Steering Committee, 77 said that some time prev-
iously a well-established nursing home, the Park Lane Nursing 
Home (Johannesburg) had come into the market and the Broader-
bond had decided to take a hand in obtaining control of the 
institution. The nursing home had been purchased with Broed-
erbond funds and through the medium of Volkskas as well. How-
ever; ·as Volkskas was wholly controlled by the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, it might well be said that the Broederbond had 
bought the institution. The Uitvoerende Raad (Executive Coun-
.·' 
. _1, 
766ee below, pp. 153f. 
77Dr. Diederichs was then also head of the Reddings-
daadbond (see below, p.151) and one of the three curators of 
the Economic Institute of the F.A .. K., charged with control 
over the Reddingsdaad-funds. Through 30 June 1950, donations 
to the latter totalled ~50,260 (with interest and dividends 
~83,325) of which ~6,545 was invested in shares in 22 busi~ 
ness concerns, including ~53,050 in the five mentioned above, 
Volkskas (~5,000), Uniewinkels (~5,000), SASBANK (~5,000), 
F.V.B. (~36,050) and Saambou (~2,000~; see Verslag van die 
Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres (1950), pp. 149-153.------
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cil of the Bond) had invested ~7,000 in the business. It 
had been a good investment from every point of view, finan-
ci~l as well as national. It was already showing profits, 
but apart from that it was the only large Afrikaner venture 
of its kind in the country. Prior to its purchase the nur= 
sing home had been 100 per cent in the hands of the English, 
including the matron and nurses. Now he could say with pride 
that the institution was 100 per cent Afrikaans. All the 30 
nurses were Afrikanerse All the provisions and stores were 
purchased as far as possible from Afrikaans firmse Probat-
ioner nurses were being taken on for training so that there 
would soon be a good supply of Afrikaans nurses. They had 
had to contend ~ith difficulties when they opened up, but 
today they were accommodating double the number of patients 
. . 
and there was an ever increasing demand among Afrikaners for 
accommodation in the nursing home. This was the healthy 
position of an Afrikaans venture which the English opposit~on 
had prophesied would go bankrupt in three months time. The 
institution was virtually in the hands of the Afrikaner Broed-
erbond and was better equipped than any private hospital in 
the country. The business was in the form of a private com-
pany~ This had been found desirable, as it might have fallen 
into foreign hands if it had been formed as a public company. 
It had a capital of ~0,000 of which ~7,000 had be.en investe_d 
by the Afrikaner Broederbond. Most of the shareholders were 
members of the A£rikaner Broederbond with very few exceptions. 
No one was allowedto have more than 20 per cent of the vot-
ing power among the shareholders •••• In reply to a question 
from the floor, Dr. Diederichs said that the Executive Coun~ 
cil's investment had not been made in its own name. The 
shares had been bought in the name of Gesondheids-Diens, 
Eiendoms •· Benerk (Health Services Proprietary Limited) in 
order to hide the Broederbond interest in the venture. The 
shareholders of Gesondheids-Diens Eiendoms Benerk were: 
Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, D.r. Mostert of Germiston, Dr. de Villiers, 
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I. M. Lombard, Dr. Stegman, Dr. Diederichs himself and J. R. c. 
Verseput. 
From this restricted view through some of the closed 
doors of the Nationalist Economic Movement, let us now return 
to the conference hall where the Movement was launched pub-
licly. 
The 'People's First Economic Congress' 
The Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres assembled in Bloem-
fontein in October 1939, partly for the purpose of deciding 
how ·the reddingsdaad funds were to be employed, and partly 
to plan the economic advancement of Afrikanerdom in general. 
The Congress was convene.d and the arrangements for it were 
made by the F.A.K. 78 Those present were addressed by leading 
members of the Broederbond and of the National Party, by news-
paper editors, Dr. Verwoerd (Die Transvaler), Dr. van Rhijn 
(Die Volksblad); university. professors., Dr. G. C. Schumann 
of Stellenbosch, Professor N. Diederichs of the Free State, 
. 
Professor L. J. du Plessis of Potchefstroom; financiers and 
company directors, Dr. H. J. Otto of Die Nasionale Pers, Dr. 
M. S. Louw of the Afrikaans insurance firm, SANLAM. 79 
Among the subjects discussed was the form of economic 
activity Afrikaners should adopt. Here, several different 
proposals were advanced. Mr. J. J. Bosman, Manager of Volks-
kas, then a small co-operative bank, said that the capitalist 
profit system, represented by proprietorships and limited 
liability companies, was un-Afrikaans, and that the Afrikaner 
must take as his economic ideal 11 the co-operative system ••• 
78Dr. N. Diederichs, 11 Die Afrikaner se Ekonomiese 
Ontwikkeling Gedurende die Afgelope Tien Jaar en die Rol van 
If die F.A.K. in die Verband, Verslag ~ die Tweeds Ekonomiese 
Volkskongres, 1950, p. 25 •. 
79 It is not known whether Drs. Otto and Louw were 
members of the Broederbond. 
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the only Christian-National economic system.nao Professor 
L. J. du Plessis urged the Congress to initiate· an economic 
movement with a Christian-National character freed of' the 
spirit of' capitalism •. Brit:ish-Jewish capitalism, he declared, 
was selfish, sectional, served no national interest and sim-
ply aimed at enriching the few. The Afrikaner should seek 
a truer wealth, the exploitation of natural resources 11 in 
honor of the Lord Almighty. 11 S.l. 
Despite the objections raised to the form and spirit 
of capitalism, reflecting an antipathy then widespread among 
Afrikaner intellectuals, 82 the keynote at the Congress was 
struck by SANLAM executive, Dr. M. S. Louw, who attributed 
the Afrikaners' economic backwardness to the fact that urban 
Afrikaners were predominantly employees of foreign bosses 
80J. J. Bosman, 11Die Kooperatiewe Winkel, rt Verslag van 
die Eerst.e Ekonomiese V0lkskongres, 1939, p. 103. 
8~Quoted in P.D. Memorandum ~. 
82Typical of Afrikaner strictures was that by J. H. 
Coetzee, who wrote in a work publicizing the background and 
ideals of the Economic Movement that capitalism had produced 
rta great record for impoverishment and economic and social 
distress,'r that it framed conditions whereby 11human, ethical 
and aesthetic values are made subordinate to materialistic 
values; family bonds, national sentiment, language and ances-
tral tradition are tolerated only so long as they do not com~ 
J?ete with the hunt after profits and alwa;rs more profits 11 
(Verarming ~ Oorheersin£, pp. 111, 106f.). Dr. P. J. Meyer, 
Chief Information Officer of the Ossewa Brandwag, demanded 
,,the total annihilation of capitalism11 (Die Stryd Y§11 die 
Afrikanerwerker. Die Vooraand ~ Ons Sosiale Vrywording 
(Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia-Drukkery Edms. Bpk., 1944), p. 
75) together witl} the party-political system, and their rep-
lacement by the 'Authority State, which is at the same time 
Volk State, Leader State and Corporative State'1 (Demokrasie 
of Volkstaat? (Stellenbosch: A.N.S.- en A.N.J.-·Brosure Nr. 
"5," 1942), p. 19). ,.,This State,u he explained, nhas been more 
or less achieved in·a pure form~for the first time in Italian 
Fascism, German National-Socialism, Portu~uese State-CorJ?or-
ativism and Spanish National-Syndicalism, (Ibid., p. 17). 
For further references to early Nationalist economic attit-
udes, see above, p. 
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who exploited them. The solution was for Afrikaans them-
selves to become employers, and for existing Afrikaner busi-
nesses to expand so that they could provide employment in a 
more sympathetic national atmosphere for more Afrikaner wor-
kers. This .should be the Congress' aim. "If we want to 
II ~f • achieve success, Dr. Louw said, we must use the technique 
of capitalism, as it is applied to the most important indus-
try in this country, the gold mining_industry. We must es-
tablish something like the finance houses of Johannesburg. 1183 
The Congress followed Dr. Louw's advice. It created 
an organizational structure whose main achievement was to 
found and strengthen Afrikaner capitalist enterprises. Rev. 
Kestell's original conception of the reddingsdaad as a char-
itable, non-partisan movement, directly and principally con-
cerned with helping Poor Whites, was replaced. The anti-
capitalist sentiment at first prevailing in the Afrikaner 
intellectual world was, with the advance of Afrikaners in 
commercial fields, gradually abandoned. 84 
It was ac·cordingly decided 11 to penetrate the existing 
ecoDDmic structure and gain a controlling share in the econ-
omic life of the country .. " 86 .At the inception of the Econ-
omic Movement, Afrikaner~controlled businesses accounted for 
only 5 per cent of the total volume of business turnover in 
the country. 86 Afrikaners comprised 60 per cent of the white 
population, Dr. Diederichs pointed out in 1940; at least half 
the businesses in every town ought to belong to them. 87 
83Quoted in Die Vaderland, 4 October 1939, in P.D. 
Memorandum ~. -.--
84See below, pp. 204f 
86Volkshandel, August 1943. 
86 Dr. A. J. Visser, rfDie Ekonomiese Posisie van die 
Afrikaner,n··volkshandel, 16:25, Mei 1955. 
87Die Volksblad, 21 November 1940, in P.D. 215/1940. 
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To move towards this goal, the Volkskongres formulated 
a plan of action. It adopted re·solutions providing for the 
founding of a number of integrated agencies whose task would 
be to spearhead the drive: the Ekonomiese Instituut; the 
Reddingsdaadbond (R.D.B.) and Reddingsdaadfonds (i.e., fund); 
and Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk (Federal People's Invest-
ments Limited). 
With respect to the first of these, the F.A.K. Execut-
ive was instructed in terms of a Volkskongres resolution to 
establish an Ekonomiese Instituut whose function would be to 
implement the resolutions and continue the work of the Volks-
kongres. The membership of the Ekonomiese Instituut was ap-
pointed by the F.A.K. and was intended to represent the var-
ious fields of Afrikaner economic endeavor, as well as Afri-
kaner labor and charitable organizations. Of the sixteen-
member Ekonomiese Instituut in 1950, five were then or were 
to become Cabinet Ministers: Dr. T. E. Donges, Dr. A. J. 
Stals, Dr. A. J. van Rl;lijn, Dr • .A .. Hertzog and Dr. N. Died-
erichs.86 It will be recalled that at least four of these 
people were also on the Executive Council of the Broederbond. 
The Ekonomiese Instituut was conceived as nthe econ-
omic policy council of the volk as a whole a~d of the R.D.B. 
in particular.ueg Formation of the RDB. was one of the spec-
ific tasks witn-which it had been charged, the Volkskongres 
having resolved upon the establishment of 11 one great Volks 
Organization, Christian-National in outlooktt which would pro-
mote the material and cultural welfare of Afrikaners. The 
first branch of the Reddingsdaadbond met in Bloemfontein in 
1940. Dr. Diederichs was appointed Hoofleier (Chief Leader) 
86Die Ekon~miese Insti tuut '(F .A.K.): Verslag m 
Werksaamhede Sedert Stigting Tot )Q Junie 125Q, in Verslag 
van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres (1950), p. 147. 
69Besluite van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres 125Q, 
in Verslag van die~eede Ekonomiese Volkskongres (1950), p. 
135· 
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of the organization. The RDB., unlike the Ekonomiese Instit-
uut, was designed for mass membershi~. Within two years of 
its foundation it claimed 63,000 members, organized in 343 
branches. Its main functions were to mobilize the savings, 
capital and purchasing power of Afrikaners in the service of 
Afrikaner businesses; to bring Afrikaner workers under labor 
leaderships holding to an Afrikaner-National, in place of a 
class, outlook; to undertake research and provide advice and 
information about businesB methoQ.a and investment opportunit~ 
ies; to promote the technical and commercial training .of 
young Afrikaners and assist them in job placement; to organ-
ize spiritually-uplifting leisure time activities for the 
Afrikaner people. Finally, the RDB., being that branch of 
the Economic Movement in direct contact with the public, was 
entrusted with the collection of financial donations--the 
Reddingdaadf6nds ~., ~e ·~ 
Control over the Reddingdaadfonds, however, was vested 
in the Ekonomiese Instituut, which received all monies collec-
ted for the Fund from the RDB' Administration and investment 
of the Reddingdaadfonds was handled by three curators chosen 
by and from among the Ekonomiese Instituut: Dr. Me S. Lous, 
Dr. Diederichs and Professor L. Je du Plessis. Between 
1940 and 1950, ~50,259 was collected for the Reddingdaad~ 
fonds. With interest this ·sum reached a total amount of 
~183,325, of which ~32,551 was utilized for such miscelaneous 
purposes as Administrative expenses (~14,633); furniture and 
library {J..lOl); RDB. Head Office (I.e, 750); etc. The balance, 
comprising the bulk of the Fund (~50,774), was employed in 
three ways: loans (~9,000); donations and gifts (~5,229); 
investments (~6,545). 
The RDB. Service Bureau ( Pty.) Ltd. received ;bl9, 000 
for the purpose of issuing loans to Afrikaner students. 
90See Verslag van die Reddingdaadbond van §Y Werksaam-
hede Gedurende die 10 Jaar van & Bestaan, in Verslag van die 
TWeede EkonomieseVoikSkOilgres (125Q), PP· 159-170. -- --
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Of the amount expended on donat.ions and gifts, the 
F.A.K. received ~16,548, the RDB. itself obtained ~12,845, 
the Na'sionale ~ad Y§d1 Trustees (National Boa.rd of Trustees) 
and ·Similar agencies established by the Movement to wrest con-
trol of trade unions from socialist l~aderships 9~ were gran-
ted·~, 841. Federals Volksbeleggings Benerk, a profi t-niaking 
finance corpora~ion set up by the Ekonomiese Instituut (s~e 
below), was.given ~500. Charitable organizations received 
donations amounting to ~t994. 
The sum of ~6,545 was invested in the acquisition of 
shares in 22 different companies, including finance corporat-
ions (the largest single investment, *"36,050, was placed with 
Federals Volksbeleggins Beperk), banks, building societies, 
chain stores, hotels, publishing houses, clothing factories, 
etc. All the concerns, mentioned i~ the reports of Messrs. 
Lombard, Herbst and Diederichs as having Broederbond links, 
including Gesondheidsdienste (Edms.) Beperk, 92 received cap-
ital investments from the Reddingsdaadfonds. 93 
In launching the campaign to captu~e a controlling 
interest in the economy, the Volkskongres did not place rel-
iance for the·necessary financial power solely on the pen-
nies and pounds donated by group-spirited Afrikaners to the 
Reddingsdaadfonds. Whereas the dividends earned from com-
panies in which the Reddingsdaadfonds were invested returned 
to the RDB., a group organization, provision was also made 
for the mobilization of private self-interest through the 
..,. 
establishment of an investment corporation offering shares 
to individual Afrikaners. Federals Volksbeleggings Beperk 
9 :t.See below, pp.l55-l67. 
92See above, pp. 146-148. 
913See Die Eltonomiese Insti tuut (F .A.K.): Verslag van 
llerksaamhede Sedert Stigting Tot .2Q Junie 125Q, in Verslag 
Y§d1 die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres ( l95Q), pp. 149-153· 
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(F.V.B.) was the outcome. It was estimated at the incor-
poration of F.V.B. that between ~o,ooo,ooo and J:.lOO,ooo,ooo 
of Afrikaner savings was invested in banks, insurance com-
panies, building societies and trust companies controlled by 
non-Afrikaners; F.V.B., it was hoped, would gain control of 
that money. 94 
The corporation was launched with a share capital of 
~300,000, of which ~55,000 was underwritten by SANLAM and 
SASBANK, two Afrikaner financial institutions whose existence 
pre-dated the Economic Movement, while the Ekonomiese Instit~ 
uut retained 36,000 shares purchased with Reddingsdaadfonds 
for the RDB •. F.V.B. 1 s directors, who included Dr. Donges 
and Professor G. C. Schumann of Stellenbosch, were empowered 
to refuse to sell shares to an applicant without supplying 
reasons; it was explained that this would guarantee that 
shares remained concentrated in the hands of Afrikaners and 
would prevent them falling into the hands of individuals who 
might be hostile to the national cause~ 96 
In addition to the institutional structure established 
for economic penetration, the Volkskongres also approved plans 
for the education and organization.of Afrikaner consumers. 
Their awareness of and committment to the Economic Movement 
would of course largely decide the success or failure of the 
businesses set up through the RDB. and F.V.B. The main con~ 
tribution here was made by Dr. Verwoerd, formerly~~the fact 
may not be co-incidental--Professor of Applied psychology at 
Stellenbosch. He urged the formation of Afrikaner consumers' 
associations in every district of the country, whose members 
would make their purchases at shops approved by the associat-
ion. Approval would be limited to shops owned by Afrikaners 
or by people sympathetic toward& the Afrikaner. Consumer 
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associations would provide Afrikaner undertakings with an 
as'sured turnover, thus lessening sales uncertainty and en-
couraging investment. 9~ Also suggested by Dr. Verwoerd was 
the publication of a buyers' guide listing the names arid 
addresses of Afrikaner businesses, which would be mailed to 
Afri¥~ner families$ Shortly thereafter thousands of Afrik-
aner families began receiving in their post Die Afrikaner ~ 
Koopgids (The Afrikaner's Buying Guide), a booklet of exhor-
tation and information on more than 1,000 Afrikaner busines-
ses.97 
One group of Afrikaner consumers posed special prob-
lems and received special attention. These were the workers. 
It may be useful to give some indication of the natu~e and 
solution of these problems before tracing the further course 
and accomplishments of the Economic Movement. 
The Economic Movement and the Afrikaner Worker 
Upon the support received from the Afrikaner worker 
as a consumer and voter hinged both the political and econ~ 
omic prospects of the Nationalist Movement. 
Such support could not be taken for granted. Unlike 
many of those attending the-People's First Economic Congress, 
· the Afrikaner worker stood to gain materially few if any 
direct benefits from the establishment of Afrikaner busines-
ses; his economic interests were served most immediately by 
his trade union. Indeed, the emergence of Afrikaner employ-
ers of white labor might lead to conflicts of interest with 
Afrikaner workers. Animosities engendered between the two 
groups over wage claims or strikes could cripple efforts to 
·mobilize Afrikaner purchasing power. Class consciousness 
might displace ethnic consciousness--to the ruin of the ~at-
96 Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, 11Verbruikersverenigings, 11 Ver-
slag ~die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres (1232), P• 170. 
97Die Vaderland, 18 February 1940, in P.~. Memoran-
dumm •. -
ional Party whose political hopes were invested in 
sibility of group unity. 
We have seen that during the 1930's 
of impoverished .Afrikaners for'· whom··· rural 
migrated to the cities to find employmente 
and 40's 
life was 
In 1936 
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the pos-
thousands 
at an end 
there 
were more than half a million Afrikaners living in towns, 
most of whom had been born on farms. By 1951 there were a 
million Afrikaners in towns. 98 Many joined trade unions 
j 
whose leaderships generally were non- or anti~Nationalist. 
Some became active socialists and communists. Trade unions, 
Dr. Albert Hertzog warned the 1939 Volkskongres, were "com-
pletely ruining the .Afrikaner in the cities. 99 
Uncertainty about the political and economic role the 
Afrikaner worker would play was reflected in the programme 
of the RDB. As one of its objectives that organization prop-
osed: 
To make the Afrikaner labourer part and parcel of the 
National Life and to prevent the Afrikaans workers devel-
oping as a class distinct from other classes in the 
Afrikaans national life.l.oo 
How? Now that the main efforts of the Economic Move-
ment were to be engaged in launching private businesses, a 
chronic possibility would exist of Afrikaner workers and emp-
loyers meeting as adversaries. The solution Nationalists 
favored was the elimination of collective bargaining and the 
establishment of wage fixing wholly as a function of the 
State. In this way, unfriendly direct contacts between the· 
98Pauw, Qg• cit., p~ 263; Pretoria News, 23 March 1955, 
in P.D. 13/l955/134f. 
99Quoted in Die Vaderland, 6 October 1939, as cited 
in Alex Hepple, Trade Unions in Travail. The Story of the 
Broederbond-Nationalist Plan to Control South African Trade 
Unions (Johannesburg: Unity Publications (Pty.) Ltd., 1954), 
P• 14. 
J.oo•·~ons·:Reddingsdaa<l 11 (Broch1J,re issued by the RDB; Head 
Office), p. 27, quoted in·Hepple, .QJ2• cit., P• 30. 
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i 
two groups could be ·minimized:. .Addressing Parliament in 
1943, Mr. B. J. Schoeman, thel future Nationalist Minister 
of Labour, declared: i · · 
' I • 
••• This system of collect~ve bargaining has outstayed it~ 
usefulness entirely. It tas.an essential part of our .econ-
omic life in the past, anfi is .still ·.so under the pre.sent 
capitali.stic .system where[ the worker him.self is responsib-
·le for hi.s livelihood. U~der the new economic .sy.stem 
which we want to bring abput, it will, however, be re-
dundant. The b·ody by meah£:! of which this so-called col-
lective bargaining take.s place i.s the trade union.s, but 
if the State accepts full!re.sponsibility for the fixing 
of wages and the regula-t?i?n of working condit_ions, .the 
principal·: function of the 1 pr_e.sent .. trade unions will". dis-
appear ••• under the new system the trade unions will be 
largely converted into actual workers' organisations. 
which will be representative of the workers. These organ-
izations will not so muchjbe entrusted with the function 
of obtai-ning better wages.land better working conditions 
by means of collective ba~gaining with the employers, 
they will be mainlY. entru~ted with ·the task of regulating 
domestic matters as betwe~n the employers and the emp-
loyees. And for the rest ;of looking after the spiritual 
w~lfare of the workers ••• ~~01 · · 
l 
The abolition of tradi-t{ional trade unionism and its 
replacement by a trade unioniJm which aimed at bringing the 
workers' problems 111 to the att~ntion of the State and the 
people 11 .l. 04 were objectives whdse i~sti tutim:l would have to 
a'\'Tait the future when the Par~y gained power. But that fut-
1 
ure might never arrive if the ireactions of Afrikaner workers 
I to the problems of industrial [employment continued to be inf-
luenced by grou~s neutral or ~ostile to th~ Nationalist Move-
1 
ment. Immediate stop-gap meas;ures we:re wanted to meet the 
. · i · II II 
threat of class division among! Afrikaners. Enemy trade 
I • • 
union leaders would have to be! ousted from their positions, 
and .Afrikaner workers in parti\cular brought under the guid-
ance of "Christian-National" trade union management. The 
quoted 
to of 
I 
I 
I 
.l.
01Assembly Debates, 19\ January 1943, cols. 87f, 
in Hepple, op. cit., p.! 30. 
. -- --- I 
~02The phrase is taken ~rom the 1943 Election Manifes-
the Natiqnal Party, quot~d.ibid., p. 31. 
I 
I 
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II : II latt_er would not promote m:a.terialistic motives of greed , 
nor would they strive to 11gb.in advantages for one group at 
the expense of another_ or' o~ the national interests 11 , but 
· It ~ II ~03 
would aim . ~t t~e welfare oi the whole.. __ 
Efforts to remodel ~he various trade unions into 
I . 
Christian-National and Afri~aans-oriented organizationsttl.o4 
were initiated in 1936 when) a Stellenbosch woman landowner 
I donate~ ~10,000 to launch at campaign for this purpose. To 
• I 
administer the grant, Dr. Diederichs and Dr. Hertzog founded 
I 
Die Nasionale Raad van Trustees (The National Board of Trus-
tees).~05 This agency as w~ll as front .... line organizations, 
. I . 
such as the Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond (White Workers' 
I 
Protection Society-;BWBB), tlso received money from the Red-
dingsdaadfonds,~06 the Afrifaans Churches~ the Armsorgraad 
(Poor Care Council), the National Party and individuals.~07 I . 
The Party, _the Afrik1ner Churches and Business provided 
staff as well as financial ~elp. For instance the chairman 
of the Blankewerkersbeskerm~ngsbond, in 1945, was a clergy-
man, its secretary an ex-scriool principal, the assistant sec-
retary a former special rep~esentative of the Afrikaner in-
surance f.irm, SANIAM. Exe01.iti ve members of the organization 
I in or before 1948 included B. J. Schoeman; Jan de Klerk, 
I . j 
Schoeman s successor as Min~ster of Labour; Franz ~etz, later 
Deputy Minister of 'Bantu Admini-stration and Development; Dr. 
I 
Diederichs, RDB. Chief Leaddr, director of companies, and 
i 
I 
~ 03Die Kruithoring, Jbne 1943, quoted in Hepple, QJ2• 
cit., p. 31. . ! 
~ 04Pauw, Q:Q.· cit~, p.\ 210. 
1 
~ 06Hepple, . .QJ2.• cit., jp • · 38 • 
l.o-6 See above, p. 153.1 
\ . ~07Report of the Garm1ent Workers Commission of Enq-
uiry 1948-49, (U.G. 16-'so),l Minutes of Evidence, cited in 
Hepple, QJ2• cit., p.. 21. 
·a '59 
subsequentiy Minister of Economic Affairs; J. du Pisanie, 
National Party M.P. for Germiston; Rev. C. Brink, Moderator 
of the N.G. Kerk in the Transvaal, and other clergymen. 108 
- ' The Mineworkers Union was the first ~nion with a 
predominantly Afrikaner membership to come in for attention. 
Rescue of Afrikaner miners from uthe evil materialistic 
influences of the Witwatersrandu: 'had been enjoined specif-
ically in the bequest leading to the formation of the Nas-
ionale .Raad van Trustees. Financed by the Trustees, a group 
led by Dr. Albert Hertzog, and calling themselves 11 The 
Reformerslt, took the field in 1937 to undertake the rescue 
operation; .Among.thei'r objectives, the Reformers sought to 
promote the mineworkers' 11 economic, social and cultura in-
t II Jl • f · erests, to cleanse the Mineworkers Union of all foreign 
and wrong influences, 11 and 11 to guard and strive for the main-
tenance of the colour ·bar in the Mining Industry11109--theJ..la.:s.t 
being something with which the Union's existing ieadership 
would certainly have found nothing to QUarrel. 
Sto~my tides.then struck the Union. Its Executive 
wa.s charged by the Reformers with corruption and with not 
. 
being representative of the mineworkers.~10 Publicity was 
given to the fact that the Union Secreta~, Charlie Harris, 
was a Jew. In 1939, Harris--ffalias Terberkowitzu as he ap:-
peared in the Nationalist Press--was assassinated by a young 
Afrikaner who believed that he had thereby accomplished a 
~08U.G. 16-'50, Minutes ofuEvidence, quoted by Hepple, 
op. cit., pp. 19f; Alex. Hepple, The Fiery Cross of Job 
Reserv1rtion," Africa South, 2~42-ll-7, Af?ril-June 1958; George 
Clay, Portrait of a Cabinet Minister, Africa South, 1:51, 
Jan.-March 1957. 
109From Rule 3 of the Reformers' constitution, quoted 
by Hepple, Trade Unions in Travail, p. ~9. 
1~ 0Report of the Mine Workers' Union Commission of 
Enquiry, 1951, (U.Q:. 52-~, para. 5; Sachs, .212· cit., 
PP• 169f • 
l6'b 
patriotic duty.~~~ Further troubles in· the Union led to an 
investigation of its activities by a Government Commission 
in 1941. The report of this United Party-appointed body was 
severely censorious of the Reformers, whose activities were 
labelled "disruptive and detrimental to the interests of the 
miners _'U"Jl2 Finafucial irregularities, linked to the union 
Executive by another Government Commission in 1946, as well 
as dictatorial control,~~s suggest, however, that there was 
work for neformers. An abortive strike was called against · 
the General Secretary's regime in 1946. ·A. more effective 
jurisdictional strike the following year resulted in an elec-
. tion for the Union Executive being held under Gover~ent sup-
ervision. The balloting brought the mineworkers at last 
under Christian-National leadership';.i.J...-4. 
The Reformers had decided as early as 1941 who should 
hold the various paid officials' posts in the Mineworkers' 
Union when the takeover was effected.J...~ 6 In 1948, Daan Ellis, 
hitherto a 11welfare officer'l of the Nasionale Raad van Trus-
tees, was nominated and elected as the new General Secretary 
of the Union. In 1949, Ellis bought a new headquarters for 
the Union with Union funds at a price.considerably in excess 
of building's market value. Subsequently Ellis acquired 
interests in a number of liquor stores from the man who had 
arranged the sale of the headquarters building, a transaction 
which had brought the latter a profit of ~3,000. Several ~ 
union members being dissatisfied with these affairs, another 
Government Commission was appointed to investigate the Union's 
~J...l.The Star, 14 October 1939; Cape Argus, ~7 October 
1939, in P.~. 161/1939· · 
~l. 2Quoted by Hepp1e, Trade Unions in Travail, p. 38. 
l.l.SReport of the Mineworkers' Union Co~isslon of 
Enquiry, 1946, (Q.G.· 36-'46), paras. 164, 144, ~tc. ---
~l.4Sachs, Qp. cit., pp. 168f. 
J...J... 6 Re:Qort of the Mine Workers' Union Commission of Enq-
uiry, 1941, quoted in Hepple, Trade Unions in Travail, pp. 38f. 
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management. The Commission implied that sharp practice had 
accompanied the purchase, but reported itself unable to 
assign responsibility as neither Ellis or his partner in the 
transaction would testify truthfully on the subject.~~ 6 Des-
pite Opposition proddings, the (by this time National Party) 
Government brought no charge against them. A private pros-
ecution lodged against Ellis by a colleague on the Union's 
Executive was dismissed on a technicality. However, this 
litigation brought to light a number of other dubious trans-
actions, one concerning a Funeral Benefit Scheme which the 
Union had· contracted with a certain firm at a price above 
that quoted by competitors. This provided work for yet anot-
her Government Commisslon.~~ 7 
The capture _of the Miheworkers' Union by Nationalist 
supporters, though evidently effecting no great improvement 
in the Union's administration, furnished a springboard with-
in the trade union movement for further Nationalist advance. 
The Reformers had previously agreed that after the Minewor-
kers' Union was safely in their hands their next step would 
be to reform the Garment Workers' Union, followed by union 
after union. 1~ 8 
~~ 6 U.G. 52-'51, para. 33· The money used to purchase 
the headquarters building came out of a ~500,000 grant made 
to the Union in 1944 by the Chamber of Mines. According to 
a letter (6 January 1960) from the Public Relations Officer 
of the Chamber of Mines to the present writer, the grant was 
made in response to a Union demand for a wage increase, How-
ever, that negotiations for a wage increase for Union mem-
bers should result in a cash grant to the Union seems a 
strange settlement. A member of the Gold Producers' Committee 
of the Chamber of Mines and several Union members told the 
Mine Workers' Unlon Commission of Enquiry in 1951 that the 
money was intended for distribution among Union members in 
the form of cash gifts, (~., paras. 16, 24). 
117Hepple, Trade Unions in Travail, pp. 45f.. 
:1..1. 8 Ibid.,·p. 39· 
--- ·-------~---------· -----
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Like the mineworkers~ most of the white garment wor-
1 kers were Afrikaners--poor women migrants from the country-
. I 
side; 119 similarly, the Uni9n's leader was not an Afrikaner. 
. I 
There the resemblance ends, ifor this General Secretary had 
I 
a reputation for financial ~onesty and had engaged the act-
ive· support of most of the ~ank and file. The Reformers, 
I . 
fearing that his influence 9n the garment workers was des-
troying their color conscio~sness120 and alienating them 
from the National Party, saJ him as a national enemy, a 
. I 
11
volksvyand'r. 11.A Russian Jdw, a communist by the name of 
Bolly Sachs;" Dr • .Albert Her~zog informed the 1939 Volks-
k~ngres, 11 is'the man who mus~ protect the interests of 
I . 
Afrikaner'workers against the bosses of the cloth~ng fac-
tories who· are also mainly J~ws. 1u. 21 
A campaign to remove tachs from his position with the 
1 i Garment Workers Union had a~ready started when the Reformers 
1 I initiated their moves to win\ control of the Mineworkers I . 
Union. Many organizational fesources of the Nationalist 
Movement were thrown-in to it. The Dutch Reformed Churches, 
i 
characteristically, joined w~th active and open support. In 
1944, for example, they form~d an 'Enlarged Church Committee' 
in Germiston, then center of ithe garment industry, to "pr·a-
i 
I 
! 
I . 
119Department of Labo~r, Report of the Garmen~ Workers' 
Union
11
CommissiRn.of Enouiry ]948-49, .~950, (U.G. 16- 50), para. 
163; Touleier I.The Poor Whi:te Problem in ·south .Africa, p. 29. 
· 
120The Commission of Ebquiry appointed by the National-
ist Government in 1948 to invlestigate the· affairs and adminis-
tration of the Union noted in1 its report that the General Sec-
" I . 
retary had testified that if 1 he had a native girl looking 
after his child she could usel.his bath at any time and that he 
saw no reason for treating he~ differently," U~G. 16-'50, para. 
167, ! 
~!:1.:1a::1:Dr• A •. Hertzog, "Ar\beidsorganisa:s:i.e, 11 Verslag van 
die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkekoggres ( 1939), PP• · 182f. Sachs 
was expelled from the Communi~t Party in 1931. According to 
the Garment Workers' Union Commission of Enquiry, he remained 
a communist sympathizer, oppo~ing the Second World War as an 
imperialist blood bath until the involvement of the Sovi_et 
Union, when his Union newsuap~r and himself underwent a com-
plete about face, U.G. 16-~50~ paras. 343f, 359. 
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serve Christianity~,. and protect white garment workers :from 
being "debased to a position of equality with niggers.Jtl. 22 
Sachs was assaulted. Union meetings were broken up. An 
editorial, pamphlet and. verbal attack was maintained which 
cost several clergymen, Nationalist newspapers and politic; 
ians dearly in a su9cession of court actions and settlements 
:for defamation.l. 23 Still, the bulk of the Afrikaner garment 
workers continued to cast Union ballots :for Sachs' leader-
ship. 
The advent of Nationalist control in the ~ineworkers' 
Union enabled greater resources to be brought into the drive 
against Sachs and other left-wing union leaders. In 1950, 
:funds belonging to the Mineworkers 1 Union were invested by 
its new leadership in a publishing venture, ttThe Workers' 
Press, Ltd.lt With Dr. Albert Hertzog, now honorary member 
of the Mineworkers' Executive, as Editor-in~Chief, and the 
Union's General Secretary, Daan Ellis, on the Board of Direc-
tors, the new company began publishing newspapers. In add-
ition to the one that they issued for their own union-~~ 
Mynwerker--they produced two other papers, Die Klerewerker 
1. 22The phrase appears in a pastoral letter addressed 
to the Transvaal Garment Workers' Union by Rev. A. B. du 
Prerz of the Germiston Dutch Reformed Church, quoted U.G. 
16- 50, para. 72. The Enlarged Church Committee was establis-
hed after two Afrikaner women worlrers were expelled from the 
Union for disrupting work in a :factory when nine Coloured women 
were hired. The expulsion, which was effected by a unanimous 
vote of the Union's Germiston Branch Executive Committee, :fif-
teen of whose 16 members were Afrikaners, was viewed:-,:py-~:-the 
Dutch Reformed Church as an action undermining 'white civil-
isation'. The story of the ~arged Church Committee's eff-
orts to meet the situation was told in a court action for def-
amation brought by Sach.s against one of the Committee's mem-
bers, Sachs v. A. B. du Preez, W.L.D., 1945, P• 94. 
1.23See E. S. (Solly) Sachs, Rebels 1 Daughters 
(N.pl.: Macgibbon & Kee, 1957),.pp. 132-161. 
---~~--:~-------___ ..;..___ ____ ~ ------- -·-·· -
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and Die Bouwerker for distributic?n amonggarme.nt workers and 
! . 
building workers. Material cont~ined in these two papers 
. I 
led rapidly to libel actions by qfficers of the unions con-
, 
cerned, which resulted in the company's bankruptcy and liq-
uidation.~24 
The Reformers received an~ther se~back in 1950 when 
I 
G. H. van dar Walt, who.had been
1
expelled from the Garment 
Workers' Union upon the discover~ that he was a paid agent 
I 
of the White Workers' Protection ~ociety, and who was then 
I 
built up in Die Transvaler as a rriartyr for white ·civilization, 
and was brought out as a Christia~-National rival for the 
. i 
Union leadership, admitted under :cross-examination before 
the Garment Workers' ·Union Commi·sision of Enquiry to a record 
of sojourns in mental hospit~:jtlS ara convictions fo.r offences 
ranging from attempted murder to petty theft.~ 25 
Despite the failure of the! Reformers to turn the rank 
I 
and file against Sachs, his twentr-five year career as General 
Secretary of the Union was over. ; The machinery of State, "'' 
which since 1948 had been under N~tionalist control, was now 
I 
activated against him. In May 19~2 he was ordered by the 
Minister of Justice, C. Re Swart,: to resign from the Union 
I 
and never again to become a member· He was also prohibited 
from attending any but religious, !recreational and social I . 
gatherings, and from entering any\part of South Africa out-
f 
side the Transvaal. The Minister is action was taken under 
I 
powers vested in him by the Supp~ession of Co~nism Act 
(No.44 of 1950, amended in 1951 td make its terms retroactive) 
from which there is no court appeJl. By September 1953, 3~ 
I 
other trade union officials~ incl~ding a number of left-wing 
Afrikaners, had been ousted from ~heir positions in a similar 
I 
; 
I 
~24:Q..Q:.. 52-'51, paras. 33-36; Sachs, The Ch6tee before 
South Africa, pp. 186f. 
~ 25Sachs, Rebels' Daughters!, pp. 176-182. 
i 
I 
I 
I 
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manner.~26 
In retrospect, it may be said that although the cam-
paign to bring the Afrikaner industrial v-rorkers into the 
ranks of the Nationalist Movement did not achieve its full 
objectives, it was on the whole successful. As we have seen, 
hold-ups were encountered. Some Afrikaner workers and trade 
unionists became estranged from Nationalism and remained in 
conflict with the National Farty. 127 Most Afrikaner workers 
(and others) failed to observ:e all the tenets of Christian-
National labor and, ·as Jan de Klerk, the Minister of Labour, 
lamented in 1959, continued striving 
to sell their labour for the highest price as though it 
were a commercial article, and not a divine vocation 
which has to be performed in obedience to,'God. 12 8 
But such areas of resistance do not register on the political 
scale, where considerable ground was covered and many perils 
overcome. As Minister de Klerk, speaking on another occasion, 
told Parliament: 
In 1938 •• ·.the National Party in this House reached its 
all-time low with 28 members. The struggle could not be 
waged on this front. In the political sphere the Nation-
al Party was practically paralyzed, and we had this wild 
flow of communism engulfing the workers on the Rand. 
Then the Afrikaner people, in its broad mass, got up in 
arms and stepped in with all the organizational power 
at its disposal •.•• That is why one found the three 
Afrikaans churches, the RDB., the F.A.K. and the Blanke-
werkersbeskermingsbond co-operating •••• 129 . 
JL26 Ibid., pp. 189-195; Hepple, Trade Unions in Travail, 
P• 60. 
127In 1958, nineteen women officials of the Garment 
I . . f Workers Union, including Johanna Cornelius, Sachs successor 
as General Secretary, brought a successful libel suit against 
Mr. J•. du Pisanie, Nationalist M.P. for Germiston and a White 
Workers' Protection Society official, Natal Mercuny, 4 Novem-
ber 1958. The Union also opposed the Government's low wage, 
border factories scheme. 
128Die Transvaler, 28 September 1959, in P.D. 39/1959/392. 
12 gQuoted in Alex Hepple, 11 The Firey Cross of Job Reserv-
ation~ Afritr.a South, 2:45, April~June 1958. 
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Within ten years that cowoperation brought the Nation-
al Party and its allies to power, with 79 seats, a Government 
majority of five, from an election in which 19 work~ng class 
constituencies were taken from the United and Labour Parties 
by an aggregate majority of only 9,4ooJl.so 
Perhaps this narrow victory left the Nationalists in 
too weak a position to execute their original plan to elim-
inate collective bargaining. Or perhaps they saw retrospec-
tively no political need for it. The landless Afrikaner 
workers had never in great numbers joined the British-led 
Labour Party, and, unlike the working classes of the nine-
teenth-century, industrializing, European States, had not 
formed their own.l.sl. They had learned, for the most part, 
l. 30Sachs, The Choice Before South Africa, p. 208. 
l.al.A month before the 1961 General Election, a Nasion-
ale Arbeiders Party was formed. Among those involved in 
its formation were J. A. Kruger, Assistant Chief Secretary 
of the Iron and Steel Workers' Union, K. du Preez, General 
Secretary of the Engine Drivers and Fireman's Association, 
and B. Keeble, District Secretary of the Amalgamated Engin-
eering Union; (The General Secretary of the S .,A. Iron and 
Steel Trade Association, Mr. L. J. van den Berg, announced 
that he had been authorized by the President and Vice-Pres-
ident of the Association to express disapproval of the action 
of two senior officials in participating in the Party's for-
mation). 
Afrikaner workers were reportedly aggrieveo_ that their 
wage standards were being threatened by the low-vrage border 
industries (see below, pp. 320-322) and that instead of 
checking unemployment the Government was urging them to 
tighten their belts; a supporter of the Nasionale Arbeiders 
Party, E. P. van der Merwe, Orange Free State member of the 
General Council of the Mineworkers 1 Union, said that the 
·National Party was becoming a reactionary, capitalist party. 
Among the reported objects of the new organizatio~, 
which came·forward under the indicative English name, Conser-
vat;i.ve Workers' Party (c.w.P.), were improved social services, 
a reasonable minimum wage for all sections of the community, 
con~rolled white immigration after proper safeguards for the 
welfare of South African workers had been taken, etc~ 
In the October General Elec~ion, the c.w.P. unsuccess-
fully contested four Witwatersrand working-class constituen-
cies against National Party candidates, amassing an aggregate 
l67 
to associate themselves politically with an educated elite 
that w:as not F~sionist, and was not half-socialist, as in 
Western Europe. With encouragement, they had continued to 
regard themselves not as workers or ~rikaner workers, but 
as white men; and not primarily as white men, but as Afrik-
aners. .And while they may have made no real contribution to 
the advance of the Nationalist Economic Movement, at least 
they had thrown no serious obstacle into its path. 
Advance Of The Economic Movement 
The motto of the Economic Movement was nBuy Afrikaans!•. 
An extensive edue-ational campaign was mounted to bring this 
message home to 1,200,000 Afrikaner consumers. Here the RDB. 
1ed the way, its members serving as cadres among the general 
idircitamner population, its Economic Division conducting •r a 
large number of personal interviews,n and dispatching "thous-
ands and thousands of letters .to every nook and cranny.of the 
uaes · land .. ·-··· In every ne~ghborhBod wher~ an Afrikaner business 
was established, the local RDB. branch gave a helping hand.J..as 
However, efforts in the field of , .. ek6nomiese bewusmak-
ing't (awareness) were not confined to organizations specif-
ically designed for econnmic propaganda. Political,cultural 
and religious bodies, whose memberships in any cas·e largely · 
overlapped with that of the RDB., also assisted. Prominent 
among them was the 11volkskerk" (i.e., Dutch Reformed Church),· 
which as Die Burger.pointed out was expected to give a lead 
vote of 8,554 againsta total National Party vote of 23,728; 
in the 1958 General Election, these constituencies were cap-
tured by the National Party against United Party opposition, 
by a narrower margin, 23,681 to 15,866; Sunday Times, 3 Sep-
tember 1961, in P.D. 34/1961/324; Die Vaderland 6, 7 Septem-
ber,l96l, Rand Daily Mail, 7, 8 September 1961, in P.D. 
)5/1961/331; Rand Daily ~' 19 October 1961. 
J.. 32Verslag ~ die Tweeds Ekonomiese Volkskongres, 
p. 163. 
i 38 Ibid., P• 163. 
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in matters other than the gos~ei.~34 In 194-5, for instance, 
the General Synodal Commissio:th. of the N.G. Kerk in the Free 
State adopted a report by it~Jsurveillance Commission which 
declared that I 
The poor-white probleml the problem of volks'-evils, 
unemployment, denationali~ation and hostility to the 
Church, can be solved eff$ctively only if the Afrikane~ 
becomes an employer, and. 1;.hose who are employed do no · 
longer work for foreign efploiters but can work in the 
employ of their own peoplt? • ••• our people should be 
taught that savings must *o longer be invested in foreign 
institutions. · Our volk h~s its pwn financial institut-
ions ••• in which the right:atmosphere prevails and where 
justice is done to the Aftikaner employee.J.36 
Not only did Afrikaner[organizations of all types join 
directly with the RnB. in mobllizing the Afrikaner's 11might-
l ft • iest weapon, his purchasing power, · but no doubt they con-
tributed indirectly to the EcJnomic Movement's.progress 
. . I 
through their efforts to deepe;m Afrikaner group consciou.sness 
in general. This was promotet in various ways. For instance, 
in the .same year and city in which the Economic Congress met, 
I 
a Conference on Christian Nat:ional Education took place, also I . 
organized by the F.A.K. This\resulted in a permanent Instit-
ute for Christian National Edt?.cation, which strove with grow-
. I ing success to bring mother tongue, Christian National-based 
I 
.education to all (but particularly Afrikaner) school children 
in South .Africa.J.36 Afrikane~s educated in a Christian Nat-
1 
I 
I J.S4~ Burger, 13 October 1945, in P.D. 460/1945. 
j 
~ 35Die Vaderland, 23 Aigust 1945, in P.D. 453/1945. 
~ 36The advance of the Nationalist Movement rev.ersed 
the tendency to educate all white children through the me-
dium of both Afrikaans and ~lish, a policy favored by the 
United Party as a means of promoting white fusion. Between 
1946 and 1954 the following p~rcentage drop occurred in the 
number of white pupils receiv~ng instruction in both lang-
uages in elementary and high school: Cape, 4.48 to 2.81; 
Transvaal, 2 to nil; O.F.S. 2~11 to 0.09; Natal, 2.98 to 1.43. 
In the Cape this represented an immense change since 1925, 
when 48 per cent of the whitelpupils were being taught through 
the medium of both languages; !Patterson, QE• cit., P• 60. 
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ional spirit were likely to be group-conscious people, who 
read Afrikaans newspapers and other publications, adhered 
I 
to the Dutch Reformed Church, toted National Party, bought 
in Afrikaner shops. ~gain F.AtK• initiative resulted in 
. i 
the RDB. appointing a Uniale Raad vir Volkspele en Volksang 
(Union Council for People's Gawes and Songs) to foster trad-
itional Afrikaner forms of rec~eation.~87 
I 
Contributing to the awa~ening of group consciousness, 
i 
at the same time an outgrowth qf it, virtually a complete set 
I 
of parallel institutions appea~ed on the South African scene. 
Afrikaner motorists were encourjaged to join the Voor~rekker-
1 . 
motorkl'ub in place of the Soutl .African Automobile .Associat-
ion or the Royal Automobile Clu~. A specifically Afrikaner 
I 
Red Crose society was created, \the Suid-Afrikaanse Noodhul_p-
liga. Afrikaner women were expfcted to join the Vrouefeder-
asie instead of multi-group or ~ritish ·dominated welfare ass-
ociations, and Afrikaner :SON!B~':.t·f join the Voortrekkerjeug_ 
rather than the Boy Scouts. Th~ Fe·derated Council of South 
African Teachers proved to be t9o negative a body for most 
. . I 
Afrikaner teachers, who establi~hed their own Onderwyser-
unies.138 In these and other s~heres of life, contact bet-
ween Afrikaners and non-Afrikan$rs was reduced. Half-page 
! 
'advertizements in Die Transvale~ called on Afrikaners to pat-
ronize ff,a 100 per cent Afrikaan~ firm ••• (Ons ~ Droogskoon-
:makers).Our Own Dry Cleaners"; a;.ppealed to readers interested 
, . . I 
, in '~tthe welfare of Afrikaans· wivtes and daughters who work in 
clothing factories" to purchase [shares in Die Volks Hemde- eh 
. . . • I 
\ 
I 
I See Federation of Afrikaans Oult~ral Societies. Institute 
,for Christian-National Educatio~, Christian-National Educat-
.ion Policy (Johannesburg: Instiltute for Christian-National 
Education, l9i9) for an official1 statement of the P9·11cy. 
; 
iafvittrsla.g:Tva.n die Tweede\Ekonomiese Volkskongres, p. 
I 188Natal Witness, 7 Octob~r 1935, in P.D. 42/1954/414; 
Pretoria News, 4 October 1954, if R·D• 41/19547405. 
I 
I 
' 
119 
Klerefabriek (The People's Shirt and Clothing Factory)::1.39 
where Afrikaner women would be safe from abuse by foreign 
bosses. 
Periodic communiques from RDB. Headquarters reported 
on the progress of the Afrikaner economic advance. According 
to RDB. Chief Leader Diederichs, Volkskas' investments rose 
by 700 per cent between ~iine 1938 and March 1942, from 
~15,ti00 to *'1,570,000. SASBANKts fixed deposits increased 
from ~367,419 in 1938 to Jt.746,217 in 1941. SANLAM grew 45 
per cent during the three years following the Volkskongres. 
Over the same period, the value of business turnover in 
Afrikaner retail establishments rose by an average of between 
300 and 400 per cent, and many new enterpri~es made their app-
:earance. This development was attributed part~y beo..e'Ol:l.aitions 
of wartime demand, but on the whole it was due,· said Dr .. 
Diederichs, to neconomic awakening 11 .a40 
The struggle had merely begUn and no conclusion wa~ 
, ·intended until full economic equality had been won. A book 
published by Die Nasiona1e Pers in 1942, as part of its 
11Second Trek S.eriesnt, pictures in an idealized fashion the 
course and destination of this trek: 
••• the Afrikaner ••• must begin to conquer a place in 
retail trade. Once he is established here, he must set 
foot in the wholesale trade, and from there into industry. 
At the same time, an exclusively Afrikaner credit system, 
commercial and people's banks and investment enterprises 
must be developed. Moreover, in this way opportunities 
are created for Afrikaner labor forces to be employed by 
Afrikaners in Afrikaner enterprises and in the interests 
bf Afrikaner business. Thus both the Afrikaner's labor 
and purchasing power and his savings-and capital-strength 
are employed in Afrikaner interests. For now the Afrikaner 
worker will buy from the Afrikaner retailer and the lat-
ter :from the.Afrikaner wholesaler. The Afrikaner whole-
saler will deal with the Afrikaner factory, whose capo.;. 
~89Die Transvaler, 31 July 1941; 2 August 1941. 
140Dr. N. Diederichs, "Die Ekonomiese Volkskongres 
van 1939 e-n d.aarna, '' Volkshanael, 4:15, Maart 1943. 
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ital comes from Afrikaner investors and whose credit from 
Afrikaner institutions. Thus .the earnings· of the Afrikaner 
worker complete a pure Afrikaner cycle in which all ranks 
are of service.~4~ 
Besid.es encouraging Afrikaners to help each other econ-
omically, the Movement also fostered a combative spirit 
against non-Afrikaner enterprise. The corollary of rtBuy 
.Afrikaans!'' was not le-ft implicit. · A boycott sentim€mt was 
developed, ·functioning perhaps as a centrifugal force neut-
ralizing the competitive advantages of lower costs and prices 
enjoyed by the more experienced and established non-Afrikaner 
businessman. wTo trade with a non-Afrikaner shopkeeper may 
result in an immediate saving,n Professor L. J. duPlessis 
admitted in a speech to the 1939 Volkskongres, '~but it also 
means surrender of the bit of wealth, which the.Afrikaner has 
laboriously earned, to his people's enemies (volksvyande) who 
put it to work for their own interests.~42 
Three non-Afrikaner groups, in particular, the Britons, 
Jews and Indians, comprising a tenth of the country•s populat-
ion, among them handled close to· 95 per cent of its business 
turnover (sales). They did not all experience the aggressive 
actions accompanying the Afrikaner economic advance. No or-
ganized boycotts appear to have been mounted against the 
British section, who were politically entrenched behind the 
governingUnited Party. Perhaps it was feared that such act-
ion in this quarter might provoke legislative' count·ermeasures, 
or lead to damaging retaliatory boycotts by British whole-
salers; perhaps it was considered hardly feasible to boycott 
all non-Afrikaner business, Afrikaner enterprises being few 
and far between, with a limited range of stocks and services. 
But the Jews and Indians were more vulnerable to boycotts and 
~4~Coetz~e, Qn• cit., pp. 124f. 
i 42Professor L. J.; du' Plessis, ;'Die Doel van ons 
Ekonomiese Strewe,u Verslag van die E.ePste Ekonomiese 
Volkskongres, p. 33. 
172 
other hostile economic maneuvers. . Both were small groups, and 
both could expect little or no sympathy from the British. 
Moreover, Indian property had no political defences. 
Of all the groups encountered by the Afrikaners on 
their Second Trek, the Jews were materially and profession-
ally the most advanced. Occupational analysis of the white 
adult male population in the nine biggest cities of South 
Africa in 1926, a population of which 9.1 per cent was Jew-
ish, 22.7 per cent Afrikaner, and 60.5 per cent British, 
showed that 42~2 per cent of the merchants and business man-
agers in commerce were Jewish, compared with 5.7 per cent 
Afrikaner and 42.1 .per cent·British; 1.0 per cent of unskil-
led laborers were Jewish, as against 60.2 per cent Afrikaner 
and 33.1 per cent British.~43 
In pre-industrial Bouth Africa, relations between 
Afrikaner and Jew were harmonious. The Boer on his lonely 
farmstead looked forward to the visit of the Jewish peddler 
with his sugar and cloth, his nails and news; the two men 
chatted over coffee in the kitchen. With the onset of the 
Second Trek, theAfrikaner began meeting the Jew as a boss, 
and then as a potential ri~a1~ 
The first legislative application of anti-Jewish feel-
ing occurred in 1930, with the passage of the Quota Act, lim-
iting Eastern European (mainly Jewish) immigration to South 
Africa. This was followed in 1937 by the Aliens .Act, designed 
to lessen the influx of German Jews. Both measures commanded 
~43Pauw, 21?.• cit., Tabel .:XXIII; pp. 222-225. In some 
of the humbler occupations, such as semi-skilled shoe maker, 
Jews were also disproportionately heavily represented, 27.0 
per cent of cobblers being Jews, 37.3 per cent Afrikaners and 
26.6 per cent Britons. (In 1926, the total Jewish population 
numbered 71,816; in 1951 approximately 110,000; Morris de Saxe 
and I. M. Goodman, editors, The South African Jewish Yearbook, 
~ (Johannesburg: The South African Jewish Historical 
Socie~y, 1929) p. 43; Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, editors, 
The Jews in South Africa, A History (Cape Town: Oxford Univer-
sity PresS'; 1955), p. 270-:T 
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support from the British as well as the Afrikaner elector-
ates.:1.44- rtWb.at·chance has the Afrikaans-speaking section of 
the population to get a proper place in commerce?u said Dr .. 
Malan in explanation, adding: ~The English-speaking section 
are also suffering in this respect. •~~"1.46 
Agitation against the internal Jewish population was 
a novel phenomenon among Afr:Lkaners, as were the various 
shirted organizations, Greyshirts and Blackshirts, devoting 
themselves to it.. It started in 1933, according-to a South 
African Jewish historian, who points out that it was then 
"Roundlytt condemned in Die Kerkbode, organ of the largest of 
the three Dutch Reformed Churches.i46 By 1937, however, the 
Synod of the Transvaal D.R.C. adopted the following resolution: 
Persecution of any section of the community does not 
carry with it the approval of the Synod. Where anti-Jew-
ish movements are launched for economic or other reasons, 
the Synod wishes to leave it to the Christian conscience 
of its members to decide how far such movements are jus-
tified or not. 147 · 
The Jews, like other privileged and under-privileged 
groups in South Africa, had little sympathy for the economic 
aspirations of Afrikaners. Hostility between the two groups, 
·born in the cities where Jewish prosperity and Afrikaner 
poverty were in daily intercourse, spread even into the rural 
areas, where Jews had formerly been respected by Afrikaners 
as People of The Book. The 1941 Synod of the Orange Free 
State Dutch Reformed Church, representing a predominantly 
rural population, voted 64-61 that the Jews were not God's 
144Saron and Hotz, Q2• cit.,.p. 379. 
146Quoted in Enid Alexander, Morris .Alexander, A Biog-
raphy (Cape Town: Juta & Co., Limited, 1953), p. 187. 
146Saron and Hotz, ~· cit., p. 384. 
~47Quoted ibid.·, p. 384 •. 
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Chosen People, as Paul Kruger had believed; 148 at a Black-
shirt meeting,in the Transvaal market town of-Heidelberg, at 
which the Poor White problem was ascribed to Jewish machin-
ation, a resolution was passed unanimously by the 300 persons 
attending, calling for the expulsion of the Jews from South 
Africa.~49 
The mainstream of the Nationalist Movement advanced 
somewhat.less drastic policies. In the first issue of Die 
Transvaler (1/10/37), Dr. Verwoerd, the editor, wrote on 
the 'Jewish Problem'. He maintained that the Jews were not 
hated, but that they were seen as a group which stood in the 
way of the Afrikaner's economic welfare. Each white popul-
ation group should have a share in each of the most impor-
tant occupations in ratio to the proportion it formed of the 
white population as a whole • 
. This proposal, in the modified form of a vocational 
permit system for unnaturalized foreigners, was incorporated 
in the 1938 Election Manifest9 of the National Party, along 
with a promise of stricter controls over naturalization and 
total prohibition of further Jewish immigration.~ 50 During 
the election campaign, the Pa:rty cl~imed recognitiOn as chief 
anti-Jewish champion. Fighting for the Piquetberg seat 
against Weichardt, the Greyshirt leader (at present a Nation-
al Party senator), the National Party candidate, Dr. Malan, 
declared that he had done more to battle the Jews than his 
opponent; and gave instances.7 5 ~ In future he would 'fight 
~48Die Vaderland, 29 MJ.rch 1941, in P.D. 233/1941; 
Patterson, Q:Q· cit., p. 291. 
14 ~Die Transvaler, 29 November 1937, in P.D. 68/1937. 
:J.. 50Alexander, Ql?.• cit., p. 198; _Saron and Hot·z, Q:Q• 
cit., p. 384. 
~ 5 ~Die Burger, 22 January 1938, in P.D. 75/1938:~ · 
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to stop Jews from acq"Uiring .s;o'Uth African citizenship, and 
would limit their entrance irtto the professions.~ 52 It will 
I . . 
be seen that the middle soci9-economic position in which his-
tory a~d the industrial revolution had placed Afrikanerdom 
I 
had given rise to a demand td extend the policy of ethnic 
job reservation, then operatfng against all elements of the 
dark-skinned population, to ~he upper ranks of the white 
people· as well. i 
Preceding and through~ut the war years, the anti-Jew-
ish campaign was kept up. ~ere were repeated Nationalist 
demands for_the cessation ofiJewish immigration,~53 calls to 
oust Jews (and .Asians) from ~igh positions in the economy, 164 
I 
I 
spotlights fixed on their s.trong representation in the medical 
I 
and legal professions. 155 I~ 1939, Dr. H. P. Thorn (present-
1 
ly Rector of Stellenbosch University and Chairman of the 
I 
F.A.K.) informed the Christelike Jeug Vereniging (Union of 
Christian Youth) that the future Calvinist Republic would not 
grant equal rights to ''coloureds, natives and Jews.r":L. 56 In 
1941, a Reddingsdaadbond bus~ness established at Parys decided 
that only C~ristians might b~ shareholders.~57 In 1943, the 
Transvaal division of the Na~ional Party banned Jews from mem-
. I 
bership. 158 In 1945, a studient writing an M.A. thes!fs at 
I 
Pr.etoria University recommended therein that in future cen-
. ) 
suses, ,Jews be listed ''not a,s Europeans or English-speaking 
I 
152Die Transvaler, 2~ January 1938, in P.D. 76/1938. 
I 
~53 . Alexander, £2· cit., pp. 203, 214. 
164D1e Transvaler, 
165Die Transvaler, 
I 
I 
1~ May 1938; 21 September 1944. 
I lq June 1945, in P.D. 447/1945. 
I 
166Die Burger, n.d., )in 1:·12· 165/1939. 
i 
167Die Transvale:r, 2i April 1941. 
i 
16 6Saron and Hotz., ~· cit., p. 38·4. 
\ 
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persons, but as Jews."~59 Iri the same year, reports resul-
ting fr®m the overrun:tid~g-~)by Allied troops of Buchenwald, 
Weimar and other German concentration cap1ps, werelabelled 
by Die Transvaler as fratroci ty propaganda"; 160 i?- a signed 
article on nThe Jewish Problemt11 dln Die Nu~-1e Orde in October 
. --- ---- ----
October of that year, Oswald Pirow, subsequently Chief Pros-
ecutor in the Treason Trial (1958-60), wrote that he was 
n'openly and outspokenly anti-Semitic, u and that in his con-
• !1 • 
sidered opinion the world would be a better place to live 
in if every Jew. could vanish from this. earth. JJ.:Lol. 
By 1948, the a.nti-Jewi!sh campaign was over. It was cal-
led off before the General Eleetion,~62 and it was not renewed. 
in 1951, the National Party ~n the Transvaal rescinded its 
ban on Jewish membership, and in 1955 the name of Dr. D.F. 
Malan was inscribed in the Golden Book of the Z11onist World 
Organisation in appreciation of his contribution to better 
race relationships in South Africa. 
Not being in power during the campaign, the National-
ists had been unable to enforce all their anti-Jewish schemes. 
Even so-- Judging froni. the Jewish Board of Deputies 1 -Press .. 
Digests, which kept a watching brief on the campaign--they 
seem to have organized no boycotts of Jewish shops. There had 
been some incidents reported :of Nationalist town councils re-
fusing to issue trading licen;ses to Jewish applicants.:1. 6 s 
:t. 69Johannes Petrus Potgieter, •n Kri~iese Ontleding 
~ die ~evindinge -~ Beskouinge Aangaande die Ve~~rming ~ 
Blankes in Suid-Afrika (Unpublished M.A. Thesis in History, 
University of Pretoria, 1945), p. 99. 
' 16024 and 25 April, 1945. 
:1.oi4 and 11 October 19A5. 
:t.
62Alexander, 212· cit., PP·. 215ff. 
168Indian View~, 7 January 1938, reported that a Jewish 
businessmant refused a trading license by the Potchefstroom 
Town Council. had protested that such action would reserve bus-
• . N 
iness for nthe chosen few. [I.e., Afrikaner~ and Indians. 
177 
There had been one remarkabl$ attempt at intimidation: on Oc-
tober 12, 1937, within a :fortnight after Die Transvaler began 
publication (and also after 1 t was well on i't'S 'course of anti-
JeY.liSh agitation), 'the manager of Die Voortrekkerp~s, which 
.owned the nev-1spaper, wrote a letter to the Jewish Board of 
Deputies informing them that .it would be impossible to res-
train the feelings of loyal Nationalists, incensed at the fail-
ure of Jewish firms to purchase advertizing space in the col-
umns of his newspaper, unless the leaders of South African 
Jewry disclaimed what he believed to be a boycott 
., • " .. ~~;;;.,~l•and actual proof df the contrary is given by the 
reappearance of advertisements from Jewisb. firms •••• ac-
tion on your part on the lines indicated-wili calm mat~ 
ters :for the time being •••• ~ 64 
Following this up, the National Party leader in the 
Transvaal, J. G. Strijdom, who was also Chairman of the Board 
of Directors of Voortrekkerpers, drew attention in a public 
speech to Jewish Business 1 s omi.ssion to contribute signi:fic-
' ttl' 11 an<lily to Die Transvaler s ife-blood ; maintenance of the 
. ~ . u 
advertizing boycott would provoke serious countermeasures, 
he warned.~66 Meanwhile, the Jewish Board.of Deputies denied 
supporting. the ''alleged" boycott., and voiced its opposition 
to any policy of boy¢ott of one section of the South African 
population by another.~ 66 This episode took on an interes-
ting retrospective light when the Nasionale Jeugbond organ, 
Stryd (Struggle), declared in 1941 that it refused advertize-
menta from Jews point-blank.i 67 
i 6~Die Transvaler, 30 ,November l937, in P.D. 68/1937· 
' 
:l. 65Die Trarisvaler, 18 ;November 1937, in P.l2,. 64/1937. 
~ 66 P .. D. 68/1937· 
~67Die Transvaler, 21 April 194l1 in P.J?_. 236/194l. (Stryd was of course not launched as a business venture.) 
The methods employed by Die Transvaler_:.:.,to get on its :feet were 
comprehensive; business grou~s whom were being labelled edit-
orially as 11people' s enemies · were not only threatened, but 
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More serious and protracted was the contact of the 
Economic Movement with the Indian Community. The latter were 
descended mainly ~rom indentured laborers, brought to S?uth 
Africa between 1860 and 19ll.to work on the sugar, tea and 
wattle plantations, the railways· and mines of Natal. Many 
remained in the country afte~ completing their indentures • 
.Although extreme poverty continued to be the lot o~ the maj~ 
ority of Indians,l. 6 e a minority acquired commercial property, 
chiefly small retail shops. An Afrikaner estimated in 1943 
that Indians held 5,000 more general dealer's licenses than 
his own people, though there were five times as many Afrikan-
ers as Indians in the country.l.69 
·As early as 1865 the white groups began imposing res-
trictions on the political, work, tradingfand property-owning 
rights of Indians. The latter were virtually debarred from 
entry or residence in the Orange Free StatE! in 1891, and their 
movement between other provinces fE!ll under strict controls.l. 70 
Like other non-white groups, they were subject to discrimin-
ation with respect to educational opportunities. The closing 
of fields of livelihood, and_ barriers to their free.:~· movement, 
179 
led to an intensification of their competitive pressure at 
points still open to their e:titerprise. 171 causing white 
people to demand yet further re.strictions on Indian economic 
activity. In his Economic History of South Africa (1924), 
M. H. de Kook, presently Governor of the South African reserve 
Bank, gave academic expression to the long prevalent desire 
of both ruling groups for a final solut:Lon of the problem 
they considered to be the JJindian Problemn: 
His successful competition with the Europeans in trade, 
agriculture and industry is becoming more and more a 
menace to the welfare of the white population of Natal. 
It is a problem which demands drastic action, either 
restriction of the rights of trading and owning land 
now enjoyed by the Asiatic or repatriation on a larger 
scale. Both have their advantages and disadvantages. .A 
Combination of the two methods might prove to be the 
easiest way out of the difficulty. 172 
While the anti-Jewish agitation was ebbing after the 
Second World War, a strong anti-Indian campaign was in prog-
ress. Editorials in the National Party Press, and speakers 
at pol-itical gatherings, were urging Afrikaners to boycott 
Indian shops. 173 It was proposed at a 1946 meeting of the 
Pietersburg Waaksaamheidskomi.tee (Vigilance Committee), atten-
ded by nearly 2,000 people, that Whites entering Indian shops 
and white girls working for Indians be tarred and feathered.~ 74 
The spirit engendered was suer that in February 1947, a mob 
of about forty white youths burst into an Indian reception at 
a Pretoria hotel and assaulte:d the guests. 17·6 At the same 
time, a boycott of Indian shops, centered originally in the 
rural areas. of the Western Transvaal, 1,'fas reported by Die Trans-
1 71U .G. 37-' 35, para. 242. 
172QQ. cit., p. 148. 
1
;
3 Die,Transvaler, 28 June 1946, j,.n P.D. 443/1946. 
174Die Transvaler, 8 February 1947, in ~.D. 551/1947. 
175Pretoria News, 4 February 1947, in P.D. 521/1947. 
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valer to be ~spreading like a veld fire.Hl. 76 Fanning its 
flames, :Dr. Diederichs announced that the RDB. was consider-
ing specific measures to combat the Indians and to strengthen 
the position of Afrikaners in commerce.~ 79 The Diamond Fields 
Advertiser, reflecting the ~ain body of English-speaking 
white opinion, blamed Indians for provoking the boycott 
against themselves.~ 76 In March, Pretoria University students 
picketed Indian stores in th~ city to keep white buyers away.l. 79 
In May, Dr~ J. H. Loock, a leading organizer of the boycott, 
declared that Indians were not regarded as permanent elements 
of South African ~ociety, lik:e 'tNatives and Coloureds'•, who 
were therefore being asked to support the boycott; also, the 
support of Jews would be welcome.l.eo 
The acquisition by the National Party in 1948 of con-
trol of the State legislative machinery provided more effec-
tive means of forcing the Indian shopkeepers out of competit-
ion than voluntary boycotts, ,which were incompletely supported 
by Whites and generally ignored by non-white consumers. Under 
the Group Areas Act, enacted ,in 19:30, powers were declared 
for the elimination of Indian commerce from town centres, and 
the restriction of Indian business activity to special locat-
ions, where it was envisaged Indians would live and trade 
chiefly amongst themselves. Even a number of Afrikaner Nat-
ionalists joined in the locai and international agitation pr~t­
esting this measure, which wquld have transferred valuable 
property sites to v7hi te hands while~ depressing the income of 
the Indian community. Possibly because of fear of internat-
176Die Transvaler, 20 Februaryl947, in £·12· 522/1947. 
l. 77Die Transvaler, 26 Februar:y 1947, in P.D. 523/1947. 
17825 February 1947, in P.D. 523/1947. 
179Die Vaderland, 29 March 1947, in P.D. 527/1947. 
160Natal Witn~, 13 Y~y 1947, in P.D. 533/1947. 
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ional retaliatory sanctions, the Group Areas Act was amended 
in 1961, allowing Indians to retain their business interests 
in town and city centres, provided that they did not live on 
the premi.ses.1.a1. This marked the first reversal of National 
Party policy. All the same, unofficial boycotts, encouraged 
by Nationalist writers and organizations, continued to be 
launched.l. 82 As recently as July 1959, the Boere-Unie (Far-
mers' Unions) o~ ~otgietersrus was organizing a boycott of 
all Indian shopkeepers in the town; the Mayor, announcing his 
support of the boycott, declared that the Indians were "paras-
i tes'r .1. 83 
The efforts to persuade Afrikaners to spend only with 
Afrikaner businesses and to avoid dealings with non-Afrikaners 
complemented the work being done by Nationalist economic plan-
ners and businessmen in opening the shops, bank branches and 
financial institutions for the absorbtion of Afrikaner income. 
As previously indicated, many of these ventures were super-
vised by the Ekonomiese Insti tuut, "the economic policy coun-
cil of the volk as a who~e. and the rum. in particular. l. 84 
The Ekonomiese Instituut co-ordinated the financial policies 
of older and newly-established enterprises to the end that the 
former provided the latter with financial support. Thus the 
building society, BAAMB01Y.; falling in th~ red in 1944, two 
years after its establishment, was set firmly on its feet 
with funds and administrative assistance furnished by the 
bank, Volkskas, the insurance company, SANLAM, and the invest-
l.Bl.The Star, 9 February 1961, in P.D. 6/1961/61. 
:I..
82See Scholtz, Het di'e .Afrikaanse Volk • n Toekoms?, 
p. 134; Stanley Trapido-;-"'The Place of Boycott, ''-Africa South, 
3~21, July-Sept. 1959. 
183Sunday Times, 5 Ju]y 1959; The Star, 6 .July 1959. 
l. 8 *Verslag Y.§:1! die Ti'reede :Ekonomiese Volkskongres, p. 
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ment house, F.V .. B. 1 a6 The latter as well as even younger 
Afrikaner financial-institutions were instrumental in estab-
lishing clothing, canning and fertilizer factories, a distil-
lery, a mining company, one of the world's greatest tobacco 
firms (Rembrandt), and several other businesses. 186 
Ten years after the People's First Economic Congress, 
accomplishments of the Movement were noted. A survey conduc-
ted by the Afrikaanse Handelsinsti tuut (Chamber of Commerce), 
an institution itself born of the Movement, revealed that the 
Afrikaner's relative share in business, as measured by the 
proportion of business turnover handled in all non-agricultur-
al sectors, had more than doubled, from 5 per cent of the nat-
ional total in 1939 to about 11 per cent in 1948/49. 187 The 
greatest headway had been made in commerce, where the Afrik-
aner's share of turnover controlled rose over the ten year 
period from 8 to 25 per cent.' The number of Afrikaner shops, 
hotels, gas stations and other service establishments increased 
from 2,000 to 9,585, and were now employing 74,000 persons of · 
whom 37,000 were Whites and 36,180 Non-Whites. 188 About 80 
per cent of this commercial growth, representing new undertak-
ings as well as take-overs, was accounted for in small towns 
and villages, 189 where English, Jewish and Indian business 
185Dr. M.S. Louw, 11 Die .Afrikaner in die Geldwese,u 
Verslag ~ die Tweede Ekonomlese Volkskongres, p. 94. 
:1. 86.Anton Rupert, "Die Afrikaner in die Nywerheid, 11 
Verslag van d~e Tweede Ekonomlese Volkskongres, p. 108; I>r .. 
~. J. Meyer, ·Die Afrikaner se huidige Posisle en Stryd op 
Ekonomiese Gel::lied, 11 Volkshandel, 15:38, Augustus 1954. 
167A. j. Visser, ~Die Ekonomiese Poslsie van die 
Afrikaner, Jll Volkshande1, ·16:25, Mel 1955. 
:1..eeJ. L. Sadie, Die Afrikaner in die Landsekonomie 
(Johannesburg: Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorpor.porasie, 1957), p. 
27! . 
189?otgieter, Die Ekon:omie ~ die Afrikaner en JEl 
Aandee1 in die Sakelewe, pp. 29f. 
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nameplates were now more rarely seen.:190 
In manufacturing the Afrikaner share of turnover rose 
from 3 to 6 per cent; in mining from nil to 0.5 per cent; in 
finance from 5 to 8 per cent.~9~ Slight as these advances app-
ear in· relation to the ground occupied by non-Afrikaners, th~y 
include a number of spectacular company performances, notably 
those of SANLkM, whose yearly income grew from ~900,000 in 
1939 to ~,ooo,ooo in 1949, with annual profits of almost a 
million pounds; and Volkskas·,. which developed from a small co-
operative bank into one of the giant national commercial banks, 
with 77 branch~s, a paid-up capital of ~1.5 million and total 
assets of about ~0 million. 292 The RDB., itself, the spear-
head of the Economic Movement, had marched in nine yearstto 
control over 14 national companies, including banking concerns, 
with a combined capital of ~7 mi&lion; these in turn control~ 
led bet~een ~0 million and ~50 million of capital and a turn-
over of between ~400 million and ~500 million. 193 
Nearly three out of every four.businesses classified 
·, . ·. 
in 1948/49 as Afrikaner controlled had first opened their 
doors after the 1939 Economic Congress.:t:94 The establishment 
and expansion of these undertakings was assisted by the cir-
cumstances of South Africa's wartime boom economy, from which 
all business groups.benefited. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Afrikaners not only prospered, but improved their relative 
business position, suggests that the Nationalist Economic 
~9 °Carter, ~· cit., P:• 259. 
29~V1sser, loc._ cit.~l P• 25. 
~92 . . Louw, loc. cit., PP• 85-87. 
~ 93Die Transvaler, 1 July 1949. 
194These firms accounted for one-third of the turnover 
of all Afrikaner undertakings- in 1948/49, and engaged half 
the workers employed by all ~frikaner concerns, Potgieter, 
.Q12.. cit. , p •. 27. 
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Movement bore fruit. 
· Pride in these achievements was voiced by speakers at 
the People's Second Economic Congress, which met in Bloemfon-
tein in 1950. Unlike the 1939 Congress, which was attended 
chiefly by men having· as yet no direct· connection with busin-
ess, those-present in Bloemfontein in 1950 were for the most 
part financiers, industrialists and merchants. This, itself, 
was taken as indicative of the progress made.~ 95 But the 
satisfaction was not complete. The Movement had not yet suc-
ceeded in bringing Afrikamars the major share of the country's 
business; only a little over a tenth was in Afrikaner hands. 
Occupationally, Afrikaners were still, among Whites, under-
represented in the professions and aisproportionately heavily 
represented in menial jobs; Afrikaners were still found rarely 
in the highest, and overwhelmingly in the lowest income brac-
kets, among Whites. 196 Moreover, it was feared that the rel-
ative advance of Afrikaners in commerce, particularly, might 
be checked or even turned by revitalized post-war competit-
ion from the English-speaking section. 197 
~ 95 Dr. S. Pauw, '1Die .Afrikaanse Ondernemer, die Ver-
hruiker en die Werker, II ·Verslag m die Tweede Ekonomiese 
Volkskongres, p. 111. · 
196Aecording to Professor G. 0. Schumann, the annual 
per capital income of Afrikaners, 15 years and over, in 1946, 
was I.J.48, compared with *-308 for non-Afrikaner Whites, 'Die 
~konom~ese Stryd van die Afrikane~: Ons Ekonomiese Ag~er­
stand. (Mimeographed speech, n.pl., n.d.). Figures sup-
plied to the present writer by the Bureau of Census and Stat-
istics show that at the time of the 1951 Census, .Afrikaners--
then 66 per cent of all Whites of working age--formed an abs-
olute but declining majority (in relation to English-speaking 
Whites) along a continuum of eleven income categories up to 
~599 per annum, and a minority in the nine income categories 
from ~00-~799 to ~5,000-and over. Roughly six out of .every 
ten white people earning less than ~00 p.a. were Afrikaners, 
whereas only four out of every ten white people earning more 
than ~OO,p.a. were·Afrikaners. 
~~ 7Potgieter, Die Ekonomie m die Afrikaner •••• , P• 
~4. Potgieter contrasts the declining profitability and fal-
185 
Thus, though the People's Second Economic Congress, 
unlike its predecessor, was meeting under the cloud of a new-
ly militant nationalism--African Nationalism--in an atmos-
phere beginning to fill with appeals for white unity, it was 
in no mood to call off the economic struggle with the British 
element so as to strengthen the common white front against 
the disfranchise~ non-propertied non-white people. She 
Afrikaner's owning share in manufacturing industry amounts to 
a mere 6 per cent, said Anton Rupert, head of the giant Rem-
brandt tobacco concern, 
--far too small for us now to pull out all the props 
from beneath this little volk' s edifice ( 'Pvolksgebou") 
inorder to go b'P.ilding bridges to others.~98 . 
-This view, apparently answering a request-for white 
co-operation introduced at the beginning of the conference by 
two representatives of the English-speaking business commun-
ity, received the endorsement. of the Congress; the latter 
formally declared the urecommendation in connection with fur-
ther co-operation with.other race groupsu to be unacceptable 
"at this stage11 and referred the matter to _the Executive Com-
mittee of the Ekonomiese Instituut for further study.~9~ 
There would be no let-~p. As Dr. Malan had said in 
opening the 1950 Congress: 
The powerful effervescent volk's emotion must not be 
allowed to evaporate like, the morning dew, and the mighty 
stream of· regenerated volkf s love and sense of unity must 
not be permitted to disapp~a:r unused in the barren desert 
, sands •••• The Trek must continue. Its co-urse was immutably 
set. The goal and the potentialities were and still are 
1) ..111~~~~': t;~.;~t. 
ling volume of sales of the small (i.e. Afrikaner) tradins 
store with the rising profitability of the (non-Afrikaner) re-
tail chain stores, which in post-war years have been establish-
ing branches in the small country towns, and threatening to 
oust the .Afrikaner shopkeeper from his position there, ibid., 
PP• 102-105. 
198Loc cit., p. 96. 
::LSI'Styerslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres, p. 
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unlimited. 200 
Throughout· the 1950's, the RDB. persevered on its mis-
sion of ''economic awakening11• There were s:till too many 
Afrikaners who placed the "weaponu of their purchasing power 
nin the hands of our people 1 s enemies'', noted a report sub-
mitted to the 1952 RDB. Oongress. 20~ .The RDB's task would 
not be completed, said Dr. P .. J. Me.yer in 1954, untill '1 every 
Afrikaner has learned to make his purchases from his compat-
riots"' and 111has conquered his rightful p:)..ace in retail and 
wholesale trade and in finance and industry.u~ 02 Indicat-
ing a short-cut to this goal, Dr. M. S. Louw, ·chairman of 
SANLAM and more than twenty other companies, and President of 
the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, warned in 1958 that unless 
Afrikaners acquired a bigger share in the control of industry, 
mining and financB, they might resort to nationalization. 203 
Yet despite the persecuted and aggressive tone maintain-
ed throughout the decade by leaders of the Movement, popular 
interest in it appears to have waned. Within two years of the 
National Party's election victory in 1948, the RDB. lost over 
a third of its membership. 204 The economy was booming as 
never before, and although Afrikaners generally remained less 
prosperous than other white people they ~ere no longer poor. 
They were getting more pay and better housing, the Government 
200 11.' fl! Dr. D. F. ]IT_alan, Openingsrede , Verslag :Y2!!: die 
Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres, p. 7• 
20~The Friend, 3 October 1952, in Press Review No. 2P., 
2 February 1959, p. 5. 
202Die Oosterlig, 9 March 1954, in P.~. 28/1954/263. 
203Natal Mercury, 31 October 1958. 
20~erslag ygg die Reddingsdaadbong van §Y Werksaam-
hede Gedurende die d:Q Jaar_m §Jl Bestaan, in Ve:rslag m 
die Tweede Ekonomiese Vo1kskongres, p. 161. 
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was in their hands, new problems were beginning to concern 
them. Few persons outside the editorial offices of the RDB. 
journal, Inspan, appear to have heard "voices calliTl_g for a 
helping hand to lead them out of the workhouse of an enemy 
economic dictator. 11206 
At the same · t'ime the position and methods of Afrikaner 
businessmen seem to have been changing. Some had become well 
established and were no longer fighting for a bridgehead 
where they were compelled to rely for their main support on 
their own ethnic group. An incident occurring at the 1958 
Congress of the Afrikaans Taal .§!1 Kultuur Bond (Language and 
Cultural Union) suggests that those businessmen now wishing 
to enter a more cosmopolitan market were becoming self-con-
. scious about open appeals to group ·sentiment. Addressing the 
Congress, Mr. J. J. Broekman, manager of an Afrikaner assurance 
society, said that if Afrikaners were to withdraw their money 
from other building societies and invest it in Afrikaans soc-
ieties, the Afrikaner economy would be placed on a sound foot-
ing. rt·The savings of Afrikaners are being used for the ben-
efit of non-Afrikaans societies and the Afrikaners are only 
getting a few pence as interest on their money,~ continued Mr. 
BFoekmano t 1About ~550, 000,000 has been invested in building 
societies in South Africa. Of this ~200,000,000 comes out of 
the pockets of Afrikaners. Yet my company, the only pure 
Afrikaans society in the Union, has only ~2,000,000 of this 
amount. 11 At this stage, Mr. Broekman and the Chairman appeal-
ed to newspaper reporters present not to report the address. 
The reason for their request is indicated by the fact that Mr9 
Broekman had earlier sought approval from the Congress for his 
company to issue assurance application forms in English; "we 
need the support of non-Afrikaners such as English and Jews, tt 
205 Inspan, January 1950. 
. _, 
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Mr. Broekman had explained. 206 
Though the incentive for public agitation seems to have 
diminished after 1948, and RDB. membership fell, Afrikaner 
business suffered no set-back during this period. In any 
event this could hardly have happened while members of the 
Ekonomiese Instituut were occupying Cabinet posts and Broed-
erbond leaders, patrons of the Economic Moveme~t, success-
ively held the Premiership. Indeed, it will be seen that a 
number of Afrikaner enterprises experienced their most rapid 
growth rates during this era of National Party rule. 
That the latter would lead especially to the promotion 
of Afrikaner economic advance was forecast in 1954 by Dr. P. 
J. Meyer of the F • .A. K. /i~ddressing the RDB. Congress, he said 
that through state channels ( 11 langs staatsweefl!) and through 
private enterprise Afrikaners·would obtain a dominating posit-
ion in the economy within a few generations. This outcome 
would be expedited 
if young Afrikaner businessmen are appointed by a sym~ 
pathetic national government to the directorships of un-
dertakings in which the state has a share •••• The great 
backwardness of the Afrikaner in the private economic ac-
. tivities of our land is due to political circumstances 
forced on the Afrikaner in a former stage of his economic 
development •. The Afrikaner can therefore justly expect 
from a sympathetic government that restrictive measures 
be not applied in the same way to young i.e. Afrikaner 
enterprises as to long established undertakings. 207 
The full extent to which the Government has bee·n able 
to furnish special assistance to private Afrikaner businesses 
cannot be known. Some evidence pointing to help being exten-
ded is available, for example to the Nationalist Press. Econ-
206Natal Mercur:y, 19 September 1958. Reporters of the 
Bloemfontein daily, The Friend, were banned from attending 
· the remaining sessions of the A.T.K.B. conference following 
publication of Mr. Broekman's speech, The Star~ 19 September 
1958, in P.D. 38/1958/311. . 
207Dr. P. J. Meyer, 11 Die Afrikaner se huidige Posisie 
en Stryd op Ekonomiese Gebied, n Volkshandel, 15:37, Augustus 
1954. 
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omic as well as political ties link the latter with the Nat-
ional Party; 206 nine Cabinet Ministers in 1959 were current= 
ly directors o"f newspaper publishing firms. 209 These firms 
were not deriving full advantage in terms of ·circulation and 
advertizing income from the fact that six out of every ten 
Whites were Afrikaans-speaking: many Afrikaners were reading 
rival English-language newspapers as well as Afrikaans papers, 
few English-speaking Whites were buying Afrikaans newspapers, 210 
and most non-white readers were taking only English-language 
newspapers. 21l. Consequently, the aggregate circulation fig-
ure of the English-language dailies was four times greater, 
in the 1950's, than that of the Afrikaans dailies: 680,000 
to 168,000; one English-language Opposition newspaper alone, 
The (Johannesburg) Star, sold 170,000 daily copies, outstrip-
ping the country's five Nationalist dailies combined. 2 :J. 2 Rel-
atedly, the advertizing income of the A!rikaans Press, includ-
ing the relatively higher circulation monthlies, mmonnted to 
about a third of that received by English-language newspapers 
and journals. 2 l.S Dissatisfaction was expressed with this 
208See Carter,~· cit., p. 39. English-language news-
~apers supporting the United Party are under the financial con-
1b.J:ra.il.:r:-ol' the mining industry, ibid., p. 39. See also H. Lindsay 
.Smith, Behind the Press in South Africa (Cape Town: Stewart, 
n. d.), pp. 86, ·145, passim. 
209Sunday Express, 26 October 1958. 
2 l.°Carter, 212.• cit., p. 38; Surveys on the Witwaters-
rand indicated that only up to four per cent of the English-
speaking whites normally read an Afrikaans paper, whereas 20 
to 40 per cent of Afrikaners read English dailies. 
el.l.Die Transvaler, 4 June 1954. 
2 l. 2 The total circulation figure for English-language 
dailies excludes papers like the Golden City Post, designed 
mainly for non-white readers; see Alex. Hepple, Censorship 
and Press Control in South Africa (Johannesburg: 'Published by 
the Author, 1960), pp. 71-73. 
2 l.SVolkshandel, 17:17,· Junie 1956. 
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situation, 2~4 and steps were taken to alter it. A boycott of 
the Pretoria News, an estimated three-quarters of whose read-
ers were Afrikaners, was urged in a pamphlet distributed at a 
National Party meeting in the capital on May 20, 1952. 2 ~ 5 
This was not all. In 1954, the International Press In-
stitute, with headquarters in Zurich, gave notice that the 
South African Government was f~voring its supporting newspap-
ers in the allocation of official adverti~ements. Over a short 
period of observation it was found that the Cape Argus, the 
newspaper with the biggest circulation in the Cape Province, 
received official advertizing worth *=320, and the Cape Times 
(evening paper:) ~54; Die BU.rger 1 s official advertizing, for 
the same period examined, was worth ~~,248 (at much lower 
rates per column inch). In Johannesburg, the figures were 
*2,548 for the Strijdom-Verwoerd newspaper, Die Transvaler 
(circulation 36,000) and ~,790 for The Star (circulation ca. 
·l50,000). 2 l. 6 
Another private publishing venture reported to be ben-
efiting from public funds was Proteapers Bpk., a subsidiary 
of Dagbreek Trust, of which Dr~ Verwoerd is a director and 
the late J. G. Strijdom was Chairman. According to a report 
in an Opposition newspaper, Proteapers published a monthly non-
2 l.4 r'The dire poverty of our Afrikaner publications is due 
to the fact that mining, commerce and industry in this courr-
r try is concentrated in the hands of the Afrikaners enemy •••• 
Our publications depend on advertizements emanating from our 
enemies ( 11 volksvyande") ,rvc Insnan, Mel 1952. Concern was also 
felt over·the influence of the Opposition Press on non-white 
people, Die Transvaler, 4 June 1954, desc:r;ibing as "tragedy11 
the fact that non-Whites read newspapers 'in which the natien-
al-minded Afrikaner is quite openly presented as the oppressor 
of the non-Europeans.u 
2 ~ 6Africa X-Ray Report, .April 1955. 
2 l.
6 Africa X-Ray Report, July 1957. Volkshandel, 17:15, 
Januarie 1957, reported a 40 per cent rise in the profits of 
Die Voortrekkerpers (which issues Die Transvaler and other pub-
lications) for the year ending 30 June 1956. 
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political magazine for Africans, Bona, which ran stories on 
crime, sport, society, witchcraft, etc. Dr. Verwoerd, then 
Minister of Native Affairs, made it compulsory reading in 
African schools, which, in 1957, were taking about 35,000 
copies a month. Proteapers received an estimated ~0,000 per 
annum in payment from Dr. Verwoerd's Department. 2 ~ 7 
Although designed for wider purposes, perhaps the most 
important boon given to Afrikaner publishing conce~s has 
been the National Party1 s single-medium, mother tongue, educ-
ation policy. As already indicated, 2 ~ 6 the Nationalist pol-
itical advance has checked the spread of bi-lingual education 
for white school children, with the result that new generat-
ions of Afrikaners are being trained who tend to be literate 
only in their own language. Circulation of English-language 
newspapers among Afrikaners may thereby fall, while a more 
certain readership is being developed for the Afrikaans Press. 
Another (predominantly Afrikaans) industry which suc-
cessfully solicited Government help was the liquor industry. 
The latter had long campaigned to lift the legal restrictions 
on the sale of liquor to non-white people. Though Coloureds 
and Indians were entitled to purchase limited quantities of 
European liquor, total prohibition applied to Africans, who 
were by law permitted only the traditional tribal beer. Expan-
sion of wine production in the 1950 1 s, with no corresponding 
enlargement of the market, led to successive production sur-
pluses and financial deficits, the surplus of unsold stock 
in 1956 amounting to 36.5 per cent of the output. 2 ~ 9 Pressure 
on the Government to abolish racial discrimination in liquor 
2 ~ 7Sunday Express, 13 October 1957, in Brian Bunting, 
Who Runs Our Newspapers? The Story Behind the Non-White r~ess 
(Cape Town: New Age Pamphlet, n.d.), p. 6; _ 
2 ~ 6See above, p. 168n • 
. 
2 ~ 9Brian Bunting nSix Portraits of Apartheid. 6. Lig_= 
uor and. the Colour Bar,'' Africa South, 2:42, July-Sept. 1958. 
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sales was intensified. By 1958, the liquor lobby had secured 
the support of the then Minister of Justice, 0. R. Swart, the 
Administrator of the Cape Province (center of wine and spirit 
manufacture), National Party newspapers like Die Burger, and 
the Commissioner of Police, Major-General C. I. Rademeyer. 
The latter,. arguing on the enormous cost of enforcing the liq-
uor laws, the huge toll of arrests (over 250,000 annually~, 
a~d the great burden that vain attempts at enforcement placed 
on the police, announced in his rt.private capacity11 that he 
stood for the unrestricted supply of liquor to ali races. 220 
In addition to the consideration that equally applicable ob-
j actions were not raised by the police to the pass laws, which 
account for more arrests than the liquor laws, a further int-
erest in this case arises from the fact that the Dutch Reform-
ed Churches opposed repeal. 22 1. The National Party had hither-
to managed to win the Churches' approval of its policies, but, 
unable to do so in this instance, overrode their objections 
and in 1961 abolished the restrictions. 222 
, That sector in which Afrikaner Business made the most 
spectacular strides after 1948 was Finance. Between 1948/49 
and 1952/53, total deposits in Afrikaner banks rose from 6.9 
per cent to 9.3 per cent of deposits in all banks. Assets of 
Afrikaner insurance companies rose from ll to 13.4 per cent 
of the assets of all insurance companies. The Afrikaner share 
220Ibid. 
22~Patterson, ~- cit., p. 171. One of the D. R. Chur-
ches withdrew its affiliat+on to the S.~~Temperance Alliance, 
which of course also opposed ·repeal, because the Alliance·am-
ended its constitution to allow non-white membership, Contact, 
May 1957 ~ · 
222 During the second reading debate on the Liquor Amend-
ment Bill, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Erasmus, said that it 
had been decided to introduce the Bill because, particularly 
since last year's riots, it had been said that non-Whites had 
a grievance because of discrimination in the supply of liquor, 
Cape Times, 20 June 1961, in P.D. 24/1961/245. 
1~3: 
in building societies increa~ed :from 0.6 to 2.4 per cent. ·g 
I Over the first four years of': Nationalist Administration, the 
Afrikaner share of financialjbusiness as a whole increased 33 
per cent, from 7.5 to 10 p~rl cent of the national total. 223 
:Notable among individ~al firms was the growth of.Volks-
. I kas, which boosted its assetf from ca ~20 million to •73 mil-
lion between 1949 and 1959. 221 4 ·Several directors of the bank, 
now the third largest in the country, sat on the Government 
benches, and one, Dr. Albert I Hertzog, .was promoted to the 
Cabinet. It is likely that Nationalist support contributed_ 
to the surge of this institulion, it being· reported Party I . 
practice upon gaining controt of t.own councils to transfer 
the municipal accounts to Volkskas. 225 EXpressing what is 
probably the Party 1 s attitud~ towards the bank's competitors, 
. I \ f.P Senator E. Nel declared i~ P~rliament: Barclays Bank and 
I 
Standard and other businesses in this coUn.try:are not really 
" u) I our own ( ons eie and we w+ll force them to close. We will 
ruin ·them; P11226 I:ri 1958, the !Government refused Barclays Bank 
and Standard Bank permissionlto establish agencies in the 
1 Gape Town African location of Langa. EXplaining the Cabinet s 
decision,. Dr .. Verwoerd said: I 
.Two years ago Barclays Bank, the Standard Bank of South 
Africa and the Allied Building Society applied to the Cape 
Town Oi.ty•.'0'6uncil for pefmission to open branches at Langa. 
The Government acceptyd the proposal in principle and 
approved the plans, and the Council went ahead and built I . 
. the premises which are n9w ready for occupation. 
~ter considering theimatter the Government has now 
decided that because Vol*skas has fewer agencies .in Native 
locations than other ban~s, three agencies in favour of 
Volkskas should be granted in locations which have no 
I 
i 
I 223Potgieter, Die Eko:riomie ~die .Afrikaner ••• , passim. 
. . I 
22 ~erslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres, 
p. 86; SUnday Times;-ls-Gctober 1959. 
J 225Africa X-Ray Repori, July 1957. 
·I 226Quoted in Africa X-+Ray Report, June 1957. 
I 
I 
I 
.bank a~encies. At present there is no bank agency at Langa.~27 
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However, subsequent further reconsideration by the 
Government·resulted in all three banks entering the location • 
. As with the case of the Indian traders in urban centres, it 
would be interesting to know the factors that influenced this 
change of mind • 
. Although, as will have been seen, the evidence is still 
scant, it would be unnatural and surprising if the Nationalist 
Government, \'lhose members have execut.ive as well as ·emotional 
links with the Economic .Movement, were neutral in attitude and 
practice in the competition between Afrikaner and non-AfrikaR-
er business. Undoubtedly, along with Dr. Meyer., they consider 
the relative backwardness of the Afrikaner in business as due 
to former political happenings whose effects they are now in 
· a position to revers.e. Consequently, the English-speaking 
Whites' position of economic and social superiority may be ex-
pected to be further eroded with time. 
However, time may see the English finally deprived of 
this position by others than Afrikaner Na~ionalists. For ~s 
the latter in the 1950's continued to wrestle with the British 
for more economic power, they found themselves unexpectedly 
engaged on the economic front from below. For the first time 
they experienced boycotts against their own shops, banks and 
factories, as African Nationalists, wielding their purchasing 
power as a political weapon, voted against the Government by 
absenting themselves from the cash registers of its members 
and suppo:rters. 
The latter began to come under this familiar pressure 
in 1956, when th~ Cape African National Congress declared a 
Boycott of ''certain firms and institutions set up and suppor-
227Q.uoted in Cape Times, 21 August 1958, in Press Rev-
iew No. 4, 25 August 1958, p. 19. ·Unlike the other three 
firms, Volkskas initially made no application to the Cape Town 
City Council fo~ permission to operate in Langa, The Star, 
22 August 1958~ 
., 
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ted by Nationalist politicians for the specific purpose of ad-
vancing the Nati0n~list cause. '' 2 tl 8 As a consequence of prev-
ious efforts by organiiations iike the RDB. to acquaint 
Afrikaners with the names of firms that they should support, 
the problem of deciding what businesses to include on the boy-
cott list presented the African Nationalists with no difficul-
ty. The list contained the names and product names of the 
Rembrandt to~acco company, the Langeberg Co-operative, which 
had become the country's largest fruit and vegetable canning 
enterprise, the Klipfontein coal concern, the First National 
Tea and Coffee Company, 229 the Afrikaner insurance firms and 
building societies, Volkskas, a number of shops and two gar-
ment firms, one of which had been given special dispensation 
by the Minister of Labour to move into an area, not covered 
by minimum v-rage rates, where it could employ Africans at the 
cheapest rates rrto put its affairs in order. " 280 
228Quoted in Africa X~Ray Repor~, July 1957. 
. . 
.
229According to the above source, First National Tea 
and Coffee pamphlets and other literature connected with the 
Afrikaner Economic Movement were being distributed in Afrik-
aans schoolf3. 
280Africa X-Ray Report, July 1957. In order to encour-
age implementation of its 'llborder industries'' policy (see 
below, ~:i., Jj20 ) , the Government imposed no· obligation on 
employers establishing factories near the African reserves to 
pay their workers a minimum wage. An article in 1958 by the 
South African Labour Party leader, Alex Hepple,·revealed that 
less than 4 per cent of those engaged in the border factories, 
chiefly clothing factories, were white people, and these were 
the oWn.ers, managers, administrative staff and supervisors. 
The other 96 per cent were the factory workers, who were Afric-
an men, women and children. Many of the child factory hands 
were between the ages of ten and fifteen, a large number of . 
them wortlng nbarefooted fhardly a hardship for South Africans! 
ttl!: ~ 
and in tattered clothes. The Whites 1-rere getting higher than 
city pay in the rural faetories, while the Africans received 
from one-third to one-fifth the wages paid for similar work 
in Witwatersrand factories. The Africans were prevented by 
influx control .regulations from working in the cities; they 
were granted no sick leave, were excluded from unemployment 
196 
Volkshandel, the journal of the Afrikaanse Handels-
instituut, admitted on May 5, 1956, that many Africans in the 
\ 
urban areas were obeying the boycott appea~: 
In spite of certain denials and insinuations which 
have appeared in the daily press, the fact must be stated 
that many Afrik~ner businesses, particularly manufacturing 
establishments, for a considerable time already have felt 
the effects of the boycott movement, especially in areas 
like Natal, East London and Port Elizabeth. 
Th~s hurt was undeserved, the journal maintained: 
The Afrikaner is not guilty of race hatred in spite 
of all accusations •••• The Afrikaner and his organizat-
ions have never yet tried to fight against or exclude 
other population elements. 28~ 
In 1959, the A.N.C. announced a nation-wide boycott of 
businesses associated with the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement. 
It was planned to initiate the campaign with a Day of Self-
Denial on June 26th, when Africans would be expected to buy 
nothing. Reassuring readers in April with the editorial 
headline, nDit Sal Misluk"r (It Will Fail), Die Transvaler 
nevertheless condemned the intention to boycott Afrikaner 
. 11 firms as introducing an element into political relationships 
which if able to continue on its.course might have incalcul~ 
able consequences.u 232 .As June 26th approached, Die Transvaler 
. 1 h became more apprehensive and threatening'. Native workers 
who listen to the boycott call will be mercilessly weeded out 
by the employers,u it warned on June 23rd, adding for the att-
benefits, had no trade union and were prohibited from strikifug, 
(Alex Hepple, uJob Reservation (II). The Achilles Heel, .-r Af-
rica South, 3:40, October 1958.) One of the firms receiving 
dispensation from the Minister of Labour to pay lower than 
the prevailing urban wages rates was Volks Hemde~ en Klere-
fabriek, which, it will be recalled, was established with RDB. 
finance. By 1955 it had become the sixth biggest clothing 
factory in the country out of a total of 620, employing in 
its Standerton plant 176 Africans and 15 Whites. It received 
the wage dispensation while issuing a repeated dividend of 
71. I 2 per cent, Africa X-Ray Re12ort, September 1955. · 
231.Volkshandel, 17:5, Mei 1956. 
232Die Transvaler, 28 April 1959. 
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ention of the British section that if the boycott became eff-
• u active, not only Nationalist Afrikaner manufacturers would 
suffer but others; and even slight successes would have bad 
repercussions on Anglo-South African trade. On the 25th, 
reassurance and warning were coupled in the headline: ttPolice 
Will Even Use Armored Cars'~. 
The next day, urban"Africans generally responded to 
the boycott call, and shops dealing mainly with them soon put 
their shutters up. Some shopkeepers began removing products 
on the boycott list from their she-lves. 288 Reflecting the 
limited though noticeable succe.ss of the campaign, Volkshan-
del in the following month again put forward a defensive plea: 
••. it is r!diculous to try and make racial and polit-
ical classifications and to characterize businesses as 
Nationalist undertakings •••• Business life knows no racial 
and political considerations; but only business consid-
erations •••• 234 
The journal added that the boycott movement ushould be erad-
icated root and branch11 and that anti-boycott legislation 
should be enacted for this purpose. 236 
The meeting of Afrikaner and African Nationalism on 
the economic front found Afrikaner businessmen not only 
defending their positions, but simultaneously pressing to 
283Natal Witness, 27 June 1959. 
23~olkshandel, 20:7, Julie 1959. 
_
235 Tl:le Transvaal Chamber of Industries, representing 
mainly English-speaking White businessmen, questioned the ef-
fectiveness of such a measure. In a confidential memorandum 
circulated to its members, it noted the political motives and 
effectiveness of the boycott movement, but considered that 
anti-boycott legislation might lead to more dangerous overseas 
repercussions on South African trade than the boycott itself. 
11 In the ultimate," the memorandum observed, 11it must be con-
eeded that boycotting is a very common weapoR used in commer-
cial circles to alter the policy of producers or wholesalers 
and that there are also historical precedents where the boy-
cott has been used in South Africa by Europeans against Europ-
n 
eans and by Europeans against non-Europeans, quoted Sunday 
Times, 19 .April 1959. 
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extend them. Conscious of the growing importance of the non-
white market, they were ,interested not only in holding the-ir 
share of African custom, but also in increasing it. Two 
obstacles blocked the way. One was the Government's policy 
of reserving b~siness opportunities in the African Reserves 
for Africans. This was decided in 1956 as a condition of 
tr separate development 11 • Volkshandel, together with many 
South African economists, criticized this decision as one 
likely to.retard development~ Africans were too poor in cap-
ital resources and too inexperienced and untrained in entrey.--
preneurial activity to develop, without considerable outside 
assistance, sufficient means of livelihood to support the 
large population additions that Government ideology envisaged 
for the Reserves. White businessmen should be allowed in, 
the 1j.ournal urged. 236 But the Government refused to give way, 
and has not permitted a free flow of capital into these regions. 
A second obstacle to Afrikaner commercial expansion 
in the .African market was the Governmentts policy of reserving 
for Africans trading licenses to operate in the urban African 
locations. Outside the Reserves, these were the only areas 
where Africans were not debarred from renting land for busin-
ess premises. .At the 1958 Congress of the Afrikaans Handels-
instituut, a resolution was adopted against the granting of 
trading licenses to urban Africans. The Government was req-
~ested to see to the matter. The Government offered to enc-
ourage the departure of African shopkeepers from the town loc-
ations to the Reserves, but formulated no specific plan for 
their transfer. Dissatisfied with this response, the Handels-
instituut exerted renewed pressure. An editorial in the Octob-
er 1959 issue of Volkshandel presented the organization's pub-
lic argument. To permit Africans to set up stores in locat-
u ions would to a large measure be justified if the sympathy 
236Volkshandel, 17:10, Junie 1956. 
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and loyalty of the native tow~rds his white guardian could 
thereby be acquired. •r Howeve~, African loyalty to the policy 
"whereby our beloved-:·· SoutherP, Af;rica can be assured as a home 
:for· the· Whi tesr' could not be :counted on. African business-
• i 
men, the journal judged, were1, merely interested in making 
money and not in helping the Government execute its apartheid 
I 
policy. The development and prganization of the African mar-
ket by African businessmen co1stituted a grave threat to the 
i 
maintenance of white rule: 1 
The well-intentioned ptan of the Department ~f Bantu 
Administration and Developmeni) that the natives be offer-
ed the opportunity to obtain experience and capital in 
this location trade which\they can then apply in develop-
ing their own areas f1.e. ~ the Reserve!) and in trading 
there is a fine ideat-butiwith little practical meaning. 
The native trader who is going to give up his chances of 
sharing in the hundreds or millions in purchasing power 
of the urban native for t~e few millions in purchasing 
power in the prospective Bantustans is no clear-headed 
businessman. In fact there are already signs that these 
rising native capitalists'find their best investment to 
be the financing of agita~ors and agitations with the 
I 
view to a trade boycott against the Whites in order to ca~-
ture this great potential:purchasing power for their 
·location trade. 2~ 7 i · 
In response, the Minis~er of B • .A.D., Mr. de Wet Nel, 
I 
assured a gathering of Afrikaner businessmen later that month 
I . 
that he would not permit a pe~manent black trading caste to 
be established in the uWhi te'r \areas under the protection of 
. I 
his Department. He was aware jof an objection to these traders: 
I 
they were a future threat to white businessmen. Once they 
I 
began accumulating capital thJy would start selling things 
I 
like radios, stoves and clothtng, and that would create com-
1 
petition for white-owned shops: in the vicinity of the locat-
[ 
'I 
287Volkshandel, 20:7, O~tober 1959. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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ions. 2 a 8 He would make these traders realize that they were 
going to trade in town locations for a limited time only, and 
that they would have to move to the Reserves. He invited the 
Afrikaans Handelsinstituut to join in high-level discussions 
on the subject with his Department. 239 
No action to remove the African location traders has 
been taken to date (1961). ·As the Government. and the Afrikan-
er Chamber of Commerce are in accord on the principle of the 
matter, the delay in implementing the policy may be due to a 
re-evaluation of its advantages against its repercussions, 
including the likelihood of another and more damaging boycott 
response. It is therefore possible that the hold-up may be 
permanent. 
Ideals And Results Of 1h£ Movement 
Although the Economic Movement has not come to rest, 
certain of its tendencies appear manifest. The goal of acq-
uiring a dominant economic position in the cities, while still 
far off,. is being approached. The road to some of the Move-
ment's non-material objectives seems, however, to have been 
lOst, if it· was ever taken.; 
Rev. Kestell's conception of the reddingsdaad was not 
followed. Dispensing charity to Poor Whites was not accepted 
as the Movement's prime concern. In 1941, after much ques-, . 
tioning of the role of the RDB. in terms of the line given by 
Rev. Kestell that poor Afrikaners should not be abandoned to 
State charity, Chief Leader Diederichs made the position 
clear: it was impossible for the RDB. to reach the mass of 
238 In 1959, there were 1,682 African shoplceepers in the 
Johannesburg locations. An estimated 54 per cent of their 
turnover came from the sale of food; 18 per cent from tobacco 
and cigarettes; 6 per cent from toiletries (mainly soap); 4 per 
cent from parafin and candles; 2 per cent from polishes; l per 
cent from medicines; and 15 per cent from miscella:r;teous items 
(writing materials, insect powders, candy, pots and pans, etc), 
Volkshandel, 19:13, Januarie 1959. 
239The Star, 24 October 1959. 
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nour people 11 ; that was a task for the State. The chief pur-
pose of the.RDB. was to help the Afrikaner acquire a position 
in trade and industry in the towns, so that he could employ 
other Afrikaners. 240 
Dr. Diederich's position was certainly the more sensib-
le. Had the Reddingsdaadfonds been distributed among Poor 
vfui tes on a per capita basis, they would hav.e received less 
than ~· each. Char~~y would not have led to many or any 
'cumulative mater~al benefits. The allocation of ~34,750 
for the provision of study loans to 420 student~ in the first 
9 years of the Movement 24~ constituted a more useful applic-
ation of the Fund. And though the prime beneficiaries of the 
uact of rescue 11 were the more educated and well-to-do Afrik-
aners who were'set up in businesses as managers and execut-
ives, poor Afrikaners also prospered from the greater and more 
varied job opportunities that concerted economic development 
created; and perhaps they benefited psychologically too, for 
the economic and social advancement of some of their fellow 
Afrikaners may have given them a needed spur as well as a 
vicarious boost to their self-esteem. With the latter in mind, 
one can appreciate the eulogy of a private, commercial bank--
Volkskas--as 11 perhaps the greatest pride of the Afrikaner 
people. 11242 
Yet Kestell had hoped for even more than that Afrikan-
ers should uplift themselves without depending upon assis-
tance from other people. He wanted the reddingsdaad to be of 
such a nature as to restore the feeling of Afrikaner brother-
hood, which he believed had once existed and was vanishing. 
He viewed the. acceptance of materialistic values and the devel-
240Die Transvaler, 2 August 1941, in P.D. 251/1941. 
24~Verslag van die Tweede Ekonomiese Volkskongres, 
P• 165. 
1"1 242Schumann, Die Ekonomiese Stryd van die Afrikaner. 
Ons Ekonomiese .Agterrstand, 11 p. 8. 
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opment of class snobbery among Afrikaners with dismay. 
The prevention and eli!mination of. class feelings was 
' . . ' also an adopted goal of the ~eople s First Economic Congress. 
. i 
However, the Movement that t~e latter launched, by helping to 
advance Afrikaners and diver~ify their economic functions, was 
I 
bound to bri·ng about a separ~tion of interests and associat-
1 
ions; and by accepting the p~ofit motive as the principal 
incentive for undertaking th~ reddingsdaad, was bound, it 
would seem, to strain the co~esive spirit of the group. 
At first, the EconomiQ Movement was anti-capitalist in 
I 
t fJ I t 11 spiri or testimony. A reaill~ anti-capi talis struggle, a 
Volkshandel editorial descri~ed it in 1943. 243 Capitalism and 
the values it promoted were declared to be alien growths, 
1rforced upon our people from ithe outside world.11244 
I r Despite this sentimen~, the Movement s leaders did not 
I 
I 
concentrate its efforts on b~ilding up the RDB., the profits 
of whose ventures belonged t~eoretically to the Afrikaner peop-
i . 
le as a whole, and were not :r:eturned to individuals.. They con-
ducted the anti-capitalist stl,ruggle by promoting private bus-
' inesses as well. 
For some time there wJs uneasiness about this. While 
I 
a German victory was expected, materialism profiteering and 
I 
uAnglo-Jewish 11 capitalism remained under fairly regular attack. 
!n 1940, after the establishment of Federals Volksbeleggings 
I 
Beperk, the widespread criti9ism of capitalism in Christian-
1 National-Socialist circles induced Dr. M. S. Louw, founder of 
. i 
the company,- to explain that !it was not the "form which is im-
portant, but the fruits of tJ::le undertaking. 11246 Afrikaners 
I 
24 SVolkshandel, 3:2 J~nuarie 1943. 
I 
i 244J. J. Piek ttDie A:firikaanse Ekonomiese Beweging in 
- It ' ' die Toekoms, VolkshanG.el, 3:p:r, Augustus 1942. 
246Die Tl.,ansvaler, 5 S[eptember 1940, in P.D. Memor-
andum 433.--- 1 
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should not worry, stated a Volkshandel editorial in 1942, about 
whether this or that type of economic institution was employed 
in the struggle; for that had no bearing on its nature or pur-
pose.246 Replying in another issue to accusations from the 
A.frikaner community that certain Af·rikaner businesses were 
capitalist, the editor stated that only superficial resem-
blances had been pointed out, that the spiritual aims of Afrik-
aner businesses were QUite different from others, and that 
there existed an unfortunate tendency among Afrikaners to beg-
rudge their fellow Afrikaners any success and advancement 
they had achieved. 247 
Although spokesmen for the Movement throughout the war 
years continued to claim some correspondence between economic 
practice and Nationalist ideology, the two were hardly in 
proximity, as the following example may indicate: one· of the 
.offshoots of RDB. w~s a fllm distribution company, Volksbios-
koDe, which built up a profitable business presenting American 
movies, mostly musicals, cowboy and horror films, to rural 
Afrikaner audiences. Among the Companyts directors were Dr. 
T .. Blok (then Professor of History at the Orange Free State 
University), Dr. C. F. Visser (head of the Voortrekker Move~ 
ment--the Afrikaner parallel to the Boy Scouts--and Rector 
of the Normal College, Bloemfontein), and Dr. Diederichs. 248 
.At the same time, the latter was sitting on the editorial 
board of Die Nasionale Pers'. "Second Trek Series'r--li ttle 
green books written to publicize the ideals and history of 
various aspects of the Nationalist Movement. In 1942, Dr. 
Diederichs and his editorial associates brought out a work by 
Dr. H. Rompel, Die Bioskoop in Diens Y§g die Volk (The Cinema 
in the Service of the People), which expressed concern over 
246Volkshandel, 2:lf, 40, April 1942. 
247 Volkshandel, 2:lf, Februar~e 1942. 
248P.~. Memorandum 433· 
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the effects of Hollywood films on the Afrikaner mind, urged 
that ~the ordinary scandal films and novelties with which our 
public is presently being poisoned ought to be ••• completely 
eliminated," observing however that such films together with 
. . ff 
most cowboy pictures, b~cause they are filled with strong 
action and because the.market for them in smaller rural cin-
emas and among the youth is very large ••• bring in enormous 
profits. 11249' Nationalists might argue that the prevailing 
levea of.taste was an unfortunate circumstance which could 
not be altered immediately, and that if Volksbioskope did not 
exist its profits would fall into the hands of a non-Afrikaans 
company. 
As Afrikaner business multiplied and prospered, the 
Economic Movement ceased being portrayed as an anti-capitalist 
struggle250 The earlier hopes that feelings of group solid-
arity and responsibility would not be submerged by financial 
249Dr. H. Rompel, Die Bioskoop in Diens van die Volk, 
2 dele(Bloemfontein: Nasionale Pers Beperk, 194~deel II, 
PP• 79, 39f. 
260The popular association in the post-'.'lar world of 
anti-capitalism with communism possibly also influenced this 
change. The former Afrikaner Nationalist attitude towards 
capitalism, expressed very largel.y through Marxist concepts 
and phraseology, led recently to an interesting sequel. Dur-
ing the 1958-61 treason trial of African National Congress 
and other anti-Government leaders, the principal expert Crown 
witness on communism was A~ Murray, Professor of Politics at 
· It n Cape Town University, who identified as communistic various 
documents attributed to the Congress Movement. Under Defence 
cross-examination, Professor Murray was presented with certain 
statements and asked to declare whether on the basis of his 
knowledge of communism these statements were t'communisticu or 
not; whereupon he. identified as Jf communisticr~ ·quotations from 
his own writings, published duriag the anti-capitalist (Nat-
ional-Socialist) phase of the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement. 
1r • Do you hold the view--or did you hold the view--that the wor-
king class are exploited by the capitalist class?n the Defence 
Council asked. Professor Murray replied: 11 I held the view 
many years ago. Today my interpretation of-the situation is 
different,~ Quoted in the Cape Times, 11 November 1959. 
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considerations grew dimmer. Afrikaners with insufficient sec-
urity could no more expect a loan from an Afrikaans finance 
company than from any other. 11 The financial institution, rr 
explained a contributor to Volkshandel in 1957, 11 is in a · 
position of trust and it is moreover dependent for its suc-
cess on the dividend that it can provid.e its shareholder and, 
as such, cannot function in a charitable direction. rt 2 s:L The 
correct approach to business, according to another writer in 
the Handelsinstituut's journal, does not allow for such attit~ 
udes as human loyalty to old associates and employees. rrBus-
iness by 1ts nature is objective, impersonal, International, 
cold, hard, merciless and without loyalty. 11 The businessman 
serves 
11
a god of gold and profits and has no heart. 11 The bus-
• II • inessman knows only one law, namely, that the weak and incap-
able must fall by the wayside .. n Though this approach is alien 
to the Afrikaner because of his upbringing and religion, it 
II is an approach he had better learn: ••• business is almost a 
new religion and until we acquire these characteristics and 
this approach we shall always have to play second fiddle •••• n 252 
Afrikaner Nationalism had long jettisoned its earlier Nat-
ional-Socialist ideals when P. H. Rorich, Managing Director 
of the Afrikaans investment company, Bonuskor, said, in the 
course of addressing the 1958 Congress of the Afrikaanse Han-
' delsinstituut on the "Important Role of the Profit Motive 11 , 
. . n 
that he was proud to describe South Africa as the strongest 
bastion of democratic capitalism in the worid. 268 
Not surprisingly, the Rev. Kestell 1 s hopes were not 
realized. Afrikaners had not destroyed the social hierarchies 
25 :LDr. M. D. ]li..arais, 11Die Afrikaner as Belegger, 11 
Volkshandel, 18:9, Julie 1957. 
252 J. J. F. Lemmer, 11Wat is Verkeerd met Afrikaanse 
Sake?", Volkshandel, 17:10f; .April 1956. 
253Volkshandel, 19:?, Oktober 1958. 
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but had begun to climb them. 264 They were converting to the 
nnew religion". Addressing the Seventh RDB. Congress in 1954, 
the then Chairman of the organization, Rev. J. Conradie, 
observed that 
the tremendous grip which materialism has obtained 
on us has to some degree crippled us in our contribut-
ions to our own funds •••• People have only the one idea: 
what they can get out of the Reddingsdaadbond instead 
of asking what they can do for the Movement ••• the mot-
ive of serVice is increasingly vanishing. 256 
In other words, perhaps, Afrikaners were becoming more 
like other urban people. The motive of personal service was 
possibly vanishing, but then the need for it had become less 
obvious. Functions of the family were being performed by 
trade unions, employer associations, charitable organizations, 
State agencies; functions of the commando by the police. 
Afrikaners were not returning to the ways of their fathers. 266 
254Perhaps indicating a developing sense o.f social self-
consciousness, the 20,000 Afrikaners whose surname is Venter 
(meaning 11 peddlern) were recently reported as wanting to rep-
lace this·wora: by·its synonym, 11 smoust1, in laws and ordinances. 
tt 11 The use of venter, they claimed, cast·a slur on their dignity, 
'Jan Burger~1 nlm .Afrikaner's D1ary, 11 The Star, 17 September 
1959. . 
256 Die Oosterlig, 9 July 1954, in P.D. 28/1954/263. Up 
to 1950, less than a third of the original target for the Red-
dingsdaadfonds (~500,000) had been collected, Verslag Y§ll die 
Tweedg Ekonomiese Volkskongres, p. 124. 
266An aspect of this is suggested b!r the following item 
in the Natal Daily News, 22 October 1958: Doubts about the 
future of the Voortrekker Movement (the Af:rikaans counterpart 
of the Boy Scouts) were expressed recently at the Provincial 
congress of the movement in Bloemfontein. Dr. F. Hagen, of Har-
rismith, said that the movement is suffering from a serious 
affliction which could cause its end, says a report in the 
Volksblad. .As far as the bigger boys are concerned-, the move-
ment has become "~artificial", he said. Only a small percen-
tage of high sch0ol childreR in the Free State belong to it. 
According to Dr. Hagen the movement no longer offers anything 
constructive and practical. The bigger Children are no lon-
ger interested in inspanning oxen, tracking, estimating dis-
tances, saddling horses or signalling with flags. The con-
gress appointed a sub-committee to make practical suggestions. 11 
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But how could the, and why should they? Ox waggons were not 
breaking down on narrow passes, imperilling the progress and 
safety of the trek; British gunfire was not huddling farmer 
and bywoner together in holes; no longer did isolation and 
the absence of roads, cars and educational differences make 
their company inevitable and tolerable. Afrikaners were not 
giving to the Reddingsdaadfonds. But the lines of whi'te 
shanty-town dwellers at the relief offices were a memory. The 
Second Trek was succeeding. 
Yet certain bonds were holding firm, despite the inc-
reasing heterogeneity of the group in occupation, income and 
association. Of course, Afrikaner businessmen, like Afrikaner 
workers, were endeavoring to promote their special interests 
against other groups, including other Afrikaners. They were 
seeking; for example, to secure revision of the country's 
railway rating policy, which favored the farmers at theiT ex-
pense.267 They were questioning aspects of the Government 1 s 
color policy. 258 But like their Afrikaner employees, gener-
ally they were adhering to the National Party. The latter, 
despite new economic and social divisions among Afrikaners, 
was maintaining its character as an ethnic political organ-
ization, a political brotherhood of most Afrikaner farmers, 
professional people, workers and businessmen. In short, the 
successes of the Economic Movement had not destroyed the Nat-
ionalist Movement. 
257For an account of this policy, see Franklin, Econ-
omics in South Africa, pp. 167f. Attacks on the railway rat-
ing policy at the 1958 Congress of the Afrikaanse Handelsins-
tituut were coupled with assurances that the speakers offered 
11well-meant and constructive criticismrr and that the Govern-
ment •'is aware of our good will, n The Star, 24 September 1959. 
258The Handelsinstituut has warned that the Government's 
proposed ~olicy of ~ranting independence to the African Reser~ 
ves might endanger White South Africa' and could lead to mil-
itary problrms as a consequence of treaties that sovereign 
"'Bantustans might conclude with foreign powers; see Volkshan-
del, 14:14, Maart 1953. · 
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One of the circumstances which may account for this is 
that Business and the Party have developed historically as 
. . I 
interlocking interests, the former s representation in the 
Parliamentary Party, and the Party's dependence on Business 
advertizing for its Press, helping to assure a mutually rec-
eptive and sympathetic relationship. Again, .Afrikaner bus-
inessmen, whose livelihoo~ was built up and still comes lar-
gely from the consumer support of Nationalist voters, would 
have to think twice before pressing their special interests 
to the extent of issuing a political challenge to the Party. 
Furthermore, they have been helped to achieve their present 
position because most_ of the country's people in effect have 
been prevented from competing with them; the retention of prop-
erty thus acquired would seem to demand the continuation of 
the polit.ical status quo. 269 Some English-speaking business-
men who are more critical of Government policy, like Harry· 
Oppenheimer, own properties outside the country, and are mem-
bers of an international cultural community where their lan-
guage and outlook is not alien. But most Afrikaner business-
men, and workers and farmers, can not easily see how they 
might reproduce the pattern of their lives outside South .Af~·:.. >: 
rica, or in a South Africa that has radically changed. 
0 0 0 
269At the famous Kliptown meeting of the 'Congress of 
the People', on 26 June 1955, a 'Freedom Charter' was adopted 
jointly by the African National Congress, The Congress of Dem-
ocrats (Whites) the South African Coloured Peoples' Organiz-
ation, the Indian National Congress and the Congress of Trade 
Unions. Among the aims which it set forth 11 for all our coun-
try and the world to known were the.following: 
11The mineral wealth!. beneath the soil, the Banks and mon-
opoly i:adustry shall be transferred to the ownership of the 
people as a whole. 
0All other industry and trade shall be controlled to 
assist the well-being of the people. 
11All people shall have equal rights to trade where they 
choose, ·to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and 
professions. 
11 Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall 
be ended, and all the land redivided amongst those who work 
it. • • • II 
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In these last three ch~pters, we have been tracing some 
effects of the South African industrial revolution on relat~ 
i 
ions between the white immigrant bearers of the new economic 
I 
activities into the country and the Afrikaner descendants of 
• 1 
the older Dutch settlers. Weihave seen how the Afrikaners 
I 
came to the city; a.nd how by mollective action they acquired 
I 
jobs in both its streets and qffices, and homes in both its 
poorer quarters and wealthy suburbs. 
. '. 
Other people also came\to the city, drawn to it by 
industry or pushed there by overcrowding in the countryside. 
I . 
These ~<Tere mainly black peopl~, whose remote ancestors were 
also immigrants from the nortH. They too, like Afrikaners, 
I 
sought a more secure and decerit living. They, too, found 
I 
their languages not understood, their feelings often disreg-
arded. To these people ~t has\ mattered little whether the 
flagpoles above the streets al1png which they passed were fly-
! ing the Union Jack or the·colors of the House of Orange. Both 
symbolized mo~e or less the sa~e experience. In the next 
chapter we shall examine some kspects of that experience. 
iv 
I 
i 
i 
·THE BURDEN OF RUlE 
I 
! 
I The native stands in 'relation to the European as a 
~· - ·I 
child of eight years to 1a man of mature experience--a 
child in religion and moiral conviction, lacking any 
art or science; with th~ most primitive requirements 
and the most elementary i,knowledge of the matter of 
meeting those requireme~ts. 
If ever a race requi:r'ed the lead and protection of 
another race with whom tt is placed in contact, in or-
der to prevent its downf!all; it is the native in his 
relationship to the whi t;e man. 
' ,--! 0 Lord, Come Quickly.: 
! 
Prime Minister J; B .. M ... Hertzog, 
Malmesbury Speech, ·1925.~ 
Painted altar inscription in-
side a church of the Coloured 
community, Knysna, Cape Prov-
ince, 1960. 
Although, as has been; seen, contacts between the two 
I 
sections of tha}:·whi te popula~ion have produced animosity, the 
fact that economic power has\ been largely concentrated in the 
I 
i hands of English-speaking, while politipal authority has been 
- • • . I . 
wielded by Afrikaners, has prrhaps helped to temper their rel-
ationship. Since the Genera~ Strike of 1922, no major violent 
clashes have occurred betwee~ white people. Each group has 
possessed its own tangible m~ans of influencing the other and 
i protecting itself. 
1 
I No balance of powers regulates the relationship between 
. ! 
the white and black people. ,In all spheres of life, private 
or public, economic or political, the whit.e man commands and 
i 
~Federal Council of the Nationalist Party of South 
. r Africa, The Segragation Problem, General Hertzo~ s io~u~ion 
(Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, ~eperk, n.d.), p. 13. 
2l0 
i 
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the black man obeys. Where the latter may or may not live, 
what jobs he may or may not hold, the wages he receives, the 
taxes he must pay, the schooling of his children, the number 
of cattle he may possess, these and other matters are deter-
mined by white people.-
The latter are afforded opportunities by their monopoly 
of power to arrange these matters in their own favor. However, 
they maintain that the system is not disadvantageous to the 
black people, whom they con.sider to be a race of children, 
incapable of governing themselves, let alone others. 2 ~hey 
hold that their religions require them to rtprotect and trainn 
Non-Whites, and to refrain from abusing their authority;) 
rtWhen a aivine calling has to be fulfilled, 11 stated an edit-
6rial in Die.Transvaler, 
not count.Hs 
II • 
self-interest and opportunism do 
Undoubtedly, most .white people consider that they ha~e 
exercised their rule in a fair and upright manner. They bel-
ieve that they tax themselves to provide free social services 
.to the voteless four-fifths of the population, and they see 
the housing projects and hospitals which shelter and care for 
non-white people as material evidence of the financial sac-
rifices they have borne to bring health and well-being to their 
wards. They acknowledge individual cases of abuse, but they 
2 A Dutch Reformed Church statement on the franchise 
rights of Africans, issued in 1951, declares that the vote is 
a privilege entrusted only to those who are capable of exer-
cising it with responsibility to God. The African does not 
comply with this requirement and is therefore incapable of 
using this right properly, (Report adopted by the ·council of 
Dutch Reformed Churches dealing vri th the Principles of Calvin-
ist Christian Policy, cited in The Star, 22 May 1951, in P.D. 
21/1951/245.) A more common ou~look is that equal political 
rights are impractical because only someone ready to shut his 
eyes to reality can claim that the Native is intellectually 
II 
ripe to judge what is good and bad for him, Die Transvaler, 
21 October 1954, in P.D. 45/1954/449. 
3 Die Transvaler, 28 Ap~il 1959. 
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are bewildered and angered byaccusations that they generally 
exploit and mistreat non-white people. They believe, in the 
words of Dr. A. L. Geyer, then South Africa's High Commission-
n I 
er in London, that gradually the Bantu are rising in the 
scale of Civilisation through the millions being spent-by 
whites on their education and devel0pment. 114 
How these belief's acco:t;>d with the practice of minority 
rule will be considered in this chapter, where we examine 
I 
·some of the economic and soci~l aspects of the white people's 
monopoly of political power. \ 
i 
I 
Government Revenue and Expendi!ture QB Africans 
I Taxation without repres:entation served as a slogan to 
rally the disaffected in the ~erican Revolution. Likewise, 
one of tha complaints voiced br the Voortrekkers embarking on: 
the Great Trek was that they h~d no say in the Government 
I 
that wastaxing them and burdening them with vexatious laws. 6 
! 
This grievance was effectively'remedied in the Republics 
which they established in the hinterland~ There. the Trekkers 
enjoyed a condition amounting tirtually to representation 
. . I 
. I • 
without taxation.· The Governments of both the Orange Free 
I State and the Transvaal were g~nerally unsuccessful in getting 
their farming electorates·to s~bmit to direct taxation. 6 Yet 
. ·J . . 
the affairs of' State and the salaries of officials had to be 
financed somehow. It appears that one of the methods adopted 
. . I . 
was to tax the conquered Afric~n tribes surrounding the Boer 
farms and territories. Thus:,; '~~{hen the Free State failed to 
I. 
I 
4: i 11 
. Quoted in F. A~ w. Luc~s, Who Pays for Services Prov-
ided for .Africans? 11 Race Relations Journal, 22:1, 1953. 
5 See Para. 2, 11 Manifesto! of the Emigrant Farmers, tt 
in Eybers, ed., Select Consti tu:tional Documents Illustrat-
~ South African History 1795-1910, p. 144. · 
I. 
I 
6 van der Walt, Wiid and ~eyer, eds., Geskiedenis van 
Suid-Afrika, vol. ii, p. 234. 
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induce its burghers to pay t;heir poll tax, "a hut tax on nat-
ives not working for farmerd was imposed.instead.n 11 When 
II H i 1 such idle natives balked ~t paying, the interna revenue 
service in the shape of a Bd.er Commando was customarily dis-
patched to punish them. The Transvaal's revenue from African 
I 
taxation mounted rapidly after 1881, partly as a result of 
' I 
punitive expeditions sent against recalcitrant tribes. 8 
I 
As to whether these black taxpayers received service 
for their money, G. J. F. V~sser, a student of African tax-
I 
ation, writes that 11 it was :n;ot always kept in mind that taxes 
collected from natives also had to be used for the benefit 
I 
of that particular communityj."P Indeed, the same writer off-
' ers no evidence to indicate ~hat the idea was ever considered. 
i 
Not a penny was spent bY,!~e.drtp..er of the two Republican govern-
ments on schooling for .Afric:ans.l.o But then, until the dis-
covery of gold, they spent v:ery little on educating white 
children.l.l. 1 
In the two British cob...onies of the Cape and Natal, a 
I 
policy of. State assistance tp church mission schools for Aff.ric-
an children was initiated in! the middle of the nineteenth cen-
' 
:Wry. . IConcurrently, taxation of Africans began. In the case 
, I 
of Natal, Government expend~tures appear to have been largely 
i financed by the African peop~e, particularly through the lev-
.! 
ying of import duties on articles consumed mainly by Africans; 
I 
! 
I 11Ibid., vol. ii, p. 234. 
~Gysoert Jacobus Franpois Visser, Ekonomiese Aspekte 
van Naturellebelasting in Suid-Afr1~ {Unpublished Master of 
Commerce Dissertation in Economics, Potchefstroom Univ·ersi ty 
for Christian Higher Education, 1955) pe 128. 
i 
~Ibid., p. 14. 
l.oMarquard, The Peoffles and Policies of South Africa, , 
p. 186; J .• W. Macquarrie, · The New Order In Bantu Education, 1 
Africa South, 1:33, Oct.-Dec• 1956. 
I 
I 
l.l.See above, p. l~n. 
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the expenses to cover the introduction of indentured laborers 
from India to work in the white sugar plantations were met 
from the duties paid by Africans through the increased tariffs 
of 1860 and 1863.~ 2 
From the absence of evidence-indicating the opposite, 
it would seem reasonable to assume that Whites were not sub-
sidizing Non-Whites at least to the beginning of this century. 
Thereafter, a more detailed picture emerges. G. J. F. 
Visser investigated the affairs 9f the Transvaal Native Affairs 
Department under the Milner regime, and found that from the 
end of the Anglo-Boer War until Union (1902-10), revenue from 
.African taxation amounted to *A,734,872 and expenditures on 
the provision of services to Africans totalled W06,500; •tthe 
white community then was subsidized to a considerable extent 
by the natives. n~a 
Whether, ·as is implied, this situation was reversed 
when the reins of government were transferred after Union in-
t to the hands of the country s white inhabitants may now be 
considered, beginning with the fiscal policies of local or mun-
icipal authorities: 
In 1914, the Tuberculosis Commission, while investigat-
ing reasons for the prevalence of the disease in South Africa, 
found "many instances"' of municipalities making tta consider-
able profit 11 in runniil.g their non-white locations. This prof-
it was being diverted to General Municipal Revenue, that is 
, it was being spent on services for the white inhabitants of 
the towns. This was being done while conditions in the locat-
ions were "badly in need of improvement. 11 .As examples typical 
of various·types 'of towns--rural, industrial, coastal, etc.--
that were administering their locations at a profit, the Com-
mission cited Cradock, Pretoria, Bloemfontein, Grahamsto.w:p., 
~ 2de Kievriet, History of South Africa, pp. 8lf. 
~ 8Ekonomiese .Aspekte van Naturellebelasting, pp. 22, 
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Graff-Reinet, Kimberley, B~aufort-West, Jagersfontein, 
Uitenhage and East London. Regarding Bloemfontein, capital 
of the Orange Free State, it was found that in the year end-
ing 31 March 1913, the City Treasurer had managed the non-
white locations at a profit to the city of ~2,500. This fig-
ure represented the difference in the amounts collected from 
African location dweilers in rents, pass fees, water charges, 
sanitary fees, etc., and that expended in providing services 
for Africans. It 1-ras discovered that the city was assessing 
the location shacks, for the purpose of coliecting rt sanitary 
fees 11 of four shillings per month per dwelling, at a rateable 
value of ~384, although the City Treasurer admitted that ~0 
ww.n~a~~ave been a more accurate valuation. However even this 
.seemed an excessiv.e figure to the Tuberculosis Commission. 
The city had collected l:.3,000 in sanitary fees during.the 
previous year on the basis of its location assessment system. 
Bloemfontein was a sewered town, but its non-white locations 
lacked proper drainage. Despite substantial annual profits 
drawn from the provision:. of services .to its 12,000 African 
workers and their families, the MUnicipality had not consid-
ttt ' ftr ~4 
ered a sewage system for the locations because of the cost • 
In Grahamstown, seat of an Anglican bishopric, the 
situation was as follows: in 1912, the ¥mnicipali ty made a 
prof.it of 45.4 per ce:q.t in 'running;~its locations. This was 
. . . tt ' 
J'absorbed into the General Revenue. The City Council levied 
a water-rate of ten.shillings a year on each location shack. 
The service provid~d in return for.this levy, representing 
the then equivalent of a black worker's wages for over a week, 
was set forth in the following terms by the Commission: 
~4Report of the Tuberculosis Commission, 1914, (~.G. 
34-'14), para~. ~48-250 
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The supply is .given by means of several four-hundred 
gallon tanks placed at different spots in the locations~ 
The taps on<:these tanks are locked, and are opened only 
twice a week, by order of the Council. The water enters 
the tanks very slowly, oh~ the dribble. ·A responsible 
official of the Council told the Commission, in the 
course of evidence, Hthe tanks are no sooner opened than 
"they are ~mp~ied, ana they (the inhabitants) cannot get 
any more. They pay ten shillings a year, and perhaps 
they get two-paraffin tins full a week •. Twice a week 
the tanks are.opened; and they all crowd around.these 
half inch taps.with their tins, and they may have to 
wait for hours to get their turn at the tap, and they 
struggle and fight like Kilkenny cats to get it. 11 
The water-works account of Grahamstown for the year 
1912 showed. a profit of ~1,694 (revenue ~5,705, expenditure 
M,Oll). 
The.Grahamstown locations were further characterized 
as follov-rs: 
ti!There is no proper sys.tem of sanitation carried out 
in the locations. The use of pails and the removal of 
night soil is optional. And where there are infectious 
d.iseases (when they happen to be found out), there appears 
to be no regular method of removing or burying the excreta, 
or of supplying and using disinfectants. The sick and 
dying crawl out and defecate as near as possible to the 
hut they live in, and when they get beyond the strength 
of that, they lie in their filthy clothe9, or use rags 
which are thrown out in the streets, or hidden in the It ~5 .. 
aloes and prickly pear bush. 
The Mayor admitted that tuberculosis was rife among 
the inhabitants of the locations. Between 1904 and 1916, 
the average infant mortality rate among non-white babies in 
Grahamstown was 333 per thousand, 1"lhile births exc~eded total 
deaths in only two of these years. 16 
16Quoted ~., paras. 248-50. 
16Macmillan, Complex South Africa, p •. {8• Apart from 
housing, the living conditions of Grahamstown s non-white res-
idents seem to have improved little bety.reen 1914 and 1959. 
In the latter year, Rhodes University published a study which 
Professor James·Irving h~d conducted among 568 African famil-
ies, comprising 3,371 persons (90 per cent of the total) liv-
ing in the town•s new, unsubsidized housing estate. The med-
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. At Uitenhage, where location revenue brought in k2,010 
in 1912, expenditure amounted to approximately ;b900 (no charge, 
however, seems to have been made here for water): 11 The prof-
it is taken into General Revenue and spent upon the· (!hi te J 
town. According to the evidence of the Mayor and Town Clerk 
the profit on the locations provides about one-tenth of the 
revenue of the town. The Mayor expressed the opinion that 
this was not a sound policy •••• 11 ~ 7 
Nine years after the report of the Tuberculosis Com-
mission appeared this system was altered. The change, brought 
about und~r· the Natives.· (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, consisted 
in the establishment of a system of segregated municipal acc-
ounts, one for white people, the other for black. .Each local 
authority was obliged henceforth to keep a.Native Revenue Acc-
ount, into which was to be paid all revenue derived from the: 
administration of Native Affairs within its area, and against 
which services to Africans vrere chargeable. 
This put an end to the system of overt and direct sub-
ian household income was ~. lOs. a month, half the families 
had more than this and half less. After the rent had been 
paid, the median household had *.6. ls. a month left for food, 
clothing and all the other necessities of life. This worked 
out to an average of 8 pence per person per day--enough to buy 
one loaf of bread. The avera~e family poverty datum line (see 
below, p. 239 for explanation) was calculated at ~22. 9s. per 
month; living below this level were 96.7 per cent ()f all the 
households (:Vmri~l Horrell, compiler, A Survey of Race Relat-
ions in South Africa 1258-59 (Johannesburg: Soutft African InB-
titute of Race Relations, 1960), pp. 193, 211). I have worked 
in many countries including East China, but I have never come 
G If accross such poverty as exists in rahamstown, said Professor 
Irving C~uoted in Assembly Debates, 14 September 1958, col. 
3884). As the Christmas season approached in 1959, a committee 
backed by all the charitable organizations in the town sought 
to provide supplementary food for families attempting to exist 
on 6d. per person per day. However the numbers were too great 
and the sixpenny standard had to be reduced to a fourpenny one. 
Conditions were such that as each load of the town's rubbish 
was dumped near the location, dogs, children and adults would 
rush to hunt in it 'tfor usable or edible bits 11 , (.Letter to Cape 
Times, 11 December 1959). 
~ 7U.G. 34-'14, para. 214. 
2.b8 
sidization of white by non-white town dwellers. It did not, 
however, bring about a reversal of that system. Local author-
ities generally seem to have interpreted the ~ct in such a way 
as to render their Native Revenue Accounts self-balancing, 
that is their African populations, usually the poorest commun-
ity in the town, paid in full for every public service supplied 
to them or did without. The following figures summarize re-· 
venue and expenditure of all local authorities during the f'in-
ancial year 1935/36, when the total numbers of urban Whites 
and Blacks were approximately equal:~ 8 
Total revenue ••• *'l6,028,525 Total ~enditure ••• ~l4,992,624· 
Revenue from Expenditure on 
locations • • • 471·~~21 locations • • • 380,372 
The system of separate·racial accounts in effect en-
abled the urban white community to continue to enjoy the ad-
vantages of cheap non-white lab'?r at no financial expense to 
itself. In 1940, P. H. G-6.enault and R. J. Randall, two 
University of the Witwatersrand economists, investigated the 
system in detail, collecting some of their findings in the 
following table: (p. 219) 
; 
Guenault and Randall point out that their figures do 
not represent the situation fully. Of those municipalities 
listed in the table as showing deficits on their Native Re-
. venue Accounts during 1938, only two dealt with these deficits 
by means of a subsidy from General Revenue, that is from the 
white ratepayers. Johannesburg and Simonstown carried for-
ward their deficits in anticipation of a surplus on Native Re-
venue Account at some future date, while the others had accum-
ulated revenue surpluses in previous·years against which the 
·deficits were charged.~ 9 
. ~ 8Leo Marquard, The Black Man's Burden, by Johan Burger 
(pseud.) 1 P• 97. 
. a 9For a summary of the workings of the Native Revenue 
Account system in 1943, see Ellen Hellmann, editor, Handbook 
2!! ~Relations in South Africa (Cape Town: Published for 
the South African Institute of Race Relations by Geoffrey Oum-
berlege for the Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 260-264~ 
TABLE V 
NATIVE REVENUE ACCOUNTS 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDING IN 193820 
Municipality 
Beaufort' .. West 
Bloemfontein 
Boksburg 
Durban 
Germiston 
Graaf-Reinet 
Grahamstown 
Greytown 
Johannesburg 
Ladysmith 
Pietermaritzburg 
Port Elizabeth 
Queensto·vvn 
Sabie (Village 
council) 
Siinonstown 
Uitenhage 
Ventersdorp (Village Council) 
Vryburg 
Witbank 
TOTALS ......... . 
Total 
Income·· 
On 
Native 
Revenue 
Account 
1,787 
33,808 
6,882 
107,338 
16,589 
2,426 
1,292 
864 
172,252 
3, 760 
14,498 
19,120 
2,915 
303 
355 
6,041 
443 
539 
3,699 
394,909 
Total 
Expenditure 
On Native 
Revenue 
Account 
(including 
income and 
redemption 
charges) 
1,611 
32,489 
5,5552 l. 
69,721 
l4,449 2 l. 
2,581 
1,498 
889 
195,383 
2,765 
14,330 
18,655 
4,797 
172 
381 
5,2322 .J_ 
375,028 
Net 
Profit 
On 
Native 
Revenue 
Account 
176 
1,319 
1,327 
37,617 
2,140 
995 
168 
465 
131 
809 
13 
178 
. 45,338 
219 
Net 
Loss On 
Native 
Revenue 
.Account 
155 
208 
25 
23,131 
26 
30' 
The general policy, it was further stated, was to aim 
20P. H. Glienault and R. J. Randall, ''Some Financial 
. n Aspects o·f Urban Native .Segregation in South .Africa, Race 
Relations 7:95, 1940. 
2 l.Excluding capital assets purchased out of revenue. 
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for a regular surplus on Native Revenue Account, which could 
then be diverted to meet the costs of purchasing capital ass-
ets. The policy operated as follows: capital expenditures, 
such as on African housing, were (and still are) largely fin-
anced by municipalities through loans from white investors 
a~/or the Central Government at guaranteed interest rates. 
Rents, though low in re~ation to white levels, were set at 
scales sufficiently high to insure that the Native Revenue 
Account could meet the interest and redemption on the loans. 
These arrangements not only made it unnecessary for white 
ratepayers to pay for African housing, but the provision of 
such amenities was made a source of interest to white inves-
tors. .nWhen Johannesburg Municipality talks proudly of the 
millions of pounds 'it' has spent on Native housing,n &nob-
server has remarked, 11 it should be remembered that it is; i~ 
practice, the Native who foots the bill.u 22 
Rents were also fixed to cover the expenses of other 
services (social welfare, recreation, etc.) seemingly provided 
by the municipalities. Had such services been charged for 
separately, many Africans might have decided to forgo them, 
in which case, Guenault and Randall believe, the conscience 
of the white urban community might have been stirred so as to 
requ~re the local authority to provide the sports field and 
' 
creches free of charge. These contingencies were avoided, ~ .. 
'they say, by including the cb,arge in the rent~ 28 
Another important financial source employed by local 
authorities to meet the costs of housing and caring for urban 
Africans were the profits drawn from the municipal monopolies 
on the sale to location residents of the traditional tribal 
brew, known among Whites as 1 Kaffir Beer'. This monopoly took 
advantage of the fact that with few exceptions Africans, until 
1961·, were prohibited from purchasing European liquor. Though 
violation of this prohibition was widespread, the sanctioned 
22¥~rquard, The Black Mants Burden, PP• 89f. 
23G~enault and Randall, loc. cit., P• 97. 
municipals beer halls attracted an enormous custom, their 
profits representing a major source of municipal revenue. 
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. I 
For instance, Pretoria's surp+us on its Native Revenue account 
I 
estimates in 1956/57 was *2,2~6, whereas the profits on its 
I 
spec:i:al Kaffir Beer Account w~re ~141,696; in 1957/58 the cor-
. l . 
responding figures were ~36,7~4 and ~115,299, and in 1958/59 
·~25,906 and ~131,755 respecti~ely. Pretoria allocated one-
third of its profits on Kaffi~ Beer Account to pay for rec-
. I 
reation and social welfare se~ices, inc1udin~ hospital ser-
vices, and. two-thirds for hou~ing. 24 
.. I I 
To present a contrasting case, Johannesburg experienced 
I budget deficits in its adminis:tration of Non-European Affairs 
since the end of the Second w:o!rld War. These deficits rose 
to an annual amount of almost Ia quarter of a million pounds 
in 1958, despite yearly avera~e profits on Kaffir Beer Account 
from 1956 to 1958 of over ~soo!,ooo. 26 The books were being-
I 
balanced out of contributions ~rom the General Rate Fund, so 
that it would seem that in thi(s city, at least, the white 
ratepayers were· subsidizing th~e social services of the African 
I 
population. However, according to· Kieth Fleming, Chairman of 
i 
I ' the City Council s Finance Oo~ittee, this was not the casee 
i 
The contributions from the Gen~ral Ra.te Fund, he observed in 
his 1959 Budget Speech, represrnted nin essence ••• a subsidy 
I 24City Council of Pretoria, MUnicilal Accounts, Estim-
ated and Revised Estimates, 19v6/57, 1957 58, 1958/59· 
---- I 
25 0ity of J6hannesburg,\An:riual Re orts of the Manager 
of the Non-European Affairs Department, 1944 45=1955-56; . 
Abstracts of Accounts for the Years ending 2Q. June 125.Q., __ 1957, 
1:22§.. I~ a typical financial year, more than 10 per cent of 
the City s expenditure on Native Revenue Account was paid in 
wages, salaries and cost'of liting bonuses to the Administrat-
ion's white employees, the latter accounting for a greater 
share of the expenditure than that received by the MUnicipal-
ity's black employees. 
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to the employers. 1126 
i 
In order to appreciate~. Fleming's point, it must be 
realized that the overwhelming majority of urban African wor-
kers receive wages an which they cannot provide themselves 
and their dependents with the pasic requirements for health 
I 
and well-being •. 2 7 Where an Af[r'ican worker 1 s expenses for 
housing, transport, hospitalization and child care are partly 
i 
met by contributions from loca~ government expenditure, this 
generally means that his labor! is required by the white com-
munity; in many cases.where hii labor is not required, he 
would not be in a position to receive these services. In oth-
er words, he would not, in many cases, be perm~tted to remain 
in the town unless his presenc~ served the economic interests 
I 
of the white community. 
The principle establish~ng this position was first 
clearly enunciated by the Trankvaal Local Government (Stal-
. I 
lard) Commission in 1922: 
The native should only ~e allowed to enter urban areas, 
which are essentially the white man's creation, when he 
is willing to enter and toiminister to the needs of the 
white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so 
to minister. 28 I 
i Should a black man lose:his value to some white person, 
I 
through unemployment or some other cause, the chances are that 
I 
he would be dealt with along t~e lines proposed by the Stallard 
I 
Commission in a policy recommendation subsequently enacted into 
law: 
i 
26 City of Johannesburg, ;Budget Speech of the Chairman 
of the Finance Committee, Councillor Kieth G •. Fleming, con.;.. 
tained in the Estimates for the Year 1959/60, p. 14. 
i 
27Beebelow, pp. 240-24f· 
28~ovince of the Transvaal, Rerort of the.Local Govern-
ment Commission (1921), 1922, ~T.P. 1- 22), para. 42. The 
contention that the cities are !essentially the white man's 
creation must be regarded as m~sleading in view of the fact 
that non-whi.te people were responsible for most of the manual 
work involved in their construotio~ and in the development of 
the industries on which they a~e based. 
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The native affairs department of the municipality .... 
should be constantly engaged in removin§ masterless and 
redundant natives from municipal areas. 9 
The pass laws and influx control regulations which con-
trol the residence of Africans in urban areas have developed 
to a point at present so that only those Africans who were 
born in a town and have never left it, or who have worked 
there continuously for one employer for ten years, or who 
have resided there lawfully (e.g., as a wife, or unmarried 
son or daughter under eighteen years of age of a legal resid-
end) for fifteen years without ipterruption, and have never 
.been sentenced to a fine over ~50 or to imprisonment for a 
period over six months, have a legal right to remain in that 
tovr.n for more than 72 hours without obtaining special permis-
sion from the authorities. 30 Should an African, who was born 
in a town and has lived and worked there continuously all his 
life, leave to reside elsewhere for any period, even two 
weeks; he may not return to his home town for more than 72 
hours unless issued with a special permit; if he does so with-
out authorization, he is guilty of a criminal offence invol-
ving a fine or imprisonment. 3 ~ No African may remain in a 
town which he has entered to seek work if the labor bureau 
deems it to be an area of labor surplus. 32 Moreover, even 
Africans lawfully resident in a town may be removed from that 
29!·R· 1-'1922, para. 278. 
50Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 
1945 as Amended in 1953), Section ·10, summarized in Muriel Hor-
rell, compiler, The 'Pass Laws' (Johannesburg: S.A. Institute 
of Race Relations, Fact Paper No. 7, 1960), p. 7. 
31Legal interpretation of Act 25 of 1945 as Amended, 
Section 10, in Senator Leslie Rubin, This is Apartheid (Lon-
don: Victor Gollancz, 1959), p. 7. 
32Government Notice 1032 of 1949 as Amended, Section 4, 
Regulations for Proclaimed Areas, cited in Horrell, comp., The 
I · t l Pass Laws , p. 7• 
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tbwn if the number of Africans there are determined to be in 
excess of its reasonable labor requirements. 33 
These measures obviously are designed to prevent Afric-
ans becoming; an economic burden on the white urban communities. 
It may thus be inferred that those Africans allowed to remain 
in towns are, in most cases, economically valuable to the 
white populations, who would otherwise not tolerate their 
presence, and that therefore whatever these people receive 
from Whites in addition to wages cannot be regarded as a sub-
sidy to them. For if the white community found their labor 
unprofitable at the wages paid plus the necessary additional 
expenses on housing, transport, etc., it would evict'them from 
the town and not undergo these expenses. 
~robably it was this view which lay behind Councillor 
Fleming's contention that Johannesburg's contributions to meet 
the deficits on its Native Revenue Account constitute a sub-
sidy to the employers of African labor, rather than to the 
black workers themselves, who could not maintain their econom-
ic utility at the wages they receive. Among the proponents 
· of this view was the late South African jurist, F. A. w. Lucas, 
who wrote:· 
Whatever their.services may be worth they must be 
housed. They are not employed out of charity. If they 
are required they should be trained to do and be employed 
on work on which they can earn sufficient to house them-
selves. Unless and until that is done there is no jus-
tification for the claim that the whites are being taxed 
t? give housing services to the Africans. They by their 
work are in truth paying for their housing. The same pos-
ition arises in regard to any other· services which may 
have to be provided for Africans, such as health services, 
hospitals, and schools. 34 
It may be urged ~hat not all public expenditures on 
I 
urban Africans are rigidly linked to the latters economic 
33
.Act 25 of 1945 as .Amended, Section 28, cited ibid., 
pp. 20f. 
84{t:Who Pays for Services Provided for Africans? 11 Race 
Relations·Journal, 22J5, 1953· 
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utility.: expenditures subsidizing lower transport fares, yes, 
as the white community would also suffer if Africans could 
not afford to get to work; expenditures on schooling, partly, 
as many jobs require the African employee to be literate; 
expenditures on medical, welfare and recreational services, 
and on betJ:,er housing may, however, be.associated partly with 
non-economic considerations, such as fear of the spread of 
infectious diseases, concern over the state of South Africa's 
image overseas, or they may be partly due to humanitarian im-
pulses, that is to chari t·y, in which case an element of pure 
subsidy may exist. 
But just as those who deny that white people subsidize 
black city dwellers have not demonstrated that the sole mot-
ives for, say, expenditur~s on African housing, have been con-
siderations of expediency, so those who claim that Whites sub-
sidize Blacks have not shown where, if anywhere, such expen-
ditures become expressions of something other than economic 
or political self-interest. Little may therefore be validly 
drawn from this aurvey of the fiscal relations of the black 
and white urb~n communities beyond the fact that although the 
latter believe Africans are a financial burden on them, their 
laws and regulations are designed to prevent such a burden 
from materializing. 
Involved as the question of subsidization is, it must 
be approached from yet another angle; this will become evident 
in the discussion of the taxation policies of the Central 
Government, to which we now turn~ 
Three periods may be distinguished in the Central Gov-
ernment's fiscal relations with the black population. The 
first, beginning in 1925 with the imposition on Africans of 
a uniform and nation-wide system of direct taxation, was 
characterized by the Government's unwillingness to spend any 
more on African development. than it received in revenue from 
Africans; this being termed the "'principle of self-help1t. The 
years 1943 to 1948 witnessed a departure from this principle, 
and those following the advent of the present National Party 
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to power--a return to it. 
Previous to 1925, each of the country's four Provinces 
maintained its own system of taxing Africans. It is notewor-
thy that those Provinces where Africans were disfranchised 
imposed the heaviest taxes, whereas the Cape, which retained 
a common, non-racial voters' roll until 1936, imposed the :i · 
~tghtest tax on Africans and spent the most on their behalf. 
F~r instance in-1921/22, the Cape, whose revenue from African 
taxpayers was considerably less tha::n that of the Transvaal or 
Natal, spent more than twice as much on African education as 
did all the other Provinces (including the Orange Free State) 
combined. 36 
Taxation of Africans was centralized and standardized 
under the Natives (Taxation and Development) Act of 1925. The 
latter required every male .African, eighteen years or over, to 
pay the Central Government a General Poll Tax of ~1 every 
.year, and, if he lived in a Reserve, a Local Hut Tax of from 
lOs. to~ a year, depending on the number of his huts. 36 At 
the same time, the income of white persons was taxed on a 
progressive scale, the poorer groups being totally exempt from 
taxation. Consequently, the majority of white farmers through-
out the country, some of whom owning 6,000 acre farms but poss-
essing cash incomes that fell below the lowest bracket on the 
white scale, paid no direct tax at all, though it was required 
of all their African laborers. 37 
3 SVisser, Ekonomie·se Aspekte ~ Naturellebelasting, 
PP• 73-76. 
36Exemption permits were granted in cases of extreme 
indigency, chronic disease and disability, and to bona fide 
students. In 1930, 17,528 exemption permits were issued, 
Report of
1
the Native Economic Commission 1930-)..932, 1932, 
(Q.~. 22- 32), Addendum by F. A. w. Lucas, para. 330. 
37Ibid., paras. 332-334. There was some resistance to 
the measure. On November 14, 1929, Oswald Pirow, the Minister 
of Justice, flew to Durban and personally led a force of 400 
Transvaal police against shack dwellers who had not paid their 
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As had been done by local authorities two years earlier, 
separate accounts were established for Blacks and Whites un-
der the 1925 legislation. The institution of the Native Rev-
enue Account system by the Central Government implied, as Dr. 
Verwoerd later interpreted it, ''that the vast Bantu majority 
must find,· to a considerable extent, the means for its own 
development.usa Finance Minister Havenga, pfuloting the Bill 
·through Parliament, explained it as follow:s: 11The natives 
are clamouring for development and education •. ;.You cannot 
get the white people to consent to taxation for this partic-
ular purpose. tl 89 The principle of 'self help' was thus affirmed. 
Adherence to this principle.lasted almost twenty years. 
One-fifth of the revenue from the General Poll Tax, plus an 
annual sum of ~340,000 (representing the total Provincial ex-
penditures on African education in 1921/22), went into a Nat-
ive Development Account, and was spent on African education. 
The remaining four-fifths 'twent into the Treasury to cover 
~-4. 0 . administrative costs. During the depression years, revenue 
from .African taxation-feel sharply, with the result that the 
Fund for African education was "absolutely empty at the beg-
inning of 1934 despite determined efforts by the Native Affairs 
Commission, which in cooperation with the Native Affairs Dep-
J?oll Tax. The force surrounded the location, bombarded the 
inhabitants with tear gas bombs, with the result that 11 the 
natives were duly impressed with the majesty of the law; the 
poll tax was collected,w Round Table, 20:423f, March 1930. 
88 Information Service of the Department of Native Aff-
airs, Statement ]2y the Hon. Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, :M.ini~ter of 
Native Affairs, in the Senate of the Parliament of the Union 
of South Africa, 7th June, 12.5!!:.· Bantu Education Policy for 
the Immediate Future, 1954, p. 6. ~Cited hereafter as Ver-
woerd, nBantu Education Policy for the Immediate Future 11 ). 
39Assembly Debates, 25 June 1925, col. 5007. 
4 0Visser, Ekonomiese Aspekte van Naturellebelasting, 
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artment is responsible for the administra-t?ion of the Fund, to .. 
~eep expenditure on native education as low as possible. 't4~ 
From 1933 onwards, the share of' the proceeds from the General 
Poll Tax spent on African education was increased step by step, 
and the proportion going into the Treasury to cover adminis-
trativ'e expenses was reduced. :ijowever, these administrative 
expenses (including the cost of collecting the tax) were then 
defrayed from indirect taxation of Africans--fines, lic~nse 
fees, etc. 42 By 1943, four-fifths of the General Poll Tax 
was going to African education. Two years later, the Smuts 
Government passed the Native Education Finance Act, signal-
ling what Dr. Verwoerd termed as a 11 revolutionary change 11 in 
the financing of African education. 
Thus until the middle forties, funds spent by the State 
on African development for the most part came directly from 
Africans themselves. 43 A.t that time, the principle of 11Allow-
ingn Africans to pay for their own social services was "'dis-
regarded.'~-44 Due to the initiative of Smuts' Finance Minis-
ter, J. H~ Hofmeyr, the urging of white liberals, and the 
idealism generated among part of the electorate by the issues 
of the Second World War, the policy of limiting State expen-
ditures on African education to the proceeds of the Poll Tax 
was abandoned, arid the funds for education were drawn from 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund, i.e., general State revenue. 
Thereupon the annual budget for African education grew by a 
rate of about 10 per cent a year. 46 
4~Ibid., p. 85. 
42 Ibid., p. 86. 
-
43See U.G. 22-'32, Addendum by Mr. Lucas and Dr. 
Roberts, para: 662. 
4 4yerwoerd, uBantu Education Policy for the Immediate 
11 6 Future, p. • · 
46 Carter, The Politics Qf Inequality, p. 101. 
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However, this departur~ from traditional policy was 
short-lived.. In 1948, the National Party came to power. In 
. . i 
1949, the Federation of Afrik~ner Cultural Societies (F.A..K. ), 
which, as will have been seen1 in the preceeding chapter, is 
I 
closely associated with the National Party', issued·a statement 
proposing a definite education policy ~or each population 
.group. The financial princip~es embodied in this statement 
i 
were subsequently implemented:in other fields, besides educ-
. • if : . 
ation. Article 14 of the Principles of Christian-National 
It. · • i . • Education ·~.-referred., to the Cop..oured people, the more than one 
million descendants of misceg~nation between the original 
Hottentot inhapitants of the pape and white, black and brown 
. I 
newcomers. It stated: r 
We believe that Colour~d education should be regarded 
as a sub-division of the palling and task of the Afrikaner 
to christianise the non-EUropean races in our fatherland. 
We accept the principle o1 guardianship of the non-Europ-
ean by the European and p~rticularly by the Afrikaner. 
This guardianship imposes: on the Afrikaner the solemn 
duty of seeing that the Coloured people are educated in 
accordance with Christian: and National principles ..... we 
believe that only when th,e Coloured man is christianised, 
can and will he be truly :p.appy, and that he will be proof 
against his own heathen i~eology and all sorts of foreign 
ideologies which promise ~im pseudo-happiness but leave 
him in the long run unsat~sfied and unhappy •••• The finan-
cing of Coloured .Ed.ucatioh should be placed on such a 
basis that it is not provli.ded at the cost of European 
education. 46 i 
! 
f . I Article 15, entitled ~ative Education , declared that 
African education should be based on the principles of white 
guardianship, non-equality an~ segregation; its aim should be 
to inculcate the white man's view of life, particularly that 
of the Boer nation; like Coloured education, the cost of 
African education should not pe borne by the white man. 47 
46 Christian-National E~ucation Pollet (Johannesburg: 
Institute for Christian-National EducationF .A. K.), 1949), 
p. 14. . : 
47Ibid., pp. 14f. 
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One of the first steps taken in this direction by the 
Government was to restrict school meals for African children, 
These meals were being provided under the National School 
Feeding Scheme, an outgrowth of the same spirit_and initiative 
that in 1945 would remove the limitation on expenditures on 
African education to the proceeds of the Poll Tax. In 1943, 
General Smuts' Finance Minister, J. H. Hofmeyr, announced in 
his Budget Speech that the Government intended to supply at 
least one meal a day to all.school children, irrespective of 
color, the financial burden to be borne by the Central Gov·ern-
ment and the Provincial Administrations. As a result, many 
children began receiving some food while at school, either as 
a complete meal or as a supplement to the food they received 
at home. In 1949, the Minister of Health of the new-Govern-
ment, Dr. A. J. Stals; announced that the amount allocated 
for African school feeding would be pegged and ff!gradually 
decreased until eventually there would be nothing left, rt for 
nthe Bantu should be taught to be self-dependent. u4 a Accor-
dingly, the Scheme was withdrawn from farm schools, mine 
schools and m~ssion schools; extension of the Scheme to new 
schools was prohibited; the basic allowance of 2d. per child 
p~r day, which had applied to all races, was reduced in the 
case of African children to~.; all Government allowances 
for further equipment, and for renumeration to cooks, were 
cut off. In 1956, by which time over-all Government expen-
ditures from the Consolidated Revenue Fund on African educat-
ion had been pegged (see below, pp. 233f ), African school 
boards were given the option of continuing with school feeding 
at the reduced scale, or of employing the money instead for 
the extension of educational facilities. Faced with this 
choice, most school boards elected to extend educational oppor-
tunities to more school children•· School enrollment thereupon 
increased but the sum allocated for African school feeding, 
~ 8Department of Education, Arts and Science, Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry into School Feeding, 1251, 1951, 
(Unpublished), para. 97. 
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*-628,000 in 1954/55, dwindled to ~50,000 in 1958/59· From 
over 600,000 African school children, representing 85 per cent 
of the total African primary school enrollment, who had once 
received the.meals, the number dropped to 156,250 in 1956, 
·and still further in succeeding years. 49 
In Parliament, Opposition Members pointed out that in 
the fin~ncial year 1955/56, the four Provincial Administrat-
ions spent no less than ~1,700,000 on feeding White, Coloured 
and Indian school children with one meal a day free of charge, 
while those children most subject to malnourishment and under-
nourishment were shortly to get nothing at all from the Gov-
ernment. 50 The fault of such arguments, declared Mr. F. E. 
. • 1 
Mentz, a Nationalist M.P .• and a member of the Government s 
Native Affairs Commission, was that the people who put them 
fl t II forth knew nothing about the soul of · he Bantu • The Bantu 
did not want to be 11 spoonfedn. Rather, the motto for the 
Bantu should be: 11Where there is a will, there is a way. 115 :t.. 
49Ibid., paras. 97-99; Assembly Debates, 11 June 1957, 
col. 7783; Summary of the :Report of the Native School Feeding 
Committee, 1949, in·Quintin Whyte, Native School Feeding 
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 
1949), p. 24; Horrell, compiler, A Survey of' Race Relations 
in South Africa 1955=26, p. 199, and 1957-5?, P• 190. 
60Assembly Debates, 11 June 1957, col. 7783. 
5 :t..Assembly Debates., 11 June 1957, cols. 7784-6. This 
motto was not suggested for white school children, many of 
whom, coming from tne wealthier suburbs and attending schools 
participating in the feeding Scheme, were wasting the school 
meal of milk~ ~ruit, cheese and other items, because they were 
not hungry (A Surve.y of Race Relations 1a South .Africa 125.5-
5£, p. 199). In July 1960, school feeding was curtailed ~or 
white, do-loured and Indian children in the Transvaal. Only 
special schools for backward or problem children, and schools 
where over half the pupils came from ''less privilegedJr homes, 
continued to receive school feeding grants from the Provincial 
Administration. 11 Less privilegedJ' homes were defined ~s those 
where the income Gf the parents did not exceed ib372 p.a., in 
the case of white families with one child; Up to ~708 p.a.,. in 
the case of white families with ten children; ~174 p.a. in the 
case.of Coloured families irrespective of the number of chil-
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As an estimated 45 per cent of the Africans born in the coun-
try do not live to reach the age of sixteen, 52 it may be doubt-
ed whether this slogan, in place of food, will help them find 
that way. 
Dre Verwoerd spoke in a similar vein. ~s Minister of 
Native Affairs, responsible for the welfare of the African 
population, he admonished Opposition Members of the "sentim-
entality" they had introduced into the debate. He·c6ntended 
that '~in· the case of the Bantu11 the food was wasted and was 
Hnot at allFt SUCh a great assei •. 6 S 
These statements were not in accord with the findings 
of two Nationalist-appointed study groups, whose reports had 
been available for some time. Thus, in regard to the Scheme's 
effect on the health of African children, the Native School 
Feeding Committee reported in 1949 as follows: 
Evidence from teachers ~nd principals showed that there 
was a decrease in fainting during school hours, coughs and 
colds had decreased in frequency, the children were less 
sleepy, more lively.and alert, and improved in appearance, 
while there.was deterioration during the holidays. Medic-
al evidence from the Chief Medical Inspector of Natal and 
the Polela Health Centre supported these conclusions, as 
did that of several ophthalmologists. 64 
The Committee, furthermore, had drawn attention to a 
controlled experiment in which the incidence of malnutrition 
among children attending a school where a·meal was provided 
dren; ~38 p.a., in the case of Indian families irrespective 
of the number of children, A Survey of Race Relations in South 
Africa 1959-60, p. 223. 
62U.G. 61-'55, P• 54. 
63Assembly Debates, 11 June 1957, col. 7794. 
64Summa~y of the Report of the Native School Feedin~ 
Committee, in Whyte, Native School Feeding, p. 15. A 1939-40 
survey of 10,982 African school children in the Reserves found 
that only 14.9 per cent of the children had two meals a day, 
only 0.6 per cent three meals, ibid., P• 7 • 
.:J 
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dropped from 42 to 16 per cent in a year, while that in anot-
her school, at which no meal was supplied, rose from 27 to 30 
per cent. 65 
I • The (Cillie) Commission of Inquiry into School Feeding, 
reporting two years later, found that undernourishment among 
children in South Africa was widespread, denied that the food 
was wasted or that. the Scheme was a failure, and recommended 
that it be extended with greater subsidies per child. 66 Five 
Afrikaners signed this report, to no effect. The plea of Opp-
qsition Members during the d~bate that an additional J:.2,500,000 
be allocated for a meal a day to children in African-schools, 
and that the money should come out of the Consolida.t-eQ. Revenue 
Fund, 11 si~ply passes my compreb,ensionH, said Dr. Verwoerd. 6 7 
· ·rn 1954/55, the principle of iself'-help' was re-introd-
uced into the financing of African· education itself. Contrib-
utions from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, which had been inc-
reasing steadily since the S~uts Government's decision to make 
the cost of African education a responsibi.lity of the society 
as a whole, 68 were then pegged at a fixed amount of ~.5 mil-
lion per anri.lim. Expenses were so·on running considerably in 
excess of that amount, and were expected to rise further if 
the percentage and number of African children receiving some 
schooling increased, not to mention the p~oblem of improving 
the quality of their' education. 5 9 These additional expendit-
66 Ibid., p. 15. 
66 Report of the Commission of InquirY into School Feed-
ing, paras. 201, 213, 239. 
6 7Assembly Debates, 11 June 1957", col. 7795. 
68See Above, p. 228. 
69Government statistics for 1953 show that approximately 
.seven times as much was spent on educating each white pupil as 
on each black pupil; and, taking into account that only half 
the African children of school age were receiving some educat-
ion, 14 times as much was spent on educating each white child 
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ures subsequently were met by the African populat·ion directly, 
through the Poll Tax, four-f~fths of whose proceeds were cred-
ited to a newly-established Bantu Education Account, and 
I 
I 
through compulsory school le~ies imposed to recover the ca:p-
1 
ital cost and interest charg4s of erecting and maintaining 
lower primary schools (up to two years beyond kindergarten). 
The building of higher prima~y and secondary schools was made 
! 
dependent on the condition t~at African school boards raised 
' half the· money, the Governme~t adopting the position that then 
only would it consider contri~uting on a ~for ~ basis. 60 
r t ' The self-help princi~le was also applied to the 
I • 
sphere of slum clearance and \housing •. In 1954, the Cabinet 
[ 
decided to approve no furtheri sub-economic housing schemes for 
Africans. 6 :L A relatively sma\11 number of subsidized dwellings 
continued to be built for thils group, but the general effect 
of the Cabinet 1 s decision, as' will be seen from the following 
i . 
as on each black child, see f1gures issued by the Department 
of Education, Arts and Science, quoted in A Survey of Race 
Relations in South Africa 1959-60, p. 210. 
60In 1958, one out of two African children were atten-
ding school, approximately three-quarters of whom in lower 
primary schools. Of an Afric&n school population on the Wit-
watersrand of 123,189, only 3\)6 were in senior secondary class-
es. A school administrator stated that the main reason for 
this was Government policy, w~ich permitted only lower primary 
schools to be built from the compulsory schools levy fund 
(derived from a tax of up to ~s. per month imposed on Af'rican 
residents in urban housing schemes). He referred to the case 
of one of the Witwatersrand municipalities, Benoni, which had 
applied to build higher ·p~imary or secondary schools :from 
either the compulsory school ~evy or the Native Revenue Account 
(in both cases money contributed by Africans themselves), but 
had been refused permission by the Governm~nt, see ibid., pp. 
211-214. : 
6 :LSouth African Instit~te of Race Relations, An Anal-
ysis of the Proposed Increases in African Taxation (A Fact 
Paper published by the South African Institute of Race Relat-
ions, 1958), p. 9. (Cited hereafter as RR. 107/58) 
I 
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table, was to limit Government loans to building schemes 
I 
where the redemption and int~rest charges were wholly recov-
erable in the rent: 
! 
TABI(E VI 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
. ON~ AF.RICAN HOUSING, 1950/51 TO 1958/59, UNDER 
ECONOMIC HOUSING LOANS AN:Q SUB-ECONOMIC HOUSING FUNDS 62 
1950/51 ••••• ~····· 
1958/59 ......... ~ •• 
Total 
(1950/51-1958/59): 
·I 
i 
From Economic 
Housing Loans 
I 
Amounts Number 
Allocated Of 
Houses 
*"' 
Built 
742,217 1,366 
5,086,540; 17,581 
24,476' 186 i 
! 
80,901 
From Sub-economic 
Housing Funds 
Amounts Number 
Allocated Of 
Houses 
.. Built 
2,160,722 3,507 
130,94763 252 
8,718,297 18,680 
The table indicates that almost 72 per cent of new 
housing for Africans was provided on a subsidized basis at the 
beginning of the decade, but bnly .01 per cent in 1958/59. 
I Less than ._9 million of the aggregate amount of ~33·million 
spent on African housing wentlinto subsidized schemes; of the 
99,581 dwellings erected, mortk than three-quarters·werebui1t 
I 
on a fully paying basis. 
1 
The policy was embarked upon after the National Buil-
ding Research Institute had p'Q.blished the results of a study 
62Figures taken from State of the Union, Economic, Fin-
ancial and Statistical Year-Book for the Union of South Africa 
1960-61--r.Tohannesburg: DaGama Publications, 1961), p. 124. 
• . . - I 
63~559,522 was spent that year on subsidized houstng 
for Non-Africans, A Survey of :Race Relations in South Africa 
1959-60, p. 159. 
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conducted between 1951 ana 1953 in Durban, Vereeniging and 
Germiston, which concluded that incomes were so low that 61.6 
per cent of the .African families surveyed were rJunable t? 
. ff • 
afford any rent whatsoever , that 11.2 per cent were able to 
pay some rent but required-subsidization, and that only 27.2 
per cent could afford to pay an economic rent. 64 
In addition to the curtailment of funds for sub-econ~ 
omic African housing, local authorities were encouraged to 
place existing sub-economic projects on a completely paying 
basis, raising the rentals so as to cover losses previously 
incurred. 66 In some of the cities, such as Pretoria, all 
schemes were.converted to economic. 66 In Durban, rent inc-
reases of from 300 to 440 per cent were anticipated. 6 ~ In 
most of the smaller towns.there are now no sub-economic dwel-
lings.68 In Grahamstown 1 s King's Flat economic houstng es-
tate, il.i 1959, three-quarters of the African families were 
paying more than 20 per cent of their incomes on rent, and 16 
per cent were paying more than 50 per cent; leaving an average 
income of· 8d •. per person a day (equivalent to the cost of a 
loaf of bread), and 96.7 per cent of all households subsis-
ting below the poverty datum line. 69 
640ited in RR. 107/58, p. 16. 
615 Ibid., p. 9. 
66 Ibid., p. 9. 
67Natal Mercury, 20 November 1958. 
66RR. 107/58, P• 9. 
6 ~See A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 125§-
~, p. 193. \See below, p. 239 for explanation of the term, 
poverty datum line 11 .) .According to the Medical Officer of 
Health at Benoni, in the Transvaal, the removal of Africans 
from their former slum dwellings near Benoni 1 s industrial areas 
to the model Daveyton location meant ·that about 15 per cent of 
the wages of many workers had now to be spent on transport. 
Concurrently, the charge for rent was twice to three·times 
higher than formerly. As a result, less money was available 
for buying food, and the incidence of tuberculosis had risen 
sharply, see ibid., p. 192. 
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Apparently, the 'self-help1 principle for Africans was 
popular among much of the electorate, a number of Cabinet 
Ministers giving it prominence in speeches delivered during 
the stryddae (lit., '1struggle days 11 , i.e., fund-raising) camp-
aign of the Nationai Party in May'l959. The Minister of 
Bantu .Administration and Development, for instance, considered 
it politic to tell a meeting of white people in the Witwaters-
rand industrial town of Boksbu~g that Africans themselves 
would be made to pay for the elimination of slum dwellings 
and for their replacement by better housing on the Witwaters-
rand: 11Within thirty years they. !!;he Non-White~ will have 
paid back completely every penny plus the interest on it as 
well as the rent. 1t 70 
While 'self-help' through higher rents was solving the 
problem·of re-housing the urban African population, as readily 
available means were not at hand for applying the principle to 
other problems. One such was the problem of financing univer-
sity education for Africans. This assumed a concrete form 
in 1957 when the Government introduced a Bill to exclud~ non-
white students from the Universities of Cape Town and Witwat-
ersrand, where they had been admitted on an academically non~ 
segregated basis. The Bill, finally enacted inl959, also 
provided for the establishment of separate university-type 
facilities f0r Non-Whites. This involved the duplication of 
academic buildings, libraries, staffs, etq., including in the 
case of Africans the construction'and maintenance of two new 
11
uni versi ty collegesr; in Zululand and the northern Transvaal. 
The capital costs of.these colleges w~re to be met through 
interest-free, repayable Government loans, but the maintenance 
charges and staff salaries were to be defrayed out of the 
Bantu Education Account. The latter, as has been seen, was 
70Quoted in Die Transvaler, 4 May 1959. 
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already fully committed furnishing little more education than 
two years beyond the kindergarten level to three out of every 
eight African children. To widen and lengthen educational 
opportunities and to meet the recurring costs of university 
apartheid, new sources of revenue were necessary. Although 
the de~and for university apartheid had come almost exclusiv-
ely from among the majority section of the white population, 
to insist that the latter pay for it would violate the prin-
ciple of 1 self-help 1 • It was accordingly decided to make 
Africans pay for the running costs of the new colleges, and 
as the current revenue collected from Africans was insuffic-
ient to defray these and other educational costs, to raise 
the level of African taxation. A Bill to this effect was in-
troduced into Parliament in 1958, and was enacted into law 
during the session. 
The Natives Taxation and Development Act, as the meas-
ure was termed, increased the General Poll Tax payable by 
African men between the ages of 18 and 65 from ~1 to ~l. l5s. 
per annum, a 75 per cent increase; it extended the Poll Tax, 
for the first time, to African women, who were made liable 
to pay at a minimum rate of~~per annum. These rates obtain-
ed irrespective of earnings;. . Above yearly incomes of J:.l80, 
in the case of men, and ~240, in the case of women, progress-
ively higher taxes were imposed. Any income tax paid by 
Africans, who were liable to this form of taxation on the same 
basis as Whites, could be deducted from the portion of the 
Poll Tax in excess of ~1. l5s. 7~ 
Before introducing themeasure, the Government had in 
its possession an Inter-Departmental report summarizing the 
7 :1.RR. 107/58, .p. ~· Althou~ the Act was designed to 
assist in the process of self-help ; no previous consultation 
with .Africans took place. The Minister of Finance explained: 
uit is quite contrary to ordinary principles first to consult 
those people who will be affected by taxation and to ask them 
whether they would like to pay the tax, tr Assembly Debates, 
16 September 1958, col. 3915. 
' 
.. 
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earnings of A.'rrt:Ca.n taxpayers. The report listed only 45,000 
. ' 
Africans in the whole country who earned over ~15 a month; 
2,135,000 belonged to the undef ~15 per month group (~180 per 
year), and: of these, 1,107,730:African taxpayers living out-
' side.the Reserves belonged to ~he group earni~ under ~50 a 
year. 72 Th~ significance of these figures can be understood 
t I I in the context of the povertyi datum line concept. All mem-
bers of Parliament were apprai~ed of the meani~~ of this con-
cept through a Fact Paper:·} distributed among them by the South 
African Institute of Race Relations before debate on the Bill I . 
began. This Paner also includ?d details on African living con-
ditions, and much of what follbws is taken from it. 
' Several social surveys studying the economic circum-
·Stances of the urban African w?rking class have employed the 
'poverty datum line' as their frame of reference. Professor 
i E. Batson, who developed and used the concept in social sur-
veys ofGape Town, described the 'poverty datum line' as 
an.estimate of the income needed by an individual house-
ho:]..d if it is to 11ttain a 9-efined minimum of health and 
decency.~~.The·terni poverty datum line must not be regard-
ed as the line dividing those who are poor from those who 
are not. It is a line·bel0w which health and decency can-
not be maintained •••• Such ~.standard is probably more re-
markable for what it omits!than for what it includes. It 
does not allow a penny fortamusements, for sport, formed-
icine, for education, for saving, for hire purchase, for 
holidays, for odd bus rides, f.or newspapers, stationery, 
tobacco, sweets, hobbies, gifts, pocket money or comforts 
and luxuries . of. any kind. ' It does not allow a penny for 
reflacement of blankets, furniture or crockery. It is not 
a human' standard of livilh.g.. It thus admirably fulfills 
its purpose of stating the barest minimum upon which sub-
sistence of health can theoretically be achieved under 
western conditions. It does not in any sense describe 
even a minimum ideal. 73 ! 
I 
Professor Batson pointed out that in practice a family 
! having an income equal to, or ~ven appreciably above, the pov-
' 
72Assembly Debates, 16 September 1958, col. 3885. 
I 
73Q,uoted in RR. 107/58,1p. 14. 
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erty datum line, would not maintain the health of its members 
for long, because its income would in fact be spent partly on 
tobacco, newspapers, candy and other non-essentials, as well 
as on replacements of items such as blanlrets. He considered 
that a family would probably need an income about 50 per cent 
above the poverty datum line before it would actually buy all 
the minimum essentials allowed for. 74 
On the basis of the poverty datum line, investigations 
were conducted into the average monthly incomes and expendit-
ures of .African families on the Witwatersrand and in other in-
dustrial areas. Studies of essential minimum monthly family 
expenditure, average family income, and income deficits, re-
vealed the following with regard to African families in 
Johan'nesburg: 76 
ITEMS OF ESSENTIAL EXPENDITURE 
Food 
Rent 
Fuel, Light, and Cleaning 
Transpor.t 
Clothing 
Tax 
1. Total Essential Expenditure 
2. Average Family Income 
3. Monthly Income Deficit 
1950 
~- s. d. 
11 4 
1 13 
1 7 
12 
2 l5 
l 
17 4 4 
12 l6 6 
4 17 10 
1954 
~. .s. d. 
14 18 
·1 19 
19 
1 6 
4 5 
l 
23 10 4 
15 18 11 
7 ll 5: 
These figures show that between 1950 and 1954, the 
average incomes of Africa:n families in Johannesburg increased 
by 24 per cent; but essential expenditure rose by 33 per cent. 
The average monthly deficit increased by 55 per cent. Mr. De 
Wet Nel, subsequently appointed Minister of Bantu Administrat-
ion and Development, who was presented with.these figures, 
l'f stated during the debate on the Poll Tax increase: Of course 
the cost of living has increased, but not proportionally to 
7~ranklin, Economics in South Africa, p. 36. 
76 RR. 107/58, P• 15. 
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the increase in wages •••• t176 In 1952, the poverty datum line 
in Johannesburg was calcuiated at ~20. 12s. 4d. with 69.3 
per cent of the African families falling below that; in 1954,· 
it was ~3. 10~ 4d. with more than 70 per cent of the families 
below that; in 1956 the poverty datum line was ~25 with 87 
per cent of the families below that. 77 
From a series of investigations undertaken by various 
agencies in many towns, it was found that '!fin every ~ where 
comparable figures ~ available, between §2 per cen~ and 1§ 
ner cent of the .African families in the town .Q:Qpcerned have 
~95Ea _incomes below the minimum necessary to provide~ 
barest essentials of living. 'f 76 
One implication of these figures is that only 55 per 
cent of all Africans born in South Africa live to reach the 
age of tax-paying (18). 79 The average life expectancy of' 
Africans is about 36 years, and of Whites (whose per capita 
income the Tomlinson Commission estimated as ten times great-
er80) about 70 years. The.. death rate among the latter is just 
over a third that among Africans (7.6/1,000 to 20.9/1,000). 
76Assembly Debates, 24 July 1958, col. 862. 
77African Poverty (A Fact Paper published by the South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 1957), p. 31. (Cited 
hereafter as RR. 67/57.) . .A Nationalist M.P., Mr. J. A. F. 
Nel, replying to Opposition statements regarding the rise in 
the cost of living, quoted the East London poverty datum line 
for 1941. When it was pointed out to him that this repre~en­
ted the position 17 years earlier, he observed: "It was ~;.. 
~4. 5s. Od. for a man, his wife and five childreli, whether II . . . it was 14 or 17 years ago, Assembly Debates, 16 September 
1958, col. 3879. 
76RR. 107/58, p. 16. Italics in source. 
79U.G. 61-'55, P• 54. 
6
°Cited in Sheila T. Van Der Horst, The Economic 
Implicati-ons of Political Democracy. The Road to Economic 
Progress (Johannesburg: Anglo American Corporation of South 
Africa Limited,_ 1960), p. 2. 
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Sixty-seven per cent of these African ~eaths are attributed 
to diseases. associated with malnutrition. 8 ~ 
A survey cited during the Parliamentary debate on the 
tax increase indicated that in the city of East London close 
to half of the African babies born in the locations died be-
fore they were two years old; 82 forty years previously, the 
infant mortality rate (deaths before the age of one) among 
Africans in the same city was estimated as 400/1000. 83 In 
the first six months of 1957, 761 Africans died in East Lon-
don of tuberculosis or enteritis; over the same period the 
number of white deaths from these dise~ses was ten. 84 In 
Durban, according to the 1957 report of the City's Medical 
Officer of Health, the death rate among African children from 
gastro-enteritis was 100 times greater than among white chil-
dren. 86 
Reflecting some of the more minor implications of the 
low income levels, medical examinations of African school 
children have found between 60 and 70 per cent to be ttrecog-
nizably malnourished; 50 per cent need nursing and medical 
attention, while almost 10 per cent of children attending 
school may require hospitalization for diseases directly or 
indirectly attributable to ID:B.lnutrition.tr 86 
1 · n 6 Theodore Gillman, Malnutrition in.African Condit-
ions,11 in Prudence Smith, eaitor, Africa in Transition, Some 
BBC Talks on Changing Conditions in the Union and the Rhodes-
ias (London: Max Reinhardt, 1958T, :pp. llf. - --
82.Assembly Debates, 16 September 1958, col. 3937. 
83Ma.cmillan, 2J2• cit., pp. 38f. 
84Assembly Debates, 16 September 1958, col. 3937· 
86Sunday Tribune, 26 October 1958. 
86Gillman, 11 Malnutrition in African Conditions,n in 
.Smith, 212.• cit., P• 12. 
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·· In the rural Reserves, colorfully portrayed in tourist 
brochure~, death from "nutritional failureu and disease is 
even more common than in the cities. A recent survey conduc-
r 
ted in one of the larger Reserves, the Ciskei, concluded that 
of a thousand African babies b~rn~alive, 242 died before the 
age of one, 327 before 2 years and 508 before t)?.ey were 18. 87 
Persistent poverty may ~e compounding its effects. 
According to Professor Theodor~ Gillman, head of the Depart-
r 
ment of Physiology in Natal University•s Faculty of Medicine, 
chronic malnutrition from infa~cy, and even from conception, 
is gradually eroding the h~alth and vitality of the African 
population. 88 Mothers, themselves malnourished from their 
I 
infancy, and falling under theiphysiological strains imposed 
I 
by child-bearing which further\dehabilitated them, often were 
carrying a malnourished foetust It is not to be wondered at, 
he writes, that nAfrican babie~ are born underweight, are 
I 
hyper-susceptible to the many infective diseases so prevalent 
in th.eir slum environments and:succumb to these so easily and 
I 
. II . . 
so often. Meahwhile, thousands of those who survived child-
1 . 
hood were.presenting themselves at hospitals with chronic liver 
! . 
diseases, with premature heart :.failure, and were frequently 
apathetic or even demented. Arltopsies on seemingly healt~y 
Africans killed in road accidents usually revealed widespread 
I 
internal damage, due directly dr indirectly to inadequate diet. 89 
87Ibid., p. 12. 
i 
88The National Health S~rvices Commission had reached 
a similar conclusion in 1944, ~1~: ~All the eviden~e we have 
received strongly suggests--in :the absence of precise data ex-
tending over a long period it could do no more~-that in the 
territories, on the farms and in the towns 0 their poverty is . increasing and their health det 1.erioratine;, Report of the ~at­
ional Health Services Commission, 1944, (U.G. 30-'44), p. 25. 
i 
I 
89Gillman, l.r.~lnutrition in African Conditions, ft in 
Smith, ~· cit., pp. 16f. 
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The portrayal of this situation by Opposition speak-
ers during the Parliamentary debates on the Native Taxation 
and Development Bill drew varied comments from those who 
were going to vote for the measure. Some said that they had 
seen Africans possessing expensive furniture and wearing :fine 
clothes. In one ·of the early debates, Mr •. De Wet Nel said: 
It must first be proved that they are in fact poverty 
stricken.. But do not let us allow ourselves to be per-
suaded by all sorts of people that the Bantu in general 
finds himself in such a critical position. That is the 
academic finding of people who write books, people like 
the Institute of Race Relat1ons. 90 · 
Later, reactions became sharper. The trouble with 
opponents of the Bill, remarked Mr. J. von S. von Moltke, was 
that they "suffer from a sickly liberalism and negrophilism.n 9 1. 
Although manyAfricans failed to meet the cost of liv.: 
ing, many were evidently attempting to do so by crime. A Mun~ 
icipal investigation carried out in Johannesburg's Western 
Areas locations, in 1951, concluded that 8 per cent of the 
families were supplementing their incomes through illegal 
means. 92 In 1956, for instance, the brewing, selling and poss-
, ' 
ession of illicit liquor--through which part of the income of 
bachelor workers was redistributed to mothers running liquor 
rshebeens'--accounted for a fifth of that year's total of 
1,129,923 convictions of' Africans for various offences. 93 
Others dealt in drugs, engaged in prostitution and theft, or 
90Assembly Debates~ 24 July 1958, col. 864. The acad-
emic· findings to which Mr> .. De \.Yet Nel objected correspond to 
the findings of the Tomlinson Commission (see U.G. 61-'55, e.g., 
S~ction III, p. 26; Section IV, P• 39; Section IV, p. 54) of 
which he had been a member and whose report he had signed. 
9 1.Assembly Debates, 16 September 1958, col •. 3924. 
92 6. I RR. 7 57, PP• 3f. 
93A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1957-58, 
p. 223. 
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participated in strikes, a criminal action in respect to 
African workers. 94 Some simply did not pay their tax. "In 
1'1 • 
order to achieve the status of manhood, a National Party 
M.P. declared during the debates on the'taxation Bill, nthe 
eighteen-year-old Native does not mind paying this small in-
crease in tax. He considers it an honour. 1196 In the year 
preceeding the debate, 177,890 Africans were convicted and· 
fined or imprisoned for non-payment of tax. 96 
The Natives Taxation and Development Act represents a 
further step towards the elimination of all appearance of sub-
sidization of the African by the white population. "We do 
H . 
not have one homogeneous community, said the Minister of 
Finance, 11 in which the prosperous people can be taxed to prov-
ide services for the less prosperous, but we have various com-
. l! 97 
munities which must by economically sound individually. · 
Nonetheless, funds not directly contributed by Africans 
to public accounts continued to be spent· on their behalf. It 
will have been seen, for instance, that ~•5 million is drawn 
annually from the Consolidated Revenue FUnd to help finance 
the cost of African education.· Expenditures are also made on 
African health services and pensions. The Tomlinson Commiss-
ion considered that in 1951/52,· the total contribution of 
945trikes by .African workers are forbidden under War 
Measure 145 of 1942, under the Native Labour (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act of 1953, and under the various Masters and Ser-
vants laws, which make breach of contract a criminal offence, 
Ellen Hellmann, Racial Laws versus Economic ggg Social Forces 
(Johannesburg: S.A. Institute of Race Relations, 1955), p. 27. 
Nevertheless, strikes by African workers do occur, more than a 
hundred in 1957, according to the Minister of Justice, who re-
ported that 539 Africans were charged and 274 convicted dur-
ing the year for participating in th~.A Survey Q[ Race Relat-
ions in South Africa 1957-58, pp. 164f. 
96Assembly Debates, 16 ~eptember 1958, col. 3891. 
96Assembly Debates, 16 September 1958, col. 3880. 
97Assembly Debates, 16 September 19.58, col. 3837. 
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Africans to public funds, through direct and indirect taxes, 
rents, fines, pass fees, prison labor, etc., hardiy balanced 
even that portion of non-assignable public expenditure on gen-
eral administration.(police, justice, defence, transport and 
communications) which could be charged theoretically to them 
as beneficiaries. Leaving this imbalance in respect to the 
cost of common services aside, the Commission estimated that 
.a net amount of at least ~8,624,000 was spent on their behalf 
by Central, Provincial and Local Governments, and in the form 
of grants by private industries and welfare agencies·. 98 .Anot-
. her study, employing different methods of calculation, placed 
the Africans 1 · Hdebt to their white guardiansu at ~16 million 
for the financial year 1954/55. 99 
.. 
Many Afrikaners and English-speaking Whites, on occas-
ion_, take pride in such figures, regarding them as indications 
of the sacrifices they undergo to improve African living stan-
dards. At other times they find it disturbing to think that 
their tax money is being spent on Africans, whom they feel 
should be learning to become self-dependent. This latter att-
itude, which inspired the legislation we have just been discus-
sing, appeal'!s to be the more important of the two, as far as 
internal politics are concerned; it is catered to by other 
figures which suggest that Government on all levels spenasno 
more on providing services to Africans than it collects from 
them. Thus, after the Native Affairs Department issued a press 
release in August 1956, claiming that during the 1955/56 fin-
ancial year the Central Government and Provincial Administrat-
ions would spend a total of ~35 ·million on behalf of Africans, 100 
Dr. Verwoerd rose during the following Parliamentary session 
96U.G. 61-'55, p. 38. 
9~isser, Ekonomiese Aspekte van Naturellebelasting, 
PP• 98f. 
100A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1957-58, 
P• 83. 
247 
to deny, as he put it, "the accusation that the Government 
was a~legedly taxing the Whit~ taxpayers of the country in 
i 
order,to provide different types of services for the,Bantu, 
such as housing, transport, and even Trust tractors on the 
tribal farms of the Bantu and ;,services of that kind •••• u More, 
; 
I • he saf.d, was being con:tributeaj by Africans to the .cost of 
II : tJ;les.e services than people realize--r estimate the figure·at 
I , 
anything between I:,30,000,000 and ltA.Q,OOO,OOO.nJ.ol. 
One Member of Parliament concluded from this that 
revenue from and expe;nditure o~ Africans were self-balancing 
. . 
items.J..oa I However, the two sets of figures are incomplete, 
the former leaving out loc~l Gpvernment expenditures'· Dr. 
Verwoerd's excluding certain items of revenue.J..os 
~ . i 
But. even were the gaps ~o be filled, and 'comparability 
; 
established, ·the resulting figure still would not be a valid 
inqicator of the financial rel~tions prevailing between the . 
white and black population groups. There are two main reas-
' Qns for this. The first conce~ns the degree to which the sys-
tem of.segregated racial accounts reflects the actual sources 
of State revenue. 
Under this system, taxes paid by white persons enter 
the Consolidate·d Revenue Fund; 1 taxes paid by Africans general-
[ 
ly are credited to the Native ~evenue Account. Indirect taxes, 
I 
s"t:tch as import duties, excises, etc., are entered into the 
' Consolidated Revenue Fund, but imost estimates of revenue 
" 
l.o:L.Assembly Debates, 28 :March 1957, cols. 3744-6. 
I 
.J.. 02.Assembly Debates, 16 'september 1958, col. 3948. 
. J.oasee RR. l07/58, pp. 5-11, for a more detailed break-
down and .fuller discussion of t~ese figures. Dr. Verwoerd's 
estimate included African contr:ibutions in indirect taxation 
(+mport duties, excise, license:s, stamp duties, fines, the road 
fund, etc.,) which goes into the Consolidated Revenue Fund; 
Government levies for particula~ services (e.g. hospital lev-
ies); on-the-spot payments for public services, such as rents 
paid to municipalities, transport fares, etc.; 11 Kaffir beeru 
profits to pay for housing const.ruction; services performed· 
g~atis by Africans, but which h~ve a monetary value, such as 
building dams and schools, erecting fences in the rural areas, 
etc. · 
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ce.J-lected from Africans, including all those previously quot-
ed, assign a share of this indirect taxation as an African 
contribution. No other part of State revenue that is not paid 
in by Africans is regarded as a contribution from them. 
One of the principle sources of State revenue is com-
pany taxation, the taxes pai~ by businesses. In other.coun-
tries, the revenue derived from the collection of such taxes 
is considered to belong to the community as a whole, (as is 
indeed all revenue), and not to any one section of ite It 
would be difficult in any case to decide to whom such revenue 
~ . 
belonged, as the profits on income on wh~ch corupany taxes are 
paid are usually a product of the joint efforts of many differ-
ent people. 
In South Africa, the State receives more than a third 
of its total revenue from company taxation, paid on the prof-
its of mining, industry, commerce and farming. For instance, 
in 1954, company income tax yielded ~2,635,000.~ 04 All of 
this is credited to the Consolidated Revenue Fund; and is con~ 
sidered to be a contribution of the white community; no por-
"' tion of it is included in any of the previously quoted estim-
ates of the amount Africans contribute to State revenue. 
There seems to be no principle involved in the assign-
ment of this revenue to one section of the population. It·is 
not held that the proceeds of this tax belong to the people 
who pay it, the treasurers, managers or owners of companies, 
and must be reserved for their. individual or collective .benef-
it. There are no ·separate accounts for white businessmen and 
It wo~kers. Although the latter are no more directly responsible 
' f~r pay:l,.ng company income tax then black workers, benefits 
they receive from its expenditure are not regarded as subsid-
ies. The same position obtains in other respects, also. Des-
~ 040fficial Year Book of the Union of South Africa, 
No. 29, 1956-57, p. 435.--
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pite the claim of some Afrikaners that they constitute a sep~ 
arate people, 105 they have not demanded a separate Afrikaner 
Account; or inv.oked for themselves the principle of 'self-
help'; or acknowledged any 1 debt' which might have been felt 
owing to the more prosperous and heavily-taxed English~speak­
ing section. 
Indeed, there would seem to be no valid basis for doing 
so. The national income and the national revenue is a joint 
product of many efforts. It is irrelevant who pays the. reven-
. 
ue, and there have been no satisfactory attempts to disentan-
gle t,he relative shares of the different groups who produce 
the wealth such payments represent. It is clear that with-
out the African.worker, no less. than the white worker and 
entrepreneur, few businesses in South Africa would exist. 
More than half the· labor force in secondary industry, more 
than 87 per cent in agriculture, more than 93 per cent in min~ 
ing, is Black. 106 If a system of separate accountsis to 
serve as a meaningful indicator of the contributions of groups 
' ' to each other s income through public finance, then the deter-
mj}nation of the amount Africans contribute to the taxable 
• profits of companies would seem to be a necessary requirement. 
As already mentioned, in none of the contemporary estimates, 
purporting to show by how much Africans are sUbsidized, has 
this been done. 107 
10611We know we are not a section.--We know--that we are 
a people,- a people with our own character, ourown language 
II 
and culture, our own past and our own future, Dr. N. Dieder-
ichs, Ekonomiese Bewuswording, ·p. 10. (Author'· s italics.) 
106U.G. 61-'55, pp. 35f. (Figures apply to 1946.) 
l. 07The Report of the Commission 211 Native Education 
1949-1951 admitted the indirect contribution of Africans to 
the wealth of the country, and, consequently, to the taxable 
income of companies and non-African individuals, but made no 
attempt to reach an estimate of the amount, (see U.G. 53-'51, 
paras. 156-162). The Native Economic Commission tried to 
assess this contribution in 1932, employing an arbitrary for-
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There is a further reason why claims that Africans are 
subsidized need to be qualified. These claims take no account 
of the influence of the color bar, whose operation governs 
the distribution of income, thus determining the relative 
size of the payments which the respective color groups are 
able to make towards State revenue~ 
The effect of the color bar, for example on the magnit-
ude of company·tax, can be seen as follows: Approximately 
half of the State's revenue from this tax, or about one-sixth 
of its total revenue, comes from the mining industry, chiefly 
from the gold mines. The margin of profit in gold-mining, 
from which these taxes are derived, is wedged between the · 
price of gold, which is not subject to the industry's control, 
and the cost of production, whose major component is the cost 
of labor. If the wages of black miners were higher, the prof-
it margins would be reduced. However, these wages are gener-
ally prevented from rising, i.a .. , through the prohibition 
and suppression of strikes, and through the operation of the 
pass laws, which hinder .Africans from selling their labor to 
the highest bidder, limiting competition for their services 
between the mining industry, which pays them a wage whose pur-
chasing power has not risen in half a century, and secondary 
industries, where the pay is higher. 108 In the absence of 
these discriminatory restraints, the industry's income probab-
ly would be distributed differently, so that even were the 
State's revenue from gold-mining to remain constant, it would 
be gathered from the· sources in different proportions--for 
mula which it termed, the 'National Income Ratio'. (On the 
basis of this formula, approximately ~15 million of the ~0· 
million received by the· State from company taxation in 1954 
could be credited to African revenue.) See U.G. 22- 1 32, 
paras. 1062, 1094-5; for further details and criticism, see 
ibid., .Addendum by Mr. Lucas, :para. 357; Round Table, 22:908, 
.September 1932. 
~ 08See below, pp.. 261n, 269. 
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instance, less from company inc?me tax, and more from import 
duties and excise on goods which black miners, better paid, 
could afford to buy. Thus the absolute and relative contrib-
' ution of· black people· to State tevenue would seem higher than 
it now appears. 
These restraints on the growth o~ African incomes oper-
ate not only in th~ gold-mininglindustry, but over the whole 
.economy, depressing wages belowlthe value t~ employers o~ the 
workers' output •. ~ 09 A Government body, the now de~unct Social 
and Economic PlanningCouncil, ~rew att~ntion to this in 1943, 
when it expressed the hope nthat the large groups who now 
.receive less than is warranted ~y the contribution their work 
makes to the national income will receive higher wages'~ ~:1.o 
Various manifestations o{ color discrimination also 
.! • 
affect the relative size o~ individual incomes. Thus, more 
is spent from puqlic funds in educating and training Whites 
than Africans~ This reduces pressure against the barriers 
of job reservation. It does not eliminate that pressure, 
I 
otherwise these barriers would *ot exist. Most manage~ial, 
professional, skilled, and many!semi-skilled positions in the 
' 
economic structure are closed to Africans by legislation and 
i • 
by white conventions. Thousands o~ unskilled jobs are like-
wise shut off to A~rican job seJkers by the 'civilised labour 
policy'. Moreover, the right to !locate a business is restricted 
! 
on a racial basis. These educational, occupational and commer-
cial expressions of the color b~r limit the income--earning 
i . 
opportunities of A~rican taxpay~rs. At the same time, they 
' increase the incomes of white taxpayers, who do not have to 
:l. 09Sheila T. Van Der Horst, 'A Plan ~or the Union's 
Backward Areas: Some Economic ~spects of the Tomlinson Com-
mission's Report, 11 S .A.J .. E., 24 :!94, June 1956. 
110Social and Economic P~anning Council, Report No. 1: 
Re-emp1o¥ment, Reconstruction ~d CQuncil's Status, J~43, 
(U.G. 9- 43), para. 40~ : 
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face unrest.ricted competition ~rom four-fifths of the populat-
ion. 
Estimates of the degree;to which the African population 
is subsidized by the white pop~lation (apart from having been 
challenged by Government leaders) include no adjustment for 
I 
the extent to which the color ~ar transfers income-earning 
and tax-paying capacity from t~e former to the latter. They 
make no attempt to distinguish'the productive, as distinct 
I 
I 
from the paying·, sources of rerenue. · Such estimates-are 
therefore misleading. 
It will be seen that the 
I 
in a context where the earnings 
i 
policy of 1 self-help 1 operates 
of those subject to the policy 
are first depressed by variouslrestrictions, ·and that it seeks 
to limit public expenditures on the health, education, housing 
. . I 
and general welfare. of these people to the taxable proceeds 
of such earnings. 
Some of the problems emerging from this were raised in 
Parliament during debate on th~ proposed tax increases. Part-
icularly active here were the Natives 1 Representatives, the 
three white Members of Parliament whom Africans in the Cape 
i 
Province had been entitled to ;elect after the abolition of 
the common franchise in 1936. :Typical of their interventions 
was that by Mr. Lee Warden, Na~ives' ReprE?sentative (Cape . ·~, 
Western), who asked the Minist!er of Finance what advice he 
I 
should give his constituents w~o wanted to know how to take 
care of their families on wage
1
s of ~3 a week. The Minister 
t did not reply. · 1 
A Nationalist Member subsequently declared that the 
. J I 
contribution of the Natives Representatives to the debate 
was harmful, and that it disturbed 1tthe harmony and goodwill" 
between the races; "the count~y and.the people outside are 
longing for the happy day wheri this House will get rid of 
I 
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those hon. members.ul.l.1. 
That day came in 1960, when the limited representation 
of Africans in Parliament was terminated. 
Policy And Poverty 
I 
i 
I 
I 
Extreme poverty marks no:t only the lot of most Africans, 
but of most people. In India ppverty is worse than in South 
I Africa,~l. 2 and it is worse in ~ny independent African states. 
I . 
Unlike some other countries, 
population problem. Only 15 
ho~ever, South Africa faces no 
I per cent of the land is arable, 
but this is more than double the area being cultivated. More-
l . 
over, the country is rich in mi~eral resources, coal, iron 
. ' 
ore, asbestos, chrome, manganese, aside from gold and diamonds. 
I 
Means have not been lacking for\the reduction of ignorance and 
the elimination among the poor of economically-wasteful cus-
toms.l.l.a The question therefore arises whether the persia-
tence of widespread poverty in the country is not related to 
the nature of its political sys~em, to policies and conditions 
i 
which the political system help~ make possible and impossible. 
I 
The political system, as \in a number of other countries, 
I 
.is geared to respond to the vot~rs, who like their counterparts 
,· 
elsewhere may employ the ballot :to advance and protect their 
interests, material and otherwise. The system is distinguish-
. ed, of course, by the fact that ,the vote is confined to the 
l.l.l..Assembly Debates, 16 S~ptember 1958, col. 3962. 
I 
~l. 2The Tomlinson Commissibn noted •rtha t the Bantu in 
the Union possibly enjoy a somewrat better living standard 
than the average inhabitant of I~dia~ where the per capita 
income amounted to ~19.14 in 194~-49 -~~19.64 being the fig-
ure for the Bantu in 1946-47 (exclusive of additions from 
'the subsistence sector and by way of official budgets), U.G. 
61-!55, P• 39. . i . 
~1. 8With regard to reform bf the tribal land tenure 
·system, see below, pp. 301, 310.1 
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white .people.~~4 No restraints exist on the exercise of the 
power this gives them, beyond those that are self-imposed. 
Under the following headings, we shall examine some of the 
implications of this, as they relate to the question at hand. 
A. Policies that foster poverty as ~·incidental consequence 
or their operation 
Through their exclusive control of State power, the 
white people may order matters affecting the distribution of 
wealth in such a manner as to secure for themselves the max-
imum advantage, leaving members of the voteless majority 
with whatever remains, which sometimes may be insufficient 
for survival. It will be seen that policies benefiting var-
ious sections of the electorate, farmers, workers and business-
men, have tended to produce this side effect. 
The white farmers have always exerted a considerable 
political influence. A majority of 81 out of the 153 Members 
of the House of Assembly, elected in 1938, represented their 
interests, 53 being farmers themselves, while 28 were lawyers, 
professional politicians, doctors and clergymen elected from 
farming areas.~~ 5 After the 1953 General Election, 70 of the 
159 Members taking seats in the House of Assembly were far-
mers •. ~1. 6 
Between 1910/11 and 1935/36, the State expended 
~112,214,970 directly on behalf of the white farmers 
(~71,493,957 from loan.votes, ~o,ooo,ooo of which had been 
1 ~4~When we speak of democracy--and the Leader of the 
Opposition·knows it--it is the democracy which we practiced 
in the Republics and which we are practisingttnow, and that is 
that the people who vote govern the country, Dr. Verwoerd 
addressing Parliament, 18 September 1958, qu0ted in Natal 
Mercury, 19 September 1958. 
1 i 5 Marquard, The Black Man's Burden, by John Burger 
(pseud.), p. 117e 
1~ 6 Carter, QP.• cit$, p. 180 .. 
255 
written off by 1940; and *'40,721,013 out of revenue)e Over 
the same period, IJ565,843 was granted O!i' loaned by. the State 
for agricultural improvements in the African Reserves, this 
sum including the salaries of the white officials who super-
vised its expenditure.~~ 7 
Further indicative of this community's political in-
fluence are the numerous laws and regulations devoted to tar-
iff protection, export subsidies and preferential railway 
rates, which have been framed in the present century in an eff-
ort to maintain agricultural prices and bolster farmers' in-
comes against crop and market fluctuations.~~e As in other 
countries, such measures made the price of food higher than 
it would otherwise have been. A leading economist found that 
their effect was to leave South Africa in the 1930's with the 
It dearest bread, sugar and butter of almost any civilised ag-
ricultural country in the world. 11 ~~~ In the case of maize, 
' . the Africans staple food, the price on at least one occasion 
was made too high. This happened after the passage of the 
1937 Marketing Act, a measure designed to regulate the.· func-
tioning of control boards for the marketing of various agric-
ultural products. The control boards were entrusted with the 
administration of price-fixing schemes which were intended to 
stabilize producers' incomes. Only white producers were en~ 
titled to vote on the'schemes. 120 Under the Maize Industry 
Control Board's scheme, it was decided to sell maize to stock-
1~ 7Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, p. 120; 
Marquard, Qg. cit., P• 49. 
:1.~ 8See'Eric·Davis, uSom~ Aspects of the Marketing of 
Farm Products in South Africa, S.A.J.E., 1:167-187, June 
1933· 
~~ 90 .. S. Richards, uSubsidies, Quotas, Tariffs and 
the Excess Cost of A.gricul ture in South Africa, u S .A. J .E., 
3:389, September 1935 .. 
~ 20van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, p. 311. 
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feeders as feed for their cattle at specially reduced terms, 
the loss on the cheap feed to be compensated by the higher 
price charged human consum.ers.l.::n The 1937 Annual Report 
of the Victoria Hospital, Lovedale, Cape, af~ords a glim~se 
into a side effect of the scheme in one small district o~ 
aouth Africa 1 s countryside. In the drought-stricken area in 
which the hospital was situated, A~ricans r:•were living al-
most entirely on maize bought at stores.-" ·They were charged 
16s. to 17s-. 6d. a bag ,.,cash down;', while the price to ~ar­
mers for ~attening up their stock-was fixed at 8s. 6d. Out 
of 554 out-patients received by the hospital in September of 
that year, 133 were cases of recognized malnutrition. There 
were 117 admissions (in-patients) of persons suffering prim-
arily from malnutrition. Nine persons starved to death. 
There were nine other dea~hs in which starvation was certi~­
ied.as one of the causes of death.:L 22 
A mild influenza epidemic, which caused colds among 
the white patients at the hospital, took 32 lives among the 
Africans, whose resistance had been lowered by"'malnutrition, 
The wealthier Africans who could af~ord a suf~icient 
quantity of maize could afford little else. Some of them died 
of scurvy. All the patients who died an the hospital o~ this 
disease had been living solely on maize. 123 
:J..Zl.R. Leslie, w. H. Hutt, Thomas H. 
erf.son, Eric Emmett, ttEconomists' Protest. 
and Maize Marketing Seheme: Memorandum of 
S.A.J.E., 6:4lf, March 1938. 
Kelly, H. M. Rob-
The Dairy Produce 
Objections, 11 
:L 22The Re§istrar 1 s Office in the district refused to 
· accept the term starvation11 on the death certificates, and 
returned them to·the doctors. 
:~..zett.Annual Report 1937 Victoria Hospital Lovedaletr, in 
Lovedale Missionary Institution~ Report for 1231 (Lovedale, 
Cape: The Lovedale Press, 19371, pp. 45-49. The report 
attributes these conditions to 11the action of the Maize 
Control Board in forcing up so enormously the price of this 
staple and only che~p food of the poorest people during a 
time of drought •••• 
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The maize schemes continued. At the beginning of 1940, 
when the world price of maize was 5s., the Government guaran-
teed farmers an export price of from 8s• to 9s. 6d. per ba·g, 
setting aside for the purpose a large subsidy, which, in eff-
ect, came from local consumers who were charged 13s. per bag-~ 
over double the world price.j_ 24 Mor-e recently, the cost to 
the country of the export of maize at a loss amounted to M.7 
million on the 15 million bags shipped out in 1958.~26 In 
view of the continued prevalence of malnutrition in the coun-
try~ this clearly does not represent the total cost; even 
many who could afford sufficient quantities of maize ~auld, 
because of its higher price, have less money available for 
other :foods. 
The latter, including meat, cheese, wheat, sugar, but-
ter, were also affected by the policy of·maintaining high 
agricultural prices.j_ 26 In several instances, the farmers 
were thereby helped to more than meet their costs. The prof-
itability of the marketing scheme for butter, for example, is 
indicated by the fact that the locally-unsold production sur~ 
plus increased by several million lbs. after the Government 
began granting bounties to cover losses incurred in export; 127 
~24Lewis Sowden, The Union Q[ South Africa (Garden City, 
New York: Dobleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1943), pp. 237f. 
l. 25Die Transvaler, 31 May 1958. (Estimate) 
l. 26 IJ . If . . 4. . Richards, Subsidies •••• , §_.~.~ .. E., 3: 03, 
September 1935. Apparently, AfricaRs did not constitute much 
of a market for these products, a farmer informing the Native 
Economic Commission .in the 1930's that, 11 We have so many kaf-
firs that are just shadows, and one feels that they cannot 
even earn 30s. a month, 11 U .. G. 22- 1 32, Addendum by F • .A. w. 
Lucas, para. 61. 
l. 27J. G, 1\neen, 1 ~The Present Position of the Dairy 
Industry in South Africa,lf S.A.J.E., 3:44~,447, September 
1935· Rising losses on tae export of butter were recently 
reported in Die Transvaler, 31 May 1958. 
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in the ease of wheat, after importation was prohibited in 
1930 and export quotas fixed and guaranteed, sub-marginal 
lands were brought into cultivation, the wheat acreages in-
creasing in all Provinees.l.28 
In 1941, the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements 
Commission observed that 11 the interests more especially of 
the poorer consumers were'in many cases not properJ._.y studiedu 
in the State's marketing policies.l.29 
_It is also clear that the interests of non-voting 
groups generally have not been considered in State policies 
designed to benefit white workers. Noteworthy here are the 
laws and regulations con.stituti:rig the industrial color bar, 
whose effect is that of a system of internal tariffs, forcing 
up the price of goods produced by protected workers but sold 
to all consumers, including the unprotected workers. Some-
times, as with Government efforts to introduce the 'civilised 
labour policy' into private industry,l.Bo an external tariff 
was employed to give effect to this internal tariff. This 
happened in the textile industry which, at the time of the 
'civilised labour policy's introduction, was mainly engaged 
in manufacturing cotton sheeting and blankets for the 1 kaffir-
trade1. In order to fulfill the double requirements of 
achieving 111 sa tisfactory labour conditions 11 (i.e., employing 
a greater ratio of more highly-paid white'workers), and sur-
viving the competition of cheap imported blankets, the indus-
try requested tariff protection. This was granted with the 
result that the price of blankets increased by 90 per cent, 
enabling the industry to re-organize its labor force. Not 
l. 28Riehards, 11 Subsidie~ 0 ••• , 11 S.A.J.E., 3:382,391, September-1935; w. A- Martin, Subsidies, Quotas, Tariffs 
and the Excess Cost of Agriculture in South Africa: A Crit-
icism,11 S.A.J.E., 3:561, December 1935., 
l. 2 ~U.G. 40- 1 41, para. 91. 
l.
30See above, pp. lOOf. 
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only were employment opportuniti.es consequently narrowed for 
non-white workers, but the higher price of blankets drove 
these· articles beyond the reach of some of th~ poorest Afr1c-
and.~3~ No doubt this represents an extreme instance, but 
almost all applications of the industrial color bar, though 
not designed to harm non-voting groups, limit their job opp-
ortunities while. simultaneously raising the cost of living. 
Turning to the white business community,.the most 
obvious instances of State policies favoring its members are 
the laws excluding.African trade unions from the official 
registration necessary for them to function as collective 
bargaining bodies; and prohibiting African workers from strike 
action. ~ 32 Alt.h.ou,gh ~eneral politicfi.l ·inter.ests are· al·s..o . : 
involved here ,<·tliet·emp~oyer:' group ··:obviou~J:.or~:have·· deri.ved. 
material benefit from these measures at the expense of Afric-
an workers. In only 9 of a reported 64 illegal strikes 
staged by African workers in 1958 were the disputes settled 
by the granting of higher wages; in 2.3 of the disputes, the 
striker& were prosecuted.~ 34 
Certain self•imposed limits have been drawn by the white 
people on the opportunities for economic aggrandizement affor-
ded by their m9nopoly of power. Thus, about 12 per cent of 
the country's land area, including some of the more well-wat-
ered parts, were reserved for African occupation by the Land 
J.s~u.G. 22-'32, .Addendum by F. A. w. Lucas, paras. 353f. 
~ 32For detailed discussions of the relevant legislation 
tt 
and its application, see Ellison Kahnff The Right to Strike in 
South .Africa: an Historical Analysis, §. • .A.J.E., 11:24-1+7, 
March 1943; Routh, Industrial RelatioRs and ~ Relations, pp. 
lf, 26f; Horrell, Non-European Policies in the Union and the 
Measure of their Success, pp. 19f.; Brian Bunting, The Afric-
an in Industry," Africa South, 4:18-27, Oct.-Dec. 1959; .G. V. 
Doxey, The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa (Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press, 1961;;-pp.· 135-139, 150-153· 
~ 34A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa ·1258-?9, 
pp. 223f. It was not stated how the remaining strikes were 
settled. 
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Acts of 1913 and 1936 ~ the emplo'yment of Africans on skilled 
work in defined areas, primarily urban African locations, haer 
been permitted; African businessmen bave been l·icensed to 
trade in urban locations and rural Reserves. Moreover, the 
i 
economic opportunities of ethel politically powerless groups, 
the Coloureds and Indians, have
1 
not beerr completely restric-
ted even when the activities ~fi these groups clashed with 
white interests. In no case, hpwever, have· such self-imposed 
limits impoverished sections o:t:i the white~.eomm.unity. 
i ' 
B. Policy requiring poverty as a ·condition for its · ·· .. , -, ·· 
I 
·. ! .. 
fulfillment I 
I 
Historically, mining and·white-controlled agriculture 
have experi.enced difficulties i:9- attracting African labor, 
difficulties stemming partly fr~m the inability of these sec-
tors to offer wages competitiveiwith those.prevailfng in in-
. I 
dustry and commerce. For instance in 1958, when the average 
annual cash wage of the 445,000 [African workers engaged in 
private manufacturing industry ~nd construction was about 
. i 
~156, it was about ~8 for the 480,000 African mineworkers 
I 
(exclusive of the value of food,: accommodation, medical ser-
vi.ces and recreational amenities\, supplied by the mines free 
of charge).l.So' General statisti1cs are difficult to obtain 
I 
for the 750,000 African farm laborers, as wage rates and con-
' ditions of employment vary widely from region to region; 
studies of farming areas in the Orange Free State and Trans-
' 
·' 
Vaal, in 1957, showed a range in:the annual cost to the farmer 
of emplp·ying an African laborer ?f from *-41 to ~72, figures 
I 
that include the value of both cfsh and kind payments, but 
l. 36See A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa ~-
52, pp. 245, 250; and pp. 201, 204, in the-survey of the fol-
lowing year. The average cost of food and accommodation, acc-
ording to an International I.abor!Of.fice estimate for 1957 (cit-
ed ibid., p. 204), was 3s. ~. per miner, pe~ shift, which 
would work out at about M4 l'l-te::~2 a year. 
l 
\ 
I 
I 
26l 
exclude the value of additions to the laborer's income from 
the consumption and sale of portions of his own crops. and 
livestock~ raised on land made available to him by the far-
mer.l.86 
With regard to mining, not only have African wages 
·been lower than in other urban industries., but their purchas-
ing power seems not to have risen since the nineteenth cen-
tury.~87 The pay, moreover, ~as been inadequate to support 
urban family life, with the result that the mines tradition-
ally have relied for the bulk of their labor force on peasants 
recruited from rural areas, where the living costs are lower 
and opportunities exist for supplementing wages to so~e ex-
tent. In a policy statement to the Witwatersrand Mine Nat-
ives' Wages (Lansdown) Commission in l944, the Chamber of 
Mines declared: 
The ability of the mines to maintain their-native lab-
our force by means of tribal natives from the reserves 
at rates of pay which are adequate for this migratory 
class of native but inadequate in practice for the det-
ribalised urban native is a fundamental factor in the 
economy of the Gold Mining industry.l. 38 
' l. 36See A Survey of Fac~. Relations in §..Q}lth ~frica 
l958-59, pp. 237-239· 
l. 37Doxey, ~· cit.~ p. 44, gives African gold-miner's 
average wages as 6ls. per month in l894 (~36. l2s., p.a.), 
and 30s •. to 45s. per week in l897 (1:,78 to ~ll6 p.a.), ibid., 
p. 52. Whatever the exact position, it would seem that, 
considering the lowered purchasing power of the currency, 
the real wages of African miners are presently less than what 
they were in the l890'~. 
l.aeu.G. 2l-'44, par~. lQl. The Commission questioned 
! the assertionthat miD:e wages were adequate f?r tribal Afric-
ans, noting that the budgets of a black miner s cost of liv-
ing, which the Chamber of Mines had offered in evidence, were 
alligned to his ear~ings, and made no provision whatever for 
milk, fat, meat or vegetables. In fact, the Commission claim-
ed that if the average amount derived by a Transkeian migrant 
laborer from his land and stock in the Reserve were added to 
his mine wages, his total income feel far short of his living 
requirements; and that even were the period he spent- .under-
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Compounding the difficulty of mine recruitment, pres-
ented by the low wage factor and the necessity of the miners 
' living away from their families in barrack conditions, has 
been the hazardous nature of the work. Between 1911 and 1957, 
26,040 black and 2,156 white miners lost their lives through 
accidents in the Transvaal and Orange Free State gold mines.~ 39 
The mortality totals fo.r such occupational illnesses as 
phthisis are not known, but in 1958, for instance, the death 
rate on the gold mines from disease was 2.23 per thousand 
African workers employed, which means nearly 900 deaths that 
year.~40 
The problem of securing a sufficient labor supply for 
.this industry has long interested not only the mine manage-
ments, but the State. Mining taxation represents one of the 
chief sources of public revenue, the gold mines alone yiel-
ding *'500,000,000 in taxes between 1910 and 1960.~4 l. The 
ground extended, e.g.;.to.HLmonths in·everytwo years, he 
would still be unable to meet expenses necessary to maintain 
himself and fr.is family above the line of "ordinary reasonable 
requirement, ibid., paras. 228, 245. 
_l. 39Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines, 
Sixty-Eighth Annual Report, Year 1251, p. 82. 
l.40Private letter, dated 6 January 1960, from the Pub-
lic ~elations Department of the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State Chamber of Mines. In 1937, when, according to Leo Mar-
quard, 25 per cent of Africans applying to mine recruiters in 
the Reserves were reJected as physically unfit, 2,757 of the 
75 per cent considered fit died of diseases contracted on the 
mines, (The Black Man's Burden, by John·Burger (pseud.), p. 
110). The death rate from accidents and disease has been grad-
; ually reduced.· In the earlier days, it was much higher, 
10-14 per cent among African miners from the Transkei, and 
27-30 per cent among the large force recruited from Portuguese 
East Africa, see.S.Q. 9-'13, Mi~utes of EVidence, p. 210. 
l.4.iPrivate letter, dated 6 January 1960, from the Pub-
lic Relations Department of the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State Chamber of Mines. At the time the Economic and Wage 
Commission was reuorting (1926), the State took over 25 per 
cent of the gold illining industry's revenue in direct taxation 
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Low Grade Ore Commission estimated in 1932 that about half 
the Government's spending power came directly or indirectly 
from the mines; about half the white population obtained all 
or· part of its livelihood directly or indirectly from the 
gold mining industry; more than half the value of the coun~ 
try's imports were paid for in gold.~42 Though the relative 
importance of the industry in the total economy has since 
declined, the opinion of a witness befdre that Commission 
II . 
still stands: Dr. J •. E. Holloway, Director of Census .... con-
siders that if Sou~h Africa were suddenly deprived of its 
gold mines, it would be_a stupendous disaster, resulting in 
t.he smashing up. of the whole of its economic system. u~ 43 
From the beginning, the mines have been able io rec-
ruit most of their labor force outside the country, where, as 
in South Africa, the old subsistence economy has been break-
ing down .. Tribesmen from within the country's borders have 
also come forward, some seeking adventure, others to satisfy 
new wants. Withal, less than the requisite number of peas-
ants have been freely willing to offer their services. 
··To counteract the labor shortages, the State has oper-
and in profit sharing after wages and salaries had been paid, 
(U.G. 14-'26, Mills-Clay-Martin Report, para. 255). Subseq-
uently, the rate of taxation on gold mining profits remained 
higher in South Africa than in most other gold producing 
countries--42 per cent against 18 per·cent in Australia, 13-19 
per cent in Canada, 23 per cent· in RhQdesia, 14-18 per cent 
in the U.S .A.., 12 per cent in West .Africa, Frankel, Capital 
·Investment in Africa, p. 113. (Data for the 1930's). 
~42U.G. 16-•32, paras. 23f. In estimating that half 
the white population obtained all or part of its livelihood 
from the gold mines, the Commission included income of farmers 
from the sale of agricultural products to the mines for the 
feeding of the migrant labor force; income of the Witwaters-
rand commercial community; income of white persons living out-
side the Witwatersrand but engaged in public administration 
and transport services required by the gold mines and their 
dependent Witwatersrand population, etc. 
~43 Ibid., para. 24. 
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ated tb.ree mechanisms: one to stimulate the supply of cheap 
I 
:labor, another to canalize it t9 the lower paying sectors 
(including agriculture), and a ~hird to keep it cheap. 
The primary mechanism has been taxation. This 11 gentle 
stimulantrr, as the Cape Colony's mine-owning Prime Minister, 
I 
Cecil Rhodes, described it,.l.44 raises the coat of living, im-
, i 
posing additional cash demands on tribal Africans which can-
, 
not be met from the subsistence·economy. It has been tradit-
ionally employed to boost the l~bor supply. 146 The first 
national J?oll Tax on Africans, for instance, was designed not 
I 
only to facilitate the operatic~ of the 'self-help' princip-
' le, but simultaneously ~lito fore~ idle Natives to take up emp-
loyment." • 146 After this measure came into effect, the Board 
of Trade Industries found that )5 per cent of the cash income 
of the average rural African fa~ily was paid in taxes. 147 A 
A concurrent study of family incomes in the Transkei Reserve 
indicated that after the maize ~equirements of the family unit 
had been met, 146 an average surPlus of ~2. 12s. 6d. a year re-
mained to pay General and Local: taxes--*'1. lOs.-~and to buy 
144See above, pe 45.. , 
I 
145U.G. 22-'32, para. 53~· 
I 
146Assembly Debates, 16 ·peptember 1958, col. 3986. 
~47Leo Ma::t;'quard, The Bla:ck Man• s Burden, by John Bur-
ger (pseud.), p. 131. 1 
1 
:1.4: 8To a large extent the!se requirements must be met by 
cash payments, as the Rese.rves ,: despite their wholly agric-
ultural economy, are food impo~ting areas, exporting in return 
the earnings of ·migrant labor. : In 1936, over one million bags 
of maize were imported by-rail alone into the Transkei, (Soc-
ial and Economic Planning Coundil, Reuort No. 2_: The Native 
Reserves and their Place•in the Economy of the Union of South 
Africa, 1946, U.G. 32-'46~ Annexure XI)-.- Recently, the Chief 
Magistrate of the Transkei informed a Rotarians' meeting 1tthat 
the Transkei produces 2,000,000 bags of maize and consumes 
3,000,000 11 , quoted in Umthunywa, 11 March 1961, in J?.D. 
12/1961/129. : 
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all other food besides maize, clothing and other necessary and 
unnecessary item,E?; in some of the Transvaal Reserves, cash 
budg~ts were even more strained.J.49 In no Reserves was it 
ft possible for the inhabit·ani;'.s to meet the calls upon them for 
money payments, such as that represented by the General Tax, 
without many leaving the Reserves to work for Europeans in oth-
er parts of the ·countr.y.3..5 ° Four years after the imposition 
of the 1925 Poll Tax; 71.7 per cent of African males (18 years 
and over) were counted absent.from their homes in the Middle-
drift district (Cape), and over 60 per cent from many areas 
of the Cape, Transvaal and Natal.~ 5 ~ 
Figures published by the. Tomlinson Commission in 1956 
indicate that the incomes of African rural families have sub-
sequently risen~J.52 Nevertheless, the Commission reported 
that in 19-?l, 503,000 men, 44 per cent of the male population 
of the Reserves ~etween 15, and 64 years of age, were away frpm 
. t f h r II i their families working in he w ite areas • W th the excep-
tion of cripples and disabled persons,tt the. Commission stated, 
11nearly all. males are employed outside· the Bantu Areas a't one 
6r other stage between their 15th. and 50th birthdays. "l. 5 .8 
Thus, for many African peasants for whom adventure is 
not a steady lu;reor poverty not yet a strong enough impulse, 
the labor tax tips· the balance of their livelihoods, confron-
ting them with the choi·ce between leaving home to earn the 
...... 
149U.G. 22- 1 32, Addendum by F. A. w .. Lucas, p. 181. 
J.50 Ibid., P• 173. 
. ---:: 
l.Gl.Ibid., P• 173. 
J.52U.G.' 61-r55, pp. 98f. However, evidence pointing 
to the opposite is pJ?esented in F .. P. Spooner, South African 
B.redicament (London: Jonathan Cape, l960j, pp.~ 165-170, and 
Appendix,. pp. 259-288, where it is maintained that the real 
incomes of ~rican rural families underwent a 6.5 per cent 
decline between 1938/39 and 1953/54. 
16su.G. 61-!55, PP· 53, 94. 
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additional cash required, or remaining on their tribal plots· 
and courting arrest. They join the company of migration wor-
kers and enter the areas of South Africa under the economic 
ownership of the white people. 
At thi,s ·stag~, the 'pass' controls are brought into 
operation, channeling many of the migrants "f"ho have not already 
signed up at mine recruiting stations in the Reserves, or con-
tracted into the employ of farmers, towards these sectors. 
Under present 1 influx control' regulations, the cities have 
been virtually closed to African workseekers, ~54 more than 
71,000 being refused entry into the Witwatersrand alone during 
1953/54. :1.ss Those who have nevertheless been allOlt-Ted into 
the towns and have not found mine work or another job within 
three daY.s of their arrival, and those who have entered illeg-
. . 
ally, hav~ faced the possibility of being recruited for farm 
work by the police. In terms of a General Ci-rcular issued in 
1954 by the Secretary of. Native Affairs with the concurrence 
of the Secretary for Justice and the Commissioner of the South 
African Police, the police were instructed tha.t rrNatives arres-
ted between 2 p.m. on Sundays and 2 p.m. on Friday-s 11 for pass 
offences we're not to be charged immediately after arrest' but 
were to be ttremoved under escort to the district labour bureau 
and handed over to the Employment Officer. e •• IJ· Then 
(f) The Natives must be offered such em:t>lCyment as is avail-
able in non-prescrihed (i.e., rural) areas. Priority 
should be given to farm labour in this connection. 
(g) Natives who on account of their declining to accep~ 
employment are not released, are returned to the 
South Afric~n Police for prosecution.~66 
164Under Government Notice No. 63 of.9 January 1959, 
African workseekers are forbidden to enter urban areas with-
out previous permission from the rural labor bureaux, cited 
Doxey, 2J2· cit., p. 174_. 
;1. 66African Farm Labour, a·Survey (Johannesburg: South 
.African Institute-of Race Relatione, 1959), p. 124 .. 
;1. 56Quoted ibid., pp. 87f. 
.;\ .,:. 
-. ~ ·'-..:- ..:... ':.: .. -- ... : .. .: .: :_ - .. ,. . -·· . ,_ .; 
-···- ......... ·-· ... ---
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According to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner f'or 
the Witwatersrand, the police brought 14,154 alleged petty 
offenders to the Johannesburg district labor bureau in 1958, 
of' .whom 2,337 were induced to accept farm work in lieu of' 
prosecution.J.57 In 1959, this 'volunteer schem~' ·was suspen-· 
ded, pending a Government inquiry into reported abuses.~ 58 
Another scheme, whereby 100,000 short-term prisoners in 1953/ 
54 were voluntarily working out the unexpired portions of' 
their sentences_ on farms at a wage of 9d. a day,~59 appears 
also to have been discontinued recentlyQ~ 60 However, the 
utilization of' long-term convict labor on f'arms has grown, 
the number of farm jails'increasing from 16 to 24 between 
1959 and 1960 • .1. 6 ~ 11 La.ck of labour is the farmer's greatest 
problem," s~id. the Hea._d of the Prisons Department in 1959, 
addressing a meeting in a country town. 11 The Department of' 
Prisons has become the focal point to the'f'armers from the 
Limpopo to the Cape. They all want labour from us, but we 
cannot_supply it all. We are.doing everything in our power 
to meet the emergency.n~62 
The process of generating and directing the flow of 
cheap labor embodies, finally, a device to· insure that the 
labor remains cheap •. Such insurance is supplied by anti-
~ 67A Survey·of Race Relations in South Africa 1958-59, 
p. 313. 
p. 268. 
:1.seSee ibid •. , PP• 313-316. 
~ 69See African Farm Labour, §. Surve;y, pp. 94, 124. 
~ 60A Survey of Race Relations in South Afrioa 1959-60, 
~ 6 ~Se~ ibid., p. 267, and the previous year's Survey 
p. 320. Under this scheme, farmers erect jails on their own 
farms and arrange for African prisoners to be sent there with 
the Department of Prisons, paying the latter a hire fee. 
J. 6 2 Quoted in Ben Turok, 11 The African on the Farm, 11 
Africa South 4:30, Oct.-Dec. 19559· 
268 
strike legislation. We have already discussed this device in 
other connections. I:n 1946, it was used on the mines. 
Here, the sharp war~time rise in prices had been in-
creasingly contracting the real incomes of the industry's 
migrant labor force. Between 1939 and 1943, according to the 
Chief Magistrate of the Translrei, the price of clothing re~­
uired by the migrant laborers and their families rose by 90 
per cent, and that of food by 50 per cent. No allowance was 
paid to the African miners to , enable . them to meet the ~ncreas--~ 
ed living costs,~ 63 with the result that their real wages 
conti~ued to fall. In 1944, the ·Lansdown Commission, inves-
tigating the position, recommended a cost-of-living allowance, 
. . 
a boot allowance, and a wage increase for the black miners 
which, all told, would have cost the industry ~,642,000, an 
amount equivalent to a rise in working costs of approximately 
lOd. per ton of ore milled, sufficient to close down four of 
the mines working lower grade ores: 
Viewed as a whole, an industry which distributes approx-
~mately ~f7~000~000 pe~ annum ~0 its sharehol~ers rr.e., 
more than tne total wage bill of the industry s 30~ 000 · 
.African miner@) and contributes in direct payment to the 
State approximately ~27,000,000 should not find it beyorrd 
its capacity to defray annually in wages to its most low-
ly paid workers an additional ~2,600,000.l. 64 
The Commissio"n suggested that the ill-effect of its 
recommendations, namely that certain ore bodies would be plac-
ed outside payable limits, could be prevented were the Govern-
ment concurrently to reduce its indirect taxation (through 
customs duties and discriminatory railway freightage charges) 
on mining requirements,~ 65--a reflection on relationship bet-
163U.G. 21~r44, paras. 225f. 
~ 64 Ibid., paras. 325-329. 
~66 Ibid., paras. 325-329. 
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ween miners' wages and Government revenue. However, neither 
the cost-of-living or boot allowances were instituted, and a 
fraction only of .the recommended wage increases was granted. ~ 6 6 
Al channels whereby the miners might negotiate wage claims 
were closed; a union formed ~mong the miners during the war 
years wa's ignored by the Chamber of Mines, which in 1944 
issued a circular to its officials instructing them under no 
circumstances to meet with the union1 s representa.tives.~67 
Of numerous letters reportedly sent to the Chamber between 
1941 and 1946, on onl:y one occasion '~was any reply received 
by the Union, and that reply was merely a printed postcard 
I . t I I 
saying that the matter was receiving attention • This was 
apparently sent in error by a subordinate clerk."~68 The pos-
ition on the morning of August 12, 1946, was that African 
wages ~n cash terms were barely higher, if·at all, and lower 
in real terms, than what they had been fifty-six years be~ 
fore.~69 .At this stage, more than 70,000 of the peasant min-
ers downed tools and refused to go underground. The biggest 
strike in Johannesburg's history was on. It was crushed with-
in four days. Nine Africans wer_e killed, over a hundred in-
. jured, the strike leaders arrested and jailed, and the workers 
~ 66Social and Economic Planning Council, Report No. 
11: Economic As~ects of the Gold Mining Industry (~), 
1948, (U.G. 32- 48), para. 33; South African Weekly, 24 
August 1946. 
~ 67Edw~rd Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, A History of 
the Black Man s Struggle for Freedom in South Africa (London: 
Victor.'. Gollancz, 1948), p. 345. 
168Ibid., P• 345. 
~69The average pay in 1946 was 58s. for a 24 shift 
month, and 67s. 8d. for a 28 day month; in 1890, the average 
pay for African miners was 63s. a month, South African Week-
lY, 17 August 1946. 
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clubbed back to the shafts by the police.~ 70 The Prime Mlnis-
ter, General Smuts, remarked that "he was no"t unduly concer-
ned over what was happening in the.mines because the strike 
was not caused by legitimate grievances, but by agitators.rr~ 7 ~ 
In summary, it will be seen that the mining industry, 
partly because of its heavy tax obligations, has geared gold 
production to the consequences in cheap labor of African rur-
al poverty; and that the industry has been assisted in this 
by State measures which raise living costs, help to maintain 
low wages, and thus perpetuate that poverty. 
Obviously, such a system is facilitated through the 
denial to the cheap laborers of the opportunity to make them-
selves understood_politically, leaving ignorance and miscon-
ceptions to run at a premium •.. 
In an effort to dispel "popular fancy,. and create some 
understanding, the South Afri.can anthropologist, Isaac Schap-
era, collected letters of migrant laborers to their wives, 
relatives and friends, a selection from which he published in 
1933 in a now defunct magazine. Below are four of those let-
ters, written by. H. M., a young Bechuanaland. tribesman wor-
king in Johannesburg, to his wife at home·~ The translations 
and paranthetical notes are Schapera's:~ 72 
~ 70See Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa 
(London: . Longmans, Green and Co., 1957)-,-p. 7154; Anthony 
Sampson, The Treason Cage, the O)poeition ~ Trial in Sout~ 
Africa (London: Heinemann, 1958 , p. 77; Roux, Time Longer 
Than Roue, p. 349. No violence was used against white gold 
miners striking concurrently on one of the mines, ibid., 
P• 349. ~ 7~Cape Argus, 15 August 1946, quoted in Roux, Time 
Longer Than Rope, p. 348. 
~ 12 I. Schapera, 1tThe Native As Letter-Writer," The 
CritLc, 2:21-3, September 1933. 
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(1) First receive my letter, my wife, I greet you, I ask 
how you are, I am well in the hands of the Lord. I have 
heard your news when you said that you will build a new 
wall (for their hut), so that when I come back I must 
find it ready. It is difficult to build a hut, as a hut 
needs a person who is strong 1 and I don't know how you. 
can build up your wall when I am not there, and I wonder 
who is going to help you and show you how to build the 
hut. My wife, I wish to buy a tanka (empty petrol drum 
used for storing water), so that even if I don't manage 
to get other things I must have got the receptacle for 
water, o~ should I buy a sewing machine before this? I 
don't know. Tell me what you want, the machine or the 
tank. Greet my child and P. (the small girl nursing 
their baby), and greet for me K. and his wife (and friends), 
I have also heard that their mother is dead, and greet 
for me also (here he names two other friends) and all 
those who know me. 
(2) First receive my letter, I greet you and ask how you 
are. I" have got a sore shoulder. I don't use its hand• 
All this time when I have not been writing to you it is 
because I have heard when you said (i.e., wrote) that you 
are going to the cattle-post. Now recently came R., it 
is he who told me that you are still at home. Now I just 
,let you know that I have se~t a shawl with S. when he 
left here to go home, I don t know whether he has given 
it to you. · I have heard your word when you said that a 
plough is also needed. MY wife, there you have spoken 
the truth, but I don't know if we can manage all the things 
we are· short of in one year, for I am still thinking that 
when I come home I must bring some shillings (i.e., ready 
cash) with me with which we can help ourselves. And now 
the winter is coming, and. it is going to be cold, there 
are no good blankets for the night. I will try to send 
you a blanket, because I have left off one of the blan-
kets, the white one which· was already getting old. Even 
P. (the nurse girl) 1 I think her blanket is already gone (i.e;, worn out), I 11 try to get a cotton blanket for 
her, so that when I work for other things you must have 
got blankets, because when there are no blankets it is 
shameful. I have heard that P.'s mother was there, and I 
have heard when you said that you have given her a full 
bag (of Kaffir corn), and here I don't say anything, it 
is all :l?ight because we have to do so. I also let you 
.know that I always forget about the kutase (i.e., Afrik-
. · ~·aa:ns'· k'Wi ta:ssie, tax receipt), you must ask M. (his wife 1 s 
brother) to send it. If you can go to Mosanteng (his par-
ents_' home), get for me a ·little yellow paper, it is for 
work, put it in the letter, it is in the big yellow book. 
I want to get that paper because I want to show it to the 
people when I look for work~ As I haven't bought anything 
for myself, I 1 ll come homE\! in summer. Greet all your 
people and my children. · 
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(3) First receive my letter, I greet you and ask about 
your welfare. Ourselves we are well in the hands of the 
Lord. I want to tell you that I have heard when you said 
that you are at the cattle post. What makes me sad is 
that you report sickness (she had a spell of bleeding), 
but I don't know who can cure that sickness of yours. I 
have bought for you a big cotton blanket, so that you 
can'always put it inside the big blankets, as it is warm, 
and a shawl, it is a nice one. I do this so that you 
must always keep the child warm• I have not yet sent 
them, but ~ will tell you when I send them. I am still 
waiting to buy P. 1 s blanket, so that I can send them 
together. I thought of getting a big travelling-rug for 
you, but I preferred to buy dress material for you. I 
will buy this later on, and not be in such a hurry. Even 
if I can't buy many blankets, when we are at home we can 
use your blankets as well as mine. I have bought myself 
a very nice travelling blanket. Greet all my people at 
home, P. (his wife's younger brother who was then staying 
with her) and my children. I always forget to ask about 
the pig (there had been a great dispute at home about the 
ownership of a pig). I have heard when you say that pov-
erty does not atop, but I must also think of coming back. 
The mine in which I am working (Crown Mines) is quite 
good, but I will only work for two months, just to obtain 
provisions (before seeking work elsewhere: the BaKxatla 
do not like working in mines). My wife, I greet you. God 
be with you. I have finished. 
(4) I let you know that I have sent a parcel. You must 
hurry:·'up t9 take it from Pilane (the rai::-way station serv-
ing the BaKxatla Reserve), otherwise you 11 have to pay 
money. I am enclosing here a receipt for it. I sent 
those cotton blankets and also P.' s blanket. If God 
helps me, I shall leave this place soon, only two weeks 
more are left. If you have got those things, quicklf 
write to me and let me know. If I don't get work, I ll 
keep coming home (i.e., wo:rking his way back). 
C. African poverty and the political order 
In a report issued at the end of the Second World War, 
a Government agency, the Board of Trade and Industries, stated: 
The optimum allocation of resources requires that each 
worker shall be employed in the sphere and in the capac-
ity in which he is most productive. Any policy which is 
not in conformity with this criterion, but which res-
tricts the opportunities of individuals or of sections of 
the population from utilizing their capacities to the full-
est measure, must inevitably retard the expansion of prod-
uction and the growth of the national dividend, the 
source of all wage payments.~ 78 
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It may be assumed that in no country is this crit-
erion fully met. In South Africa, however, both the color bar 
and the operation of policies designed to help maintain it 
have made any approach to optimum production impossible. 
Indeed, the color bar'has entailed a continued loss of 
output, consisting of the additional goods and services which 
four-fifths of the population might have produced in the ab-
sence of restricted educational, job and business opportun-
ities; p:J,.us the goods and services which the less capable mem-
bers of the privileged section failed to produce in jobs and 
positions which they would not have held under competitive 
conditions. This loss represents economic development that 
has never taken place, and, as such, is inexpressible in 
money terms.~ 74 
Another long-standing impediment to economic growth has 
been the migrant labor system, which operates over a wider 
sphere than the mining industry, and which affects the produc-
tivity of African workers in occupations that they ~ allowed 
to enter. This system is also maintained as a matter of 
official policy: N·The Native must only be allowed to come 
:1. 78Report No. 282: Investigation into Manufacturing 
Industries in the Union of South .Africa, 1945, ·para.· 128. 
See also Social and Economic Planning Council, Report No. 10: 
Public Works Programme and Policy, 1946, (U.G. 37-'46), parae 
175; g.G. 53-'48, para. 167; van der Horst, Native Labour in 
South Africa, pp. 324ff; Fra~klin, Economics in South Africa, 
p. 191: S. Herbert Frankel, Whither South Africa? An Econ-
omic Approach, 11 S.A.~.;w_., 15:34, March 1947; R. Leslie, 11 Econ~ 
omics in South·Africa, S.A.J.~., 4:272, September 1936.· 
~ 74w. H. Hutt, 11 Logical Issues in the Study of Indus-
trial Legislation in th.e Union, 1' S .. .A.J .~., 3:35, March 1935. 
See Gary s. Becker, The Economies of Discrimination (Chicago: 
The University Press, 1957), where an attempt has been made 
to develop formulae on the basis of which such losses may be 
assessed.. 
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. 11 into the European areas as temporary workers, J. G. Strijdom 
declared in 1947, 11H1s wife and children must remain behind" 
Q.n the Reserve~·· :L'7e; 
As a result, many African factory workers are also 
part time peasants, failing to attain full economic effic-
iency in either of their occupations. In 1946, the Department 
of Economics of the University of Natal conducted a study into 
the effects of the migrant labor system in the Dunlop rubber 
factory in Durban. Here all but the two lowest grades of 
work were reserved for white workers, a minority of the total 
labor force. Only 4.8 per cent to 14 per cent~~depending on 
the criteria used for 'urbanization'--of Dunlop's African wor-
' kers were non-migrant. Thousands of working days were being 
lost through labor turnover. The effect on output was sugges-
ted by the Company's Industrial Engineer who estimated that 
under settled conditions and with proper training African prod-
uctivity could be raised by 400 per cent. It was found that 
low productivity, accompanied by low wages, had led to condit.-
ions under which low productivity and low wages were perpet-
uated. Fifty-seven per cent of the African workers lived in 
shacks, barracks, garages and "in undefined and possibly undef~ 
. ' It inable habitations • A clinical examination of every second 
African worker in the factory resulted in not one man being 
passed as completely healthy. · Half of the men under 35 years 
of age and approximately two-thirds of those over 35 eXhibited 
rr lesions of the skin or eyes, symptomatic of chronic and long-
standing malnutrition11 • Several cases ~f pellagra and of act-
ive pulmonary tubercuiosis were diagnosed. The results of the 
medical examination seem noteworthy in view of the investig-
ators 1 statement that the 'rDunlop factory workers are among 
J.. 76Quoted in Die Transvaler, 12 July 1947. For the 
motivation for this policy, see below, p. 281. 
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the healthiest and best paidurban workers in Durban. 11 ~ 76 
Of an ess-entially similar nature to the unregistered 
financial costs of the color bar and migrant labor system are 
the expenses incurred through the administrative, judicial 
and prison apparatus necessary for maintaining these policies. 
The total amounts involved here are not known, but an indic-
ation of them is that in 1952 the Native Affairs Department 
alone spent 1:.340,000 on the salaries of the 950 clerks eillJ?-
loyed to issue~-and ~10,000 in printing--the half million new 
forms required for the administration qf the pass laws.~ 77 
However, the costs are not limited to the economic. 
The migrant labor system, in particular, has led to some not-
able social phenomenae The policy of excluding the wives and 
families of the migrant laborers from the towns left the lat-
ter, in 1946, with an African population in which, in the 15 
to 49 years age group, men outnumbered women by more than 
two to one,~ 78 a disparity that had lessened somewhat by 
1951. 179 The Native Laws Commission reported in 1948 that 
~ 76Prior to employment, all the African workers had 
been passed as 'fit 1 by the medical officer at the Municipal 
Pass Office; see Department of Economics, University of Natal, 
The African Factory Worker, ! Sample Study of the Life and 
Labour of the Urban African Worker (Cape Town: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1950)·, pp9 7, 177. 
i 77H. J. Simons, Passes and Police, 11 Africa South, 
1:53, Oct.-Dec. 1956. 
~ 78J. L. Sadie, 11Demografiese en Beroepsaspekte van 
die Naturellebevolking, 1! in Die Natural in die Suid-.Afrikaanse 
Nywerheidslewe (Stelleneosch: Suid~Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-
Aangeleenthede, 1951), Graph B, p. 24. 
~ 79 In 1946, there were 1,194,522 male and 658,153 fem-
ale Africans of all ages in urban areas; the corresponding 
figures in 1951 were 1,424,336 and 904,198, (representing-a 
decline in the masculinity ratio of from 1.8 to 1.5), Popul-
ation Census 8th May, 1.25.1, Volume 1, Geographical Distrib'ut-
.ion of the Population,of the Union of South Africa, (u.G. 
42-'55)-;-p. 94. If oneremoved fromthe urban areas the ind-
ustrial compounds and mine compounds, where 570,044 African 
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this situation had given rise to widespread homosexuality, 
sodomy and prostitution, practices almost entirely absent 
from the old tribal societies; it had also left South Africa 
with the highest incidence of veneneal disease "of any coun~ 
try in the world that keeps reliable statistics;nl.ao However, 
the effects appear even more far-reaching. Illegitimate 
births were being registered in the 1950 1 s at rates of up to 
70 per cent in Johannesburg, ·Durban and Bloemfontein.l. eJ. A 
recent study of sexual mores in the Johannesburg African loc-
ations concluded that marriage was being dispensed with and 
that '~immorality among the urban Africans has become so prev-
alent.t:hat unless the traditional integrity of family life is 
regained the African people are in danger of moral collapse.:Jr..a.:az 
The integrity of family life is not being restored by such 
Government policies as that operating in the Western Cape 
where, in an effort to prevent the development of a settled 
African population, an estimated 4,000 African women were 
11 endorsed'; out of the area between January 1955 and July 
1957·J.es ·Many of the parentless children produced by such un-
settling conditions, themselves maturing into the urban Af-
rican millieu of impeded sexual drives and family-building 
wants, of material and social~ aspirations that are simultan-
men and 50,287 African women were barracked in 1951, then the 
disparity of 520,148 more males than females in the urban 
areas as a whole would disappeare 
~ 80Department of Native Affairs, Report of the Native 
Laws Commission 1946-48, 1948, (g.G. 28- 1 48), para. 54. 
l. 81 Carter, op. cit., p. 20; Sunday Tribune, 26 October 
1958; Laura Longmore, .The Dispossessed, A Study of the Sex= 
Life of Bantu Women in Urban Areas in and around Johannesburg 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1959), p. 49.---
182Longmore, ~· cit., PP• 313f. 
l. 83van der Horst, The Economic Implications of 
Political Democracy, p. 16n. · 
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eously being stimulated and thwarted,~ 84 are transmitting the 
tensions of their disordered.existence. Bapes and murders 
occur in South African cities at a rate that is probably 
unparalleled in the world, the Witwatersrand in 1956 record.,-: 
ing about 14 times as many murders per head of the population 
as New York, and about 150 times as many per head as London, 
Some available and fairly comparable statistics are gathered 
in the following table; the overwhelming majority of both 
victims and offenders, represented by the South African fig-
ures, are Africans: 
~ 64Advertizements in magazines designed primarily for 
urban Africans regularly dangle goods and services before 
them, which they are urged to purchase in order to become 
u successful", 1theal thy 11 and 11 ligh.ter" in complexion. It. is 
suggested that .' 11 dull aE.d unattractiven skin will become 11 satin 
smooth and ver~. much lighter'- after a]Jplication of a certain 
product; that 'to get to the·- top--start at the tol? ••• STRAIGHT-
EN YOUR HAIR FOR SUCCESS IN BUSINESS AND ROMANCE! . Many of 
these advertizements imply that there is a ready answer for 
those who have been ndreaming latelyn about acquiring, in 
effect, a resemblance to the physical appearance and aeon~ 
omic position of members of the dominant white ~opulation. 
It is notewortht; that the coupling of ubeauty11 and 11 success 11 
with 11 ligh.tness r is absent from advertizements in the West . 
African edition·of Drum magazine, whereas the relationship 
is affirmed by manufacturers advertizing in the East and 
South African editions of the. same publication. 
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TABLE VII 
RECORDED MURDERS AND RAPES, AND ESTIMATED POPULATION 
IN A NUMBER OF CITIES AND COUNTRIES 166 
Murders· (Year~ Rapes Population( Year) 
Urban .Areas ( 1951) Witwatersrand 968 (1956) 1~970;~42 
Chicago 293 ( 1956) 3,620,962 (1950) 
New York 315 ( 1956) 7,891,957 ( 1950) 
Glasgow 5 ( 1956) 1,090,000 (1951) 
London 30 ( i956 ). 8,346,000 ( 1951) 
Countries 
South Africa 2,957 ( 1956) 3,944 13,915,000 ( 1956) 
Ghana 94 ( 1950) 294 4,118,450 ( 1948) 
Nigeria 311 (1956) 408 30,000,000 ( 1952) 
U .5 .A. 6,970 ( 1956) 20,300 168,091,000 ( 1956) 
·"' It appears, therefore, that on a per capita basis, 
South Africa had about 5 times as many murders and more than 
twice as many rapes as the United .States; about 9 times as 
many .mUrders and about 4 times as many rapes as the then Gold 
·coast; and more than 20 times as many murders and rapes as 
~ 66The urban crime and population statistics are taken 
from Benson Dyantyi, uTeenage Gangsters Go To War~ tr Drum, No. 
97:73, March 1959; ana checked. (for the Witwatersrand and the 
American cities) in .Annua·l Report of the Commissioner of the 
.South African Police for the Year 1956, 1958, (g.G. 41='58); 
para. 17; The world Almanac and Book of Facts .f2!: 1:2.5.§. (New 
York: New York World-Telegram and The Bun Publishing Company, 
n.d.), P~· 310f. The national criminal statistics are from 
U.G. 41- 58, para. 17; The Gold Coast Police Force, Annual Rep-
ort for the Year Ended .31 December 12.5Q (Gold Coa·st, 1952) p. 
23; Federation of Nigeria, Annual Report of the Nigeria Police 
Force for the Year 1251, 1959. (Lagos: Federal Government Prin-
ter, 1959), p. 33; Information Please Almanac 12.5..§ (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, n.d.), .p~ 334. National population 
statistics are from Union Statistics for Fifty Years, P• A8; 
The Gold Coast Census of Population 1948 Report and Tables 
(Accra: Government Printing Department, 1950), p$ 10; The 
World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1.2.51, P• 315. 
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Nigeria. The enormous bill-boards erected in the Witwaters-
rand locations by manufacturers of flash-light batteries, urg-
ing the inhabitants to ncarry a Torchu and thus 11 BE SAFE IN 
THE STREETS TONIGHT 11 , and the corresponding advertizements in 
South African, but not West African, magazines, picturing a 
knife-wielding assailant shrinking from the beam of light, 
faithfully reflect these grim statistics, and suggest some of 
the differences in African urban life in these two areas, of 
the Continent. 186 
It is doubtful whether the relationship between offic~ 
ial policies and .Afric'an economic standards and community life 
is widely understood among the white population, despite the 
fact that several official agencies, prior to 1948, under-
lined that relationship. Obviously, some-white people are 
not ignorant of it. Writing recently in Die Hervormer, the 
offici~~l journal of one of the Dutch Reformed Churches, the 
Rev. M. J. J. Redelinghuis of Johannesburg stated: 
The restricted sphere of work for the non-white which 
existed before the policy of separate development and 
still persists has much to do with the poverty among them. 
It is horrible to think that we are directly responsible 
for the poverty of many non-whites and that God, as we 
see throughout the Bible, is always more concerned about 
the poor than the rich. 167 
Some have, in fact, urged the removal of the color bar, 
arguing that this could be done without material disadvantage 
to the white population. Thus, ~n one of its last statements 
before being disbanded, the Social and Economic Planning Coun-
cil advanced the following suggestion: 
Instead of maintaining the earnings of vested interests 
by restricting production and thus lowering the total 
national income, it is clearly preferable that production 
should be increased, the national income raised, and that 
186For an account of the ordeal facing African workers 
on their trek home with their Friday pay packets, see D.A.B., 
11Walking Home to Mofolo," Fighting Talk, 13:10, May 1959. 
187Quoted in P.D. 41/19'60/432. 
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the incomes of those who may be adversely affected should 
be maintained by transfers (through the tax system or 
otherwise) from those who have gained from the general 
rise in prosperity.~ 88 
. In other words, those white people whose earnings fell 
under competitive conditions· could be compensated from public 
revenue up to the level of their previous earnings. The idea 
was that.such arrangements need only be of temporary duration, 
because the expansion of the National Income ensuing from the 
removal of restrictions on the economy would rapidly raise 
even the lowest incomes. 
The proposal was not adopted. For even though the 
material interests of the wh:tte people might be safeguarded, 
the effect of lifting the industrial (and presumably educat-
ional) color bar would be to 'release the tendency of people to 
find jobs and social levels corresponding to their personal 
capacities and interests; social supremacy, which also com-
mands a value and attracts the strivings of people, could not 
long be maintained by the white-population under such condit-
ions, however firmly its incomes might be pegged. The main 
white political parties were not prepared to lay the ground-
work for. a social revolution. During a Parliamentary debate 
on the color bar, the Nationalist Minister of Labour made his 
position plain: ui am not in favour of throwing open the 
doors of skilled iabour to the Natives. 11 On his part, the 
Lea.der of the Opposition, promised to build a 'rNew South 
Africa't; 11 The United Party will maintain the industrial 
colour'bar; If we were in power we would enlist the hel~ of 
trade unions and employers' organizations in devising a pat-
tern of labour in which the non-European will be allowed to 
become ~ productive, so that the special task of the white 
workers in the New South African society will be to lead and 
mobilize the mass of non-European workers and to practice 
~ 88U.G. 53-~48, para. 167. The idea was also discuss-
ed in w. H. Hutt, Distributive Justice and Colour Antagonism, rt 
Race Relations, 9:93--99, 1942.; 
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those higher skills which are beyond the achievement of the 
Nativerr; (whereupon the Minister of Labour demanded to know 
what those higher skills were).~ 89 
Similarly, proposals to modify the scope of the mig-
rant labor system have been rejected, clearly for more than 
direct economic reasons. The detribalized urban Africans 
have been the most difficult section of the African populat-
ion to manage politically. The efforts to keep female tribes-
women from settling in towns help to prevent this section 
from growing. These considerations seem to dominate policy 
even where maintenance of the system runs counter to the econ-
omic needs of elements of the.white population. Thus in the 
post-war years, the gold mining industry, incurring heavy 
costs as a result of the high turnover rate among African min-
ers and the loss of experienced workers to other industries 
of.fering better pay and condii{ions, itself attempted to stab-
·ilize part of its African labor force on the new Orange Free 
State mines. Married quarters were to be provided for up to 
10 per cent of the workers, .1 t. being hoped thereby to develop 
the nucleus of a permanent .Afr·ican mine labor force.. The 
scheme was vetoed by the Department of Native Affairs, whiCh 
ruled that stabilization could only be allowed for up to 3 
per cent of the labor force, and that it could only be in-
troduced for absolutely essential personnela~ 90 
It seems that a situation has arisen where attempts to 
end the material and social wastage accompanying the color bar 
and the migrant labor system are being deflected by the mom-
entum of a vicious cycle. These policies cannot be modified 
or abandoned without undermining the social and poliuical 
order. The political order itself cannot be abandoned without 
a readiness to face the consequences of the very policies that 
~ 89Quoted in Franklin, ~· Q!1., p. 201. (My italics) 
i 
:L 90Doxey, ~· cit., P• 175 .. 
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have helped to maintain it, .consequences that have opened up 
the prospect of a traumatic economic leveling and the possib-
ility of domination by the brutalized delinquents of the ur-
ban African population. The possibility of retaliation is 
considered. It is wrong to assume, contends an organizat-
ion promoting the ideal of racial separation, that if Afric--
ans take power they 11will act differently and more fairly 
towards the European·population than the Europeans were or 
are prepared to be towards the Native population. 11 J. 9 l. 
Thus guilt and fear perpetuate themselves, 'weakening 
t . 
white people s sympathy for the needs of Africans as human 
beings, and diminishing the urge to combat their poverty. 
Even where policies less directly connected with social stab-
ility and political security are discussed, anxiety is pres-
ent to draw attention back to these issues. Speaking on a 
Native Affairs Vote on 17 May 1939 in the House of Assembly, 
the late J. G.· Strijdom had the following to say about alloc-
ating funds to provide social·services for Africans: 
The European has up to the present been able to main= 
tain himself against the superior power of the non-
Europeans because he was the master over them in intel-
lectual and economic matters. He could always maintain 
himself if he remained the superior of the native and the 
non-European in intellectual and economic matters. If 
the European in South Africa goes on in this way provid-
ing money in this way for the natives, in a way which I 
regard as an unnatural way, to uplift and civilise and 
develop the native economically, then it goes without 
saying that the European himself will eventually be the 
cause of those Natives being uplifted and raised much 
more than would be the case in the ordinary course of 
events, and that the European will no longer to the same 
extent as in the past be the master over them. If we go 
on in that way, then it goes without saying that, in view 
of the numerical strength of the natives and the Colour-
ed people, we will no longer be able to maintain oursel-
ves as Europeans, as in the past. It therefore amounts 
l. 9 l.South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), 
Integration or Separate Development?, p. 13, quoted inK. L. 
B,os)ram, Apartheid and Discrimination (Leyden: A. w. Sythoff, 
1960)' p. 124. 
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·to this, that we, as Europeans, by following this policy 
are .simply engaged in slowly but surely committing suicide 
because we are so using our forces and going out of our 
way to uplift and raise the natives economically and to 
.civilise and mentally develop them •••• Up to the present, 
although the natives increase much faster than the 
European, the position w~s that, in consequence of the 
way in which they live, there was a much higber mortal-
ity figure, especially amongst the children, but in con-
sequence of the development in medical and hygienic mat-
ters we must assume that the mortality figure, especial-
ly so far as the children .are concerned, will become 
much lower. Accordingly the proportionate increase of 
the non-Europeans as against the Europeans will become 
much worse than what I have sketched •••• we are on a dan-
gerous road with our policy; we are on the downgrade. 
We are engaged in carrying on along the road of sickly, 
sentimental negrophilism •••• We are engaged in destroying 
the future of the white man in South Africa •••• 192 
More recent think~ng along a similar vein led to the 
following statement as an argument against a hypothetical 
policy of equalizing opportunities in an integrating society: 
The impact of the policy on the demographic front 
would be. towards an increased de~endency burden among 
the Bantu (i.e., larger families). Since in an integrat-
ed society this burden would partly be the responsibil-
ity of the community at large, and the Bantu population 
would have a vested interest in increasing their numbers, 
in view of the political implications, the check on fer-
tility would not operate or would be reduced in vigour. 193 
Such considerations may:have motivated the re-applic-
ation of the 1 self~help 1 policy, but this cannot be ascer-
tained. It seems plain, however, that the lot of Africans 
:1. 92Assembly Debates, 17 'May 1939, cols~ 4861-3. 
:t93Dr. M •. S. Louw and Professor J. L • .Sadie, nThe Dyri.-
u ami.cs of Separate Development, in Hi1dergarde Spottiswoode, 
compiler, South Africa: The Read Ahead (Cape Town: Howard 
· Timmins, 1960), p. 103. The death of 48 out of every 100 
African ~ir1s before reaching 'tthe marriageable age group 11 , 
and the dislocation of family·lif'eu .through "internal mig-u . . 
ration are viewed as the two principal checks on fertility; 
u 
see Saaie, Demografiese en Berbepsaspekte van die Naturelle-
bevolking, 11 • i~ Die 'Na ture1le ~ die Suid-Afrikaanse Nvwer-
"heidslewe, ·pp. 35-37, where for¢boding is expressed about 
conditions under which these checks would cease to operate. 
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has been affected by the fact that power in the society is 
held by a minority that fear~ their advancement. What is per-
haps more important, but less clear, is whether the.re exists 
a way out of the deadlock, a. way whereby the whites might be 
released from their fears, and the Africans from the bonds 
that prolong their poverty. 
VI 
I 
RACIAL SEPARATION 
The work is done by black men. They plough 1 they 
reap; they herd and shear the sheep; they drive the 
oxen; they load the waggons; they carry the bricks; 
they draw the water; they hew the wood; they brush 
the clothes; they clean the boots;.they run the posts; 
they make the roads; they wait at table; they cook the 
food.; they wash the wool~ they press the grapes; they 
kill the beef and mutton; they dig the garden~; 'they· 
plaster the walls; they feed the horses;-~and they 
find the· diamonds. 
Anthony Trollope, 1877.~ 
This policy ('separate development') is South Africa's 
traditional policy. 
Eric Louw, Minister of 
External Affairs, 1960. 2 
Many have maintained that there is a solution to the 
respective problems which contact between the white and 
African sections of the population has engendered, and that 
it is to separate the two g~oups from each other territor-
ially, leaving each to do iys own labor and to advance free-
ly in every activity, posing no threat to, and receiving no 
hindrance from the other. 3 ,In this chapter we shall survey 
~south Africa, vol. ii, pp. 340f. 
2 Speech broadcasted from the South Africa·- Club, 
London, 10 May 1960. 
3W. W. M. Eiselen, long-time Secretary for Native Aff-
airs, and one of the leading exponents of Apartheid, states 
11 that this solution means, separating the heterogeneous groups 
from the population of the·country into separate socio-econom-
ic units, inhabiting separate parts of the country, each en-joying in his own area full citizen rights, the greatest of 
which is the opportunity o~ developing such capabilities as 
its individual members may possess to their optimum capacity, 11 
quoted Carter, The Politics of Inequality, p. 267. 
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the history and recent dev~l0pment of the idea. 
Background 
286 
The idea of racial separation first appeared in South 
Africa in the middle of the Seventeenth Century,when Jan van 
I 
Riebeeck, the first Governor of the Cape, built a palisade 
from Table Mountain to the sea, to keep cows from straying 
and his men and the neighboring Hottentots from quarreling 
and fighting. 4 However, the former would not be contained, 
and left their cabbage gardens behind the palisade to extend 
contact with the Continent and its peoples~ Penetrating 
through the mountain passes 'of the Western Cape, the burghers 
and their sons spread out over the plateau of southern .Africa, 
conquering its inhabitants and setting them to work on the 
great farms and ranches that.they marked out for themselves. 
Successive attempts were made by both Dutch and Brit-
ish administrators in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
to halt this movement and so'reduce expenditures on frontier 
wars. Beacons were erected, buffer zones demarcated, to no 
avail. The sun burned pastures and dried water holes, and 
cows ignored the beacons and trod accross the buffer zones. 
On both sides of each temporary frontier men assembled for 
cattle and land-retrieving and -stealing expeditions. 5 
For a century after their first meeting in the Eastern 
Cape in 1770, the ancestors of the white and black peoples 
warred for security, and for grass, water and cattle. Defeat · 
4 Marquard, The Story of South Africa, pp. 37f; for the 
full story, see H. B .. Thorri, editor, Journal 21 ~ Y..ru1 Rieb.., 
eeck, translated by C. K. Johnman and A. Ravenscroft, 3 vole. 
(Cape Town: A. A. Balkema for the Van Riebeeck Society, 1958), 
vol. iii, passim. ' 
6 See Edgar H. Brookes, ,The History of Native ,;Policy 
in South Africa from 1§.;Q to the Present Day (Cape Town: 
Nasionale Pers, Beperk, 1924), pp. 12f; Walker, History of 
Southern Africa, pp. 111, 184., 
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left manyAfricans isolated in land pockets along the periph-
eries of white expansion, but large numbers were drawn by 
taxation, or pushed by poverty and overcrowding, into the 
areas of white occupation. 4here,like the Hottentots be~ore 
them~ they became farm laborers, tenants and servants. 
I 
Thus long before the mineral discoveries, the count-
• ': ~ 
ry s economy had become base4 entirely on non-white labor, 
and geographic separation ofithe races did not exist. Prob-
ably within a mile of every ~erson who claimed sole European 
ancestry lived many others who did not. Over the vast count-
ryside, racial separation took place at night when the white 
' ! . farmer s family bedded down in their poor farmhouse, and the 
African or Coloured laborers!and servants went to their 
shacks; and it ended at daw~ when the 'girl'. brought the 
cof~ee• Only a few foreign-9orn missionaries objected to 
this, believing that the races should be kept apart until 
I • 
such time as the indigenous people had assimilated modern 
i 
kno1trledge and could mix and l?argain with Whites on equal 
terms; the mission Reserves ~stablished in pursuance of these· 
i 
ideas were unpopular with the farmers, who saw them as a 
. I 
threat to their labor supply~ 6 
I 
With the industrial revolution, however, new elements 
i 
were introduced into the country•s social pattern from which 
a different local outlook towards racial contact was to 
i 
emerge. One such element wa~ the landless and detribalized 
African worker. Set evermore adrift from tribal customs and 
disciplines by the limitations imposed by town life, distance 
• i . 
and time, with few possesslons beyond his wages, he was a far 
more unsettled and unsettlin~ social factor than the farm 
laborer, who preserved attachments to traditional ways, and 
~ho was customarily alloted some land for his own stock and 
fFor a comprehensive ~iscussion of this, see w. M. 
Macmillan, The Cape Colour Q~~stion, ~ Historical Survey 
·(London: Faber & Gwyer, 1927.) 
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planting. Moreover, whereas the latter maintained a person-
al relationship with the white farmer, who called him to hear 
the Bible read, whose wife doctored his family, and whose 
children played with his children, the urban African lived 
almost as a pariah. The white man whom he encountered was 
not the hearty farmer, master of all that he surveyed and 
ready to joke, but an impersonal employer, and more often a 
worker like himself, who recogni~ed him not as a comrade but 
as a 1 kaffir 1 who would work for almost nothing and would 
take his job. Where prayers were said.by white people, he 
was not invited in. Isolated by tribal and language differ-
ences even from some of his location neighbors, he moved 
anonymously, except for the name of his pass, through a 
world largely of strangers, .cut off from the past, alienated 
from the present, a partisan to the future. 
For decades, few Whites were aware that a permanent 
African working class was emerging, believing as many still 
do that African town dwellers were merely temporary residents, 
with their real homes in the Reserves. 7 But some saw early 
what waa happening and, realizing that the feudal solution 
to rural conquest and land expropriation could not be imposed 
in the city, began to expresf\ doubts about the future of 
white supremacy. .At the close of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902, 
II the Gape Times declared editorially: We are facing a strug-
gle compared with which this great war'will be as nothing: 
the struggle between Black and White. 118 
Thereafter, the idea of racial'separation on a territ-
orial basis began once more to trickle into public circulat-
ion. General Hertzog began a~vocating it in 1903, insisting 
7See below, pe 329n. 
~uoted in Christian Principles in Multi-Racial 
South Africa, a Report on the Dutch Reformed Conference of 
Church Leaders, Pretoria, 17-12 November, 125] (Johannes-
burg: n. pu., 1954), pp. 8lf. · 
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that it offered the only 11 permanent solution11 to the color 
question; in 1911, he warned that if such a policy was not 
soon implemented, 11the conditions necessary for its realisat-
ion will ••• vanish.H 9 
Vocal support for the idea came from another new elem-
ent in South .African society, the white workers. While far-
mers and businessmen sought·to increase the flow of non-white 
labor, both the Poor White laborers and the British artisans 
hoped to reverse it. The black worker held the job they wan-
ted or threatened to take the job they held. He was· a rival 
whom they wished to be rid of. 11Alloc.?-te the various por-
tions [of the countr~ necessary'for native territories and 
then send the natives to those terri tor±es," said James Riley, 
President of the Trades and LabQur Council, 'explaining to 
the Transvaal Mining Industry Commission, 1907-8, what he 
would do if he were 11 in possession of the Government n .J.o 
However, not until 1924 did the white workers. exert a 
direct influence on Government policies. In the meantime, 
those who did were not impressed with the idea of a 11white 
" . . . labour policy • Their interests were articulated by the 
South African'Native .Affairs CoiDifiission, 1903-1905, which, 
curiously, laid a foundation ,for territorial partition of the 
country, but not for the purpose of racial separation. White 
industries and farms were facing a shortfall in the amount 
of cheap labor they required. Africans were not entering 
I 
the labor market in sufficient numbers, the Commission obser-
ved, because alternative means of livelihood were available. 
They lived as squatters on white-owned farms, or they banded 
together to purchase their own plots. If this went on 
9Quoted in Roskam, .Apartheid an.d D:l..scriminatio:t;l..z 
P• 92. 
10T.G. 2-'08, Minutes of Evidence, q. 20,477; see 
also Roskam, 212.• cit., p. 92n.: 
-- I 
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it is inevitable that at no very distant date the amount 
of land in native occupation will be. undesirably extended •••• 
There will be many administrative and social difficul-
ties created by the multiplication of a number of native 
units scattered throughout a white population and owning 
the country equally with them. Such a situation cannot 
fail to accentuate feelings of race prejudice and anim-
osity, with unhappy results. It will be far more diffic-
ult to preserve the absolutely necessary political and 
social distinctions if the growth of a mixed rural pop-
ulation of landowners is not discouraged.~~ 
Accordingly, the majority of the Commission recommen-
ded that Africans be stopped from buying land outside cer-
tain areas to be defined by'legislation. 12 The Botha-Smuts 
Government gave effect to tqis recommendation in the Natives 
(land) Act of 1913. Tribal .Reserves consisting of 22 million 
acres were defined as Africa;n territory, outside of which no 
African, and inside of which no white person, could buy land; 
further provisions dealt with the position of squatters and 
share tenants on white farms, many of whom were consequently 
turned into laborers or evicted. 13 
The 1913 Land Act has been interpreted as "the first 
serious attempt in the direction of territorial segregation 
on a Union-wide scale.u14 The African Areas schedule in the 
Act amounted to less than 8 per cent of the country's total 
territory, and one quarter to a third of its African popul-
ation already had no homes in them~ 16 
Clearly, the object ·which the South African Native 
A£fairs Commission sought, and which the Land Act achieved, 
was not physical separation o'f the races, but the segregat-
ion of their economic rights.· The economic integration of 
11Report of the ~outh African Native Affairs Commis-
1903-1905, 1905, Cd. 2399), para. 192. 
12 Ibid., para. 193. 
13See Hector Menteith Robertson, South Africa: ~­
omic and Political Asuects (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1957):-p. 36; Round Table, 22:661, June 1932. 
14Kruger, Age of the G~nerals, p. 64. 
1 • 6 Robertson, ~· cit.,,p. 36. 
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Africans with Whites was forwarded, but on the basis of fur-
ther inequality. Thus, higher wages for migrant African wor-
kers were not favored by the Commission because that might. 
enable them ''to remain f.br:t·a,p_ange;r :period at their homes.":l. 6 
-The Commission was not worried about the presence of black 
workers in the towns, but urged, indeed, the establishment 
of ulabour locations 11 where family units might reside, and 
on the basis of which a permanent African urban working 
class could grow.:1. 7 Nor was it concerned that these people 
would lack equal political ~ights to develop as they wished. 
It proposed that common voting rights which, as a legacy of 
British colonial administration, still survived in the Cape, 
should be abolished, and be replaced by a separate votersr 
roll whereby Africans might elect a fixed number of Members 
to represent them in Parliament, 
the numbers not to be more than sufficient to provide 
an adequate means for the expression of Native views 
and the ventilation of their grievances, if any •••• ~e 
Thus, though_the idea~of making racial separation a 
policy received little curre~cy from the countryts dominant 
economic ·and political inte~ests, it was retained as an 
ideal, and began to serve a function ih foreign affairs, 
l 
Speaking in London in 1917, General Smuts painted a picture 
of separate development that has remained substantially un-
altered to the present day: , 
',_ ', ~~ ~- ~ . -, .r~ .·- ~ J t .. ":' ·,: '"'! ..... -~ 
I am talking'of the. idea of creating all over South 
Africa, wherever there is: a considerable native·coinmun-
ity, independent, self-goyerning institution from the. 
native populations, instead of mixing up black and white 
in the old way, as we have done, confusing everything, 
and not lifting up the black, but degrading the white. 
We are now trying to keep them apart as much as possible 
in our institutions, in land ownership, in forms of' gov~ 
ernment, and in many ways:we are trying to keep them 
:1. 6 Cd. 2399, p~ras. 378~. 
:!. 7 Ibid., paras. 248, 38.5. 
I 
J..eibid., a 443 par • • 
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apart, and thus lay do~ an outline of policy which.may 
take a hundred years to': work out, but which in the end 
may be the solution to ·our native problem. It will cer-
tainly be that in South Africa you will have, in the 
long run, large areas CMltivated by blacks and governed 
by blacks, where they will look after themselves in all 
forms of living, and in! suitable parts you will have 
white communities which:will govern themselves according~ 
to accepted principles.: The natives will come to work 
in the white areas, but as far as possible the forms of 
political government will be such that each will be sat-
isfied and developed according to his own proper lines. 
This is the attempt we ~re now making in South Africa. 1 ' 
It can be seen that General Smuts did not envisage a 
1 White South Africa'· indepe~dent of black labor. As will 
I 
appear, neither does the present National Party. When Gen-
eral Smuts left office in 1924, the number of urban Africans 
was greater than the entire'white population of South Africa 
' in the year that gold was dtscovered. 20 
Nevertheless, total ~,eparation w·as still widely discus-
' sed in South Africa,·as can be gathered from the criticism 
t:o which the idea was subjec~ed by writers during the 1920's. 21 
Indeed, with the advent to power in 1924 of a Nationalist-
: ' 
~9Quoted in Round Table, 7:809, 1916/17. 
20At the 1921 Census the urban African population tot-
aile~ 587,000 1 Muriel Horrell, The Economic Development of the 'Reserves :,the Extent to which the Tomlinson Commission's 
ReCommendations are being ImWlemente~Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Fact Paper Noe 3, 1959), 
p. 2. (Hereafter cited as RR. 93/59. 
21Botha, Die Arbeidsvraagstuk in Suid-Afrika, pp. 208f; 
Brookes, Q2· cit., p. 144; Lqrd Olivier, White Capital and 
Coloured Labour hLondo,n: Leonard and Virginia Woolf, 1929), 
P• 144 states: But it is really time that South African 
publicists should give up talking about segregation, a vis-
ionary ideal which no one in ,contact with the facts of the 
situation seriously pretends ~o cQntemplate: for it is now 
clear and officially recognis1ed that territorial segregat-
ion is not practicable, since: the land will not be conceded 
for it, while industrial segregation is not desired, since 
' 11 the native is everywhere in d~mand as a labourer. 
293 
Labour Coalition Government;, under Hertzog's leadership and 
with such separationists as Walter Madeley in the Cabinet, 
the separation of the ra:ces even appeared about to begin. 
The white businessmen with their attachment to cheap labor 
·were out, and t·he most vocal segregationists, supported by 
I 
the white workers and job needy from among the vanguard of 
300,000 Poor Whites were in~ Politically, the time was 
riper than it had ever been~ 
The new Prime Mlnist~r promised to make South Africa 
safe for the white man by achieving sra solution of the· native 
question on a durable and sound basis. 1122 General Hertzog's 
contribution to this goal, qontained chiefly in his 'Native 
Bills 1 , was however modest. One of these measures implem-
ented the recommendation of .the South African Native Affairs 
Commission that the common ~ote be· taken away from Cape 
Africans and that the latter be placed on a separate roll. 
This was accomplished in 1936, after Hertzog and Smuts had 
fused their followers in the. new United Party. A second 
bill, passed also in 1936, dealt with the land question. To 
the original 22 million acres reserved for Africans under 
the 1913 Land Act, a further 18 million acres would be added, 
thus.completing the ground-w6rk for territorial partition of 
the country, 87 per cent for Whites and 13 per cent for Blacks. 
Although, now, after ~ quarter of a century, the land 
purchase scheme is almost complet.ed, the enlarged 'Bantu 
homelands' support·an even smaller percentage of the African 
population than they did in 1936, when the scheme was star-
ted. This situation was forWarded by Hertzog's taxation and 
tariff policies, initiated in 1925, which, as has been seen, 
raised the cost of living in the Reserves, accelarating the 
22Federal Council of the Nationalist Party of South 
Africa, The Segregation Problem: General Hertzog's Solution: 
The Smithfield Speech, p. 11. • 
294 
trek to the cities. 23 While the white urban population inc-
reased by 50 per cent betwe.en 1921 and 1936, the non-white 
urban population grew by 90 per cent, 24 the number of 
Africans settled in towns and cities rising over these fif-
teen years from 587,000 to 1,141,642. 26 Indeed, with the 
I 
Reserves supporting an estimated 3 million Africans in 
1931, 26 and with 3.6 million resident in the enlarged. 
Reserves in 1951, 27 it appears that most of the increase of 
the African population over 1 twenty years, amounting to 
approximately two million persons, was absorbed economically 
and territorially in the areas defined as 'White South Africa•. 
Hertzog1 s administra~ion reduced the prospects of 
achieving ra~ial separation in another way. His 'civilised 
I . : labour policy and his conf:trmation of the principle of rac-
ial job reservation through the 'Colour Bar Act' of 1926 
. I 
gave the poor, unskilled Afrikaners a protected niche in the 
economic structure, and at tne same time provided white 
skilled workers with the ass~rance that Africans would be 
prohibited from competing for their jobs. Thereby the more 
dissatisfied and insecure Whites were made content, with the 
result that racial separation, no longer a solution to 
anyone's economic problems, lost its foundation of self~inter­
ested support, and became putely an ideological issue. 
But as an ideology it'was to assume increasing im-
portance as the political problems to which it offered an 
answer became more acute. In the wake of the Second World 
28Round Table, 20:429,' March 1930. 
24U.Q:.' 40- 1 41, para. :.55· 
26RR. 93/59, P• 2. 
26 Prof. ·J. du Plessis, •rnie Arm Blanke en die Kleur-
Vraagstuk,11 Race Relations, 1:04, May-June 1934. 
27U.G. 61-'55, P• 53· i 
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War, sweeping changes transformed race relations around the 
globe. Nationalist movements began ejecting Europeans from 
their centuries-held position of domination in .Asia and 
Africa. Feeling against racial discrimination became more 
articulate and organized •. At the first session of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United, Nations in January 1946, South 
Africa's racial policies came under attack, as they would in 
each succeeding year from ever more numerous opponents. At 
home with the violent suppression of the Witwatersrand 
African miners' strike, the:days of a docile African working 
class drew to an end. Between 1945 and 1957, police strength 
doubled. N~ longer were ed~cated .Africans prepared to co-
operate gratuitously with tlie regime. When the news of the 
breaking of the miners' strike reached the Bunga (the Native 
Representative Council established by the Government in 1936 
for the ventilation of griev'ances), its members disbanded, 
determined never to convene in such a manner again. 28 Young-
er leaders of the old, hesitating African National Congress 
(founded in 1912, the same year that Hertzog formed the 
National Party) began preparing to turn that organization 
onto a course of mass education and mass action for full 
equality. 29 , 
i As the political haZafds of attempting to maintain a 
racially-stratified society entered the foreground, the white 
population's need for assurance that a means lay at hand for 
averting these'dangers began to become increasingly manifest. 
28Walker, QQ• cit., P• 764. 
29For a survey of the history of the A.N.C., see 
Sampson, The Treason Cage, pp. 41-114. According .to one South 
African historian, the African urban population at this time 
"was no longer merely snuffing curiously around the palisades 
0f the perimeter. It was growling to obtain entrance and the 
chorus was swelled by the wolf pack which was out for blood 
elsewhere,'' Kruger, .QJ2• cit., p. 220 
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It was met by the political re-introduction of the tradition-
al ideology under an unfamiliar name-~apartheid. Addressing 
Parliament in 1947, General Smuts said: 
The position cannot be solved along the old lines* 
Room must be made for them on the principle of apartheid 
by the people being kegt apart ••• it is neither a new 
word nor a new thing. 8 . . 
During the 1948 Gene·ral Election, however, it was not 
General Smuts' United Party' but the National Party under the 
i 
leadership of Dr. Malan which made apartheid their main 
campaign slogan. Although some intellectuals interpreted the 
word as indicating a; policy'of physical separation of the 
races into different territ6rial areas, most Nationalist 
voters did not think their tarty intended any more racial 
separati·on in the immediate future than separate entrances 
to the post office. Had th~y thought otherwise, it is doubt-
ful whether apartheid would have commanded much electoral 
support. For at the very time that the Nationalists were 
taking office, the Native Laws (Fagan) Commission was repor-
ting that its members had 
seen no sign whatever: in the country of a readiness 
to dispense with Native Labour. The best example we can 
mention in this'regard is the farming industry* We have 
quoted figures "rhich show the ~roportion of Nativ:es to 
Europeans in the rural areas ~.e., outside the Reserve~ 
to be 9 to 2. Yet there is a serious shortage of 'farm 
labour. Nowhere, however, did we find the farmers wel-
coming the movement of Natives from the farms as a step. 
in the right direction or considering their replacement 
by European labourers as'a practical or desirable alter-
native. On the contrary, all proposals, which they put 
before us, were intended to prevail upon Native labour-
ers to remain on or return to the farms. 8 ~ 
However much the new Government recognized the pros-
·pective dangers of a South Africa dependent upon a political-
ly rightless labor force, it could not afford to provoke 
30Quoted in Roskam, .Q12.,• cit., P• 94. 
8 ~U.G. 28-'48, para. 25. 
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farmers and other employers b~ progressively separating them 
I 
from their workers. On the otther hand, intellectuals in the 
I 
.Afrikaans universities and churches were demanding that a 
concrete committment to. racial[ separation be made~ Adding 
to its problems, the new Gove~ent faced the embarrassment 
of having publi.cized itself asj the champion of a policy 
whose feasibility had just bee~ publically denied by a 
judicial commission of inquiry!. The Fagan Commission had 
I 
declared as its i 
i irresistable conclusion th,at it would be utterly imposs-
l.' .:.: ible to put the Native population which is already out-
side the Reserves, back in~o the Reserves, or even to 
keep the whole of the incr:ease there in the fUttlre. 32 
I 
32Ibid., para. 22. Suc:cessive Commissions throughout 
the century had reached the same conclusion. The Unemploy-
ment Commission in 1922, despite the the~ widespread unemploy-
ment of white workers, stated ~hat it was too late in the 
history of South Africa to undertake a policy of nsegregat~ 
. 11 ( ) I ion as it was then termed and analyzed the ecoRomic and 
political factors that made it[ "impossible to carry a scheme 
of segregation through ParliameRt. If there were a very · 
sincere and widespread enthusihsm for a 'White South Africa' 
it is just possible that the opposition of immediate p~cun­
iary interests might be overbojr'ne, but there is no sigh of 
such enthusiasm, 11 (U.G. 17- 1 221, pp .. 22f)e The Economic 
and Wage Commtssionin 1926, when the average percentage of 
Non-Whites out of the total employees in South African ind-
ustry was 64, put the matter as follows: 11 The contact of 
native and European has lastedi too long, aRd.their economic 
co-operation is too intimate a:hd well-established, for the 
native to be excluded from Eurbpean areas and European ind-
ustries. The provision of adequate native reserves has been 
delayed too long for it to be possible now to provide reserves 
within which it would be possiple for the present native 
population of the Union to liv~ without dependence on out-
side employment; and it was fo~ too long the policy of the 
Union to drive the native, by taxation and other.devices, to 
work for the Europeans for it to be possible now to exclude 
him from the field of employment he is ocCUJ?Ying," (U.G. 
14.;. 1 26, Mills-Clay-Martin Report; para. 275). The Native 
I Jt Economic Commission of 19~2 co~cluded that full economic 
segreg.ation11 was '~impossible 11 and ~~partial economic segreg-
'tt' n 11 : 11 n ( G 2·2 1 2 ation was ·impraeticable aRd: unfair , U._. - 3 , para. 
694) •. The Social and EcoE.omic!Planning Council, outlining 
in 1946 a full-scale developme~t program for the Reserves, 
I 
! 
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Anxious to prevent the Fa~an Commission from having 
the last authoritative word about apartheid, at the same time 
lacking a practical reply, the gbvernment did what governments 
' i . . have found useful in such circum~tances. It appointed its 
own commission to collect facts ~nd make suggestions. This, 
~he (ToiDlinso~) Commission for t~e Socio-Economic Development 
I 
of the Bantu Areas within the Un~on of South Africa did, 
' with an importance consequence. :The Tomlinson Commission 
I 
stated that the territorial sepa~ation of the races was 
desirable and possible. It list~d the minimum steps necess-
: I 
ary to approach this goal. Thus,\ when the C<?mmission s 
Report was released in 1956, ·the :Government and ·its suppor-
1 
ters were compelled to decide whe~her they would take these 
steps. 
The Plan For Apartheid 
The Tomlinson Commission made it clear that if the 
process of economic integration i~ a unitary society were 
' 
allowed to continue, the growth of the rightless and proper-
tyless African working class would reach a stage where its 
nevertheless concludedthat uNo R~serve Policy-~not even the 
policy advocated in the Report--w~ll make it possible for 
South Africa to evade the issues raised by the presence of 
the Native in European farming %r~as and in urban areas, Fl! 
(U.G. 32-r46, para. 13). Three y~ars after publication 0f 
the Fagan Report, the Industrial Legislation Commission dec-
lared that 11the practical difficulties seem insuperable if 
an industrial development sufficient to absorb the majority 
of Natives in their own territories is envisaged, 11 quoted 
in South African Federated Chamber: of Industries, ·Enclosure 
to the Minutes of the Central Econpmic Affairs Meeting, 7th 
August 1959, 'Development of Indus;tries on the Perimeter of, 
and within the Bantu Areas 1 • Memorandum Presented to Each 
Member of the Cabinet). On the other hand, the Board of Trade 
and Industries, in a 1945 Report urging industrial decentral-
ization to combat the po~itically wenacing concentrations of 
urban African·workers, called for a large measure of territ-u . 
orial segregation, though making ~o claims as to how large 
a measure was possible, (Report No. 282: Investigation into 
Manufacturing Industries in the Union of South Africa, para. 
135.) I 
I 
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rightlessness could no longer be maintained, and the posit-
ion of the white people would become. untenable. The vote 
could not be withheld forever, and with political equality 
and the removal of all ceilings on opportunity a society 
would develop, stratified o'p. the basis of personal achieve-
ment, where the stigma of color would disappear, racial 
inter~arriage would eventually result,·and the Whites would 
be assimilated in a new 1tbicplogical entity 11;t 33 This could 
only be averted by a policy'leading to "ultimate complete 
. t1 
separation between Europeans and Bantu, 34 a policy necess-
itating the development of those areas -defined by the 1936 
Land Act as Bantu Areas int~ economically viable units, i~ 
which the bulk of the future African population could be 
accommodated, and where the~e would be no obstacles to 
African advancement and thus no spur to revolution • 
. • 
To get the Bantu Areas into shape for such a task 
would present no mean pr~·ble~. Consisting of some 260 sep-
arate units, comprising 37 million acres;:or ·a little over 
one tenth of South Africa's total land surface, they were 
already the most thickly populated places in South Africa 
outside the large urban centers, and yet they held less than 
half the then African population of the country. They com-
prised areas of virtually bare land, 30 per cent of which 
was 11badly erodedu, 44 per cent "moderately so 11 , 35 territ-
ories where the lowest living standards in South Africa 
I 
prevailed, where the value of total production had barely 
risen since 1936, where the p,er capita income had been declin-
ing for at least twenty years';, 36 regions so poor that at any 
33U.G. 61-55, p. 102. 
34Ibid., p. 106. Italics in text~ 
35 Ibid., PP• 46, 49, 51. 
; 
36 Ibid., p. 99; U.G. 16-'45, para. 32. 
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one time almost half the m~n between the ages of fifteen and 
sixty-four were absent, 3!1 laboring for their famili.es in that 
'White South Africa 1 where live and work twice as many black 
people as Whites. 38 Those who remained behind, women, small 
children, old men, were technically the most backward in 
South .Africa, the most illiterate, the most sfckly, the least 
capable of productive work in every way. 39 Now the problem 
was to re-direct the pattern of South African industrial 
and urban growth to these very regions, so that there might 
be gathered in them', as soon as possible, most of the count-
ry's African population. The problem, in other words, was 
to re-orients the historicai development of South Africa. 
The reversa.l of the course ·of South African populat-
ion movement, implied by ap~rtheid, would necessarily require 
a crash program for regional. economie development and rapid 
social change. The Tomlinsdn Commission made an attempt to 
I 
work out such a program. The Commissioners realized that 
if the Bantu Areas,. already :overcrowded with 3.6 million 
people exporting half their ,adult male population 1:11nnually 
to keep themselves alive, were to support an additio;nal ten 
million mouths by the· year 2::,000, then economic and social 
life in the Reserves would have to be completely reorganized. 
The remains of the tribal subsistence eco~omy would have to 
be swept aside and replaced by a viable private agricultural 
system. Sub-economic land ~oldings would have to be elimin-
ated.40 Only on the basis of economic land holdings, which 
would remove the need.for external earnings and the consequent 
absence from the Reserves of their able-bodied working force, 
could soil erosion be halted,and productivity raised. However, 
37U .Q:. 61-' 55, p. 94. 
sep.ranklin.: Economics :in South Africa, p. 122n •. 
-39See U.G. 61- 1 55, Chps. 13, 15, 23. 
I 
4.0Ibid., P• 114. 
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the establishment of economic land holdings and of a class 
of full-time farmers was impossible under conditions of 
rural overcrowding. Accordingly, half the existing populat-
ion of the Reserves, close to 2 million people, would have 
to be moved off the land at' the very start, and provided 
i 
with alternative occupations. 4~ Those remaining, it was 
calculated, would then have: space to grow sufficient grain 
to feed themselves, although there would still be no surplus 
left over to feed the non-farming population for a long 
time. 42 
These steps could no~ be taken without first clearing 
away two of the principal social obstacles to increased and 
efficient production--the ti-ibal land tenure system, entwined 
I 
with most of the traditions:of chieftainship; and the (}overn-
' ment restriction that forbade one man from holding more than 
one plot, and thus denied full scope to the productive eff-
orts of the more ambitious and capable African tarmers. 
Private, freehold tenure would have to be instituted in their 
place. 48 · 
i 
4 :1-Ibid., pp. 74f, 114 .• 
42 Ibid., p. 114. 
4311 The deterioration bf the Bantu Reserves is due to 
a combination of factors. ohe of such factors is the system 
of land tenure •.• nor can the~e be pride of possession of land 
in which there is no ownership in the'full sense of the term, 
vested in the person who is using it •••• A revision of the 
system of land tenure is regarded as one of the prerequisites 
to the stabilization of the land in the Bantu Areas and the 
full economic development of' their potential •••• The Commiss-
ion recommends that in areas,where the Bantu desire that their 
land should be granted £o them under title deed, this should 
be done and the existing forms of tenure should be superceded 
by such grants. In making S)lch grants the Comm~ssion recom-
mends that these should be freehold titles •••• ,(ibia., p. 
t~2!, _1~;~-~::r,.~~- ~t,~ ~~J?~l;'t, the Commission reffOIDIDifnded that 
:private agrieulture slioula gll'ald~lly replace all other forms 
of land tenure; that the changeover should be.comiJUlsory in 
. areas where a majority were in favor and optional otherw~se, 
(ibid., p. 195). With regard to Government restrictions on 
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A costly financial program to support land reclamat-
ion would be required to give effect to these reforms. At 
the end of 1952, onlY-:::"9 .4 per cent of the land in the 'Bantu 
Areas t had been stabilized ~gainst ero·aion. The Commission 
estimated that, at the.curr~nt·tempo of the Government's 
Stabilization Program, the time required to stabilize the 
land in all the Reserves, a.~suming that the stabilized land 
was to be fully maintained,'would be 245 years. Wind and 
rain would naturally not wait that long. Expert technical 
' . 
witnesses testified that if•large areas were not be become 
1 
irredeemable, only 10 years:were available to complete the 
stabilization works. The oc?mmiesion cono~u.ded that it the 
soil was to be saved a large scale reclamation program-had 
i 
to be launched without delay, a program unattainable with-
out the concurrent implemen~ation of its other recommendat-
ions: ffnot only funds and technical staff will be needed, 
but the'population problems of the Reserves and the allied 
social.problems will have tq be solved simultaneously, if not 
II ' beforehand. The stabiliza~ion program would necessitate an· 
expenditure'of ~35,000,000.~4 
Yet, at the very out$ide, agricultural reorganization 
and reclamation would afforq livelihoods to less than two 
million Africans. Therefore, the more than one-and-a-half 
million, who would have to ~e drawn off the land to make 
agricultural reorganization.~ossible, together with those 
1 . 1 
who would be leaving White South Africa , as well as the 
tenure, the Commission state'd: 'tThe principle of 'one-man-
one-lot' ••• reduces every Bantu tG a low level of uniformity 
with no prospects of expanding his activities nor of exer-
cising his initiative. It fs essential to make opportunities 
for the creation of a class pf contented full-time Bantu 
farmers with holdiD~s of sufficient size to enable them to 
farm profitably and to exercise their initiative and to 
develop according to their individual ability and resources. 
The abolition of the 'one-mah-one-plot!. policy is accor-
u ' dingly recommended, ibid., p. 152. 
44Ibid., pp. 75f. 
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millions anticipated through :future population growth, would 
all have to be absorbed in.manu:facturine; and commercial activ-
ities within the Reserves. Industrial development would have 
to begin from scratch, for: 11 as far as industries are concer-
ned, the Bantu Areas are in'fact a desert •••• 1146 Fifty-
thousand employment opport~nities outside agriculture would 
have to be created in the Reserves annually, 20,000 of these 
in secondary industry and donstruction, the rest in the nat-
ural outgrowth of service a'ctivi ties. 
With regard to the· 1:oca tion of thf.s industrial devel-
opment, the Commission stated that as far as possible -it 
should take place within th~ Reserves, rather than along 
their borders, although development of the 'Border Areas 146 
could supplement the main program. But emphasis shbuld:·n6t 
i 
be on the latter, because h~re the entire structure of con-
ventional and legal color b~rs applied, as in other 'European 
Areas', and therefore the p*oposed objective of full separate 
development (vertical segregation) would be undermined and 
' the removal of all obstacles to advancement and production 
would not occur. 47 
I 
The provision of powe1r, water, transport, communicat-
ions, and a huge program of urban development involving the 
establishment of over lOO.African towns to house the workers 
of the Reserves, would have to be undertaken 11without delayu. 4 e 
As the resources for ~apital formation'among the 
If ·. 11 ...... Africans themselves were meagre ,~~ the financing o:f all 
46 Ibid., p. 49. 
46 I. e., "a European area si.tuated so closely to the 
Bantu Areas, that families of Bantu emp~oyees ••• can be estab-
lished in the Bantu Areas in
11
:such a way that the employees 
can lead a full family life, i ibid., p. 140 • 
. 
47Ibid., PP• 141, 183. 
48 Ibid., p. 150. \ \' 
. 
49Ibid. 
·--' 
P• 133· 
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this, as well as the requisite entrepreneurial skill and 
technical knowledge would initially and for some time have 
to come from the outside. Government should supply some·of 
the funds, particularly for the provision of public facil~ 
ities, but uas far as possib_le, the development of industry 
should be undertaken by private enterprise. n 50 Seven mem-
_bers of the Commission, th~ majority, including Mr. de·wet 
Nel, the next Minister of Native Affairs, signed this recom-
' mendation, stating that without private capital investment 
in the Reserves, 11 the desired tempo of.development w±ll prob-
ably not be attained." 51 ~o civil servant members of the 
Commission opposed the entrp.nce into the Reserves of private 
capital supplied by Whites on the grounds that this would 
I 
re-create white residential areas ~nd vested interests, and 
thus block apartheid. (Here was a.slight dilemma: separate 
development could hardly be' ·achieved without private white-
i 
owned capital, but private ~hite-owned capital would com-
,· plicate the achievement of ~eparate development.) 
Ho\'r much money was n~cessary to reach the first stage 
of apartheid, that is, to develop the economic capacity of 
I 
the Reserves for a de jure ~opulation of 10 million within 
. I 
twenty-five years, 8 million of whom being urbanized and 
supported by economic activities within or bordering the 
.Areas' plus another It millipn being the dependents of 509~'·000 
migrant laborers employed ell,sewhere? 6 2 The Commission prop-
. , I 
osed that to get all aspects: of the development program into 
operation, ~10~ million woul~ have to be provided during the 
·first 10 years period, ~55 nrl.llion of this being interest-
bearing and recoverable, the rest representing expenditures 
of a socio-economic nature (~ousing, roads, etc.), which in 
50 Ibid., p. 132. Italics in text. 
51 Ibid., P• 142. 
52 Ibid., P• 179· 
• 
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vi·ew of :population growth would have to be undertaken an-yway, 
whether in the Reserves or:not. 58 The Commission offered 
. ' 
no estimate of the money r~quired to attain the only other 
stage of a:part~eid it envisaged, the settlement in the Res-
erves by the year 29001 o;B·,"i4.8 million of the then anticipat-
ed total African populatio* of 21.3 million. 54 
: f . Before noting the G<j>vernment s reaction to the Plan, 
certain points should be kept in mind. In the first place, 
. . 
the Commission shaped its ~ro:posals for the thinning of the 
Reserves' agricultural :population and the ·enlargement of 
individual land holdings with the object of making possible 
an average· family income f~om farming of about MO a year, 
the planning of agricultur~l reorganization for any higher 
I 
incomes being rejected as ~ecessitating the removal of an 
even larger pe·rcentage of t~e existing Reserves :po:p':llation 
f'rom the land and into indu~try. The figure of ~0 i'las 
. I . 
approximately the average i~come of 900 full-time African 
I 
farmers whom the Commission 1 interviewed. 55 It is lower than 
the estimated present averate income of Reserve families as 
a whole (b97), much of which comes from the earnings of mig-
ratory labor. 56 Thus, it would appear that the Commission 
was either mistaken in repo~ting that its proposals would 
enable the bulk of the agricul tu,ral population to work the 
' land on a full.-time basis, without having to ~ugment its in-
come from the migrant earnirigs of its adult males, or else 
it was assuming lower ReserV-e incomes in future than the 
average now generally preval~lng. 
53 Ibid., p. 206 • 
~ . . 54These figures are c:ontained in Verslag van ~ 
Kommissie Vir Die ~osio-Ekonomiese Ontwikk~ling van ~t~­
Bantoegebiede Binne ~ ~ ~ Suid-.Afrika_, val. 16, ch. 
47, p. 16,-~the mimeographed:, unabr'idged and unpublished 
version of the Report·. 
65U.G. 61-'55, :P• 113'·· 
I 
l 
66 Ibi.Q,., P• 98. 
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It also seems that the Commission considerably under-
. I 
estimated the capital costs of industrializing the Reserves, 
and overestimated the latter's capacity for industrializat-
ion. Its proposals envisaged:the creation within the Reserv-
es over a period of 25-30 years of an urban-industrial struc-
, 
ture equal in population magnitude to the present one in 
South Africa as a whole, with:a spending program represen-
ting the annual equivalent of :only 2.1 per cent of South 
I 
Africa's current rate of gros~ investment, only two-thirds 
of l per cent of_the country's net National Income, and con-
siderably less than the new g~oss investments made by one 
South African insurance compatiy, alone, in 1956. 67 Eoth 
I 
I 
supporters and opponents of apartheid maintain that this c~n-
not be done. Their estimates bf the average capital outlay 
in plant and machinery alone, required to put a man in fact-
• I 
ory work, range from ;b30068 to:;bl,000 69 per worker. To est-
'· 
67 ' Robertson, Qg. cit., ~P· 64ff. 
58 1 D I 
· Sheila T. van der Horst, A Plan for the Union s 
Backward .Areas:. Some Economic ::Aspects of the Tomlinson 
Colnnrl:S.sioonJs Report' n §..A. J .E. , \ 24: 109' June 1956. ; 
59 J. L. Sadie, The Implications of the Separate Devel-
opment Policy (State Informatio~ Office~Fact Paper 16, 1956), 
p. 12 (Professor Sadie was one '()f the economic advisors to 
the Commission). The Afrikaans:e Handelsinstituut also· estim-
ated that an average of ;bl,OOO ~as necessary to establish a 
worker in industrial employment\ (buiJ,.ding, provisions, machin-
ery, stores etc.),. (Volkshandel, 14:12, Ma.art 1953) • .An in-
stance of the actual magnitude of capital investment required 
to absorb surplus rural populattons in secondary industry is 
afforded by the Zwelitsha Project in the Oiskei Reserve. 
Planned under the United Party &dministration after the Second 
;World War, a private British concern together with the Indus-
trial Development Oorporatioh;: a South African Government 
agency, had by 195l.jointly spent ~1,400,000 on the buildings 
and machinery of.a textile plan~ producing finished cotton 
fabrics from raw cotton. This sum created employment for 
1,000 African workers, but cons~derable additional investment 
was p:rojected to the end that 5,[000 African workers i'roul~ 
eventually be employed. This investment "w~e exclusive of the 
amounts expended and required fo,r the housing of the workers 
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' 
ablish secondary industries in the Reserves capable of employ-
ing the target figure of 20,000 new workers every year over 
. ' . 
the first ten years would therefore seem to necessitate an 
investment, exclusive of expenditures on power,communications, 
roads, houses and other amenities, of between ~0-200 mil-
lion, considerably more th~n the i25 million proposed by the 
Commission for this purpose. 60 Even if the latter's recom-
mendations were regarded m~rel"y as stimulants to development, 
they were of too limited a~ order, according to the journal 
of the Afrikaan~e Handelsinstituut, to be capable of attrac-
ting the requisite amounts pf private capital. 6 ~ Moreover, 
it is doubtful whether the ~ypes of industry envisaged--bak-
eries, construction, repair~ng, saw mills, paper products, 
I 
furniture, clothing, textil~s, light metals (knives, forks, 
household ware), home industries (pottery, weaving, etc) 62--
could reproduce by 1981-6 employment opportunities in the 
Reserves equivalent in aggregate to those of the present, 
I 
heavily-industrialized Sout~ern Transvaal, Durban-Pi.netown, 
Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and Western Cape complexes, which 
have reached their present position after more than fifty 
years of development based oin the exploitation of gold, coal 
and iron. 
The balance of payments prospects which industrial 
.development of the Reserves would entail were termed by the 
and their families, the.layi:p.g out.of a model town, the fur-
nishing of utilities, etc. ~oreover, the Zwelitsha site was 
located within the electrified area of the country, whereas 
most parts of the Reserves are not, (See Charles s. Morgan, 
nThe Story of Zwelitsha, 11 The Manufacturer, 1:22-26, 30 March 
1951). A 1951 United Nations estimate of the cost in an under-
·developed territory to put a:man in non-agricultural employ-
ment was *390 per man, this being the average for li~t in~ 
dustries requiring little capital and highly capitalized heavy 
industries, cited Assembly Debates, 15 May 1956, col. 5424f. 
60U.G. 61-'55, p. 192.
1 
6 ~Volkshandel, 17:9f, :Junie 1956. 
62U .G. 61-' 55, P• 134.\ 
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Commission as not very "ro!reaten. 6 3 At prese;nt, the Reserves 
export labor to pay for· the ;b25 ·millions worth of flood they 
import annually from the r~st of the country. 641 Such imports, 
as well as raw material imports, would necessarily increase 
considerably to provide for the projected increased populat-
ion and industrial development of the regions. As the antic-
! 
ipated outflow of migrant labor would remain constant (500,000), 
. 
the interest and redemptio~·on most of the capital supplied, 
and the payment for most o~ the machinery and raw material 
I 
imports would have to come ;through the sale in the Reserves 
of locally-produced manufactured goods and the export of what 
I 
v;ould be a considerable balance. 6 5 The entrance of cheap man-
ufactured goods into the re:_st of the country in payment for ! . 
the latter's sales to the Reserves of food, capital and raw-
' 
materials vlould probably wreck some of the Republic r s own 
manufacturing industries working with more expensive white 
and other labor; 66 or else': bring white wages down; circum-
. I 
stances that would mo-st likely provoke tariffs against the 
Reserves' exports, in which]case their development, to the 
extent it was linked to South African assistance, would be 
i 
slowed down or halted. The:commission's Report does not con-
, 
sider these aspects of the balance of payments problem •. 
Finally, it must be noted that although the Tomlinson 
It II Commission accepted complete racial separation as the 
necessary and ultimate goal,. :1 t did not plan for this: 
I 
The Commission would set as target, a program which 
will not cause dislocation, which increases the percent-
age of the Bantu population having their dwellings and 
places of work in the Bantu areas, but which will also 
; 
63Ibid., P• 210. 
64Spooner, South Afri~an Predicament, p. 222. 
65See Spooner, op. cit.,- PP• 226f. 
i 
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allow for an increase ~n the labour forces in the non-
--- --6 -- --- -- --- ---Bantu Areas. ' 
Specifically, the Commission presented a plan ~or 
apartheid·which, if adequate for its purposes, and if com-
1 
pletely carried out, would result in an increase by more than 
2 mill~on in the number of Africans in 'White South Africa' 
' by the year 2000, so that 1py the end of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, the total number of Africans in the Republic of South 
Africa with no rights to full.andfree development would 
still exceed the· number of ',Whites. 6 8 
Nevertheless, the R~port provided a foundation on 
' 
which to plan a regional d~velopment program, and did emphas-
ize some of the consequenc~s of a failure to embark on such 
a scheme: 
If a programme such :as the one outlined ••• is not tae·k-
led, and present condi t'ions continu~·~; it cannot be expec-
ted that the Bantu Area's will ever contain many more 
people than are residing there at the present stage. The 
increase in population \-rill simply '~'overflow" to other 
parts of the country. [n any case,·by the close of the 
century the European ar~as will probably accommodate no 
less than three.;;.quarter~· of the Bantu population69 •••• 
Circumstances necessitate that a clear and unequivocal 
choice be made, and the:obvious way out of the dilemma 
is to proueed with the large-scale, sustained develop-
ment of the Bantu Areasr 70 
1 
6 7Q.G. 61-'55, p. 184. My italics. 
i 
6 ~igures sup~'ijJil the unabridged and unpublished 
version Gf the Report (vol. :16, ch. 47, p. 16) show the 
anticipated results of development as leaving 6.5 million 
Africans outside the Reserve,s by the year 2000, as against 
(U.G. 61-'55, P•. 29) 4.5 to\6.1 millions Whites, depending 
on the scale of immigration.! 
I 
6 9 Ibid., P• 184. 
f 
70Ibid., P• 105. 
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The Report concludep. with an expression of hope that 
the development program wohld be implemented uin the spirit 
of an act of fai tha: 
The choice is clear~ either the challenge must be 
accepted, or the inevitable consequences of the integ-
ration of the Bantu and European population groups 
into a common society,imust be endured. 7~ 
t ' The Government s Response To The Plan 
' The Government rejedted the main features of the Plan, 
while accepting its object 'in principle. It rejected the 
proposal to abolish the tr~bal land tenure system, and ref-
' i ' 7 used to revoke the one-ma~-one-plot rule, 2 thus blocking 
·the socio-economic prerequ~sites for any measure of viable 
territorial separation. Elimination of the communal land 
tenure system, said.Dr. Ve~oerd, explaining the Government's 
decisions, 11would undermine: the whole tribal structure. 117~ 
Not only did the Government reje~t the idea of a· 
private agricultural system, for the Reserves, it also refused 
to remove the restrictions impeding the entry of white indust-
rialists and their capital into these-regions, explaining that 
free enterprise would intro~uce vested interests and lead to 
• I 
the establishment of 1 whiteispots 1 in the ~Bantu Areas', 
. ' 
similar to tP.e 1black spotsi in the 'White Areas', and would 
thus be a step towards furt~er integration and away from 
racial separation. 74 
7~Ibid., p. 211. Italics in text. 
I 
72Government Decisiorls on the Recommendation of the 
Commission for the Socio-Eg_onoiiiicDevelopment of theB'filtU 
Areas Within the Union of fu2.1l.~h. .Afri_pa, 1956, CW:.P. f.- 56), 
Decision.3. I 
73
.Assembly Debates, 1~ May 1956, cols. 5508-5511. 
74W.P. F-'56, Decisioh-9 (i). The Reserves are effect-
. ively closed to private white capital through sections one 
(2) of .A:6t lfo. 27 of 1913 ana section twelve (1) of Act No·~ 
18 of 1936', which prohibit WP.ites from buying or hiring land 
in these areas. · 
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In adopting this p9sition, the Cabinet associated it-
self with the Minority Report of the two civil servant mem-
1 
bers of the Tomlinson Commission, c. w. Prinsloo and c. B. 
i 
Young, who had themselves )first taken this 'line after the 
full Tomlinson Report had ~een written and handed to the 
I 
Cabinet. At that stage, wpen the official summary of the 
Report was being drafted, ~hey raised their argument and 
having failed to convince their fellow Commissioners of its 
! ft II 
weight, submitted as their[ personal opinions a Minority 
i 
Report objecting to industrialization with private white cap-
ital.75 The majority of t~e Commission had, in fact, antic-
, 
ipated the objection by prpposing that white entrepreneuPs 
I i' t be granted no surface righ~s in the Bantu Areas ; that white 
employees be housed in tem~orary 11white locationsrt; and that 
a policy ofAfricanizationi in the·various occupations be 
undertaken to eliminate pr~gressively the presence of white 
personnel .. 76 Obviously 
ernment, as neither did 
this made no impression on the Gov-
' the argument--really the crux of the 
' i 
' 
I· 
I 75U.G. 61~!55, p. 142. 
i . 76 Ibid., p. 142. T~e Government has not objected to 
white businesses establishing branches in.non-white areas 
outside South Africa. Aft~r explaining to a businessmen's 
meeting in 1961 that the policy of his Rembrandt group of 
industries was to establish their foreign enterprises on a 
11partnership"' basis, sel1i*g at least half the stock locally 
and appointiEg at least half the directors from the citizens 
of the fiOUntry, the Afrika~er business leader, Anton Rupert, 
said: It seems strange tJ:ilat we can erect a factory on a 
partnership basis in Kuala!Lumpur in Malaya but may not do 
so in Umtata in the Transk~i, 11 (Die Burger, 2 December 1961, 
in p .• n. 47/1961/438). Indeed~ the • Bantu .Areas' are the only 
underdeveloped territoriesjin the non-Communist world where 
outside private capital investment is actively barred. For-
eign capital investment is,' of course, encouraged in 1 White 
T I South .Africa itself, whef~ the Japanese minority, reportedly 
to facilitate the country s commercial dealings with Japan, 
were recently classified a~ 'Whites', thereby permitting them 
to associate sexually with \the other Whites, but not with the 
Chinese minority and other !'.non-Europeans', on penalty of 
imprisonment under the Immo'rality Act, Sunday Times, 3 Decem-
ber 1961, in P.D. 47 /1961/4;40. 
i 
i 
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I 
matter--that unless white ~usinessmen and their capital were 
'tr allowed into the Reserves,! the desired tempo of development 
i ' 11'77 
will probably not be attaiped, a.contention with which 
I 
the Afrikaner chamber of cpmmerce concurred: 
If this can not. be k.11owed, all bureaucratic plans 
for the development of\ these territories are necessarily 
doomed. The State wil~ not be able to go on taking 
*-600 millions for 25 yj3ars out of white pockets and 
investing uneconomically in the Reserves. 78 
i 
The State had no intention of doing this either. In 
place of the Commissionrs becommendation that it spend 
i ~25,000,000 over the first! five years to .t1stimulate indus-
1 
trial development 11 , the Goyernment proposed to set up a 
I 
Bantu Areas Investment Co~oration with an initial capital 
I 
of ~500,000, stating that +t had decided to leave the finan-
cing of industrial developrh.ent in the Reserves uchiefly 11 to 
fl! t i 1 f '1 "' 79 the Africans themselves, ~n he pr ncip e o se f-aid. 
It declared that the Commission had assumed the entry ot 
white -owned industries into the rBantu Areas', and that as 
this was not being allowed[the recommendation fell away. 80 
i The Commission, however, h~d stated that the ~25, 000" 000 
would have to be provided by the Government, uirrespecti ve 
.I 
' · IISl. of whether other sources o~ capital can be found or not. 
' t •. Moreover, it would seem from Dr. Verwoerd s remarks 
I 
that rapid changes occurre4 in the Reserves between 1954, 
when the Commission submitt[ed its Report, and 1956, when 
I 
the Report was debated in Parlj,.ament. The proposed expendit-
ure of ~7,000,000 on land ~eclamation could be cut to 
I 
I 
~15,000,000? he said, since! Africans had been put to work 
I 77U.G. 61-'55, P• 148. 
76vo lkshande 1, 17: 9fi, Juni e 19 56 .. 
• ! ' 
7 9w.P. F-·' 56, Decisi~n 9( iii). 
I 
80Ibid., Decision·lo~ 
I 81U.G. 61-'55, P· 138. I 
313 
gratis on the principle of: 'self-aid' • 62 
. Indeed, in place of\ the Tomlinson Commission's recomm-
endation for an initial te~ year spending program of ~104.4 
million, Dr. Verwoerd's opfl_nion was that only ~36.6 million 
would be required. 63 I:b is questionable whether even this 
.. 
amount will be spent. In March 1960, the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development, who had been a member of the 
Commission, announced that altogether over the three previous 
years, and in the current financial year, a total o~ 
~3,200,000 was and would b~ invested in the development o~ 
the • Bantu Areas'. 64 
I 
Why .Actual Racial Separati6n, In All Forms, Is Unacce:gtable 
To The White·Population I 
Why w:ere the Tomlinson Commis.sion 1 s plans ~or partial 
racial separation rejected or emasculated? 
. I 
Before we try to answer this, it must be noted as a 
fact whose relevance to th~ question will soon become plain 
' 
that the idea of total sep~ration as a policy has been 
. I 
repeatedly repudiated officially. Each Nationalist adminis-
' tration has gone qn record ion this. Dr. Malan, speaking to 
• i . u 
the House of Assembly on 18 April 1950, said that complete 
i 
or total territorial apartheid ••• would be. an ideal.state of 
~ i 
affairs, but that it was riot the policy of the National Par-i. •, 
ty because "our whole economic structure is to a large extent 
' ' based on Native Labour. 1166 The next Prime Minister, J. G. 
82Assembly Debates, l4 May 1956, cole. 5301-5; 
Senate Debates, 24 May 19561,, cols. 3866-7. 
68RR. 93/59, P• 9. 
-
64South African Broadcasting Corporation news summary, 
15 March 1960. 
66Quoted in RR. 93/59, P• 4. 
! 
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i Strijdom, declared that hils Government was not prepared to 
apply a policy of total sebaration, explaining that 11 a pol-
. ' II • itical party must be pract~cal and realistic and must lim~ 
I 
. it its objectives to rlwhat 1, the voters will accept.u 86 The 
• I 
third post-War Nationalist: Prime Minister, Dr. Ver~1oerd, 
announced in one of the fi~st Parliamentary debates after 
assuming office that he woUld work for t"total separation in 
the political sphereu .. 87 ylarifying his leaderts statement, 
Dr. Donges, the F.inance· Mi:t;tister, said that total territorial 
I 
separation was impracticaliand was not the policy of the 
Government: n"fhat it [}he polic~ is in fact is th_at it is 
total political 'apartheid. ! The political rights of the 
Native and the political r~ghts of the European are separate 
' 1188 
and they are completely se~arate. 
As Dr. Malan indicated, a policy of total separation 
i . 
would underminE? the present: economic structure of South 
Africa. There are now no ~achines capable of replacing all 
black workers on white farms, and in mines, factories, shops, 
I 
trucks, delivery vans and ~ome~. An attempt to begin with-
drawing African labor from any sector of the economy where 
I 
it is in demand, and where iits use affects the livelihood 
of voters, would have party~political repercussions, as the 
Government admits. 
:The Tomlinson Commisfion' s plans., however, envisaged 
no withdrawal of African labor from 11.White South .Africa'; it 
will be recalled that they provided tor its increase. They 
portended ruin to no white employer as a result of a loss of 
labor. The balance of their financial requirements was for 
interest-bearing and recove~able expenditure, and the rest 
I 
was for public facilities tq serve the increase in population 
I 
86Die Nasionale Part:2:nuus, No. 20, March 19.56 • 
87
.Assembly Debates, 
-
~7 
! 
January 1959, cols. 6lf. 
88Assemblv Debates, ~9 January 1959, col 168. 
that, the Commission claim~d, would h~ve to be furnished 
whether in the Reserves or not~ No matter how reluctant 
. ' i 
the Government normally may have qeen to impose taxation 
' 
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on the electorate for the prime, material benefit of Afric-
ans, it. would in this case~, have been a modest price to pay 
for greater political security, and one which probably 
I 
i 
would have been demanded h~d that object been assured. 
But was it? What, ~fter all, did the Plan presage? 
It meant a black majority in 'White South Africa' for as 
long·as could be foreseen.! This black majority would be 
subject to the color bar and the denial of effective polit-
i 
ical rights for as long as !could be foreseen. But how long 
could th~t be, when right ~long the borders of 'White South 
Africa' the State itself wduld be helping to build African 
industrial societies whose :inhabitants progressively would 
be acquiring the aspiratio~s, the technical ability and 
material capacity to dispu·tle \'thite political management and 
' I 
to intervene on behalf of their relatives and friends accross 
the borders? i 
Were total separation rapidly attainable and feasible 
in terms of economics and p1~rty politics, the Government 
might have acceded to the i~dustrialization of the Reserves. 
It would then have been neckssary to remove the two principal 
obstacles to this, the trib~l land tenure system and the 
restrictions on the entry of private capital. Private agric-
ulture and industry, with its concomitants of urbanization 
and education, would have ~undermined the influence of the 
chiefs, some of \'Thom, naturally set against such developments, 
have allied themselves to the Government, and have helped it 
maintain its policies and sway. 89 But-total separation would 
89Police and airforc~ action was undertaken in June 
1960 to-keep the Paramount Ghief of the Pondos at the head 
of his subjects. Official ~nd unofficial figures on the n~ 
ber of Africans killed in tne disturbances differ considerab-
ly. When police operations :,began, the troubled zones were 
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have released the Governmeht from the necessity of holding 
·the Reserves in a state of: economic backwardness under tribal 
I 
I 
authorities. It would havr enabled social change and the 
growth of African power, eyen military power, to be more 
safely accommodated. As the Minister of Defence, J. J. 
I 
Fouche, said i·n 1961, the .t\rational Party was aware that the 
1 Bantu Areas' could becomeimilitary threats to 'White South 
I Africa 1 , but enemies are bE?tter controlled v1hen they were 
outside one's borders, as ihe case of Israel testified. 90 
i 
The Tomlinson Comm.ission' s !plan for partial separation would 
I . have hardly failed to have [given rise to a Fifth Column of 
I • 
several millions within. ~t may be surmised that the rejec-
t.ion of the principal development proposals was based on 
this consid.eration, althou~ there is no indication in the 
Cabinet's White Paper (F-'56) that the effect of their im-
plementation on the security of the political order was ever 
discussed. The reasons giV;en in that document, it will be 
. I 
recalled, were that private freehold agriculture would un.,.. 
dermine the tribal structu~e, and that the use of private 
white capital would involv~ discarding the principles of 
i 
separate developip.ent. · : 
i t Rejection of the Commission s ideas for partial sep-
aration "\vas not limited to the Government, and those whose 
I interests it represented. Africans also found the Report 
unacceptable, though not fo!r the same reasons. It rrappears 
ll Jl I to be based, wrote one, on the assumption that the Union 
closed to the Press, (see SUnday Times, 12 June 1960). Pan-
doland was still under a state of emergency as of 1 December 
1961, when it was reported that 30 Pondos haa been sentenced 
to death and 1,500 were bein6 detained as yet uncharged, 
(Cane Times, l December 1961). Risings against chiefs have 
occurred in recent years iniSekukuniland, Zeerust, Witzies-
hoek, Tembuland and in the Ciskei. In each case, the police 
have entered the Reserve to
1
restore law and order, and the 
Press have been barred. : 
i 90Die Vaderland, 10 Qctober 1961, in P.D. 39/1961/357· 
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of South Africa belongs exclusively to the white population 
which is therefore. entitle~ by unilateral action to decide 
i 
upon the claims, if any, or other sections of the population 
to a place in the South .Af~ican sun. 119 :L. In 1956, a confer-
. I 
t I I J\ • ence of the coun ry s principal ~frican organizations was 
conven~d at.BlDemfontein u*der the auspices of the African 
r ' . Ministers Federation to cqnsider the Tomlinson· Report~ 
Among the decisions recorded was the following: 
\ .' . Conference rejects ~he concept of national homes.for 
Africans in certain ar~itrarily defined areas for the 
following reasons! Afrticans are the indigenous inhab-
itants of the country W:ith an indisputable claim to 
the whole of South ·Afri!ca as their home •••• there is no 
part of the country to ~hose development they have not 
made their full contrib~tion. 92 · 
This does not mean that all Africans find the concept 
; . I 
of racial separation object~onable in itself. Like some 
Whites, there are Africans who accept the idea in principle, 
I 
though advancing their own ~deas about the details. Speak-
ing to a meeting of the South .African Institute of Race Rel-
• I 
ations in April 1959, a Joh~nnesburg African businessman, 
I 
Mr. Paul Mosakay· said that Africans wanted apartheid, but it' 
I • 
. I 
would have to 'be •l3:::'p~oper. ai'artheid. . The country should be 
divided into two at the 25th meridian of longitude. The east-
ern section,.including Johannesburg, Pretoria, Pietermaritz-
burg, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein 
(i.e •. , three of the four ma:i,n industrial complexes, most of 
I 
the cities, ports and farml~nds) should be the Bantu portion,-
while the Karoo, the Kalahari and Kimberley with its diamonds 
would fall in the white are~. The plan should satisfy the 
I 
Whites as they were getting fb.alf of the country and were 
only one fifth of the population. Moreover, they would be 
9 l.Prof. z. K. Matthew~, nThe Future in the Light of 
the Tomlinson Report, 11 (Joha±mesburg: South African Instit-
ute of Race RelationsJ RR. 1~7/56, 1956), P• 18. 
! 
: 3W I 
getting the western coast and so would be sloser to the West-
[ 
ern Civilization of which they were so fond. The time had 
i 
come for the paths of Blac~ and White to separate, he remark-
! 
ed, echoing the editorialsiof the Government-supporting 
Press. 98 i 
Indeed, it would se~m that the only people who might 
I . 
reasonably be expected to aettle for an actual scheme of 
i 
racial separation are the ~fricans9 
The 'Border Ihdustries 1 And-~~ '~ntustans' 
I 
. I Within three years of the rejection of the Tomlinson 
I. 
Report, the A~rican popula~ion of Johannesburg increased by 
approximately 7 per cent, f,rom an ~stimated 546,000 in 1956, 94 
to an estimated 583,000 in 1,1959. 96 For all urban areas, prov-
. I . 
isional 1960 Census figures; indicated a 36 per cent increase 
in their African populatio~ over the 1951 Census total, as 
! 
against a 21.5 per cent ris:e in the number of urban Whites. 
I · . n Noting these figures, an Af~ikaans journal commented: In 
spite of all influx control: measures, the black ·flow to'the 
cities has not be~n stopped: but on the contrary is growing. 1196 
I 
Paralleling these developments was the progressive 
.African econ~mic occupation! of the 1 white 1 countryside. Here 
the ratio of Africans to Wh~tes, 4.5:1 .in 1948 when the N"at-
I 
93Die Transvaler, 29:April 1~59, in P.D. 17/1959/163f. 
94Union of South.Africa, Monthly Bullet'in Qf Statis-
tics, 35:2, June 1956. 
I 96Assembly Debates, 20 February 1959, col. 1262. The 
ratio of Whites to .Blacks in Johannesburg changed from 2:1 in 
1939/40 to 3:4 in 1955/56, ~ity of Johannesburg, Estimates, . 
1957-58, Budget Speech of~ phairman of the·Finance Committee, 
Councillor Kieth G. Fleming; pp. 14. 
~6~Volkshande.lj :F-ebru~ry __ .l9ql;:. in .J?..D~ 10/196l/103o; 
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I 
ional :Party took office, 97 \rose to almost 6:1 in 1959, 98 and 
. I 
was expected ·to reacb. a le"tel of 11:1 by 1970. 99 A Comm-
ission of Inquiry into European Occupancy of Rural Areas re-
ported in 1960 that 14,"703!white-owned p1atteland farms were 
then occupied exclusive~y by 924,424 Non-Whites, and that 
according to information s~pp1ied by the South African 
Police, 5,419 farms still qccupied by Whites in 1945 had 
I 
since been occupied completely by Non-Whites working for 
absentee landlords.~ 00 . 
i 
Of these two demographic movements, that into the. 
I 
n 1 • 
cities, the focal point o~ unrest and revolutionary move-
ments, 11 ~ 0~ was viewed as the most crucial. Attention partic-
ularly· fell on' the convergEd,nce ·of popu:J_ation on the countryr s 
I 
four principal metropolitan regions, where two-thirds of 
the tv10 million urban Afrid
1
ans were concentrated in 1951.~ 02 
I 
If industrial expansion co~tinued to be centralized in these 
. I 
areas, as in the past, it W
1
as estimated that the Southern 
Transvaal metropolitan comp~ex, alone, would contain 10.6 
milli_on people by the year ~000, only 2.6 million of whom 
would be Whites.~ 03 The political. implications of this were 
not lost on the Govermo.ent.! The new industries necessary to 
. I 
accommodate population growth would have to be located else-
where. But if not in the R~serves, where control over both 
I 
the industries and their lapor fo~ces might have to be relin-
quished, where? 
97g.G. 28- 1 48, p~ra.\25. 
I 
98Die Transvaler, 23iJune 1959 • 
. - . 
99Die ·Transval·er, 4 May 1960, in P.;Q .. 18/1960/199· 
~ 00Sunday Times, 8 ~y 1960. 
. ' 
~o·:L·J'i.of. J. L • .Sadie~ quoted in P.D. 33/1960/357. 
I 
102U.G. 61-t55, p. 2t •. 
~ 08 Ibid., P• 34. 
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The answer given by:the Cabinet to Parliament was that 
I it would seek to disperse new industrial developments around 
i · I t the perimeters of the Reserves, but in white territory. 
I 
The labor forc.e would sleep just accross the border in one::-•d:f 
the 1 Bantu homelands 1 • In i this way, Dr. Verwoerd explained.;., 
it would be possible ''to obtain the necessary numbers o:f 
. . : 
inhabitants within the Native areas to be on the safe side.n~o4 
The scheme offered l:rricans the prospect o:f living as 
family units, though, as the factories would be situated in· 
I I 1 White South Africa , the color bar presumably would continue 
1 
to apply and their economic opportunities would remain limit-
ed. For the white populat~on the scheme seemed to promise 
greater security. The growth of urban African concentrat-
ions would be stopped. smJ11 industrial pockets would be 
I 
scattered around the countr:y, but not in the Reserves which, 
I 
lacking viable economic strFctures of their own, would remain 
dormitory satellites of rWh[te South Africa•. 
It was soon discoveriF'd, however,. that the scheme was 
i 
more difficult to apply than to conceive. The (Viljoen) . 
' I 
Commission of Enquiry into rolicy Relating to the Protection 
of Industries pointed out ih 1.958 that the balance of advan-
' tage and disadvantage, :from'purely economic considerations, 
! 
was "heavily weighted11 against industrial decentralization. 105 
The main attraction for investment in the 'border areas' was 
that they were 'uncontrOlledi areas r whe~e minimum wage regul-
, 
i 
ations did not obtain, so that vwrkers could be paid lower 
I 
wages than in the cities. But even this advantage would fall 
. . . , f I 
away if the Government wereito bring border wages.up to 
urban levels. On the other:hand, if it failed to do so, and i • 
permitted 'border industries' to compete with factories in 
~ 04Assembly Debates, il4 May 1956, col. 5309. f· 
. ~ 05Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Policy 
Relati~ to the Protection df Industries, 1958, (U.G. 
36-'58 , paras. 45-8. 
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the cities on the basis of a iower wage structure, the rep-
ercussions of so. u endangering the employment of white work-
ers11 would soon appear. 
The dilemma began to take shape after several cloth-
ing manufacturers from the Wi~watersrand, Durban and the 
Cape moved their factories to ';'uncontrolled areas • near 
Reserves and engaged Africans 
1
at longer hours and at wages 
that were a third or less of ~he prevailing rates for simil-
ar work in the 'controlled arJasr.J..oG For some years these 
' factories had been turning out: clothes at prices undercut-
ting those of similar goods.produced in the cities. In six 
years, the number of white clothing workers employed on the 
Witwatersrand fell from 7,745 t.o 3,179.J..o& In Port Elizabeth, 
half the clothing workers lost; their jobs·.J.oe Mr. van den 
Berg, the Nationalist chairman!:1.of the Germis.ton branch of 
I I the Garment Workers Union, a~ounced in March 1959 that dur-
ing the preceeding year every Germiston factory ha~ cut prod-
uction and gone on short time;jhalf the clothing workers had 
lost their j~bs; manufacturerst profits had dwindled to 3·3 
per cent. t 1During the same period a new clothing centre, 
the size of.Germiston's, has gtown up in Charlestown--a vill-
age in the cheap-labour area. 1 0ne thousand workers are 
employed there.~~~P 
In 1959, a deputation of trade unionists met with 
I Senator de Klerk,.the Minister:of Labour, to request that 
the Government introduce wage eontrol in tborder industries' 
to prevent unfair competition.· The Minister recorded their 
representations on a dictation!machine in order, he explained, 
Review 
J.. 06 RR. 93/59, p. 16; CaRe Times, 12 November 1959. 
J..o?Sundax Times, 28 February 1960. 
I 
·· J..? 8Eastern Province Herald, 1 December 1958 • 
.. 
J.. 09Q~Qted in Bunda~ Tim~s, No.~ 4P.' 14 April 959, jp. 
i 
' I 
23 March 1959, in Press 
21. 
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to give his Cabinet collea~ues a first-hand impression of the 
case.~~o Clearly their hedrts were set on the success of the 
' 
scheme, ·and he anticipated [a difficult time. 
The Cabinet then met after which Senator de Klerk 
announced its decision. IJ remained Government policy to 
encourage the establishment of 'border industries', he said. 
i 
However, . \ . 
factories in the uncont:rolled areas are expected to 
ensure that they manufaicture.goods which will not 
endanger the employment, of the White workers in the 
controlled areas. 
I 
Which goods were th~,se? According to Deputy Minister 
• I 
of Labour Viljoen, they wer1e articles suited to the 11 Bantu 
trade. 11 ~~j_ But the Industr~al Legislation Commission of 
Inquiry in 1951 had emphasized that the range of goods ex-
clusively or mainly consume~ by Africans was very small, 
N!and no material industrial 1 development could be achieved on 
· · u~~e i 
such a limited demand. !Even most of these goods were 
already being produced'by e~tablished businesses.~~s 
To continue with Sen~tor de Klerk's statement: 
' ;
Where it is proved that the clothing factories in the 
uncontrolled areas manufacture articles which compete 
with those produced by the factories in the controlled 
areas, the existing industrial agreement will be applied 
for the area concerned.~ •• g.e., the~rage levels in the 
competing areas would bT s~andardizeqj .~~4 
In terms of these li~itations, it is doubtful whether 
'border industries' will multiply and thus exert an apprec-
~~00ape Times, 1 December 1959· 
j_~~Oape Times, 12 No~ember 1959. 
I 
~~ 2U.~. 62-'51, (Majority Report), para. 1611. 
~~ 8South African Fed~rated Chamber of Industries, 
Enclosure to the Minutes of !the Central Economic Affairs 
Meeting; 7th August 1959, 'Development of Industries on the 
. • I Perimeter of, and Within th~ Bantu Areas , Memorandum Present-
ed to Each Member of the Cabinet. 
~J.4Quoted RR. 93/59, [P• 17 • 
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iable influence on populatjj.on trends .• 
Opposition to the '~order industries' scheme arose 
I 
not only from white workers and businessmen, on economic 
grounds. Its political assumptions were also questioned. 
I 
Indeed, it was attacked, p~rticularly by the English-speaking 
. i 
section, as a subversive d~ctrine: 
Any such scheme will play right into the hands of 
Communist agitators as :it would leave industries help-
lessly and ruinously dependent upon the wage demands of 
their nearby Native labour force. 
And if the Native arieas were eventually converted into 
autonomous Black States as a pretence to the world of the 
essential morality of Apartheid, it is not difficult to 
visualise the pressure~ to which Native workers from these 
States would be subjec~ed by unscrupulous leaders in order 
to embarrass and undermane the economy of the neighbouring 
White territory. : 
For many people who thave been too complacent to face 
the real facts of Soutbl African life, .Apartheid has been 
a convenient sedative. : Under Dr. Verioerd 1 s direction, 
however, this doctrine iis a sinister threat to South 
Africa 1 s security. Ad~ocacy of Bantustan should be reg-
arded as treachery!. for: that in plain language is what 
it undoubtedly is. :1. 5 ' 
I f Initially, it was no!t the Government s intention to 
convert the Reserves into ~olitically independent 'Bantustans'. 
•. j 
.Addressing a National Part~ rally in 1951, Dr. Verwoerd said 
that .Africans would not be ~llowed to establish a Western 
Governmental system, as had: been done in the then Gold Coast, 
in their ttown11 territories. 1:1.:1. 6 Two years later, he explained 
that even'if the Africans optained r~self-government" in their 
areas, this. did not mean H'spvereign • independence", as the 
domination of the \•Thite man~ WOUld be retained. :1.:1. 7 
Within the next four, years, an estimated 88 violent 
clashes occurred between Af~icans and the South African Police, 
with 220 Africans (one a po~ipeman) killed, and 1,100 persons 
·:~..:~..sNatal Mercury, 211November l958. 
:1.:1. 6 Die Transvaler, 2~ November 1951, in P.D. 48/1951/532. 
i 
:1.:1. 7D1e Burger, 31 January 1953, in p.~. 5/1953/43. 
i 
I 324 
injured, of whom 45 were ~ite and African policemen and 16 
I 
were White civilians; the !iate then seems to have increased~ 
33 clashes occurring in 19~8 and 1959 alone.~~a Meanwhile, 
. I 
between 1953 and the end 0~ 1958, five former colonial territ-
1 
cries became independent Af'Fican states--Sudan, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Ghana and Guinea.. \ In March 1959, a. 'Promotion of' 
Bantu Self-Government. Bill'[' was introduced into the South 
.African Parliament. It abo
1
lished African representation in 
the Central Parliament and ~rovided for the establis:h.inent of' 3 
I 
governmental institutions ir the Reserves with limited admin-
! 
istrative and taxing powersf• An explanatory White Paper 
accompanying the measpre st~ted that the eight 'Bantu nation-
al units' envisaged, one fof' each of the main tribal groups 
in the country, would ,.,evenft,ually form a South .African Oommon-
1 
wealth together with White ~outh Africa which will serve as 
its core and guardian ·of th[e emerging Bantu states.·:~~~ 
Fqr some time, interpretations given to this by Nat-
' ionalist leaders differed. I In an article published in a 
' mining corporation journal ~n the very month that the Bill 
was introduced, a.nd later endorsed in Parliament by the Dep-
uty Minister of BantuAdininf-stration and Development,~~o 
the Secretary for that department, w. M. M. Eiselen,. wro'te 
I . i I that whatever degree of autonomy the Bantustans might reach, I . . . 
the maintenance of whit;e political supremacy over the 
country as a whole. is a! sine gua non for racial peace and 
economic prosperity in South Africa •••• The utmost degree 
I 
of autonomy in administrative matters which the Union 
Parliament is likely tol be prepared to concede to these 
areas will still stop sP,ort of actual surrender of 
I 
i 
i I ·.· 
~~ 8See Sunday Times,! 3lc.Janua:ry 1960; Cape Times, 11 
November 1959; Cape .Argus, ll5 HDecember 1959. 
I 
' ~~ 9Memorandum Explaining the Background and Objects 
of' the Pfomotion of Bantu .S.E?:Lf-G:._o_yernment Bill, 1959, 
Tji.P. 3- 59), P• 6. i 
~ 20A Survey Qf Race 
1958-59, P• 50. 
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sovereignty by ~he Eurqpean trustee, and there is there-
fore no prospect·of a federal system with eventual 
equality among membe~s i takin§ the place of the (future] 
South African Commonwe~lth.~ ~ . 
At the Bi111 s Seconci Reading, Dr. Verwoerd said that 
t ' I the Native areas would ultimately form free independent 
. i' : . t ' 
states, comprising a Commonwealth with the rest of South 
- . · i I I 
Africa; he was fully aware,[ he added, that Commonwealth 
meant a number of autonomous states, one in no way subordin--
r 
ate to the other.~ 22 Howe~er, he conveyed a different im-
pression during the subseq~ent Provincial Election campaign. 
I Replying then to Opposition charges that the proposed 'Bantus-
tans' would imperil White ~ecurity, he stated that he did 
. I 
I 
not fear possible evils in !the sphere of economic power or 
! I l 
arms arising from the futune Bantu homelands • The Bantu 
. . I 
I . . 
would still be under white [guardianship and care would be 
. t l taken that the development iOf the Bantu homelands was not 
I 
contaminated by wrong infl~ences 9 For example, no foreign• I . 
money would be admitted, ndr the importation of arms.~ 23 An 
I r t indication of the length o~ time the Bantu homelands might 
I 
remain under white guardia~ship was given a few days later 
by the National Party chai~man in Natal. Africans were 
tt I 
ustill barbarians , he saiaj, and he doubted whether the 
tBantu Areas' would be rea~y for independence "even in 2,000 
years time. 11 ~24 ! 
i ~ 2~W. w. M. Eiselen,t 'tHarmonious Multi-Community 
Development, tl Optima, 9!8, fMarch 1959. 
~ 22A.frica Digest, 7:\22, September 1959. 
,. 
~ 23Die Volksblad, 26! September 1959, in P.D. 39/1959/385. 
. i . 
~ 24Quote~ in The Sta~, 2 October 1959. Oswald Pirow, 
General Hertzog s ~inister ff Juftice, states in his bio~raphy 
of Hertzog, that during the
1
• 1930 s, when he, Pirow, was pro- . 
pounding the doctrine that [the ultimate future of Africa· 
south of the Sahara was a f:ederation or confederation of 11 . black and white states; he! discussed the idea with the Prime 
Minister. Hertzog "was·in rull agreement with this theory 
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The march o:f events continued. On Armist·ice Day, 1959, 
Africans in Paarl, Cape Pro~ince, rioted against the banish-
, 
ment o:f a·local trade union.leader, Mrs. Elizabeth Mafeking, 
I 
and twelve people \vere injur,ed. On December 11th, Hereros 
in Windhoek, South West Afri;ca, demonstrated against being 
moved to a new housing location further out from their places 
of work. _The police opened fire, and twelve Africans were 
killed.~25 On January 24, 1~60, a police party which had 
taken prisoners while raidin$ for illicit liq_uor in the Cato 
¥.tanor slum of Durban was attacked by Africans, and nine 
policemen were killed.~26 On March 21, 1960, the police 
opened fire on Africans demonstrating against the pass laws 
at the Sl::ia::cyJe;riTle and Vanderbijl Park locations in the South-
ern Transvaal industrial reg~on,. killing at least 67 and 
I 
wounding at least 186; on the. same day and throughout the 
fol~O\'ling week, violent clashes occurred in Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, Durban and in other South African towns and 
cities.~ 2 ~ On March 30th, a State of Emergency was·proc-
laimed that iasted five montha. On that day, the aggregate 
value of shares on the Johann~sburg stock exchange fell by 
~70 million. A five day stri~e by workers from the Langa and 
Nyanga locations in Cape Town:cost two million manhours and 
a total loss of business esti~ated at ~10 m1llion.~28 A 
\ 
but insisted that no native state should come into being any-
where in Africa until its inhabitants were fully capable of 
self-government. In this contiection the determinative factor 
would not be the acq_uisition o:f the white man's booklearning 
but of his ethical conceptions:. Anyone who really knows the 
native realises that the attai\nment of this ideal 'dill be a 
lengthy process and one accomp~nied by many lapses from grace, 11 
James Barry Munnik Hertzog, p •. 193. 
~ 25 Cape Argus, 15 December 1959. 
126 Cane Times, 25 January 1960. 
~ 27See A Survey of Race:Relations in South .Africa 
1959-60, pp. 55-E>8. - --
~28Peter Calvocoressi, South Africa ~ World ppinion 
(London: -Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 26. · 
I 
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I flight of capital began, bring~ng South Africa 1 s foreign 
I 
exchange reserves down from ~156 million on the eve of 
Sr.$.rp.-e:vli."':Lle to ~71.5 million ini mid-June 1961, ~eSJ at which 
time prohibitions were imposed on the repatriation of 
capital.~ 80 Paralleling these developments, changes went on 
. ' 1 in the outs'ide world and reactions to South Africa s racial 
' 
policies became more concrete. 1 From the beginning of 1960 
to the end of April, 1961, 18 ~ore former colonial territ-
1 
ories in Africa became indepen~ent. Several countries in 
Africa, Asia~and the West Indira began boycotting South 
African exports. Ethiopia and:Liberia instituted proceedings 
with the International Court of Justice disputing South 
Africa 1 s administrative rights! over South West Africa, a 
former League of Nations manda~e which South Africa had ref-
used to place under United Nations trusteeship, and which it 
had unilaterally annexed. In March 1961, Afro-Asian pressure 
in the British Commonwealth compelled South Africa's with-
1 
drawaJ.. from that body. In November, a motion by the Special 
l Political Committee of the United Nations to the General 
I . 
Assembly requesting the world body to institute economic and 
diplomatic sanctions against Squth Africa narrowly missed 
obtaining the two-thirds majority vote necessary for its 
' . 
adoptiori.~ 8 ~ 
In the meantime, Africans in the Rese~es had indic-
ated that they would hold the QoverP..ment to its promises or 
. I 
implications. In April 1961, l:j.eadmen of the Transkei, the:. 
I largest of the Reserves, put forward a demand for independence 
at a meeting of the Transkeian:Territorial Council--establish-
! 
ed under the 1959 Promotion of !Bantu Self-Government Act. 
I 
I ~ 29.Africa Digest, 9:57, 'October 1961. 
~ 80Dagbreek, 18 June 1961, in P.D. 23/1961/233. 
i ~ 3~Rand Dail~ Mail, 14 N,ovember 1961, in P.D. 
44/1961/40~ ' 
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Jt I tl This reportedly caused consternation among the Government 
. I •. 
officials present and resulted in the immediate postponement 
! 
of debate. 132 Within a we~k however, the Minister of Bantu 
l 
Administration and Development, who two years previously had 
I 
stated that full independence for the ReserVes was not con-
templated,133 told newspap~r correspondents in Cape Town that 
I 
the Transkei was well on t~e way to self-government and might I . 
get it in a few years. 134 :rn .January 1962, shortly after 
i 
the U.N. sanctions vote, Dr:. Verwoerd announced that the 
Transkei would receive inte\rnal self-government in the follow-
! 
ing year. The Reserve woul'd have an elected representative 
I 
assembly and a ministerial ::t'orm o:f administration, with juris-
' diction over agriculture, e;ducation, welfare sertices, lands, 
roads and local affairs. Efdernal affairs, defence and 11 cer-
tain aspects of the adminis~ration of justice~ would remain 
i . . for the time being under whfte control. All direct taxation 
obtained from Africans considered to be inhabitants of the 
Transkei, whether living inl the Reserve or not, would be 
transferred to the Transkei.Government for its use. The 
I 
latter would also receive a~ annual grant from the Central 
i 
Government equivalent to thf latter's expenditure in the dep-
artments to be placed underiAfrican control. Private white 
i 
capital would continue to bf barred from the territory, but 
a five-year program of indu~trialization in the 'Border Areas' 
I 
would be initiated. This w9uld serve as the :forerunner of 
; 
I 132The Guardian (Man9hester), 24 .April 1961. It would 
appear that the rising agai~st Government-supporting chiefs 
in Pondoland and elsewhere have had an impact throughout the 
Reserves, and that the numb~r of chiefs lining up with those 
who, like Luthuli, have long opposed the Government is in-
creasing. 
133The Star, 6. Octob~r 1959. 
18~News of the Day :rtom South Africa £y Radio Beam 
(Bulletin issued 26 April 1961, in London, by the Director 
of Information, South A:fric~ House). 
. . I . 
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similar developments in ot~er Reserves.~ 36 
Clearly the pressur~ of events has moved the Govern-
ment into a position that ~t was formerly unwilling to adopt·. 
I . . 
It may hope that the growi~ black majority in 'White South 
Africa' will accept 1 total
1
political apartheidr and be cont-. 
ent with a unilateral partition of the country which affords I . 
unlimited de jure rights tq advancement in barren regions 
where most Africans neithe~ work or live.~ 36 But its reluc-
tance to test this concept lhi therto ·would seem to imply that 
such hope can only be slim.[ Be that as it may, incompatible 
! 
objectives have now been s4t up or admitted that cannot all 
be secured. If the Reserv1s obtain full self-government, 
the policy ·of limiting funds for their development mainly 
I 
to be meagre resources that;, Africans themselves possess can-
t . . 
not be enforced; and these !areas may fall open to external 
I 
assistance of all kinds--t~ough it must be noted that most 
of the Reserves are landlodked and those that are not lack 
ports. .Again, it is diffi~ult to foresee how the low wage 
I 
structure necessary to bring industrialists to the borders 
I 
of the Reserves could be m9intained, (assuming the problems 
i 
thereby created for metropollitan \'TOrkers and businessmen were I . 
I . 
:L. 35New York. Times, 2\4 January 1962. 
I 
~ 36The official lin~, usually, is to consider all 
Africans as permanent inhab:itants of the Reserves, whether 
they have ever set foot in ~hese territories or not. Thus, 
although the Tomlinson Rer.o~t listed two million Africans 
as "permanent inhabitants 1 ;or the .urban areas (U .G. 61-' 55, 
~· 27), the Secretary for·BFntu Administration and Development 
(who, incidentally, had wri~ten the Foreword to that Report) 
later maintained: "It woulfi appear that many people have the 
wrong impression that there\ are two kinds of Bantu in the 
Union of South Africa: thos~ that live in the Bantu reserves 
and those who have made the~r homes with the White people in 
the rest of the country. That is not so. All the Bantu have 
their permanent homes in. th~ reserves and their entry into 
other areas and into the urpan centres is merelv of a temper-
. tl i 'i ary nature and for economic! teasons, E selen, Harmonious 
Multi-Community Development~ Optima; 9:3, March 1959. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I. 330 
overcome,) once freedom frqm white restra+nt enabled 
I 
inhabitants of the Reserves to organize trade unions. 
the 
Even 
I 
if a broad footing could b~ established for border industri"es, 
a real devolution of power· :in the Reserves would transform 
. i . . 
labor disputes into international issues.. 
In any event,- the m~in. problems accompanying South 
. ! 
Africa's continuing indust~ial revolution r.emain unsettled. 
'Total political apartheid'\ is not designed to halt the 
ongoing economic integratio!n of White and Non-White. It 
I . 
cannot eliminate conflicts ,of interest arising out of de 
facto situations, and so i~ can hardly prevent further con-
tacts: of a political natu~e. It cannot eliminate fear, so 
it cannot eliminate repress:ion. 
I 
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ABSTRA0:T 
I 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SOUT~ .AFRICAN HISTORY 1870-1962 
I 
I 
I 
i 
South African history is dominated by the encounters 
i . 
and relationships between English- and Afrikaans-speaking 
I ~ , . 
white people, and between white people and black people. 
I This study describes and analyse~ some aspects of the 
history and structure of these two relationships as they 
: f developed in the wake of the co~try s industrial revolution. 
. I 
There are six chapters, the firs1 four dealing primarily 
with the socio-economic basis of lthe White-White relationship, 
and the last two with the White-~lack relationship and the 
• I problem of achieving compatibilltJy between White security and 
i African advancement. 1 
i 
Before the discovery of di~amonds and gold ( l870~=and 
1886), South .Africa was a poor agricultural country. Though. 
I 
• . i Dutch colonization had begun only: 37 years after the first 
European settlement in ~ssachuse~ts, and British colonization 
in 1820 (following Britain's acquisition of the Cape during 
the Napoleonic Wars), the total w~ite population on the eve 
of the discoveries was ca. 350,000 - 1 per cent that of the I . 
contemporary United States. 
i 
The use of imported slaves:and later of subject non-
, 
white people for all manual labor.was largely responsible for 
I 
limiting white immigration and reyarding economic development. 
. I 
No white laboring class and few nqn-\·lhi te craftsmen existed 
in the country at the time of the :discoveries. This gave the 
country's industrial revolution a~ unusual character. Not 
only did the money, equipment and :managers for the mines and 
I 
allied secondary industries come ~ from the outside, but an1 
entire class of skilled workers h~d to be brought in; these 
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came chiefly from Britain. Even most of the unskilled 
.I 
African miners came from territories outside South Africa. 
' . ). 
As a result, the new industrial economy was organized in 
relative isolation from the older\Dutch-Afrikaner and African 
population. The former remained the dominant group over the 
countryside, while the towns were:mainly British in population, 
I 
English in language. Conflicts d~veloped between the two 
. I 
groups that culminated in the Ang:to-Boer War (1899-1902), 
' during which the British, in the ~ourse of winning, devas-
tated .Afrikaner farming areas. 
I 
The devastation of war, a ~eries of natural disasters 
·i 
and economic depressions, the natural increase of the Afrikan-
er rural population and the fac~ ~hat the latter had excluded 
itself from agricultural labor, which had become the province 
of the Non-White, precipitated a townward migration of 
Afrikaners in the present century.i Relatively uneducated and 
I 
unskilled; the formerly independerit farmers were long unable 
i 
to compete successfully for skilled jobs with the English-
! 
speaking artisans, who, moreover, \attempted to exclude them 
from craft occupations; and they ~,ould not accept lo1-v-paid 
' laboring work alongside Non-Whites,, who had also been enter-
1 
ing the towns and had monopolized ~his field. A considerable 
.t.:Poor Wb.i te • problem developed. ~ore than 48 per cent of the 
I 
countryfs white population was co~sidered to be 'Poor White' 
in 1932; at least 90 per cent of tbese people were believed 
' 
to be Afrikaners. I i 
The Poor Whites' search for\ jobs and the skilled 
I 1 
artisans demands for protection f;rom non-white competition. 
I t gave rise to the Industrial Color Bar. A civilised labour 
policy', instituted after the aa:ve:p.t to power in 1924 of an 
Afrikaner Nationalist - 'British' Laborite Coalition 
government, demarcated fields of ~skilled "Viork for Poor 
I Whites where the latter were free from the 
i 
pressure of non~ 
I white competition. I 
l 
! 
., 
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Although the problem of Afrikaner unemployment and 
I 
unemployability began to be solved after 1924, a wide gulf 
continued to separate the two/sections of the white popul-
i 
ation economically and social~y. In 1939, an Economic Move-
. I . 
ment was launched to,gain ecop.omic predominance for .Afrikan-
. I 
.ers vis.-a-vis the English-speaking Whites. This Movement, 
accompanied by a revival of ~litant Afrikaner nationalism, 
I 
"Was organized by the older m~mbers of the present South 
African Cabinet. Its· comba~iveness, expressed during the 
1940's in boycotts and rBuy Afrikaans' campaigns, began 
declining in the next decade!as Afrikaner businessmen 
became established, and as the need became felt for greater 
white unity in the face of newly-militant post-war African 
! 
' 
nationalism. 
i 
Turning to the White~$lack relationship, many Whites 
I . 
I believe that Blac~have bee~ and are a financial burden to 
' 
them. An historical examina:tion of fiscal policy shows :: 
this not to be the case. On the contrary, the political 
order maintained by the Whities seems to contribute to the 
persistance of African pove~ty. Proposals for African 
I 
economic advancement and he~lthier social conditions have 
I 
foundered because no way ha~ been discovered to accommodate 
the effects of implementing/them with the conditions Whites 
believe necessary for theiriindividual and group security. 
Some Whites have vier' ed territorial ('vertical') 
segregation of white and bl. ck - apartheid - as the only 
I 
means of both assuring thei~ security and removing the 
obstacles to African advanc.ement. This idea has a long 
• I 
I history of not being implentented. The reason for this is 
not only, as is commonly m~intained, the unwillingness of 
Whites to dispense with Af~ican labor and undergo the expense 
' 
of developing areas capabl~ of absorbing the black population, 
but that a policy towards /apartheid would lessen, rather than 
353 
strengthen, white security. iA peaceful resolution of the 
developing'White-Black confl-?.-ct cannot be foreseen. 
The sources employed for this study include official 
I . 
I . 
and unofficial commission reports, unpublished theses, pub-
lished and unpuplished speec~es, conference proceedings, 
I pamphlets, journal articles,!newspaper reports, poetry and 
fiction. Much of the inform~tion is derived from Afrikaans 
' . 
works on South African histo±>y, sociology and economics. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
' 
. I 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ~KETCH 
. r 
I was born 15 November 1933 fn Herborn, Germany. 
I 
MY father, Julius Salomon, was a ca~tle dealer, and my 
i 
mother, Meta Salomon, was a housewife. In July 1939, I 
was sent to England as a refugee, a~d lived until 1946 with 
I 
a family in South Wales. My parents died in a concentration 
. I 
camp. 1 
I ~ttended elementary and sebondary schools in South 
Wales until 1946, when I emigrated to live with my aunt Rose, 
I 
a nurse, and her family in the UnitFd States. I graduated 
from James Monroe High School, the J3ronx, New YGrk, in 1951, 
i . 
and subsequently attended the Oity College of New York, where 
I 
I rec-eived a B.A. in 1955. Interest in African history led 
I 
me to study in Boston University, w~ere I received an M.A. 
I 
degree in 1956. Hetween Februa;ry 1958 and July 1960, I l'ras 
I 
engaged in research in South Africa! under a fellowship 
granted by the Ford Founda.tion. 
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